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CHRISTIANITY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

A LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

DEAR SIR,—

You have asked my opinion about the relation between the Christian Church and the Roman government of the pagan epoch, and especially about the development of the hostility between the two powers—questions never out of debate, and recently treated carefully and skilfully by my friend Professor Ramsay in his interesting lectures on “the Church and Roman Empire before A.D. 170.” I am well aware that neither in theory nor in arguments there is much to add by me to what I set forth in my paper “Religions-frevel nach roemischem Recht,” published two years ago, and agreeing in the main with Ramsay’s views. Nevertheless it may not be amiss to sum up the case in the sense required by you, and to state some points where I am obliged to differ from him.

The intense hatred in which the Christians were held in the Roman empire is a fact so well established and so well known that it is not necessary to dwell upon it. Tacitus and Suetonius, Lucian and Aristides, are there to attest it, and still more fully the shout into which the mob translated their invectives: *Christianos ad leones*. It is a general feeling pervading the whole empire, the aristocracy and the populace, Italy alike and the Greek provinces of higher civilization. How early it developed itself is evident from the policy of Nero, who sought to avert from himself the fury of the rabble for a great disaster by offering up to it these unhappy sectaries. This popular hatred, bitter, universal, lasting—whence did it spring?

Certainly the Christians, as offspring of the Jews, came in for the same aversion which this race has always met with in the whole Occident—an aversion which, though restrained by a higher standard of humanity, still to the present day dominates the *canaille*, titled or not titled. They came in for the ancient hatred, but not for the time-honoured position and secular privileges of the followers of Moses. The conviction that the Christian conventicles were orgies of lewdness and receptacles of every crime got hold on the popular mind with all the terrible vehemence of aversion that resists all argument and heeds not refutation. Two of the best Romans, Tacitus excusing the emperor, who condemned the Christians of the capital for false crimes by admitting their turpitudes not requiring to be proved, Pliny wondering at finding the Christian congregations innocent and moral, give us an idea what their contemporaries of inferior order thought of these sectaries.

But these are only the outworks. It must be acknowledged that the hatred against the Christian was better founded and better deserved than the repulsive feeling against the Jew. What I am about to say may be commonplace, but it cannot be omitted.

The political order of the ancient world, and especially of the Roman state, rested on the nationality of the religion. He who imagines that the gods of Rome did not survive to the imperial epoch, may as well say that the Roman *res publica* was not restored by Augustus. The spread of doubt and disbelief is, especially in a political view, not sufficient to abolish an established religion; the Roman paganism remained, to use Ramsay's (p. 324) words, the keystone of the imperial policy. As the *cives Romani* of the imperial epoch were a different institution from those who conquered Italy, so the Capitoline Jupiter was adored in a different way by those who carried the blocks for his temple up the Tarpeian mound, and by those who founded imitation capi-

tols throughout the *orbis Romanus*; but the national religion was the foundation as well of Latin Rome as of the *Roma communis omnium patria*, the spiritual symbol of the political union.

Now this foundation was sapped, this symbol rejected by the Christians, and by the Christians first and alone. The severing of the nationality from the creed, the basing the religion on humanity is the very essence of the Christian revolution. The mighty words, "there is no difference between Jew and Greek, between slave and freeman," are the political and the social negation of the established order; the Christian proselytism, extinct long ago in the Jews, a systematic warfare against it. War too has its laws and its outlaws. The Christian "atheism," the negation of the national gods, was, as I have shown elsewhere, the contempt of the *dii publici populi Romani*, in itself high treason, or as the Christians express it (thoughts being free, but words not), the mere Christian Name, the "testimony" of such atheism, constitutes a crime in the eye of the law. It is practically unwise to carry out this principle to its full consequences; good politics must not be too logical. But it has always to be borne in mind that every follower of Scaevola and Labeo must have ranged contempt of the public gods among the crimes deserving death, and that it was a sheer impossibility in principle for any Roman statesman to accord to those guilty of it even toleration. Christianity at this stage may well be compared with republican opinion in a monarchical country. There is nothing morally to blame in it; nothing inconsistent with the highest views of patriotism and public duty; nevertheless even the most liberal monarchy cannot acknowledge a republican party. Self-defence rules the world. As long as imperial Rome continued its stay in the eternal city and maintained the tradition of national government, it regarded the Christian creed rightly as its slayer.

This general, and in a certain sense lawful, base of the Christian persecutions by the Roman empire will, I should think, be admitted generally; certainly my friend Ramsay enters fully in these views. But the question at issue lies less in the principle than in the execution. The wishes of the great majority of the Roman public, to see worked out that persecution in full force, we have glanced at; how far the Roman government did or did not give way to them? I have stated in my paper that, admitting of course many deviations from the rule occasioned by local and individual influences, generally a system of toleration prevailed, the government neither risking direct opposition to the popular feeling, nor giving way fully and completely to the logical hate or the unruly rage of the opposition party. Ramsay (p. 143) differs from this view. "When Mommsen implies that the emperors would gladly have tolerated Christianity, but were occasionally forced by popular feeling and popular clamour to depart from their proper policy and persecute Christianity, I cannot follow him." In the explanation that follows the author is not so much in variance with my statement as it seems here; still, I shall have to defend it.

In the first place what I have averred is, I should think, so necessary in itself that special pleading is almost superfluous. Warfare against religious or political ideas, however implacable in theory, is not easily put in practice. A thoroughbred monarchist, though desirous to hang every republican, if he has the power of the gallows, will find some difficulty in using his power. The most certain cure for antisemitism, though unhappily not of general application, is to name the "Jew-eater" minister; his humanity will not be the better for it, but he cannot but understand the dangers of carrying his ill-will into execution. The same fact must have manifested itself in the government of the Roman empire; good rule and policy prevented even those magistrates, who shared the feeling of aversion

against the Christians, from giving way to the passion of the mob. This must have been the case especially in the government of the epoch treated by Ramsay. There never has been a fanatic at the head of the Roman empire. The rulers were not far-sighted nor did they aim at reforming their world; they were quite satisfied to let things go on as they had gone before, and to defend the actual state of society, ignoring its dangerous under-currents. It is true that Christianity ruined the base of the existing society; but thence it does not follow that the statesmen of the epoch made war on it *à la russe*. Enough of cruelty was enacted to justify the complaints uttered in the Apocalypse; but still the strong wishes of the enemies of Christianity were not appeased, and on the whole the system of ignoring and of leniency dominated.

Full details alone could enlighten us about the balance held between the two scales, and reliable facts are scarce in the rubbish which has been handed down to us under the heading of history of imperial Rome. Augustus and Tiberius being out of the question, it is probable that the separation of Jews and Christians by the general public, and the rise of animosity against the latter took place under the second dynasty, as Nero's measures show it fully developed. The double foundation on which the persecution rested, the general contempt of the Roman gods and the belief in special crimes of lewdness and other misdemeanours attributed to their conventicles, the *nomen Christiani* and the *flagitia Christianorum*, without doubt sprang up together. I have already shown, that the first, innate and undeniable, was the necessary consequence of the juxtaposition of Christian Church and Roman State; I cannot understand how Ramsay (p. 243 n.), on arguments evidently unsolid, attributes this discovery to Vespasian. That practically in the administrative treatment of the new sectaries, the special crimes attributed to them were

much more urged than their ideal disrespect to the Roman divinities, is applicable to every stage of the persecution; and it is not to be wondered at, that in the history of Nero's reign these crimes are dwelt upon, though Suetonius' sober statement shows that Nero's government did not confine itself in its measures of repression against the Christians to those accused of arson. We may safely assume that they began under Nero partly in defence of the public gods, partly against the excesses said (and probably not in all cases unjustly) to reign among them.

The huge proportions and the cruel features, which this repression assumed in the worst years of this reign, form an exception to the general preponderance of toleration or, what comes to the same, of moderate persecution, which confirms the rule. This in my opinion continued under the Flavian dynasty. There is, as Ramsay himself admits (p. 256), no trace of recrudescence under its first two emperors. If the political dissolution of the Jewish nation and the laying waste of its centre were aimed at the Christians too, as Ramsay is inclined to admit, following Bernays, the imperial government must have been extremely ill-informed on the real state of things; though the Jews thus lost the base of their social position, the Christians were the gainers by it, being freed finally from the national trammels of their origin. Be that as it may, Ramsay is wrong in regarding Vespasian as the true originator of the warfare against the Christian creed in itself; he was far too practical for such a crusade. Much better does it agree with the sombre but intelligent despotism of Domitianus; and the persecution attributed to him I think with Ramsay (p. 259) founded in fact, though the few details handed down to us point not so much to the abstract defence of the religion of the state as to the repression of Christian proselytism arriving at the ladies in court and the imperial family itself.

I have nothing more to add. For the reign of Trajan, Hadrian and Pius, Ramsay admits freely, that the system of toleration, in the sense determined above, prevailed; the evidence of their letters preserved to us is there to attest it. Marcus may have introduced harsher measures, especially the searching for believers in the Christian creed, though the tone in which his younger contemporary Tertullian speaks of him prevents us from stretching this repression too far. The scanty details known to us may be regarded in either sense, as rule or as exception; I pass over them the more readily as here I am happy not to be at variance with my friend and epigraphical collaborator.

Less still I dwell upon the later epoch, to which Ramsay's book does not extend. It shows us the Christians increasing in number and influence, combated in literary discussion by pagan writers of high standing, and victorious in the end. The great final result of the Roman government, the union of all the widely different nations under it in a uniform body of *cives Romani*, required, in replacement of their different creeds, a religion adapted to the new order of things, to the united empire; and thus the Christian religion became the religion of civilized humanity, the slayer of the Roman religion its substitute and heir. But this great event does not enter into the present discussion, nor form a proper part of my already too lengthy answer on the question you proposed to me. The details will always remain disputable and disputed; but, on the main points, with a little common sense and a little good will, we need not despair of arriving at a general understanding.

TH. MOMMSEN.

*THE CHURCH AND THE EMPIRE IN THE FIRST
CENTURY.*

IF I venture to add some remarks on Prof. Mommsen's paper, it is purely from the desire to arrive at that general understanding, which he is hopeful of attaining. As is mentioned in the preface, my book is an attempt to apply historical principles that I have learned chiefly from his writings to a subject which he has not yet treated systematically or completely. His paper, which is now printed in *THE EXPOSITOR*, is, in some respects his most important utterance on the subject. Although in width of scope and minuteness of treatment it does not rank with the masterly paper on *Religionsfrevet nach römischem Recht*, to which I am glad once more to profess my great debt; yet it states in brief, clear, unmistakable terms his views on several critical points on which, so far as I know, he had not previously expressed himself. I do not wish to give to my remarks the appearance of a reply to him, for their chief aim is to bring out the amount of agreement that is implied in his words. His paper will, I believe, put an end for ever to several of the fallacies against which, widespread and popular as they were, I was obliged to argue in detail. Now that Prof. Mommsen has intervened, and brushed them aside into the dustbin of history without wasting a word upon them, who will be bold enough to rake them out again?

I know scarcely anything in historical literature so blind and perverse as several of the popular fallacies on this subject, which now, we may hope, have disappeared from our minds, and will gradually disappear from our books. In defiance of the clear evidence of both Pagan and Christian authorities, it has been maintained in voluminous works by many great scholars that Christians and

Jews were confused and classed together by the Roman government until the second century. Even Neumann, who in most respects stands on a higher platform, declares that it was the investigations of Domitian's officials while collecting the Jewish poll-tax that opened the eyes of the government to the distinction between Jews and Christians. Tacitus and Suetonius indeed declare that proceedings against Christians as Christians, not as Jews, were taken by Nero, who from certain reasons showed considerable favour to the Jews in Rome; but the fixed idea that the Christians were too humble and insignificant a lot to have attracted the attention of government as a peculiar and separate sect, was so strong that the evidence of these two irreproachable authorities was discounted and disregarded on the arbitrary assumption that they were thrusting into the past the ideas of their own time. It is against this habit of judging in accordance with certain views and theories instead of following where the evidence leads that I have throughout my book directed my argument. The credibility of positive statements, the authenticity of documents which are otherwise indisputable, have been denied simply and solely because they were fatal to prejudices and hastily formed theories.

But, if the Christians were clearly distinguished from the Jews by the Roman imperial administration as early as A.D. 64, we must infer from this that the Christians were already a body of a certain consequence and size, and of determinate, individualized character. Either it was the Christians of Rome who attracted notice as being a body of this character—in which case we must infer that the Church in Rome was considerable in point of numbers and organization—or it was the existence in various parts of the empire of Christian communities, similar to each other in character that impressed the central government—which also would be an important fact, as implying a certain bulk

and consistence in each of these scattered communities—or (as I believe) both facts must have come under the knowledge of the imperial administration. It was to avoid these inferences that so many scholars denied the imperial cognizance of the Christians. Now that the cognizance is admitted, we must draw the inferences, and note their immense significance.

Prof. Mommsen fixes no exact date when the Roman government and populace began to distinguish clearly between Jews and Christians; it was “probably . . . under the second dynasty, as Nero’s measures show it fully developed.” From non-Christian authorities alone no more than this can be inferred; and it is specially important that Prof. Mommsen has based his opinion solely on that evidence. But when we take into account Acts xviii. 15 as a trustworthy contemporary authority (as I have tried from archæological facts, and Spitta from critical theory, to prove that it is), we can reach a more precise conclusion. As late as A.D. 53–4, the imperial officials regarded questions affecting Christians as a mere matter of Jewish law, and not coming under the imperial cognizance. In the decade that followed, the imperial view had grown clearer. May we not infer, as in the highest degree probable, that it was the trial of the Roman citizen, Paul, that led to more thorough investigation into the whole subject? He was the first Roman sent for trial on this charge before the central authority. As a Roman citizen he had a claim to a full investigation, such as would not in any circumstances have been granted to a mere provincial. He was treated with distinction, kept not under constraint but in *custodia libera*,¹ and two years elapsed before his trial was completed.

It is both justifiable and necessary to lay great stress on the trial of Paul. With the legal constructiveness and

¹ See p. 399 of my book.

obedience to precedent that characterised the Romans, this case, tried before the supreme court, must have been regarded as a test case and a binding precedent, until some act of the supreme imperial authority occurred to override it. If such a case came for trial before the highest tribunal in Rome (and so much I suppose is universally admitted), there must have been given an authoritative and, for the time, final judgment on the issues involved.

Those who accept the authenticity of the Pastoral Epistles must go further. They must hold that the result of the enquiry was that Paul was liberated; in short, that the preaching of the new religion was permitted after a careful trial before the supreme authority. They are not likely to be wrong if they attribute this to the influence of the Spaniard Seneca, who, though about the end of 62 he fell from favour and from the supreme influence that he had previously enjoyed, had probably not wholly ceased to have some share in the guidance of government in such matters in 63,¹ when Paul's trial must have taken place. The wider and more generous policy of Seneca, like that of the Spaniards Trajan and Hadrian after him, was truer to the imperial destinies and more favourable to free development of thought.

Now Tacitus is in perfect agreement with this view. He distinctly attributes the beginning of imperial action against the Christians in A.D. 64 to accident, viz. the desire of Nero to divert public attention from himself. But, if the result of a full and formal trial of a Roman for teaching this new philosophy had been to declare his action illegal and the philosophy treasonable, we should have to treat Tacitus's account of Nero's action in 64 as essentially untrue and

¹ Nero, though he disliked Seneca, was not quite ready to dispense with his great experience and skill in the management of government business, which had been carried on with extraordinary activity and success while Seneca was at the head of affairs.

mere picturesque word-painting. We come to the conclusion that, if Tacitus is trustworthy, Paul was acquitted in 63, and allowed to continue his former course of life. It is needless to point out what an important bearing this has on the authenticity of the Pastoral Epistles.

We come now to another important point. A few years ago opinion was almost unanimous that punishment of Christians for the Name was a fact of the second century, and that consequently any document which referred to the persecution for the Name must be a composition of the second century. So late as in 1883, M. Doucet could declare that Wieseler was the only scholar who did not accept the view that this developed type of persecution was inaugurated by Trajan (see my note on p. 213). But when in my book a date thirty-five years earlier is assigned to the inauguration of such persecution, the only criticism that Prof. Mommsen makes is that I fix the date ten years too late.

Consider what judgment this implies in regard to all that class of arguments which inferred a date later than Trajan for documents mentioning persecution! But, far beyond that, consider what a total change of attitude this implies in regard to the whole position of the new religion in the state and the world! How false must have been the view on this subject entertained by those who fancied that Christians were not distinguished from Jews till about the beginning of the second century, and that Christianity had not been prominent enough to attract the attention of the government until A.D. 112.

Now the fundamental principle of historical criticism as applied to the facts of Christianity—a principle that I fully accept—is that the Christian writings must stand in close relation with the historical facts of the time. But when such a fundamental error is made about the position of the new religion in the Empire during the first century,

the necessary consequence is that the relation of every first-century Christian document to its historical surroundings is distorted and confused. Then, if he is logical in carrying out his principles, the critic who makes that fundamental error is bound to infer that these documents do not stand in the close, vital relation of genuine works to their period, and that therefore they are not genuine. True, the critic did not carry out his principle to its extremest consequences; he spared some, or many, or all of the first-century documents, sometimes from his catching, in spite of preoccupation by a false historical view, the ring of genuineness in them, sometimes from acceptance of tradition and external authority in their favour. But even if he left some documents in the first century, their historical relations were distorted, and the critic's view was necessarily confused. Nothing was visible to him in its true historical proportions; and every theory which he framed was bound to show traces of the distortion. So true is it that a serious error in respect to a fundamental point must vitiate the whole view of the historical critic about the period in question.

Again, if a considerable number of the first-century documents are brought down into the second century, what must be the inference about the second-century documents? If the critic is consistent and logical, he must argue from the obvious differences in style that the latter also are forgeries. Here, again, no critic has been thoroughly consistent. Some have come nearer "that bad eminence" than others, but none have shown complete disregard for the distinction between the genuine and the spurious in historical literature.

This distinction must be the foundation of all study of ancient history; and ability to distinguish—an ability which results from critical familiarity with the style and facts of the period—is one of the first qualities of the critic. The cases

vary in difficulty. In some the spuriousness can be recognised by the beginner; in some it is a very delicate and difficult matter to judge; and in some the genuineness is so clear and marked, that the person who disputes it merely attests his own inability to recognise style and quality. We find a case in point in Keim's arguments about the Letter of the Church in Smyrna to the Church in Philomelion. Here we have a test example. The man who cannot here discern the second-century character, and who makes it a later forgery, is lost; nothing can save him as a historical critic; his judgment is hopelessly warped and untrustworthy. This final step Keim has taken. In reading his arguments I found it difficult to believe that he was serious. I could hardly shake off the impression that he was writing an elaborate *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole theory which I am now criticising. He has reduced the theory to the absurd; but he has, I fear, done so unconsciously.

Prof. Mommsen mentions two points in my book, from which he dissents. The first is a sentence criticising part of a paragraph in his article on *Religionsfrevel*. I must now apologize for the sentence which he has quoted: it is badly expressed, and does not state correctly either his position or mine. As he remarks, my book is not so much at variance with his view as the sentence which he quotes would indicate. There remains a certain difference between our points of view; but, as he evidently considers the difference as a matter of detail rather than of principle, I shall gladly pass over it.

The second point of difference between Prof. Mommsen and myself—as it would appear the only difference of a serious character—is nominally about the date when the State consciously and deliberately resolved that Christians should be treated as outlaws; but really it is not a mere question of ten years that divides us. We differ as to the

attitude of the State towards the Christians during the first century. The view which I have taken, and which I feel driven by the evidence still to maintain, is that there was a marked difference between the action of the Flavian emperors and the wider and more generous policy adopted—though in a very hesitating and tentative way—by the second-century emperors. So far as my judgment reaches, I think that this difference is merely one point in the general contrast between the Flavian policy and that of the New Empire of the second century. This is too wide a subject to enter on; but every one must be struck with the superior strength and security of the New Empire. This was not due simply to superiority in the men, but to a radical change in the spirit of their policy. The New Empire carried out far more truly the natural tendencies of the Roman destiny. It was wider and freer in its conception of the task before it. It did not fear the current of the times, as the older Empire had done; it went with it, whether with full consciousness or not we need not ask. The education and the thought of the period were with it, whereas they had been against the first-century Empire (at least since Augustus); and the first-century emperors (especially the Flavian emperors) had feared them, and sought to coerce them (p. 272). It was part of the policy of the New Empire to give scope, so far as could safely be done, to all movements in the popular thought; it was part of the policy of the old Empire to distrust and impede such movements. This change in the Imperial policy strongly affected its attitude towards Christianity.

But other reasons—not merely general considerations, but positive evidence—attest the change of attitude and policy on the part of the State. The change of attitude and spirit on the part of the Christians cannot, I think, be explained in any other way. Prof. Mommsen, on this point, appears to me, if I may venture to express myself so

in presence of such a master, not to have weighed with due care the evidence of the first-century Christian documents. I shall confine myself to the Apocalypse, about whose first-century origin he has no doubt,¹ but it is far from the only witness (see my Chap. XIII.). He speaks of "the complaints uttered in the Apocalypse." In that phrase is summed up the whole difference between us. I find complaints uttered in the Apologists of the second century ; I find no complaints in the Apocalypse. Complaint is the language of the man who is dissatisfied with the existing conditions, and who desires to reform and to improve them. In the Apocalypse there is no wish or thought of reforming or improving the Empire ; in the Apologists that desire is the dominant note. The Apocalypse rules out the Empire as absolutely bad, absolutely unimprovable, as on the eve of inevitable destruction. The Apocalypse is not a complaint, but a vision of triumph over a cruel and bitter but impotent adversary. The spirit of such a work is, in my estimation, utterly inconsistent with its having been produced under emperors whose action was similar in character to the procedure of the second century, or at a time when the policy of the State was such that, in Prof. Mommsen's words, "the system of ignoring and of leniency prevailed." It is the spirit of the Scottish Cameronians towards the Government about 1680-88 ; and such a deep, intense, all-powerful emotion could arise only in a similar situation.

Moreover, the Apologists in the following century lay stress on the contrast between the policy of the second-century emperors and those of the first. How could they do so, if the policy was precisely the same ? It is quite true that, as they are advocates pleading a cause, their testimony must be discounted. But they were advocates of ability, some of very high ability ; and they must surely have recog-

¹ He assigns its composition to about A.D. 70. See his *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, ii. p. 199.

nised that their cause would not be advanced by misstating the whole current of imperial action when they were addressing the emperors. They appeal so pointedly to the change in policy effected by Trajan, that it is for me impossible to believe that they were appealing to a groundless fiction (see p. 341 f.).

About 112-120 the whole tone of the Church and of its writers towards the State altered, Ignatius being the last example of the old spirit. The change is comprehensible only as the result of a change in the actual situation. Such, briefly put, is the view which I hold and have tried to state, and herein lies the essential difference in which I find myself placed with respect to Prof. Mommsen.

I come now to the question—at what time did the imperial government come to the conclusion that the profession of Christianity was dangerous and treasonable—*i.e.*, when did it accept the principle that the Name must be proscribed and the Christians treated as outlaws? Prof. Mommsen unreservedly holds the view that this was the accepted principle in 111, when Pliny entered his province: “The persecution of the Christians was a standing matter, as was that of robbers”: such are his words (quoted on my p. 269). Further, he has expressly accepted the general fact of a distinct persecution by Domitian, reserving opinion on details. Now we have seen that the State began during the reign of Nero to recognise that there existed a distinct and separate body of persons, bearing the name of Christians. There is therefore no doubt that the “Name” must have been proscribed at some period between this recognition of the existence of the Christian sect and the persecution of Domitian.

Again, as has just been said, the State did not forthwith come to the conclusion that the principles professed by this body were dangerous and treasonable; but, on the contrary, the first great case where the question was tried

before the supreme state tribunal ended in the acquittal of the accused person, Paul. This brings us down to A.D. 63; and the evidence is otherwise clear, and the opinion universally accepted, that until A.D. 64 no state persecution took place.¹ It is established by the full narrative of Tacitus, confirmed by the brief and undated, but very precise, words of Suetonius, that in A.D. 64 the state began to punish the Christians. This fact has been, indeed, keenly controverted, and an extraordinary amount of ingenious and learned special-pleading has been used to throw doubt on it; but there is nothing in ancient history that is better attested, and probably, after Prof. Mommsen's emphatic statement in *THE EXPOSITOR*, this subtle and elaborate argumentation will be discarded, and historical reasoning will be substituted for it.

There remains a question—which has been put as clearly as I can put it in my p. 242—whether the action taken in A.D. 64 was the same in character as that which Pliny accepted as the established procedure when he entered his province. Prof. Mommsen is not quite so explicit on this point as he is in all the other matters that he touches on; but he apparently holds that it was the same. I have argued that it was not, and have pointed out the essential difference. Pliny punished the Christians for the Name, without asking any question about actual crimes committed by them, or calling for any evidence beyond their bare acknowledgment that they were Christians: Nero punished them for the crimes that they committed, and evidence was required² that they did commit the crimes. Prof. Mommsen

¹ I use the argument from the Christian evidence in order to press on the reader's attention the importance of using Christian and non-Christian documents side by side, and making each throw light on the other. If we accept the Pastoral Epistles, the harmony of the two classes of evidence is striking; if we deny their authenticity, it is not easy to discover harmony.

² The evidence was indeed very poor, accepted at first in the blindness of panic-struck fury, but after a time discredited by the popular opinion (p. 235); but still the form of charge demanded something in the shape of evidence.

sen replies that the fact "that practically in the administrative treatment of the new sectaries, the special crimes attributed to them were much more urged than their ideal disrespect to the Roman divinities, is applicable to every stage of the persecution." Here I am, to my great regret, forced absolutely to differ. In the later stages of the persecution, wherever we have sufficient information, in 112, in 177, neither special crimes nor ideal disrespect to the Roman divinities are insisted on in case of confession. If the accused person, in answer to Pliny's question, denied that he was a Christian, he was required to prove his sincerity by complying with the test of loyalty—*i. e.*, showing in act his respect to the Roman divinities; but if he confessed the Name, he was on the bare confession subject to the penalty of death, and no question was asked, or proof brought, about his crimes. On the other hand, if he confessed to have once been a Christian, but now abjured the faith and denied Christ, Pliny in 112, and the Governor of Gall Lugdunensis, in 177, then began to inquire into the question of crimes which he was supposed to have committed as a Christian. In fact, the Christians that abjured were in these cases put in the same position in which the Christians that confessed were put under Nero. There seems to be here implied an essential difference in the procedure; and this was the ground on which I have asserted that there must have been a change in procedure between the time of Nero and that of Trajan.

Now occurs another question. Tacitus distinctly implies (see my p. 234) that there were two stages in the proceedings under Nero, the first being concerned with the charge of incendiarism, the second being of a wider type. Was the second stage the same as the latter procedure, described by Pliny? This question also was answered by me in the negative. Dr. Sanday, in *THE EXPOSITOR* for June, answers it in the affirmative. It is with great regret that I

find myself compelled to differ from him; and I hope that the difference of opinion on one or two points in this period of history will not hide the amount of agreement between us. To his conversation and suggestions, above all to his encouragement, anything that is of value in my book is to a great extent due. He will, I know, be glad if I mention that the late Dr. Hort, when talking with me in June, 1892, maintained the same view which he has now expressed as to the character of the second stage in Nero's action. I was fully impressed with the strong array of opinion on this side when I was writing; for I felt no doubt that Bishop Lightfoot, from what he has said, would have agreed on this point with Dr. Hort; and their opinion weighs so much with me, that it was only because I could not help it that I took the opposite view.

Too much stress must not be laid on the difference on this point. After all, it is merely a question of ten years:— is the date about 65 or 75? It is indeed in several respects very important; but after all we are not divided in opinion on any principle, but only in the application to details.

I have on pp. 243 f, 258, 276, fully conceded the point, on which Dr. Sanday quite correctly insists, that the brief, weighty words of Suetonius rather tell against me; and that Sulpicius Severus is absolutely unfavourable. But the words of the latter are inaccurate in a legal point of view, and cannot be insisted on as an authority of any value. They have none of the character of those passages where Sulpicius takes Tacitus as his standard and repeats him in a remodelled form. He is conveying his own general impression; and his ideas about first-century facts were so vague and bad, that his general impressions are valueless in conflict with older evidence. It is admitted as a principle of modern historical investigation, that a statement made by this late chronicler has no value in such a question, except where express reason can be shown to hold

that he is repeating a statement of some good authority. This statement differs widely in tone from the sentences preceding, which were based on Tacitus ; and I have tried to show that it is quite inconsistent with him (p. 244).

It appears to me that the really weighty evidence in this case is the striking agreement between the detailed and carefully weighed account given by Tacitus and the evidence of those Christian documents which have the best claim to be dated between A.D. 64 and 80, especially the Pastoral Epistles. Their authority agrees, and it far outweighs everything else in my estimation. And to this critical point I shall address myself, in the belief that, if it can be clearly proved, it will be considered by Dr. Sanday to justify and reward our friendly controversy.

W. M. RAMSAY.

(To be continued.)

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

VII. THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

THE topical consideration of Paulinism on which we now enter may fitly begin with St. Paul's negative doctrine concerning justification, viz., that it is not attainable by the method of legalism. The proof of this position resolves itself practically into the Pauline doctrine of sin, which embraces four particulars. These are (1) the statement concerning the general prevalence of sin in the "sin section" of the Epistle to the Romans; (2) the statement respecting the effect of the first man's sin in *Romans* v. 12-21; (3) the statement concerning the sinful proclivity of the flesh in *Romans* vii.; (4) the statement concerning the action of the law on the sinful proclivity of the flesh in the same chapter. From all these taken together it follows that salvation by the works of the law is absolutely impossible.¹

¹ Ménégoz truly remarks that to understand St. Paul's notion of sin we must

1. The apostle's first argument in support of his doctrine of justification on its negative side is that as a matter of fact and observation sin, even in intense virulence, is widely prevalent in the world, both among Pagans and among Jews. It may be called the popular argument, and its use is to produce a *prima facie* impression or presumption in favour of the doctrine in connection with which the appeal to experience is made. It cannot be regarded as a strict proof that justification by works is impossible; at most it amounts to a proof that salvation by that method is very unlikely. To that it certainly does amount, very conspicuously in the case of the Jews. If, as is alleged, the people to whom had been given the law were as sinful as the rest of the world, the obvious inference is that the legal dispensation, viewed as a means of attaining unto righteousness, had proved a signal failure. And in view of the dark picture of the world generally, without distinction of Jew and Gentile, it is clear that, whatever might be possible for the exceptional few, the way of legal righteousness could never be the way of salvation for the million. But the empirical argument does not exclude the possibility of that way being open for the few; for though gross sin be very generally prevalent, it does not follow that such sin, or even sin in any degree, is absolutely universal. There may be some exceptionally good men capable of perfectly satisfying the law's requirements. The apostle makes it quite evident that he does not believe in any exceptions, for he winds up the account of the moral condition of the world in the early chapters of *Romans* with the unqualified statement: "therefore by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified."¹ But that he does not rest the inference solely on the fore-

remember that it is not his purpose to give a systematic course of instruction on sin, but simply to speak of it in its bearing on his doctrine of justification. *Le Pêché et la Rédemption*, p. 23.

¹ *Rom.* iii. 20.

going statement concerning the extensive prevalence of sin appears from the appended remark: "for by the law is the knowledge of sin," which is a new reason for the assertion just made. It may be doubted whether the apostle rests his doctrine as to the absolute universality of sin even on the texts of Scripture he has previously cited,¹ which on the surface seem to teach the doctrine, though as they stand in the Old Testament they are not intended to state an abstract doctrine concerning human depravity, but simply characterise in strong terms the moral pravity of a particular generation of men. That he put on these texts a universal construction is not questioned, but he may have done so not so much as a mere interpreter of Scripture, but rather as one who believed in the universal diffusion of sin on other grounds. That the possibility of exceptions was present to his thoughts is evident from his reference to the case of Abraham.² We may expect therefore to find that he has in reserve some deeper, more cogent reasons for his thesis than either an appeal to observation or citations from the Hebrew Psalter.

2. The necessary supplement to the popular argument is to be found in the famous passage concerning Adam and Christ, and in the not less notable statement concerning the sinful proclivity of the flesh. As to the former I remark that this section of *Romans* (v. 12-21) contains much more than a contribution to the Pauline doctrine of sin, or to the proof of the negative doctrine of justification. It serves the comprehensive purpose of vindicating the Apostle's whole doctrine of justification, both on its negative and on its positive side, by fitting it into a grand philosophic generalisation respecting the religious history of the world. That history is there summed up under two representative men, the first man and the second, Adam and Christ. Between these two men St. Paul draws a parallel in so far as both

iii. 10-18.

² iv. 1.

by their action influenced their whole race. But beginning with a parallel, he forthwith glides into a contrast. Apology passes over into eulogy. For the writer, at the commencement of the chapter, has been extolling the benefits connected with the era of grace, and he is in the mood to continue in the same strain, and so having once suggested the thought: Adam and Christ like each other as both representative men to opposite effects, he introduces the new theme: "but not as the offence is the free gift; sin abounds, but grace superabounds."¹

What we are now concerned with, however, is the bearing of this passage on the doctrine of sin, and so on the negative side of the doctrine of justification. That it was meant to have a bearing on these topics we need not doubt, though the direct purpose in view is more general and comprehensive. It may be said that the apostle here supplies a supplementary proof of the impossibility of attaining unto salvation by personal righteousness, a proof which converts his first statement concerning the general prevalence of sin into an absolutely universal doctrine as to the sinfulness of man.

And what then is the new proof? It starts from the universal prevalence of death. Indubitably *death* reigns over all. But death, it is assumed, is the wages of sin: there had been no death among men had there been no sin; therefore all must be in some sense and to some extent sinners simply because all die. Not improbably this was the original germ of the train of thought contained in the Adam-Christ section. But this germinal thought would inevitably suggest others. It would in the first place start a difficulty to be overcome, in grappling with which the apostle at last reached the magnificent generalisation contained in the antithesis between the two representative men. Death has swept away all the generations of man-

¹ v. 15.

kind, therefore all men in all generations have sinned. But if so, men must have sinned before the giving of the law. But how could that be if where there is no law there is no transgression, and if by the law comes the knowledge of sin? This difficulty might be met by saying there was a law before the lawgiving, a law written on the hearts or consciences of men, and sufficiently known to make them responsible. But that is not the way in which the apostle meets the difficulty, though, as we know from other places in his epistles, such a line of thought was familiar to him. He is willing to make the concession that there was no law before the Sinaitic lawgiving, and that therefore men could not legally be treated as sinners, could not have sin imputed to them as a ground of condemnation and infliction of penalty, because he has in view another way of showing that in all the ages men were under the reign of sin, and therefore subject to death. That way he finds in the great principle of solidarity, or the moral unity of mankind. The first man sinned, and that is enough. By one man sin entered into the world, and death followed in its track legitimately, righteously, because when the one man sinned all sinned. Such I take to be the meaning of the famous text *Romans* v. 12, and in particular of the last clause: ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. The rendering of the Vulgate, *in quo omnes peccaverunt*, is grammatically wrong, for ἐφ' ᾧ does not mean "in whom," but "because," yet essentially right. It requires some courage to express this opinion, or indeed any opinion, when one thinks of the interminable controversies to which these four Greek words have given rise, and considers how much depends on the interpretation we adopt. The sense of responsibility would be altogether crushing if the matter in dispute, instead of being a statement connected with a theological theorem, were a vital article of the Christian faith. Of the possible meanings of the words in question, the one for which I, with something

like fear and trembling, give my vote, is, it must be admitted, *a priori* the least likely. Who would ever think of saying himself, or expect another to say, that when Adam sinned all mankind sinned? But we know that St. Paul is in the habit of saying startling things, the sinless One made sin, *e.g.*, and therefore we cannot make it a rule of interpretation, in dealing with his writings, that the most obvious and ordinary meaning is to be preferred. Of course the most obvious meaning of the second half of *Romans* v. 12 is that death passed upon all men because all men *personally* sinned, which accordingly is the interpretation favoured by an imposing array of modern expositors. Among the objections that might be stated to this view, not the least weighty is this, that it makes St. Paul say what is not true to the fact. If he really meant to say that all died because all personally sinned, he must have forgotten the very large number of human beings who die in infancy, an act of forgetfulness very unlikely in so humane a man and so considerate a theologian. The infants would not be left out of account if we adopted the interpretation which has on its side the great name of Calvin: all died, because all, even the infants, inherited a depraved nature, and so were tainted with the vice of original sin, if not guilty of actual transgression. But this is not exegesis, but rather reading into the word ἡμάρτων a theological hypothesis. We seem, therefore, to be thrown back, in spite of ourselves, on the thought, however strange it may seem, that when Adam sinned all mankind sinned, as that which the apostle really intended to utter. The aorist, ἡμάρτων, as pointing to a single act performed at a definite time, fits into, if it do not compel, this interpretation. Writing some years ago, one would have been able to cite in support of it the authority of Pfeiderer. In the first edition of his great work on Paulinism he remarks that in *Romans* v. 12 two different reasons seem to be given for the entrance of death—Adam's

sin and men's own sin, and it may seem strange that no attempt should be made to reconcile the two. But he goes on to say: "just in this hard and completely unreconciled juxtaposition of the two reasons lies without doubt the hint that in the apostle's view they are not two, but one, that therefore the sinful deed of Adam is at the same time and as such the sinful deed of all." "This," he continues, "naturally must mean that in the deed of Adam, as the representative head of the race, the race in virtue of a certain moral or mystic identity took part."¹ But in the second edition of this work, published in 1890, the author has, with an implicit faith which is almost pathetic, adopted as his guide in the interpretation of Paulinism Weber's account of the theology of the Talmud. In doing so he makes two great assumptions: that the theological opinions of the Jews in the time of St. Paul were the same as in the period, centuries later, when the Talmud was compiled, and that St. Paul's theology was to a large extent simply a reflection of that of the Jewish synagogue. Both assumptions seem to me very hazardous. It stands to reason that Jewish theological thought underwent development in the centuries that elapsed between the apostolic age and the Talmudic era. And it is by no means a matter of course that every theological theorem current in the synagogue, and as such familiar to Saul the Pharisee, was adopted into his system of Christian thought by Paul the Apostle. That Rabbinism exercised a certain influence on his mind need not be questioned. The influence is traceable in his method of interpreting Scripture and in his style of argumentation, and it is not at all unlikely that it may here and there be discernible also in the thought-forms and phraseology of his Christian theology.² But of one thing we may be sure, viz., that St. Paul was not the slave of Rabbinical theology,

¹ *Der Paulinismus*, pp. 39, 40.

² Lipsius (*Hand-commentar in Rom. v. 12*) points out that the idea of death

and that he would never allow it to dominate over his mind to the prejudice of his Christianity. He might use it as far as it served his purpose, but beyond that he would not suffer it to go. The view he expresses in *Romans* iv. 1-3 in reference to Abraham, as no exception to the thesis that men cannot be justified by works, illustrates the freedom of his attitude towards Jewish opinion.¹

The servile use of Talmudic theology as a key to the interpretation of Paulinism, which makes the new edition of Pfleiderer's work in many respects the reverse of an improvement on the first, suggests another reflection which may here find a place. It is a mistake to be constantly on the outlook for sources of Pauline thought in previous or contemporary literature. Pfleiderer is a great offender here. According to him one part of St. Paul's theology comes from Alexandria, and the other from the Jewish synagogue, and the original element, if it exist at all, is reduced to a minimum. He cannot even credit the apostle with the power to describe the vices of Paganism as he does in *Romans* i. without borrowing from the *Book of Wisdom*.² I may find another opportunity of expressing an opinion as to the alleged Hellenism; meantime I content myself with cordially endorsing a sentiment occurring in a book by a young German theologian, of whom Pfleiderer speaks in most appreciative terms. It is that "the theology of the great apostle is the expression of his experience, not of his reading."³ The remark applies even to the Old Testament, much more to the Apocrypha, or to the works of Philo, or to the dreary lucubrations of the scribes.

entering into the world through the sin of the first man was generally current among the Jews before and during Paul's time, citing in proof *Sirach* xxv. 24, *Wisdom of Solomon* ii. 23, and iv. *Esdra*s vii. 18-20. What Paul did was not to invent the idea, but to apply it in exposition and defence of the Christian faith.

¹ Vide on this EXPOSITOR for June, p. 423.

² *Der Paulinismus*, 2te Aufl., pp. 83, 84.

³ Gunkel, *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*, p. 86 (1888).

The doctrine of the Talmud on the connection between sin and death, as stated by Weber, is to this effect. Adam's sin is his own, not the sin of the race. Every man dies for his own sin. Yet the death of all men has its last ground in the sin of Adam, partly because the death sentence was pronounced on the race in connection with Adam's sin, partly because through Adam's sin the evil proclivity latent in the flesh not only first found expression, but was started on a sinister career of increasingly corrupt influence. Assuming that the apostle meant to echo the Talmudic theory in the text under consideration, the resulting interpretation would be something like a combination of two of the three interpretations which divide the suffrages of Christian commentators.

In the famous comparison between Adam and Christ the terms *ἁμαρτία* and *δικαιοσύνη* appear both to be used *objectively*. Sin and righteousness are conceived of as two great antagonistic forces fighting against each other, not so much *in* man as *over* him, each striving for supremacy; the one manifesting its malign sway in death, the other in the life communicated to those who believe in Jesus. The one power began its reign with the sin of Adam. From the day that Adam sinned *ἁμαρτία* had dominion over the human race, and showed the reality of its power by the death which overtook successive generations of mankind. The existence of this objective sin necessitated the coming into existence of an objective righteousness as the only means by which the reign of sin and death could be brought to an end. The existence of an Adam through whom the race was brought into a state of condemnation, made it necessary that there should appear a second Adam in whom the race might make a new beginning, and in whose righteousness it might be righteous. As by the disobedience of the one man the many were constituted (*κατεστάθησαν*, v. 19) sinners, so also it was necessary that by the obedience of the

One the many should be constituted righteous. Such seems to be the Apostle's view. It may raise scruples in the modern mind on various grounds. Some may think that St. Paul has read far more theology into the story of the fall than can be taken out of it by legitimate exegesis. The idea of objective sin may appear objectionable on ethical grounds; for what, it may be asked, can be more unjust or unreasonable than that one man should suffer for another man's sins? Yet modern science will teach even the freest theological thinker to be cautious in pressing this objection; for by its doctrine of heredity it has made it more manifest than ever that the solidarity of mankind is a great fact and not merely a theological theory, and that the only question is as to the best way of stating it so as to conserve all moral interests. It may readily be admitted that a better statement is conceivable than that furnished by Augustinian theology. The question may very legitimately be raised: to what effect or extent does objective sin reign; in other words, what is meant by death in this connection? When St. Paul says, "so death passed upon all men," does he allude to the familiar fact of physical dissolution, or is death to be taken comprehensively as including at once temporal, spiritual, and eternal consequences? If my conjecture as to the genesis of the Adam-Christ train of thought be correct, we must understand *θάνατος* in the restricted sense.¹ In any case there is no ground for ascribing to St. Paul the dogma that the *eternal* destiny of men depends on the sin of the race *apart from personal transgression*.² That

¹ Lipsius in *Hand-commentar zum N. T.* maintains that *θάνατος* nowhere in St. Paul's writings means spiritual death, but physical death without hope of resurrection. *Vide* his notes on *Romans* v. 12 and vii. 10. Similarly Kabisch, *Die Eschatologie des Paulus* (1893). The views of Ménégoz will be stated in next article.

² To understand Paulinism we must carefully note the distinction between *ἀμαρτία* and *παράβασις*. *ἀμαρτία* is objective and common; *παράβασις* is subjective and personal. *ἀμαρτία* entails some evil effects, but *παράβασις* is necessary to guilt and final condemnation.

through the sin of Adam eternal perdition overtakes children dying in infancy (unless averted by baptism!) formed no part of his theology. The idea is utterly irreconcilable with his optimistic doctrine of superabounding grace. It is excluded by his conception of objective sin and objective righteousness as forming two aspects of one system. He did not think of the former as reigning unconditionally. He thought rather of the fall and its consequences as counterworked from the first by the reign of grace, Adam nowhere where Christ was not also in more or less potency. This covers infant salvation; for if infants perish, the common sin reigns unchecked and the common righteousness is convicted of impotence.¹

3. Something more than the theorem of objective sin in the sense explained is needed to produce the conviction that sin is a universal reality. It must be shown that sin is a power at work in man as well as above him, influencing his character as well as his destiny. Till this is shown men may remain unpersuaded that righteousness is unattainable by the way of legalism, deeming objective sin either an unreality or at most something external affecting man's physical life, but not his moral being or his standing before God. To shut men up to the way of faith there is needed a demonstration of the inherent sinfulness of human nature. This demonstration the apostle supplies in his statement as to the sinful proclivity of the flesh. The relative section of the Epistle to the Romans is not indeed a formal contribution to the doctrine as to the universality of sin; it rather deals with the flesh as a hindrance to Christian holiness, under which aspect it will fall to be

¹ *Vide* on this *Christ in Modern Theology*, by Principal Fairbairn, pp. 460-2; also Godet, who on *Rom.* v. 12 remarks: there is no question here about the eternal lot of individuals. Paul is speaking here above all of physical death. Nothing of all that passes in the domain in which we have Adam for our father can be decisive for our eternal lot. The solidarity of individuals with the head of the first humanity does not extend beyond the domain of natural life.

considered hereafter. It may seem unsatisfactory that so important a part of the doctrine of sin should be brought in as a sort of afterthought. But we must once for all reconcile ourselves to the fact that St. Paul is not a scholastic theologian, and be content to take his teaching as he chooses to give it.

The demonstration takes the form of a personal confession. In the first part of his doctrine of sin the apostle has described in dark colours the sins of other men; in this part he details his own experience in most graphic terms. "I am carnal, sold under sin, for what I do I know not; for not what I wish do I, but what I hate, this do I." And he assumes that in this respect he is not exceptional. Personal in form, the confession is really the confession of humanity, of every man who is *σάρκινος*,¹ living in the flesh. The ego that speaks is not the individual ego of St. Paul, but the ego of the human race. It is idle therefore to inquire whether he refers to the period antecedent to his conversion or to the post-conversion period. The question proceeds upon a too literal and prosaic view of the passage, as if it were a piece of exact biography instead of being a highly idealised representation of human weakness in the moral sphere. In so far as the artist draws from his own experience the reference must be held to be chiefly to the preconversion period, for it is clear from the next chapter that the apostle is far from regarding the moral condition of the Christian as one of weakness and misery like that depicted in chapter vii.; though it need not therefore be denied that the conflict between flesh and spirit may reappear even in the life of one who walks in the Spirit. But we miss the didactic significance of this passage if we take it as merely biographical instead of viewing it as typical and representative. That it is meant to be typical is manifest from the abstract

¹ This is the approved reading. Adjectives terminating in *νος* indicate the material of which anything is made, *Vide* 2 Cor. iii. 3, *καρδίας σαρκίνας*.

manner in which the flesh is spoken of. It is not St. Paul's flesh that is at fault, it is *the* flesh, the flesh which all men wear, the flesh in which dwells sin.¹ What precisely the apostle means by *σάρξ* is a question for future consideration; meantime the point to be noted is that the word does not denote something merely personal. It represents an abstract idea. The term may not signify the mere physical organisation, but we may safely assume that it has some reference thereto, and so find in this notable passage the doctrine that in man's material part resides a bias to sin which causes much trouble to the spirit, and prevents those who with their mind approve the law of God from actually complying with its behests. This doctrine St. Paul proclaims in the pathetic confession: "I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth not good."² What dwells in the flesh is not good but sin.³ "I know," says the apostle, expecting every man who has any sympathy with good to echo the acknowledgment. If he be right in this expectation, then it is all over with the hope of attaining to righteousness by personal effort. The appropriate sequel of such a confession is the groan of despair: "Wretched human being, who shall deliver me."⁴ If there be any hope for us, it must be in Another; our standing-ground must be grace, not law. "But," it may be said, "Paul may be wrong in his judgment; he may be taking too morbid a view of the moral disability of man." Well, it is a jury question; but, inspiration apart, I had rather take the testimony of St. Paul on this question than that of a morally commonplace, self-complacent person like the Pharisee of our Lord's parable. It is a fact that the noblest men in all ages have accepted his verdict, and this consensus of those most capable of judging must be held to settle the matter.

Granting the matter of fact to be as asserted, viz., that there is in the flesh a bias towards evil, what is its cause?

¹ Rom. vii. 25; viii. 3. ² vii. 18. ³ vii. 20. ⁴ vii. 24. *ταλαιπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος:*

Is the bias inherent in the flesh, inseparable from the nature of a material organism, or is it a vice which has been accidentally introduced into it, say, by the sin of Adam? On this speculative problem St. Paul has nowhere in his epistles pronounced a definite opinion. He declares the fact of an antagonism between flesh and spirit, but he gives no account of its origin. It may indeed seem possible to arrive at a solution of the problem which may reasonably be held to be Pauline by combining the statement in the Adam-Christ section with that of the section concerning the flesh, and drawing the inference that human nature, and in particular the bodily organism, underwent a change for the worse in consequence of the sin of the first man. This is the church doctrine of original sin. A question has been raised as to the legitimacy of the combination on which this doctrine rests.¹ This question very naturally leads up to another: does the combination go to the root of the matter? From the sin of the first man came the corruption of human nature, but whence came his sin? Was his flesh entirely free from evil bias, morally neutral, and containing no elements of danger to the spirit? Or had it too that in it—desire, passion—which might very readily tempt to transgression? If the Pauline literature contains any hints of an answer to this question, they are to be found in the terms in which in 1 *Corinthians* xv. the first man is described as in contrast to the second, only a living soul, psychical as distinct from spiritual, and of the

¹ In the first edition of *Der Paulinismus* Pfleiderer pronounced the combination inadmissible, and maintained that Paul gives two wholly different accounts of the origin of moral evil in *Rom.* v. and vii., that in the latter chapter being that sin has its origin in a flesh conceived to be inherently evil. *Vide* p. 62. In the second edition he regards it as possible that the Augustinian theory that the sinful bias of the flesh originated in Adam's fall was held by Paul, but thinks it more likely that he accepted the view of the Jewish schools, viz., that the evil bias was there from the first, and was only provoked and increased through the temptation to sin. *Vide* p. 71; and for the Jewish view, Weber, §§ 46, 48.

earth, earthy.¹ These expressions seem to point in the direction of a nature not very different from our own, and altogether suggest an idea of the primitive state of man not quite answering to the theological conception of original righteousness. The same remark applies to the account of that state in the book of Genesis, wherein the first man appears in such a condition of unstable moral equilibrium as to fall before the slightest temptation, more like an innocent inexperienced child than a full-grown man, Godlike in "righteousness and true holiness." Should a revision of the church's doctrine concerning the initial moral condition of man be necessitated by the progress of modern science, it may be found that it is not the sacred historian or the Christian apostle that is at fault, but the dogmatically-biassed exegesis of the system builders.²

4. The last particular in the Pauline doctrine of sin is the statement concerning the effect of the law's action on the sinful proclivity of the flesh. On this point the apostle teaches that in consequence of the evil bias of the flesh the law, so far from being the way to righteousness, is rather simply a source of the knowledge of sin and an irritant to sin. The topic is handled chiefly in *Romans* vii. It is introduced at verse 7 by the question: "What shall we say, then? Is the law sin? God forbid"; which is followed up by the explanatory statement that the law, though not sin, is the source of the knowledge of sin. This is explained in turn by the doctrine of the sinful bias of the flesh in consequence of which it comes to pass that the law in commanding the good, as it always does, being itself holy, simply comes into collision with contrary inclination,

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 46, 47.

² F. W. Robertson says that popular ideas of the paradise state are without the warrant of one syllable of Scripture. *Vide Lectures on the Epistles to the Corinthians in loco* 1 Cor. xv. 46, 47. Godet also on the same text remarks that Paul does not share the traditional orthodox idea of the primitive state as one of moral and physical perfection.

and so awakes the consciousness of a law in the members warring against the law in the mind. So by the law I simply know myself to be a sinner, to be morally impotent, to be a slave. To make one righteous is because of the flesh impossible for the law, a truth which the apostle states very forcibly in *Romans* viii. 3, where he represents the fulfilment of the righteousness of the law in men as the impossible for the law in consequence of its weakness by reason of the flesh. Such being the fact, made known to him by bitter experience, he argued that the law could never have been intended to make men righteous. It could not have been instituted to accomplish the impossible. It must have been instituted with reference to an ulterior system which should be able to realise the legally impossible; a means to an end destined to be superseded when it had served its ancillary purpose; a preparation for the advent of God's Son, who, coming in the likeness of sinful flesh, and with reference to sin, should condemn sin in the flesh, and help believers in Him to be indeed sons of God, walking not after the flesh but after the Spirit. We have seen with what fertile ingenuity the apostle describes the preparatory function of the law in the Epistle to the Galatians, and we shall have a future opportunity of considering his whole doctrine as to the legal economy from an apologetic point of view. Meantime what we have to note is the sombre aspect under which that doctrine presents the sinfulness of man. Human sinfulness is such as to make the question not an impertinence whether the very law of God which reveals it and provokes it into activity be not itself sinful. Yet there is a bright side to the picture. The law does more than bring to consciousness human depravity. In doing that it at the same time makes man aware that there is more in him than sin: a mind in sympathy with the moral ideal embodied in the law, an inner man in a state of protest against the deeds of the

outer man. The action of the law on the flesh on the one hand and on the conscience on the other makes me feel that I am two, not one, and this duality is at once my misery and my hope: my misery, for it is wretched to be drawn two ways; my hope, for I ever feel that my flesh and my sin though mine are not myself. This feeling all may share. On the bright hopeful side as well as on the darker St. Paul is the spokesman for the race. His *ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος* voices not only the universal need but the universal desire for redemption. It is the *de profundis* of sin-oppressed humanity. The apostle's doctrine of sin is not flattering, but neither is it indiscriminate. It is not a doctrine of total unrelieved depravity. It recognises a good element in average human nature. As described that element appears weak and ineffectual. But the important thing to note is that it is there.

A. B. BRUCE.

ABELARD'S DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT: A UNIVERSITY SERMON.

"Even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many."—*Matthew* xx. 28.

AMONG all the passages of the New Testament in which our Lord is said to have died *for* men, this is the only one in which the preposition *ἀντὶ* is employed.¹ The usual preposition is *ὑπὲρ*; and, where that is the case, I need hardly say that the attempt to read into the text the meaning "instead of," "as a substitute for," or the like, is wholly gratuitous. To suffer death, vicariously as a substitute for others would no doubt be to suffer *ὑπὲρ*,² on behalf of, for

¹ With the parallel, *Mark* x. 45. It is possible that *Luke* xxii. 27 may be nearer to the original form of our Lord's saying. But even if a touch of theological reflection has been imparted to this record of our Lord's words, the tradition is clearly a very ancient one.

² Cf. the late Prof. Evans' note on *ὑπὲρ* in the *Speaker's Commentary*, N.T., vol. iii. p. 371.

the sake of others; but that is clearly not implied by the Greek. Christ may be no less truly said to have suffered on our behalf in whatever way or ways His sufferings have tended to the benefit of His brethren still on earth.

When we come to the solitary passage from which my text is taken, the patristic idea of a satisfaction or propitiation and the more characteristically Protestant idea of a vicarious punishment, have at first sight more to say for themselves. *Ἀντὶ* undoubtedly does mean "instead of," "in place of." But a moment's candid consideration of the context will perhaps satisfy us that no theory of substitution can really get much support from the metaphor of our text. In the first place be it observed that even in this passage—the very *locus classicus* for such theories—the death of Christ is primarily set before us as an *example*: His death is looked upon as the culminating act of a self-sacrificing *life*. We are enjoined to serve our fellow-men in the same way in which Christ served us. The giving of His life is mentioned as the most signal instance of His ministry to His fellow men: "Whosoever would be first among you shall be your minister. Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many." It is clearly most agreeable to the context to suppose that His death is set forth as being serviceable to others in the same sort of way as His life of teaching and example and sympathy.

But the question may be asked, "To whom is the ransom paid?" That, however, is a question to which no answer need be, and (as I venture to think) no answer ought to be, given. The idea of a ransom paid to the Devil and the idea of a ransom paid to God are alike entirely foreign to the context. The idea is not that of a debt undertaken, still less of a punishment submitted to instead of us, but of a ransom paid to win us back from slavery or captivity. Christ's death was the price, the cost of that deliverance;

the ransom paid is the equivalent not of our sins but of us. We are not debtors but captives, whom Christ has emancipated at the cost of His own life. Is the question asked, Emancipated from what? Here again there is nothing in the immediate context to supply an answer. But if a categorical answer must be given, the whole tenour of Christ's teaching requires us to say, "Emancipated from sin"—not primarily from the punishment of sin nor yet from the spirit of evil, but from sin itself. Even this interpretation is perhaps pressing the metaphor further than need be. We ought to interpret the passage rather in the light of that dominant idea of all the Master's teaching, the idea of a Kingdom of Heaven. The prominent thought is not what Christ delivered men from, but what He bought them for. He bought them for His kingdom, He made them subjects of His spiritual empire, at the cost of His own death. That is the ultimate purpose of all Christ's work, of which even the deliverance from the slavery of sin is but a negative and a subordinate aspect.

The history of the interpretation of this text is indeed a melancholy example of the theological tendency to make systems out of metaphors. The earliest Christian writers cannot be said to have a theory of the Atonement at all: their language admits for the most part of whatever interpretation we can legitimately assign to the New Testament expressions upon which it is based. Irenæus is the first to suggest with any definiteness the idea of a ransom paid by Christ to Satan. Entirely free from the horrible idea of an angry and revengeful Father propitiated by a loving and merciful Son, Irenæus does hold that a ransom was owing to the Prince of Evil. By sin man had become the thrall of Satan. Satan had acquired rights over him. God wanted to recover his lost dominion over fallen man, to win him back to His love and His service. But "it became God" (says Irenæus) "to receive what He willed by per-

suasion and not by force, so that neither might justice be violated nor God's ancient creation perish." "Christ compensated our disobedience by His obedience." The death of Christ was brought about by Satan's machinations; but, since He was innocent, Satan had no right to *His* life; so that now it became compatible with justice that man, over whom he *had* just dominion, should be set free from his sovereignty. Why Satan brought about Christ's death, why he consented to accept Christ's death as an equivalent for his dominion over mankind (and indeed many other difficulties which may naturally arise) Irenæus leaves unexplained. The system suggested by Irenæus is more fully elaborated by Origen. In Origen,¹ and still more clearly in later Fathers, it appears that Satan was deliberately deceived by God. He was somehow or other induced to believe that in bringing about the death of Christ he would get possession of His soul. But there he had over-reached himself; he found that there was one soul which could not be held in Hades. The very device by which he had hoped to complete his triumph became the means of his own ruin, and the whole body of his ancient subjects escaped his grasp.

Such, in brief outline, was the theory of the Atonement which on the whole held possession of Christian theology throughout the patristic period. In saying this, however, I ought to add that the Atonement, at least the theoretical justification of the Atonement, is not a prominent feature of patristic teaching. To the Fathers, "as to the Church of all ages," says Mr. Oxenham, "it was not the Atonement but the Incarnation which was the centre of Christian faith as of Christian life."² And in their teaching about the Incarnation, many of them—especially of the Greek Fathers—do suggest much nobler and more rational answers to the

¹ *In Matt.*, Tom. xiii. 8, 9, xvi. 8. *In Rom.*, iii. 7, iv. 11; cf. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Oxford, 1893, p. 210 sq.

² *The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement*, ed. 3, 1881, p. 166, a work to which I must acknowledge great obligations.

question how Christ's life and sufferings really did make possible a new spiritual birth for humanity at large as well as for individual souls—answers by the side of which the theory of a ransom owed to Satan may well be deemed as superfluous, as it must to every modern mind seem arbitrary, childish, and immoral. But so it is. In that edifice of gold, silver, costly stones, wood, hay, stubble, which the theologians of the first no less than of later ages have built upon the one foundation, we must be content to cherish and to reverence the more precious and permanent elements while we abandon the more perishable to their inevitable decay.

I will not attempt to trace this marvellous theory through the various phases and modifications which it underwent during the more than eight centuries of its almost undisputed reign. By minds like Origen's we may indeed doubt whether it was ever accepted with the deadly literalness with which it was certainly understood by the Church of the Dark Ages. I wish to call attention rather to the work of the great men to whom Christendom owes its emancipation from this grotesque absurdity. Among all the enormous services of Scholasticism to human progress none is greater than this; none supplies better evidence that in some respects the scholastic age was intellectually in advance of the patristic. The demolition of this time-honoured theory was effected principally by two men—one the most lovable of mediæval saints, the other the greatest of mediæval thinkers; one the herald and precursor, the other the actual father or creator of the Scholastic Theology.¹ The attack on the received Theology was begun by St. Anselm; the decisive victory was won by Abelard. Seldom, indeed, has a theological system crumbled to pieces so rapidly, so completely, and so irrevocably. Abelard's timid disciple, Peter the Lombard,² is the last important writer

¹ Doubt had been suggested by John of Damascus. *De Fid. Orth.*, iii. 27; but cf. iii. 19.

² *Sent.*, iii. 19.

to maintain this theory of a ransom paid to Satan. And among all that crop of strange and terrible theories of the Atonement which sprang up at and after the Reformation, the old patristic view has (I believe) never been revived.

Neither of these great Schoolmen were mere destructives. They demolish the ransom theory only to clear the ground for a worthier and more reasonable view of God's dealings with mankind. Anselm's theory of the Atonement is familiar to all theological students. And at the present day it will probably be felt that, though free from the coarse grotesqueness of the older view, it is open to some of the same objections as its predecessor on the score both of Logic and of Morality. In the *Cur Deus Homo* the death of Christ still remains a debt owed, not indeed to the Evil One, but to an abstract Justice, or rather perhaps to God Himself. Man had sinned. By sin, by failing to be what God intended him to be, man had robbed God of something which was His due. Man had thereby incurred to God a debt so great that nothing in the whole universe that was not God could be an adequate compensation to Him. It would not beseem the honour or the justice of God that He should forgive man's sin without demanding this satisfaction. Nothing which was not God would satisfy His claims; and yet the debt must be paid by man. Even the Word who was God could satisfy it only by becoming man; only so could He die, and by so doing pay to God something which was more precious than that of which God had been robbed by the sin of man, and yet something which was not owing to him *ex debito justitiæ*.

I will not dwell upon the obvious difficulties of this scheme, which exercised more influence over Wyclif and the Reformers than over Anselm's immediate successors. I leave it without comment, and pass on to the very different theory which meets us in Abelard. "To us it appears,"¹ he says, "that our justification and reconciliation

¹ *Opera*, ed. Consin. 1859, p. 207.

to God in the blood of Christ is due to this, that through the singular favour exhibited to us in the taking of our nature by His Son and His perseverance even unto death in instructing us alike by word and by example, God bound us to Himself more fully than before by love; so that kindled by so great a beneficence of Divine favour, true charity fears no longer to endure anything for His sake. . . . Accordingly our redemption lies in that supreme love shown towards us through the passion of Christ, which not only liberates us from the slavery of sin, but acquires for us the true liberty of the sons of God; so that henceforth we should fulfil all duties rather from love than from fear of Him who showed to us so great favour than which none greater can be discovered; as He Himself saith, 'Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay his life for his friend.' Concerning this love, indeed, the Lord says in another place, 'I came to send fire on the earth, and what will I but that it be kindled?' For the propagation of this true liberty, therefore, it is that He declares Himself to have come."

Three points may be noticed in this Abelardian view of the Atonement:—

(1) There is no notion of vicarious punishment, and equally little of any vicarious expiation or satisfaction, or objectively valid sacrifice,¹ an idea which is indeed free from some of the coarse immorality of the idea of vicarious punishment, but is in principle somewhat difficult to distinguish from it.

(2) The atoning efficacy of Christ's work is not limited to His death. Christ's redeeming work is not on the one hand confined (in Socinian fashion) to teaching or even example, though it includes both; His love to man reveals

¹ That Christ's life and death were in the truest and highest sense a sacrifice is a doctrine of the highest value, and is quite consistent with the view taken in these pages. But to develop this aspect of our Lord's work falls beyond the scope of this sermon.

in a unique way the love of the Heavenly Father, because He is in a unique sense the Son of God. But neither, on the other hand, is His atoning work limited to the crucifixion. The whole life of Christ, the whole Revelation of God which is constituted by that life, excites the love of man, moves his gratitude, shows him what God would have him be, enables him to be in his imperfect way what Christ alone was perfectly, and so makes at-one-ment, restores between God and man the union which sin alone has destroyed.

And (3) it follows from this view of the Atonement that the justifying effect of Christ's work is a real effect, not a mere legal fiction. Christ's work really does make men better, instead of merely supplying the ground why they should be considered good or be excused the punishment of sin, without being really made any better than they were before.

Justification and sanctification become (to quote the learned Romanist theologian whom I cited before) "different names for the same thing, according as it is viewed in its origin or its nature, except that, in ordinary language, justification is used for the initial act on the part of God in a process of which sanctification, in its fullest sense, is the gradually accomplished result; they stand to each other in the spiritual life as birth in the natural life to the gradual advance to maturity." ¹

Such was the doctrine that moved the unmeasured wrath of Abelard's great enemy, St. Bernard. And, be it observed, St. Bernard is as vehement against the negative as against the positive side of Abelard's doctrine. To St. Bernard the doctrine of the Atonement stands or falls with that theory of the ransom paid to the Devil which Catholic Christendom was (little as Bernard imagined it) just on the point of throwing off. If so, the saintly Archbishop of Canterbury was as great a heretic as Abelard, though neither he nor St. Bernard seems to have been aware of the fact.

¹ Oxenham, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-8.

But whatever may be thought on this point, it is indeed strange that such a man as St. Bernard should solemnly include in a list of Abelard's heresies, which he prepared for the information of the Pope, the statement, "I think therefore that the purpose and cause of the Incarnation was that He might illumine the world by His wisdom, and excite it to the love of Himself." Such was one of the doctrines (so far as we can gather) which was solemnly condemned by a Pope and Council. Inadequate some even of our modern Theologians might pronounce it. But what a host of authorities—patristic, scholastic, Anglican, Protestant—might be produced in its favour! From what Theologian, since Theology began, could you not extract some close parallel to this beautiful expression of the whole Gospel message, unless it be some rigid Lutheran? And even the most rigid Lutheran cannot always remain faithful to a scheme of justification in which love plays no part, in which the love of God outpoured on Calvary is not allowed to awaken any response in the human heart, lest perchance even the admission of man's capacity for gratitude, often the very last spark of the Divine nature to forsake the breast of the vilest criminal—lest even this admission might be to concede too much to human merit and to detract from that comfortable doctrine of the total depravity of the human nature which God created in His own likeness and after His own image." Nor would the name of St. Bernard himself be absent from the *catena* of Abelard's adherents. Raising the question whether God could have found any other means of redeeming fallen man besides the method of the Incarnation, he replies (against Anselm) that He could have done so, but "He preferred to do it at His own cost, lest he should give any further occasion for that worst and most odious sin of ingratitude in man."¹

All through the Christian ages it has been surely the love

¹ Serm. xi. in *Cant.*

of God revealed in Christ which really has won the heart of man, and made the Christian doctrine of the Atonement a real instrument of moral improvement, however inadequate, monstrous, even revolting, sometimes has been the intellectual embodiment which it has received either from formal Theology, or from popular sentiment. Those whose theories have most tended to obscure the doctrine of Divine love have yet felt its power. But let it not be supposed that on this account theological theories are matters of no importance. Nobody, perhaps, ever felt the Divine love more powerfully, or worked more energetically in the strength of it than Luther, and yet if the love of Protestant Europe seems to have waxed in these latter days so very cold that there is some excuse for the contempt which it has unfortunately become fashionable among ourselves to speak of Continental Protestantism, it is largely owing to the paralysing influence of that formal divorce which Luther proclaimed between religion and morality in his theories of a faith which did not necessarily work by love.

“The purpose and cause of the Incarnation was this, that Christ should illumine the world by His wisdom and kindle it to the love of Himself.”¹ At the present day this heresy of Abelard’s would be welcomed as the very heart and essence of Christ’s good news by Christians of almost every shade of ecclesiastical and theological opinion. In all modern statements of the doctrine this aspect of the Atonement as a revelation of Divine Love occupies the first place. We do indeed find modern Theologians setting up side by side of this clear and intelligible doctrine theories, on the one hand, of an objectively valid satisfaction or expiation; on the other, of a mystical retrospective participation by Christians in the sufferings of Christ. But I venture to say that when these theories come to be analysed and thought out, it will be found that they resolve themselves

¹ Abelard, *Opera*, II. p. 767.

either into that notion of vicarious punishment which is now so heartily repudiated by nearly all Theologians,¹ or into what is practically the Abelardian view. If satisfaction does not mean vicarious punishment, what can it mean except that the suffering Christ removed the consequences of sin by making a new life possible without punishment? Or, if we are told that Christ offered an acceptable sacrifice to the Father, to what, if the idea of appeasing an offended Deity be rejected, can the sacrifice be conceived of as owing its acceptability or validity, except to its actual effects in awakening the love of Christ, and of all good, and the hatred of all evil? In what other way can another's suffering, or even the man's own suffering, be conceived of as purging away sin? Or if, as with Dr. Dale, the prominent idea is that the Christian identifies himself with Christ in such wise that he can really be said to have shared in His expiatory sufferings,² what can this mean (in actual sober fact) but that the love of Him who suffered awakens a sorrow for sin which does the work of actual punishment in the contrite heart? After all I cannot but feel that these modern theories of the Atonement are not very deeply held. When the Theologian is defending his own orthodoxy or writing formal theological treatises, then he feels bound, out of deference to tradition, to a system of Biblical exegesis, or to the authority of great names, to repeat more or less of the old language, while he repudiates what will seem to most minds its natural meaning and its logical consequences. But when he leaves the cave of theological formulæ and comes down into the world to speak to the hearts

¹ By none more fully and frankly (among orthodox Theologians) than by Canon Mason, *The Faith of the Gospel*, chap. vi., most of whose language I could cordially adopt, though his attempts to read new meanings into old language are not always quite satisfying.

² On *The Atonement*, ed. xi., 1888, p. 425 sq. This view appears in combination with theories which seem to me attenuations of the traditional views which Dr. Dale repudiates.

and consciences of man, then we find it is usually of the character of God revealed in Christ that he speaks, of the love of Christ for man in life and in death, of the demand which that revelation makes for answering love, of the example of Christ, of the hope inspired by His Resurrection, of the assurance which all this work of Christ brings with it of forgiveness, renewal, and spiritual life for all mankind. It is of these things that the preacher elects by preference to speak rather than of satisfaction or expiation, or mystic identification.

The hold which what I may venture to call Abelard's view of the Atonement (though, as I have pointed out, it is Abelard's only, because he extricated it from the confused and childish notions with which it had been associated)—the hold which this view has obtained over the Church of to-day can hardly be traced back through any direct historical succession to the influence of Abelard. Abelard did indeed shatter for ever the theory of a ransom paid to Satan: and the more refined theories of the Atonement maintained by the later Schoolmen bear witness to his influence. But still the Church did not at once accept Abelard's view in its simplicity and entirety. The Schoolmen who followed Abelard inherited his dialectical method, and something too of his spirit. To men like St. Bernard, the *Summa Theologia* of St. Thomas, with its full statement of objections and free discussion of difficulties, would have seemed as shocking an exhibition of human pride and intellectual self-sufficiency as the *Theologia* of Abelard. But Abelard's successors do not share his boldness, his penetrating keenness of intellectual vision, his uncompromising resolve that, while authority shall have its due weight, neither truth nor reason nor morality shall be sacrificed to it. Even from the slight specimen I have given you of Abelard's teaching you may possibly have been struck with the modernness of his tone. Abelard in the 12th century seems to stretch

out his hands to Maurice and Kingsley and Frederick Robertson in the 19th. At least, I know not where to look for the same spirit of reverent Christian Rationalism in the intervening ages unless it be in the Cambridge Platonists.

Abelard's doctrine of Redemption is not the only feature of his teaching that savours of the modern spirit. The task which Abelard set before himself is precisely the task to which the Church of our day is imperatively called. In Abelard's day the task was essayed—almost for the first time in the history of the Church—of reducing Christian teaching to the form of a systematic and coherent body of philosophical doctrine. The human mind was just awakening from a long slumber, and was insisting that the traditional faith of the Church should give an account of itself. The result of the effort inaugurated by Abelard was the scholastic Theology. The scholastic Theology, in its developed form only partially reproduced the spirit of its parent, but still nothing betrays more unfailingly a lack of the historical spirit and the historical temper than a tone of indiscriminating contempt in speaking of the scholastic Philosophy and the scholastic Theology. It was a noble and stimulating idea surely that of a science of the highest generalisations, a science that should present the deposit of traditional and historical faith in its due relation to all other branches of knowledge, accepting and fusing into itself the highest and the truest that is known from whatever source of God, the World and Man! Such an ideal is surely wanted in days when Theology is in some danger of sinking into the mere antiquarianism, or the mere literary criticism, which are, of course, among the most important of its bases and its instruments.

The new truth which now demands to be adjusted with the old truth is not the same as the new truth of the 12th or the 13th century. Darwinism and historical criticism are to us what the awakening of dialectical activity was to

Abelard, and the re-discovery of a lost Aristotle to Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. The re-statement—let us say boldly the re-construction—of Christian doctrine is the great intellectual task upon which the Church of our day is just entering, and with which it must go on boldly if Christianity is to retain its hold on the intellect as well as the sentiment and the social activities of our time. And, depend upon it, the Church that has lost its hold of the first will not long retain its control of the last. In that great task the reverent study of the past is an essential element. As an age awakens to new spiritual needs, it often finds that its wants have been to a great extent anticipated, though undoubtedly the old truth can only be rescued from oblivion by becoming something different from what it was before. No two ages can ever see exactly alike. In this re-construction of Christian Theology, I am convinced that we have something to learn from the scholastic Theologians, and most of all perhaps from the first, the greatest, the most modern of them all. Partly for this reason—as an illustration of what we may learn from him—I have ventured to speak of Abelard's doctrine of the Atonement, but still more because I believe it to be as noble and as perspicuous a statement as can even yet be found of the faith which is still the life of Christendom.

H. RASHDALL.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF EZRA IV. 6-23.

II.

WE now turn to that other passage in the interesting Book of Ezra, which has been a source of perplexity to commentators, and has led to some untenable hypotheses. We will first describe the position; then state the hypotheses by which it has been attempted to get over the difficulties, and show them to be impossible. And lastly,

give what we believe to be the true explanation, which is perfectly simple and in accordance with the whole structure of the book.

Ezr. iii. 2 to the end of chapter vi. is a consecutive history of the doings of the Jewish captives after their return from Babylon in the reign of Cyrus, king of Persia, under the leadership of Zerubbabel, whose Babylonian name was Sheshbazzar, the adopted grandson of Jeconiah king of Judah, and of Jeshua, the High Priest, the son of Jozadak, who was taken captive to Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar. It runs from the 1st of Cyrus B.C. 536 to the 6th of Darius B.C. 515. But in the middle of this history—viz., in chap. iv. 16-23—is an account of what happened in the reign of Ahasuerus, and then of what happened in the reign of Artaxerxes, in opposition to the work which the Jews had on hand, followed by the words (iv. 24) "Then ceased the work of the House of God which is at Jerusalem; so it ceased unto the second year of Darius king of Persia." If the whole chapter is taken as a consecutive history, which at first sight it has the appearance of being, it follows that the reign of "Ahasuerus" and of "Artaxerxes" came between the reign of Cyrus and that of Darius here named. But we know that Cyrus was succeeded by Cambyses, Cambyses by the usurper Smerdis, Smerdis by Darius Hystaspis, Darius by Xerxes, and Xerxes by Artaxerxes Longimanus. The problem is how to reconcile the Book of Ezra with authentic history.

One hypothesis advocated by some learned men, following in the main Josephus,¹ is that Ahasuerus, in Ezr. iv. 6, means Cambyses, and that Artaxerxes in the next verse means the usurper Smerdis, who succeeded him and reigned for a few months. But as there is no single example in

¹ Josephus (*Antiq.* xi. 2) applies to Cambyses all that is said in Ezra iv. 8-23 of Artaxerxes, but takes no notice of the difference in the name. He takes no notice either of Ahasuerus in Ezra iv. 6; in this, as in other respects, following closely not the canonical Ezra, but the Apocryphal 1 Esdras ii. 16 ff.

profane or sacred history of either Cambyses being called Ahasuerus, or the pseudo-Smerdis being called Artaxerxes, nor of either of these names being borne by any king except the kings commonly known by them, nor any historical support whatever for the idea that these names were hereditary appendages to the names of the reigning sovereigns of Persia, like the Pharaohs of Egypt, or the Cæsars of Rome, the hypothesis has about as much probability in it as one which should explain Queen Victoria to mean Queen Caroline, or King George to mean King James, and may be dismissed without further examination. Only it may just be added, as some recent commentaries (see *Speaker's Commentary*) still accept the solution, that it is a sheer impossibility that the intercourse backwards and forwards from Persia to Judæa, and from Judæa to Persia, should have taken place, and the search in the Babylonian records have been made and reported to the king, in the brief space of seven months, during which Smerdis sat on the throne. Most assuredly, therefore, Artaxerxes in Ezr. iv. 7-23 does not mean Smerdis.

The other hypothesis, which has been extensively supported, is that the Darius of Ezr. iv., v., vi. is not Darius Hystaspis, but Darius II., surnamed Nothus, who began to reign B.C. 424. This hypothesis has the advantage of preserving the sequence Xerxes, Artaxerxes, Darius; but there its merits end, being absolutely impossible. This will be seen by the hastiest glance at the history. In the first year of Cyrus King of Persia, B.C. 536, the Jews, under the leadership of Zerubbabel (here called Sheshbazzar) and Jeshua, came from Babylon to Jerusalem to build the House of the Lord which is in Jerusalem (Ezr. i. 5, 8, 11), and they actually built the altar, and offered on it the daily burnt offerings, and kept the Feast of Tabernacles (Ezr. iii. 2-6).¹ In the following year, B.C. 535, they laid the

¹ Observe that here and at ch. iv. 3 Zerubbabel is called by his own Jewish name.

foundation to the new Temple¹ with great ceremony and rejoicings (Ezr. iii. 8-13), and by so doing excited the enmity of their Samaritan and other Heathen neighbours, who set to work to obstruct the builders, and by hired counsellors succeeded in frustrating the progress of the building, so that it ceased till the second year of King Darius. But in the second of Darius, under the stirring exhortation of Haggai and Zechariah the Prophets, Zerubbabel and Jeshua resumed the work, and actually completed the building in the sixth year of the reign of Darius the King (Ezr. iv. 24; v. 1, 2; vi. 15). If Darius the King means, as is contended, Darius Nothus, the sixth year of his reign was B.C. 418. And we are helped over the stile of the difficulty of Ezr. iv. by being told that Zerubbabel and Jeshua, who were actively engaged in building the Temple in the 2nd of Cyrus, were no less actively employed 117 years afterwards!

The absurdity of such a solution is no less apparent if we approach it from another side. Zerubbabel was the heir of Jeconiah, or Jehoiachin, in the third generation. As it is expressed in our Lord's genealogy, Matt. i. 12: "Jechonias begat Salathiel, and Salathiel begat Zorobabel." How is it possible that one who may be reckoned as Jehoiachin's grandson could have been alive and active in the reign of Darius Nothus? Jehoiachin was fifty-five years old (2 Kings xxiv. 8, xxv. 27) in the year B.C. 562. In B.C. 418, one hundred and sixty-nine years from the time when he was thirty years old, you would expect the fifth or sixth generation to be flourishing, not the third. Again, Jeshua

¹ Some needless difficulty has been felt in regard to Hagg. ii. 18, as if it stated that the foundation of the Lord's House was laid in the 24th day of the 9th month of the 2nd year of King Darius. What the verse really says is this: "Consider now from this day and upward, viz., from the 24th day of the 9th month to the day when the foundation of the Lord's House was laid, consider it." The *terminus a quo* was the 24th day of the 9th month, when Haggai's prophecy was uttered. The *terminus ad quem* (going backwards in point of time) was the day when the foundation of the Lord's House was laid in the 2nd Cyrus,

the High Priest was the son of Jozadak. But Jozadak was carried captive to Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar B.C. 568 (2 Kings xxv. 21; 1 Chron. vi. 15). How could his son be acting as High Priest in the year B.C. 418, one hundred and fifty years afterwards?

Or take another test. In Ezr. iii. 12 we read that many of the Priests and Levites, who were ancient men who had seen the first house, when the foundation of Zerubbabel's temple were laid before their eyes, wept. That would only be fifty-three years after the burning of the Temple by Nebuzar-adan (2 Kings xxv. 9), where men between sixty and seventy years of age might well remember having seen the Temple in their youth. There would, of course, be fewer alive in the second year of Darius Hystaspis, when Haggai put the question, "Who is left among you that saw this House in her first glory?" (Hagg. ii. 3). But a few old men of eighty years old and upwards might well remember what they had seen sixty-eight years before. I myself remember quite distinctly seeing the Emperor Alexander of Russia, and the two Princes of Prussia—afterwards King of Prussia, and the first German Emperor—at a breakfast at Lord Liverpool's villa at Combe Wood when they were in England in the year 1814, now seventy-nine years ago. But to have put such a question in the second year of Darius Nothus, B.C. 422, when nobody could have been left who was not over 170 years old, would have been obviously absurd.

One more chronological argument, and I have done. We read in Zech. iv. 9 "The hands of Zerubbabel have laid the foundation of this House, his hands also shall finish it." And in Ezr. iii. 8-13, v. 2, vi. 7, 14, 15 we read the fulfilment of this prophetic declaration. Is it likely that this prophecy should have been either made or fulfilled if 117 years were to elapse between laying the foundation and finishing the building? (From second Cyrus B.C. 535 to the sixth Darius Nothus B.C. 418.)

But there are other arguments independent of chronology, which are conclusively against understanding Ezr. iv. 6-23 of the times preceding the building of the Temple; and thus removing the only pretext for taking Darius to mean Darius Nothus. Up to the time embraced by Ezr. i.-vi. (except the eighteen verses in question) there has been no mention whatever of the walls of Jerusalem, but only of the Temple. The arguments therefore of Rehum and his companions in Ezra iv. 7-22 are wholly irrelevant to the matter in hand, and can only refer to the later times when the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem was being agitated. They are therefore obviously out of their place here. Josephus seems to have felt this, and therefore following 1 Esdr. ii. 18, 20 introduces twice in the letter of Rathumus (Rehum, Ezr. iv. 3) to Artaxerxes an express mention of the Temple, when there is no such mention in the Book of Ezra. This shows that the difficulty of the passage was felt as early as the writing of the first Esdr., probably in the first or second century before Christ, but gives no help towards explaining the difficulty. If we follow the authentic history as given in the Hebrew text of Ezr. iv. the paragraph *vv.* 6-23, is manifestly out of its place from the mention of the walls of Jerusalem, as well as from the mention of Xerxes and Artaxerxes.

Yet another proof that these verses do not relate to the hindrance of the building of the Temple, from the second of Cyrus to the second of Darius Nothus, is found in the history of the times of Ezra and Nehemiah in the reign of Artaxerxes. Can anything be more certain than that in the reign of Artaxerxes the Temple was standing, and the Temple services regularly conducted? (Ezr. vii. 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 27; viii. 17, 25, 29, 33, 36; ix. 9; x. 1; Neh. vi. 10, 11; x. 32-34, 36-39; xi. 22; xiii. 7, 9, 11, 14). Besides these positive testimonies to the existence of the Temple in the time of Artaxerxes, we have the equally strong nega-

tive evidence of the two books of Ezra and Nehemiah. Not one single word in either of them of regret at the unfinished state of the House of God, not a single word of effort to obtain the King's leave to finish it. Nehemiah is full of zeal and activity in building the city walls, but makes not the slightest mention of the House of God lying level with the ground. In the face of this evidence is it possible to believe that in the friendly reign of Artaxerxes, and in the lifetime of Ezra and Nehemiah, who were one or both in high favour from the seventh to the thirty-second year of his reign, the Temple was lying just as it was left in the reign of Cyrus, before Haggai the Prophet lifted up his stirring voice, and Zerubbabel and Jeshua with all the remnant of the people were stirred up to work in the House of the Lord of Hosts their God (Hagg. i. 3, 12, 14).

The two hypotheses by which it has been attempted to explain *Ezr. iv. 6-23* being now shown to be absolutely impossible, we proceed to give what we have no doubt is in the main the true explanation.

We saw in considering *Ezr. ii.* distinct proof that it did not form part of the original history of the times of Zerubbabel, but was inserted much later by a subsequent compiler. Exactly the same thing has happened here. The original history, as either written or sanctioned by Haggai the Prophet, ran thus: "Then the people of the land weakened the hands of the people of Judah, and troubled them in building, and hired counsellors against them to frustrate their purpose, all the days of Cyrus king of Persia, even until the reign of Darius king of Persia. Then ceased the work of the House of God which is at Jerusalem, and it ceased unto the second year of Darius, king of Persia. Then the prophets, Haggai the Prophet, and Zechariah the son of Iddo, prophesied unto the Jews, etc. Then rose up Zerubbabel . . . and Jeshua . . . and began to build the House of God," etc. (*Ezr. iv. 4, 5, 24; v. 1*), and so on

to the end of chapter vi. where this portion of the history ends, and is followed by a long gap of sixty-two years, in which nothing is recorded. The history is taken up again in the seventh year of Artaxerxes Longimanus B.C. 457. That this history of the times of Zerubbabel, and the building of the Temple, existed in the time of Haggai, there can be little doubt. And that there could be nothing in it about Artaxerxes is of course absolutely certain. But much later, when the history of Nehemiah's times had to be incorporated in the national annals, the then compiler thought to illustrate the opposition of the adversaries of the Jews in the days of Zerubbabel, by similar instances which had since occurred in the reigns of Xerxes and Artaxerxes, and so inserted the history of those hostile efforts which is contained in *Ezr.* iv. 6-23. But this was done with so little skill as to mislead the author of 1 *Esdr.*, and many subsequent readers down to our own times, into the belief that the action described in *Ezr.* iv. 23 caused the ceasing of the work spoken of in *v.* 24, whereas really the work had ceased some sixty years before; and moreover the work that ceased was the "work of the House of God," whilst the work which Rehum and Shimshai and their companions "made to cease by force and power" was the totally different one of building the city walls (*Ezr.* iv. 12, 13, 21), which Zerubbabel and Jeshua had never thought of doing. It is impossible not to suspect strongly that the insertion of *Ezr.* iv. 6-23 in its present place was the work of the same compiler who inserted the second chapter in the previously existing history. The presumable motive—to illustrate the narrative by fresh documents—the unskillfulness with which the insertion was made, and the time when it was inserted, necessarily not before the time of Nehemiah—are all so exactly similar as to suggest the agency of the same hand. The insertion of the name of Artaxerxes in *Ezr.* vi. 14 is of the same kind.

But there is an apparent objection to the foregoing statement that must not be overlooked; I mean the fact that the narrative which ended in Hebrew at Ezr. iv. 5 is taken up in Aramean at iv. 24; whereas you would have expected that after the Aramean insertion of 5-23 the original narrative would have gone on in Hebrew again. But the objection is more apparent than real. It may be assumed with some confidence that under the direction of Haggai there was a complete Hebrew narrative of the times of Zerubbabel down to the finishing of the temple, and the dedication thereof, and the celebration of the Passover; and the archaic expression "the King of Assyria," in Ezr. vi. 22, is a very strong indication that you have in the closing verses of Ezr. vii. a portion of that narrative. But the narrative from Ezr. iv. 24 to Ezr. vi. 18, where the Aramean ends, is so consecutive, and fits on so naturally to Ezr. vi. 19-22, which is in Hebrew, that the probability seems very great that the Aramean is merely the Aramean version of the Hebrew original. The cause of its substitution for the Hebrew I conjecture to be purely accidental. The Aramean was first introduced by transcribing an Aramean document, the letter of Rehum and Shimshai to Artaxerxes, and our attention is specially called to the fact that the letter was "written and interpreted"¹ in Aramean or Syrian (Ezr. iv. 7). Exactly in the same way the letter of Artaxerxes to Ezra is given in the original Aramean (Ezr. vii. 12-26), but then the narrative goes on in Hebrew at v. 27. This would naturally have been the case here, and the insertion of the Aramean document is no explanation of the transition from Hebrew to Aramean in the

¹ Gesenius (*Thes. sub voce* מְתָרְגְּמָן) understands the word to mean "translated," i.e. from Hebrew into Aramean which was the language of communication with the court. It is curious that the same thing has happened in Dan. ii. 4. The introduction of the Aramean speech of the Chaldeans is the occasion of a change in the language which continues to the end of chap. vii. when the Hebrew is resumed and continues to the end of the book.

main body of the history. But it is very likely that the scribe who had written in Aramean Rehum's letter, and the King's answer, may have gone on by mistake to transcribe from the Aramean version instead of from the Hebrew. It seems to the highest degree improbable that there should have been no Hebrew history of the time covered by Ezr. iv., v., vi. The above explanation therefore is not affected by the transition to Aramean.

But whatever was the cause of the continuance of the narrative at Ezr. iv. 24 to vi. 19 in Aramean, which can only be a matter of conjecture, the conclusion we have arrived at that Ezr. iv. 6-23 is no part of the history which ends at chap. vi. 22, but refers to later times, is sure and certain. One or two detached points remain to be considered.

1. The identity of Sheshbazzar and Zerubbabel has in the previous pages been assumed. But the proofs of it are not far to seek. In Ezr. i. 8, Sheshbazzar is called "the prince of Judah," הַנְּשִׂיא לְיְהוּדָה. Now this title can belong to nobody but Zerubbabel, who was the hereditary chief of the tribe of Judah, the lineal descendant of King David, and the heir of his throne. It was not conferred upon him by Cyrus, it was his own rank by birth. In Num. vii. 10 we read of "the princes" הַנְּשִׂאִים, and then in the following verses to the end of the chapter we have the name and offerings of "the Prince" of each separate tribe. Zerubbabel was נֶקֶדָה or "Governor" (Ezr. v. 14, vi. 7) by the appointment of Cyrus, Ezr. v. 14; he was "Prince of Judah" by hereditary succession. This alone is quite sufficient to establish his identity with Zerubbabel. Everything else agrees with this. Ezr. i. 11, *Sheshbazzar* brings up the vessels of gold and silver with the captives who came from Babylon to Jerusalem; Ezr. ii. 1, 2, the captives come up from Babylon to Jerusalem "with *Zerubbabel*"; Ezr. v. 15, *Sheshbazzar* "lays the foundation of the House

of God." Ezr. iii. 8, 10, 11; Zech. iv. 9, Zerubbabel "laid the foundation of this House." Ezr. v. 14, vi. 7, Sheshbazzar is "Governor," at the very time when we know from the history and from Haggai i. 1, ii. 2, that Zerubbabel was the governor. So that the identification is complete whatever may be said to the contrary.

As regards the double name, one his Jewish and the other his Babylonian name, it is in exact accordance with what we know was the practice of the kings of Babylon. When a foreigner was taken into the royal service he received a Babylonian name. Thus Daniel received the name of Belteshazzar; Hananiah, that of Shadrach; Mishael, that of Meshach; Azariah, that of Abed-nego (Dan. i. 6, 7, ii. 26). It is also noteworthy that those thus taken into the king's personal service were "of the king's seed, and of the princes"¹ (Dan. i. 3), and in like manner Zerubbabel was of the royal family. So that the precedents are complete.

2. The composite nature of the book is deserving of especial notice. The first six chapters (with the exception of chap. ii. and iv. 6-23) is a continuous history of the returned captives from the first year of Cyrus to the sixth year of Darius Hystaspis. But it does not follow that the whole was by the same hand. In my article on "Ezra, Book of," in the *Dictionary of the Bible*, I gave what still appear to me strong reasons for believing that Ezra i. is mainly the work of Daniel, and among them the calling Zerubbabel by his Babylonian name. As the transition chapter between the history of the captives at Babylon, and the history of the captives returned to Jerusalem, it would naturally fall to his lot to write it as the responsible prophet. For the same reason the following chapters

¹ The word עֲבָדֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ is not that here used, but הַפְּרָתְמִים, a Persian word rendered in Greek ἑνδοξοί, εὐγενεῖς, rendered in the A. V. "nobles" Esth. i. 3 most noble" Esth. vi. 9.

(iii.-vi.) were, we can hardly doubt, either written or at least superintended by Haggai the Prophet. Some special reasons for believing this are given in the article in the *Dictionary of the Bible* above referred to. But at chap. vii. and following chapters Ezra himself comes on the stage not only as actor but also as author. Ezr. vii. 8, 9, seems to show that the early part of the chapter, though speaking of Ezra in the third person, was written by him, and he speaks in the first person throughout chap. viii. and ix. Chap. x. may with probability be assigned to him also.

But then it must be remembered that the contemporary annals of these several writers underwent a revision by a subsequent compiler or editor—possibly more than one—before they were incorporated in the sacred volume as a continuation of the Books of Chronicles in the shape in which we have it. This is proved by the additions already noticed of chap. ii., iii. 1, iv. 6-23, and the insertion of the name of Artaxerxes at vi. 14. But there may have been besides these additions many omissions and abbreviations, just as when the writer of the Books of Kings, *e.g.*, again and again, after recording certain events in the reigns of such and such kings, adds, Now the rest of the acts of Solomon, Rehoboam, Ahab, etc., are they not written in the Book of the Chronicles, etc? So that we have not in Ezra, any more than in any other part of the Historical Scriptures, the complete work of any prophet or annalist relating to any period, but only such extracts from them as sufficed to give to the Church such a record as to the Providence of God seemed fit.

It is to forgetfulness of the peculiar character of the Old Testament annals that we owe so many mistakes on the part of commentators. The very inquiries into the authorship of this or that book are conducted in a way that cannot lead to a satisfactory result. Anachronisms, the use of particular words, and similar arguments which would be of the

utmost weight if applied to a printed book, are worthless when applied to the books of Scripture, which are made up, as we have seen the Book of Ezra is, of contemporaneous documents worked up by later hands into the form in which we now have them, with such additions as they thought conduced to the completeness of the whole.

To this cause may be ascribed those anachronisms in names and such like in the older Books of Scripture, which have led some critics to the monstrous conclusion, against an enormous mass of evidence, that the books of Moses are mainly of post-exilic origin. The simple fact is that the successive editors occasionally modernized names of places, or added scraps of genealogies, or other matter which seemed to make the documents they were editing more intelligible. A good example of the modernizing process may be found in 1 Esdr. as compared with the book of Ezra. In Ezra (iv. 10, 11, 17; v. 3, 6; vi. 6, 13; vii. 23) the province of which Judæa formed part is always spoken of as being עֵבֶר נְהַרָה, "beyond the river," and the governor is described as פְּחֹת עֵבֶר נְהַרָה, "governor beyond the river," *i.e.* the country to the west of the Euphrates.¹ But in the parallel passages in 1 Esdr. the country is spoken of as "Coele-Syria and Phœnice," the name it acquired in or after the time of Alexander the Great (1 Esdr. ii. 17, 24, 27; iv. 48; vii. 1).

To sum up Immediately we recognise the true composition of the Book of Ezra, the difficulties of chronology, of personal names, of erroneous numbers, of incongruous history, vanish away. The book tells a consistent and most edifying and instructive story. The minor difficulties which remain are in harmony with the cessation of the prophetic office, which conduced so remarkably to the integrity of the earlier books of Scripture, and the discovery resulting from

¹ The Hebrew and Aramæan phrase is indifferently translated "on this side" or "beyond."

the less skilful compilation of these later books sheds an important light upon many difficulties in those earlier books which it might otherwise have been more difficult to elucidate.

ARTHUR C. BATH. & WELL.

THE DIFFICULT WORDS OF CHRIST.

III. THINGS NEW AND OLD.¹

THE words of our Lord contain many counsels to Christian teachers; but this one is in certain respects peculiar. In other sayings He expatiates on the spirit in which work for Him ought to be done; but here he enters in an unusual way into practical detail. In others He speaks in the character of the supreme Lord, who sends forth the labourers into His vineyard; but here He appears rather as Himself a worker for the kingdom, who has had to find out the path and gives His fellow-labourers the benefit of His experience.

The name which he employs for Christian teachers is noteworthy: He calls them scribes—"every scribe who is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven."

This is a singular name for Him to use. The "scribes," in the New Testament and especially in Christ's own history, occupy a sinister position, and theirs is an evil name. The Christian generations look back to them with disfavour, and Christian writers never weary of satirising their pedantic learning and orthodox absurdities. Jesus Himself delivered against them the most scorching philippics, branding them with everlasting contempt. It might naturally, then, have been expected that scribes

¹ "Therefore every scribe that is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an householder, which bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old."—*Matt.* xiii. 52.

would have no place in the new order of things which He came to found—that, though they were instructed for the use of the synagogue, there would be none of them instructed for the Church. Christ's own name, however, for Christianity is “the kingdom of heaven,” and here He speaks of “every scribe who is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven”—that is instructed so as to be of use in forwarding Christianity.¹ Nor is this the only occasion on which He applies this name to the propagators of His faith.²

There can be little doubt that what was in His mind was the occupation of the scribes with the Word of God. They searched the Scriptures: this was the duty to which they were set apart: and it was from this that their name was derived. They performed their duty very badly; and their practices will always be a warning to those to whom the same duty is committed. Yet the Word of God abideth forever; and our Lord foresaw that this was to be the weapon with which His followers were to subdue the world.

He made use of it Himself. Utter as was His contempt for the way in which the scribes of His day handled the holy oracles, yet He searched in the book on which the labour of these pedants was expended more diligently than any of them. In His own private life He sought and found in it the description of the path to pursue, and in temptation He repelled with it the attacks of the Wicked One. When He became a preacher, not only did He make use of it to confirm His doctrine, but His ordinary language was steeped in its spirit and studded with its phraseology, and in controversy He fell back continually on its authority.

Undoubtedly this was an example which the Founder of

¹ Meyer supposes “kingdom of heaven” to be personified, and the scribe to be apprenticed to it or sent into its school. This is the force of the construction *μαθητευθείς τινι*.

² Cf. Matt. xxiii. 34.

our religion intended its propagators to follow, especially when they came into possession of the ampler Bible which He was going to give to His Church. The new Bible may, indeed, be misused, as the old one was: it may be converted into a stronghold of error, or an armoury of bigotry, or a tomb of charity. But, used as Jesus Himself employed so much of it as was then in existence, it will always be indispensable; and he who would be of much use to the kingdom of God must be mighty in the Scriptures.

The equipment of the Christian teacher is peculiarly designated: it is called a treasure—he “bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old.”

The metaphor is taken either from the chest in which the jewels of a wealthy family are kept,¹ or from the store-room in which a householder keeps the provisions necessary for the sustenance of his children and servants. Perhaps the latter is the more likely; a Christian teacher is one who supplies spiritual sustenance for his fellow creatures; and, in order to be able to do so, he must have it in store, he must have a treasure.

Where is this treasure? As the word “scribe” designates the servant of Christ as one who seeks what he requires in the Word of God, it might be thought that the Bible is the treasure. And this would give an intelligible enough sense—that the Bible is a treasure-house, over which the Christian teacher presides, bringing out of it what is needed on every occasion. The connexion, however, as we shall see further on, does not permit the idea to be restricted to this.

The treasure of a Christian teacher is not anything outside of himself, such as the Bible: it is within him. It is a storehouse or magazine in the mind, which he has

¹ The receptacles out of which the Wise Men (Matt. ii. 11) brought forth their gifts are so called.

filled with spiritual accumulations. Though the mind is not a substance extended in space or divisible into parts, yet it is natural to give to our conceptions of it a visual form ; and our Lord here thinks of it as containing a store-house or magazine, which He may have conceived as a single room or perhaps as a series of apartments, opening out of one another and supplied with shelves and compartments for distributing the contents in their proper places.¹

Such is the Christian teacher's treasure. But what is it filled with? It is filled with what is necessary for the work he has to do as a witness for God and a messenger to men.

Some of the accumulations are obtained from Scripture. Although the Bible, as we have seen, is not itself the treasure, yet there is much from Scripture in the treasure ; and the more the better. In a sense all Scripture belongs to every man ; but, in a deeper sense, only as much of it belongs to anyone as he has appropriated. There are parts of Scripture which we have made our own by living through them. We have fastened our attention on them and dug at them till we have found their secret. Better still, some of them have, so to speak, come out of the Bible of their own accord, and ministered to our necessities. They have cheered us in tribulation and strengthened us in temptation, they have inspired us with courage and caused our hearts to burn with delight. Such of the contents of Scripture as have thus become our own by experience are our possessions in a way in which the bulk of the Bible is not ; and these form a valuable part of our treasure.

Among the most precious contents of the treasure may be reckoned all other personal religious experiences. The first canon of religious work is that he who would com-

¹ Elsewhere He employs the same metaphor. Matt. xii. 35.

municate religion to others must have it himself; and, the more of it he has, the fitter is he for the position. He who knows by experience what repentance and faith are, and who carries in his memory the record of his own dealings with God in temptation and trouble, about his aspirations and his failures, his plans and his hopes, has a treasure filled with the best of materials.

Another important addition to the treasure is acquaintance with the experiences of others. To have seen God's work in the souls of men is a precious possession. Some have the gift of enticing forth the confidences of others about their secret life; and to him who thus knows the history of human souls on an extensive scale the world is open; he can tap the fountains of interest with skill and meet the exact need of every condition. Knowledge of human nature in general and of human life, in its different grades and varieties, is also very valuable; because the aim of Christianity is to transform all life, and, if it is to bless men, it must be closely acquainted with their needs. Many other kinds of knowledge, however, may go into this wonderful magazine and treasure-house. As we shall see, Jesus Himself was conspicuously catholic in His conceptions of what it might advantageously contain.

How enormously the treasures of different Christian teachers differ from one another! They differ in size: one is small and empty, another large and ever widening. They differ in the quality of their contents: in one the materials are common or out of date, in another they have been sought with unceasing diligence and selected with cultured discrimination. They differ in accessibility and usefulness: one store-room is like a lumber-room, where many valuable things are cast, but in such disorder that nothing can be laid hands on when it is wanted, while, in another, everything is so well arranged that it offers itself for use just at the moment when it is required.

These and other differences distinguish one man's treasure from another, and on the size and quality of his treasure will depend a Christian teacher's usefulness.

We have seen how the treasure is filled. But it is filled that it may be emptied again for the good of the world; and our Lord indicates how this is to be done in the words—"bringeth out of his treasure things new and old."

This is generally understood to recommend a pleasing variety in Christian teaching. Old and well-known truths are to be often repeated, because people are apt to forget them: line has to be given upon line and precept upon precept; yet, on the other hand, it does not do to harp always on the same string; and, therefore, as much novelty must be introduced from time to time as may be needed to keep the attention awake. This is good advice; at least it is tolerably good; but it is utterly common-place, and entirely beneath the height and dignity of the teaching of Jesus.

What He intended is seen from observing in what connexion this saying occurs. Jesus had been teaching many things in parables; and to His disciples apart He entered into an explanation of His reasons for adopting this mode of teaching. He extolled it as the best for His purpose, and He finished with commending its use to His disciples also. This he does in this verse, which is, therefore, in the first place, a characterization of His own parabolic mode of teaching.

In what sense is a parable the bringing forth of things new and old? If by the old we understand the well-known and familiar, and by the new the unknown or unfamiliar, it is not difficult to see; for a parable may be defined to be a familiar incident setting forth an unfamiliar truth. In His parables Jesus painted pictures of the common life of Galilee and Judea which enchanted His hearers; for

“ We’re made so that we love
First when we see them painted things we’ve passed
Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see.”

This was the old ; but, almost before the hearers were aware, the new—namely, the doctrine of the kingdom—was conveyed into their minds by means of this vehicle.

The old and the new are not, therefore, to be brought out of the treasure apart—sometimes the one and sometimes the other—but they are to be brought forth together, in such a way that what is already well known and familiar may become the stepping-stone by which to ascend to what is novel and recondite. Nature is old ; human nature is old ; human life is old ; but Christianity is new : that which is natural is first, and afterwards comes that which is spiritual : but let him who brings the spiritual search in the natural for points of connexion, to which he may hook it on : this is the wisdom of the great Teacher.

Another illustration of how He obeyed His own maxim is to be found in His use of the Old Testament. To His hearers the figures, the institutions and the teachings of the Law and the Prophets were old—that is, well known and familiar—whereas the facts and truths which were to be embodied in the New Testament were novel and unfamiliar. But He brought them forth together in such a way that the ancient teaching, whose authority His hearers acknowledged led them on to comprehend and accept the new. St. Paul’s method of teaching in the synagogues was the very same : he always began with a review of Jewish history, and, when he had gone so far with his hearers upon familiar ground, he tried, by the impulse thus communicated, to carry them over the gulf which separated them from Christianity. The Epistle to the Hebrews is, from beginning to end, a brilliant illustration of the same method.

In one sense we cannot here follow the Lord and the Apostles, because, the Old Testament is not now the old, in

the sense of the familiar, and the New the unfamiliar. Rather the case is reversed: the New Testament is the stepping-stone by which we must ascend to the Old. Yet in a deeper sense the case stands as it used to do. For what, speaking in the broadest sense, is the Old Testament, and what is the New? The Old is the revelation of law, the New of love. The Old was given to rouse the conscience and produce the sense of sin, the New to meet the sense of misery thus produced and satisfy the conscience by the glad tidings of reconciliation. In this sense the Old and the New are still to be brought forth together in Christ's own order; because to preach law alone is to awaken hunger without giving bread, and to preach love alone is to offer bread to those who are not hungry.

It might be, further, shown that Jesus acted Himself on the direction He gave to others when, in His teaching, He began with the simpler elements of the kingdom, as in the Sermon on the Mount, and then, when these were learnt and in this sense old, advanced by means of them to the deeper mysteries, as in His farewell discourse. But the principle is clear and need not be illustrated further.

We may fail to follow it for either of two reasons. Some do not know the old things well enough: they do not know human nature or human life; they are unsympathetic; they do not know how to find people where they are, or to estimate the stage of knowledge and attainment which they have reached. They are far advanced themselves and expatiate on the mysteries of experience; but what they say has a far-away and unearthly sound, and their hearers are not won. Others know the old well, but they know too little of the new. They sympathize with the natural man and can describe common life with pathos, but they are cold when they begin to speak of that which is spiritual—of grace and regeneration and sanctification. Or they may be able to teach with real feeling the first elements of Christian experience, but their

hearers are soon left in the lurch. It is no unusual complaint that the circle of a preacher's ideas is so narrow that those who have heard him for a year or two have nothing more to learn from him, because, whatever text he may choose, he puts into it the same message. At bottom this means that his own experience has ceased to grow. We need to develop in two directions—first, man-wards, in sympathy and comprehension, so that we shall be able to find even the simplest where they stand and lead them by the help of what they know already to what is not yet known to them; and, at the same time, God-wards, in the experience of grace, so that those who follow our guidance may continually find themselves entering into fresh fields and pastures new.

JAMES STALKER.

SOME EARLY EVIDENCE FOR THE TWELVE
VERSES ST. MARK XVI. 9-20.

IT has been said that in the whole Greek ante-Nicene literature there are *at most but two traces* of St. Mark xvi. 9-20. My purpose in these notes is to show by a few instances that the early evidence for the disputed twelve verses has perhaps been understated.

1. IRENÆUS.

“Irenæus (188) clearly cites xvi. 19 as St. Mark's own (*In fine autem evangelii ait Marcus, corresponding to Marcus interpres et sectator Petri initium evangelicæ conscriptionis fecit sic*); and the fidelity of the Latin text is supported by a Greek scholium” (W. H., *App.* 39). See lib. iii. 11. 6 in Harvey's Irenæus (vol. ii., p. 39).

Irenæus writes that St. Mark's “beginning of the Gospel” (i. 1) was fulfilment of prophecy; and that in accordance with this beginning he writes at the end, *So then the Lord Jesus, after He had spoken unto them, was*

received up into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of God; thus confirming the prophecy of Psalm cx. : "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thy enemies thy footstool."

2. JUSTIN MARTYR.

Having such testimony to the disputed twelve verses in the latter half of the second century, we may go back a generation to Justin Martyr, and seek for traces of them in his acknowledged writings, without any presumption against the possibility of his acquaintance with them. The New Testament will in general be cited in Greek from Westcott and Hort's edition, and in English from the Revised Version of 1881. Before seeking traces of verses 9-20 we must notice what are their characteristics, not neglecting the previous labours of learned assailants of the verses, who have duly emphasized some of their peculiarities of thought and diction, and thus made it the easier to recognise allusions to them.

Mark xvi. 9. *Now when he was risen early on the first day of the week, he appeared first to Mary Magdalene.*

When He was risen (ἀναστὰς), on the first day (πρώτη), He appeared (ἐφάνη). Each of the words ἀναστὰς, πρώτη, ἐφάνη is in a sense peculiar to this verse, as is also the statement that Christ rose on the first day. In Matthew xxviii. 6 we find only, "He is not here; for He is risen, even as He said," risen before the arrival of the women, who came "late on the Sabbath day as it began to dawn toward the first day of the week" (ver. 1). Some—notice the harmonistic rendering of the Authorised Version—have found this hard to reconcile with St. Mark's ἀναστὰς πρώτη, and have suspected that Mark xvi. 9 must be spurious: see Eusebius to Marinus in W. H., *App.* 31: others condemn the self-same verse for its "otiose triple repetition." But we have not as yet found, except in that verse, express

testimony to His rising *on the first day*, nor do I know that other such Gospel testimony is to be found. That "He hath been raised on the third day" is of itself indecisive of the day of the week. Early fathers dwell upon the Lord's rising on a Sunday as a cardinal historic fact: and if in so doing they express themselves more or less in terms of the disputed verse 9, we may think (unless reason can be shown to the contrary) that they accepted it as part of the Gospel as it had come down to them.

In Mark xvi. 2, 9, 14 three Greek words are represented by "was risen" (R.V.). In Matthew xxviii. 6 the Greek for "He was risen" is ἠγέρθη, and this word, and not ἀνέστη, is used throughout the Gospel narratives properly so-called of the Resurrection—that is to say, excluding the predictive δεῖ ἀναστῆναι—except in Mark xvi. 9, where we have the latter word in the participial form ἀναστὰς. This is therefore in a sense distinctly characteristic of that verse.

No less characteristic is its expression πρώτη for "on the first day," which is alleged as proof of the spuriousness of the verse. The evening and the morning were "day one (μία)"; and this Hebraism is used in the Gospels for the first day of the week, except in Mark xvi. 9, where it is called—as some say by a Latinism, pointing to the Roman origin of the section—not the "one" but the "first" day.

A third word, peculiar in a sense to the same verse is ἐφάνη, "he appeared," which is found there only of appearances of the Lord after the Resurrection. The words for "appear" (R.V.) in Acts i. 3 and 1 Corinthians xv. 5-8 are different. Thus we have found four things peculiar in a sense to Mark xvi. 9, namely, its distinct specification of the day of the Resurrection, and the two words which express this, and the word expressing that "He appeared" on that day.

Justin, in *Trypho* § 138, speaks of the "day eighth in number, in which our Christ *appeared* (ἐφάνη), *when He was risen* (ἀναστάς) from the dead, but in rank ever *first* (πρώτης)," laying stress upon the word "first" to which special attention is always called in discussions of the twelve verses.

In *Apol.* i. 67 he tells us that "On Sunday so-called there is an assemblage of all, whether resident in town or country, and the *Memoirs of the Apostles* or the writings of the Prophets are read (p. 98 D). . . . And on Sunday it is that we all assemble, since it is the *first* (πρώτη) day, on which God changed the darkness and matter and made *cosmos*, and Jesus Christ our Saviour on the same day *rose* (ἀνέστη) from the dead; for on the day before Saturday they crucified Him, and on Sunday, the day after Saturday, *He appeared* (φανείς) to His apostles and disciples and taught these things" (p. 99 A, B).

In each case Justin states expressly and emphatically that Christ rose on the first day, and in each he has a threefold verbal agreement with St. Mark as tabulated below :

MARK XVI. 9.	APOL. I. 67.	TRYPHO 138.
ἀναστάς	ἀνέστη	ἀναστάς
πρώτη	πρώτη	πρώτης
ἐφάνη	φανείς	ἐφάνη

Hence (1) the verse Mark xvi. 9, or something closely resembling it, must have formed part of his "Memoirs of the Apostles," and (2) it must have been much relied upon as Gospel authority for the fact of the Resurrection upon a Sunday, and for the consequent observance of the first day of the week as the Lord's Day.

Mark xvi. 17. *And these signs shall follow them that believe : in My name shall they cast out devils.*

On this and the following verse it has been said, that they "contain suspicious circumstances—an excessive love of the miraculous. Miracles and the power of performing them are attributed to all believers." This again is a criticism which I welcome as serviceable for my present purpose, since it sets in strong relief the powers assigned to the faithful as such, one of which was the power to exorcise *δαιμόνια*. Akin to these verses is Matthew vii. 22, "Many will say to Me in that day, Lord, Lord, did we not . . . by Thy name cast out devils, and by Thy name do many mighty works?" But peculiar to Mark xvi. 17 is its place in a narrative of the Lord's Resurrection and Ascension, and its express promise of the power named to "them that believe."

The assertion that this power was possessed by such persons is a salient feature in the writings of Justin.

In *Trypho* § 85 he writes that *by the name* of Him who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and *arose* (*ἀναστάντος*) from the dead, and went up to heaven every *devil* (*δαιμόνιον*) when exorcised is vanquished and made subject.

In *Trypho* § 76 he quotes Matthew vii. 22 (p. 301 D), and adds that now we *that believe* (*οἱ πιστεύοντες*) in our Lord Jesus, who was crucified, have all *devils* (*δαιμόνια*) and evil spirits subject to us by exorcism.

These and other passages in his works ascribe to *believers* the power of casting out *devils by the name* of Christ, and they connect this power with the Lord's Resurrection and Ascension. The express mention of *οἱ πιστεύοντες* as having this power, and some other things in the passages in question, point again to Mark xvi. 9 *sq.* as one of Justin's sources.

Mark xvi. 20. *And they went forth, and preached everywhere* (*ἐξελθόντες ἐκήρυξαν πανταχοῦ*), *the Lord working with them, and confirming the word by the signs that followed.*

"The Greek patristic evidence for *vv.* 9-20 perhaps

begins with Justin (*Ap.* i. 45), who interprets . . . Psalm cx. 3 as predictive τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ ὃν ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλήμ οἱ ἀπόστολοι αὐτοῦ ἐξελθόντες πανταχοῦ ἐκήρυξαν. . . . On both sides the evidence is slight, and decision seems impossible" (W. H., *App.* 39).

With reference to this apparent quotation from our verse 20 "*the word which . . . they went forth and preached everywhere,*" Dr. Samuel Davidson remarks that "probably Justin Martyr" had the disputed twelve verses before him (1868). Scrivener, following Burgon, judged that they were cited "unquestionably by Justin Martyr" (1874). The late Dean Alford, perhaps not thinking of *Apol.* i. 45, asserted that Justin took no notice of the verses. To Westcott and Hort "decision seems impossible": that is to say from *Apol.* i. 45 only. But what has been said above on other passages, and in *The Witness of Hermas to the Four Gospels* on that passage, may to some readers seem to suffice to turn the scale. If not, there is still much more to be said in proof that Justin knew the so-called appendix to St. Mark's Gospel. It seems to me that he was well acquainted with it; knew it (like Irenæus) as part of one of the Gospels customarily read in his own day on Sunday; and has frequent allusions to things in it, some of which are not mentioned in these notes.

3. THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS.

The Epistle of Barnabas was perhaps written about 120 A.D. Its parallelisms with Justin's works are of such a nature that the two writers can scarcely have been wholly independent of one another. If Justin did not quote Barnabas, the ideas common to them must have been drawn in part from the Church teaching of their day. They speak in like terms of the Christian observance of the "eighth day," and had presumably the same Gospel authority for holding it in honour as the day of the Resurrection.

In *Epist. Barn.* xv. 9, we read: "Wherefore also we celebrate the *eighth* day unto gladness, whereon Jesus arose (ἀνέστη) from the dead, and was manifested (ἐφανερώθη), and went up to the heavens." The word *eighth* implies the use of *πρώτη* as by Justin and St. Mark; the word *arose*, and the fact of the ascent to *heaven*, are common to the Evangelist and Barnabas: and these agree in two other points which must now be mentioned.

St. Mark xvi. 12-14: *And after these things He was manifested (ἐφανερώθη) in another form unto two of them as they walked. . . . And afterward He was manifested (ἐφανερώθη) unto the eleven themselves as they sat at meat.*

Here ἐφανερώθη is used twice of appearances of the Lord after the Resurrection. It is so used again once only in the New Testament, namely, in John xxi. 14, "This is now the third time that Jesus was manifested to the disciples after that He was risen from the dead." St. John indeed uses also ἐφάνερωσεν ἑαυτὸν in the like sense, *He manifested Himself*, but it remains that ἐφανερώθη, *He was manifested*, may be said to be characteristic of the disputed twelve verses. We may therefore reckon φανερωθεῖς, *having been manifested*, in the passage from Barnabas, as a perhaps not undesigned coincidence with St. Mark.

Again, Mr. Rendal quotes from the book *Supernatural Religion*: "In making the Resurrection, appearances to the disciples, and the Ascension take place in one day, the author [of *Epist. Barn.*] is in agreement with Justin Martyr, who made use of a Gospel different from ours." The statement is open to criticism. Were it in part true, we might say that Barnabas and Justin had the twelve verses for their authority, interpreted them hastily, and so were led to express themselves as they have done; for in the said verses there is no palpable break between the Resurrection and the Ascension. A short summary of Mark

xvi. 9-19 is "On the first day He arose; He was manifested; He ascended to heaven." And this is what Barnabas says, agreeing in substance with the eleven verses, and, except as regards the Ascension, with their phraseology; for his "eighth" implies *πρώτη* (rather than *μία*) for "first" day. The hypothesis that they were acquainted with the ending of St. Mark's Gospel, accounts for the passage quoted from Barnabas as well as for the parallels in Justin.

We have seen that there are other indications that Justin knew the passage; and when we go back some three decades to the earlier writer, who has such striking coincidences with Justin, we do not need any great mass of evidence to make it probable, or not improbable, that he knew what was known to Justin. Their singular agreement in the matter of the "eighth" day at once raises a presumption that they rested upon the same authority for its religious observance.

But if Barnabas knew the twelve verses, he ought perhaps to show other traces of them in his *Epistle*. Of such actual or possible traces, I will here mention one only. If he knew Mark xvi. 17, with its promise of miraculous powers to true believers indiscriminately, this would certainly have appealed strongly to a writer of his individualizing bias, and we might have expected to find some trace of the verse in his writings. Further, we might have anticipated, from his inveterate habit of spiritualizing, that he would have been tempted to explain away the outward fact of demoniacal possession and make the "devils" tendencies in the heart of man. Accordingly, in *Epist. Barn.* xvi. 7, we read: "Before we *believed* (*πιστεῦσαι*) our heart was truly a temple made by hand, for it was full of idolatry, and a house of *devils* (*δαιμονίων*), because we did whatsoever things were contrary to God. But it shall be built upon the *name* of the Lord." This is his way of

saying, They that *believe* do thereby cast out *devils in the name* of the Lord Jesus.

4. THE QUARTODECIMAN CONTROVERSY.

The late Bishop Lightfoot wrote of Polycarp of Smyrna, who flourished not very long before the date to which we have traced the twelve verses :

“In the closing years of his life he paid a visit to Rome, where he conferred with the Bishop Anicetus. They had other points of difference to discuss, but one main subject of their conference was the time of celebrating the Passion. Polycarp pleaded the practice of St. John, and the other Apostles with whom he had conversed, for observing the actual day of the Jewish Passover, the 14th Nisan, without respect to the day of the week. On the other hand, Anicetus could point to the fact that his predecessors, at least as far back as Xystus, who succeeded to the see soon after the beginning of the century, had always kept the anniversary of the Passion on a Friday, and that of the Resurrection on a Sunday, thus making the day of the month give place to the day of the week.”

The weekly observance of the first day as the day of the Lord's Resurrection prepared the way for the decision of this controversy in the above sense. If St. Mark's "when He was risen on the first day" was the most obvious Gospel authority for the Christian observance of Sunday in each week, it would have served as an argument for keeping Easter always on a first day; and the argument would have commended itself all the more to a bishop of Rome if the verse was found in a Gospel traditionally associated with that city. St. Mark's Gospel generally satisfies this condition; and in the twelve verses, the very expression "first" day (as above remarked) has been thought by some to be a sign of their Roman origin. Can we confirm the hypothesis that one of the twelve verses

decided the Quartodeciman controversy by adducing evidence that they were known at Rome before or about the end of the first century?

5. CLEMENT OF ROME.

Clem. R. § 42 runs thus in the translation in Lightfoot's edition:—

“The Apostles received the Gospel for us from the Lord Jesus Christ; Jesus Christ was sent forth from God. So then Christ is from God, and the apostles are from Christ. . . . Having therefore received a charge, and having been fully assured through the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, and confirmed in the word of God with full assurance of the Holy Ghost, *they went forth* (ἐξήλθον) with the glad tidings that the kingdom of God should come. So *preaching* (κηρύσσοντες) everywhere in country and town, they appointed their firstfruits, when they had proved them by the Spirit, to be bishops and deacons unto them that should believe.”

Thus the Roman Clement, for St. Mark's ἐξελεθόντες ἐκήρυξαν πανταχοῦ, has ἐξήλθον κηρύσσοντες, with a paraphrase for the word πανταχοῦ, which he had used in the previous chapter of his *Epistle*.

If St. Clement knew the twelve verses, they must have been known to Anicetus, and cited by him against Polycarp's authorities for regulating the date of Easter by the Jewish calendar. If he so cited them, they must have contributed not a little to a decision which has governed the usage of the Church from that day till now. That decision was the logical sequel to the disestablishment of the Sabbath by the hebdomadal observance of the First Day.

C. TAYLOR.

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

VIII. THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD.

THE idea expressed by the phrase "the righteousness of God" occupies the central place in St. Paul's theology, and contains his answer to the question, What was the great boon which came into the world by Jesus Christ. That the Christian *summum bonum* should assume this aspect to his mind was to be expected in the case of one who even in the pre-Christian period of his life had been animated by an intense though misguided passion for righteousness. Righteousness had always appeared the chief good to this man; he had sought it long in vain, and when at length he found it he gave to it a name expressive of its infinite worth to his heart: the righteousness of *God*. It is a name which he has deliberately chosen and to which he steadfastly adheres, using it in all his epistles when opportunity occurs,¹ a fact all the more noteworthy that he is not, like the scholastic theologian, the slave of a phrase, or unable or unwilling to vary the mode of expression. He speaks now of the righteousness of faith,² anon of being justified by faith,³ at another time of faith being imputed for righteousness,⁴ and in all these cases the idea he wishes to express is essentially the same.

The righteousness of God, as the apostle conceives it, is something which belongs to the Christian man, yet is not his personal righteousness. It is a thing revealed⁵ and to which a man submits.⁶ It also belongs to God, yet is not His personal righteousness. It is a "gift"⁷ from God to

¹ *Rom.* i. 17; iii. 21, 22; x. 3; 2 *Cor.* v. 21; *Phil.* iii. 9.

² *Phil.* iii. 9. ³ *Rom.* v. 1. ⁴ *iv.* 24. ⁵ i. 17. ⁶ x. 3. ⁷ v. 17.

men. It is divine credit for being righteous bestowed on a man when he believes in or trusts God. God accounts one who believes in His grace righteous, He reckons his faith for righteousness. So the apostle puts the matter in *Romans iv.*

This is the Pauline doctrine in its simplest, most elementary, undeveloped form. It gives, it will be observed, great prominence and importance to *faith*. Why may appear on further enquiry, but meantime it may be worth while to lay to heart the fact, and to weigh the significance of St. Paul's doctrine in its most general and fundamental aspect.

1. The doctrine is in the first place the very antithesis of Judaism. The watchword of Judaistic righteousness was "works," individual acts of conformity to law; that of the new evangelic righteousness is faith, trust in the living, loving God. "Do" said the one, "believe" says the other.

2. Obviously the change in the watchword implies *an altered idea of God*. For Saul the legalist God was an exacting taskmaster, for Paul the Christian God has become the God of Jesus, a benignant gracious giver. What a revolution! No wonder the term "grace," *χάρις*, is of frequent occurrence in St. Paul's pages, and also faith, *πίστις*, its counterpart; for to grace in God answers faith, reciprocity, in man. And of what perennial value is the doctrine that man is justified by *faith* and not by works, and that God is such a Being that justification by faith is possible and *alone* possible! It is the charter of Christian liberty for all time: of emancipation from legalism with its treadmill service, and fear, and gloom, and uncertainty; from laborious self-salvation whether by religious ceremonial, or by orthodox opinions, or by the magic power of sacraments.¹

¹ On this *vide* J. Freeman Clarke's *The Ideas of the Apostle Paul translated into their modern equivalents* (1884) chapter v.

3. We may be sure that for Paul the ex-legalist, the intense hungerer after righteousness, who had abandoned Judaism because he had discovered its righteousness to be a vanity and vexation of spirit, the new-found righteousness of God is a great reality. "Faith imputed for righteousness" may sound artificial, and provoke the reflection, What men need is not to be reckoned righteous, but to be made actually righteous; but we may be sure that something real and valuable lurks under the phrase. For one thing pardon of sin is covered by it. This appears from *Romans* iv. 6, 7, where the non-imputation of sin is represented as the equivalent of the imputation of righteousness without works. It also appears from the notable text *2 Corinthians* v. 21, where it is said that Christ was made sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him. This is one of a group of texts through which the principle runs that sanctifier and sanctified are all of one: Christ becoming what we are and we becoming what He is. He comes under a curse, that we may become exempt from the curse; He comes under law, that we may be set free from law. On the same principle Christ the sinless becomes or is made sin, that we the sinful may become sinless. That is to say, "the righteousness of God" is equivalent to the pardon or non-imputation of sin. Surely a solid boon to all who know what an accusing conscience is.

4. It is not likely that for Paul the ex-legalist the imputation of faith for righteousness will bear a sense which implies any notion of merit in faith, or turn faith into a new form of works. On the contrary he takes pains to inform us that he has no sympathy with such a thought. "Where then," he asks, "is the boasting? It is excluded. By what sort of a law? of works? Nay, but by the law of faith."¹ That is to say, the spirit of self-complacency and

¹ *Rom.* iii. 27.

that on which it feeds, self-righteousness, are incompatible with the very nature of faith. This is sound wholesome teaching, but to maintain it it is not necessary to hold that faith has no moral contents or value. The contrary is undoubtedly the fact. To believe in God, to trust in His grace, is emphatically a righteous act. It is to do justice to God, to His character, to His spirit; to think right thoughts about Him, and to cherish a becoming attitude and feeling towards Him. It is the fundamental act of true righteousness. It is the only form of righteousness possible for sinners; it is a form of righteousness possible for the greatest sinner; nay which is not only possible for him, but which he of all men can best exhibit, for the greater the sinner the greater honour done to God by trust in His grace. He who having sinned much trusts in Divine grace is "strong in faith, giving glory to God."¹ But there is no ground for boasting in that fact. Boasting is excluded by the nature of the case. A great sinner trusting in God's grace is simply one who humbly yet trustfully confesses his deep need of forgiveness. Such an one may, as Jesus taught, be exalted by God, but he cannot possibly exalt himself. The denizens of the slums do not think themselves very virtuous in accepting the invitation to a free breakfast; they simply eat ravenously and thankfully.

The foregoing observations help us to see that the crude elementary form of the Pauline doctrine of Justification is by no means to be despised or neglected as unimportant. It is indeed as little to be despised as the foundation of a house. For it is the religious foundation, and all beyond is theological superstructure, though we in our familiarity with developed doctrines are very apt to forget the fact. On this foundation rested the salvation of many who lived before the Christian era, Abraham included. Abraham be-

¹ iv. 20.

lieved God and it was accounted unto him for righteousness, but he knew nothing of St. Paul's developed doctrine of Justification. Similar was the case of devout souls even in the days of our Lord. The faith of the publican in the parable is still of the Old Testament type, expressing itself in a prayer which echoes the 130th Psalm: "God be merciful to me the sinner." Yet he went down to his house "justified."¹ Even now, in the Christian era, there are men who feel compelled to fall back on the ultimate religious truth that a sinner's hope is in the mercy and grace of God as the only thing they are able to grasp. It is not for us to say that such men cannot go down to their house justified. The words of Jesus: "he that humbleth himself shall be exalted"² express a universal law in the moral order of the world.

Let us proceed now to consider the apostle's specific doctrine of justification. Insight into it may be gained by a careful study of his statements concerning the nature and functions of faith. We are justified by faith, he teaches; what then is the faith that justifies?

1. An important light is thrown on this question by *Romans* iii. 21-26 which may in one aspect be viewed as a definition or description of justifying faith. There faith is in the first place defined with reference to its personal object as the *faith of Christ*, which means not the faith that Jesus is the Christ, but rather faith in Christ as the embodiment of Divine grace. It is further indicated that that in Christ on which the eye of faith is chiefly fixed is the redemption achieved by His death, wherein the grace of God to the sinful manifests itself. According to this passage, therefore, the faith that justifies is not simply faith in God, or faith in God's grace, or faith in the truth that Jesus is the Christ, but faith in Jesus as one who gave Himself to death for man's redemption and so became the

¹ *Luke* xviii. 14, *δεδικαιωμένος*.

² xviii. 14.

channel through which God's grace flows to sinners. Following out this idea of faith justification might be defined as a judicial act whereby God regards as righteous those who trust in His grace as manifested in the atoning death of Christ. This account of the matter might serve all practical purposes, and even be preferable to more highly differentiated definitions, especially for the purpose of catechetical instruction in the elements of the Christian religion.

2. But St. Paul has more to say concerning faith. In certain texts he seems to conceive of faith as grasping and appropriating to itself the ideal righteousness as realised in the conduct of Christ. So for example in the words: "As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."¹ Sinful in Adam, righteous in Christ, such seems to be the apostle's thought. Faith is indeed not mentioned in this place, but it may be held to be implied as the condition of becoming righteous in Christ. What faith can appropriate God may impute. Introducing this new idea of the imputation of Christ's righteousness we get a more developed definition of Justification, such as that in the Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, according to which it is "an act of God's free grace, wherein He pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in His sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone." This definition may be regarded as a fair inference from Pauline texts, such as that above cited,² though it must be admitted that it lacks support in express Pauline phraseology. The apostle nowhere speaks of the righteousness of Christ being imputed, nor does he anywhere identify the righteousness of God given to faith with the righteousness of Christ, even in places where he might have been ex-

¹ *Rom.* v. 19.

² To which may be added 1 *Cor.* i. 26 and 2 *Cor.* v. 21.

pected to do so, assuming that his way of thinking on the subject was similar to that of the theologians who compiled the Shorter Catechism, *e.g.* in *Philippians* iii. 9.¹ On this ground so conservative a theologian as Weiss maintains that the idea that God imputes to men the righteousness of Christ does not belong to the Pauline system of thought.²

3. The apostle conceives of faith as performing yet another function in reference to Christ's righteousness,—as not only appropriating it as a ground of pardon, but as establishing such a relation between Christ and a believer as guarantees that the ideal objective righteousness without shall eventually become a real righteousness within. So in these words, forming a part of the famous Antioch remonstrance: "I am crucified with Christ, yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God who loved me, and gave Himself up for me." Is this function of faith included in the faith that justifies? If so, then our formula will be: God regards as righteous all whose faith in Christ not only lays claim to His righteousness as its own, but contains in itself the guarantee for the ultimate reproduction of a kindred righteousness in the character of the believer. But here the theological ways part. There have always been two tendencies at work in the church, one to restrict and minimise the function of faith in justification, the other to make it as comprehensive as possible. For those who follow the former tendency faith is simply a hand laying hold of an external benefit, a garment of righteousness to cover spiritual nakedness; for the patrons

¹ Where instead of *τὴν διὰ πίστεως χριστοῦ* might have stood *τὴν δικαιοσύνην χριστοῦ*, more especially as faith is mentioned in the next clause.

² *Vide* his *Lehrbuch der Biblischen Theologie des N.T.*, § 82 *b*, note 2: Pfeiderer in his *Urchristentum*, p. 250, and in the second edition of his *Paulinismus* (1890), p. 184, inclines to the same view. He remarks that the non-use by St. Paul of the expression "the imputation of Christ's righteousness" is the more remarkable as the imputation of the merits of the fathers and of saints was a feature in the theology of the Jewish synagogue.

of the latter, faith is the fruitful germ of all true righteousness, containing the promise and potency of a new Christ-like life. Both parties are animated by a genuine religious interest, the one by a desire to exclude a new form of legalism coming in under the wing of faith, the other by a desire to make sure that the righteousness of God given to faith shall be something real and Godworthy, not something shadowy, formal and artificial. Yet it is possible that in their antagonism to each other these two parties may both err in opposite directions.

As is well known, the Protestant theological tradition has very decidedly leant to the side of minimising faith's function. The great doctors of the Lutheran and Reformed confessions emptied faith of all moral contents that no pretext might remain for ascribing to it justifying virtue, and assigned to it simply the humble service of claiming an interest in the foreign righteousness of Christ. They even went the length of setting aside the scriptural idea of the imputation of faith and substituting for it the idea of the imputation of Christ's righteousness, keeping themselves right with St. Paul by the ingenious device of taking faith, in the texts where it is said to be imputed, *objectively*, so bringing out the meaning that not the act of believing, but the object believed in, the righteousness of Christ, is imputed. This manner of handling the *locus* of justification is very open to criticism. In the first place it is unfortunate that the Protestant doctors, in their laudable zeal against neo-legalism should have found it necessary to become un-Pauline in their terminology, banishing from their theological vocabulary the imputation of faith as not only inexact but even heretical,¹ and employing exclusively a phrase which, however legitimate as an inference from Scripture

¹ This attitude is reflected in the *Westminster Confession*, chapter xi., where among the false ways of justification that "by imputing faith itself" is specified.

texts, has no express Scriptural warrant. This fact is an index that somehow they had got into the wrong track, and had fallen into one-sidedness in their way of thinking. Then in the second place the justifying faith of this very controversial, extremely anti-Romish, theology, is an abstraction. A faith which is no more than a mere hand to lay hold of an external righteousness has no existence except in the brain of a scholastic theologian. Faith, if it deserve the name, is always very much more than this. The more the better. Faith cannot have too much moral contents; the more it has, the better it will serve us from the beginning to the end of our Christian career. At the very least true faith is always a humble trust in the grace of God, and that is a thing of real moral value. Then it lies in the very nature of true faith to open the soul to the influence of Christ, so that from the day we believe in Him He becomes a renovating power in our life. Lastly, the scrupulous anxiety to shut out legalism in the form of the imputation of faith, as the germ of a personal Christian righteousness, may readily defeat itself by introducing un-awares legalism under another guise. We do not get rid of legalism by careful theological definitions designed to exclude it. We may introduce thereby a dogmatic legalism as blighting in its influence on the Christian life as the Judaism of the Apostolic age, or the Sacramentarianism of Rome. It cannot be good for the health of our piety that we should be constantly taking care that our faith in the God of all grace shall be as destitute as possible of moral contents, lest perchance we fall into the mistake of finding in an ethically rich faith a ground of boasting.

But on the other hand it may be well for the health of Christian piety that we should think of God as imputing faith for righteousness only in respect of its objective function. It is perfectly true that from the Divine point of view the distinctions we make between the different stages

in the process of salvation are evanescent. To the Divine eye, contemplating all things *sub specie aeternitatis*, the whole drama of salvation in its five acts: fore-knowledge, fore-ordination, calling, justification, sanctification,¹ is one. Yet, from the human point of view, it may be important to distinguish between the stages, especially between the two last named. It may be advantageous in order to the consummation devoutly to be wished—conformity to the image of Christ—that we should conceive of God as justifying us on purely objective grounds, without reference to the work of grace He is to accomplish in us. It may give us a powerful initial impetus onwards towards the goal to be told that God pardons our sins, and accepts us as righteous, on account of the moral ideal realised in Christ the object of our trust. It may start us on our way with a peace, joy, and hope impossible to one who is constantly thinking of the uncertainties of the future. So Jesus dealt with penitents. With cheerful, hope-inspiring tone He said unconditionally: “thy faith hath saved thee, go into peace,” while perfectly aware that there were risks ahead, and that peace could not last unless sin were finally forsaken.

Is it not thus that St. Paul also conceives God as dealing with men in the matter of justification? In answering this question in the affirmative, I do not lay much stress on the verbal interpretation of the Pauline words *δικαιοῦν* and *δικαίωσις*. The controversy as to the meaning of these words is now as good as ended. It is admitted on all hands by theologians of the most diverse schools that in the apostle's use they bear a judicial or forensic sense. Dr. Newman in England in 1838 taught that justification in the abstract, and as such, is an imputation and a counting righteous,² and Dr. Lipsius in Germany in 1853 taught that *δικαιοῦν* never means *justum facere*, but always *justum*

¹ Rom. viii. 29, 30.

² Vide his *Lectures on Justification*, p. 70.

habere. But both strenuously opposed the purely forensic conception of justification. Dr. Newman held that while in the abstract it is a counting righteous, in the concrete it is a making righteous, and Dr. Lipsius maintained that in so far as it is a judicial sentence pronounced at the commencement of the Christian life, it is simply the pre-announcement of a real inward righteousness which God intends by His grace to make forthcoming.¹ In effect the position taken up by both is that God justifies because He intends to sanctify.

Was that the apostle's position? I think not, though in saying so, I do not for a moment doubt that what the apostle desired for himself and for all Christians, was a real personal inward righteousness, and that he would think nothing had been gained unless that were gained. Neither do I doubt that in his view God aimed at this result, even that believers should be conformed to the image of His Son. But two considerations lead me to believe that St. Paul did not conceive of future sanctification as the ground of initial justification. The first is what he says in 2 *Corinthians* v. 17 about "God in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them." These words suggest the idea of a general justification of mankind, in the form of a non-imputation of sins, on the purely objective ground of God's satisfaction with the merits of Jesus Christ. Individual justification on that view will naturally mean entering by faith into the state of grace in which God for Christ's sake is pleased to place the world. Doubtless this is but the beginning of salvation, but it is a momentous beginning, which one who, like St. Paul, had tried to reach salvation by the legal method was not likely to undervalue. No wonder he appropriates to it the title, *the righteousness of God*, as if it were the principal thing or even everything. This does not mean that he undervalues what follows. It

¹ Vide *Die Paul. Rechtfertigungslehre*, p. 17.

means that he has a due sense of the infinite importance of being at last *on the right road*. It indicates also, probably, his desire to give prominence to objective justification as a *great, public, world-wide fact*: God reconciling the world to Himself in Christ. Finally, it means giving the place of honour to that feature in the Pauline conception of Christianity, at which the antagonism between it and legalism is most conspicuous. The quest of personal righteousness was common to the two systems; in their attitude towards the righteousness of God, they were diametrically opposed.

The other consideration that weighs much with me is this: that St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans does not refer to the subjective aspect of faith as a renewing power till he has finished his exposition of the doctrine of justification. He takes up faith's function in establishing a vital union with Christ in the sixth chapter, continuing the theme to the end of chapter viii. But already he has said in exultant tone: "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God, and joy in hope of glory, in tribulation, and in God Himself." Does not this amount to the exclusion of faith's sanctifying function from the grounds of justification? To the end of chapter v. the apostle seems to be treating of an objective righteousness, and from that point onwards to the end of chapter viii. of a righteousness that is subjective. How the two aspects were related in his mind will be a subject of enquiry hereafter; meantime the important matter is to be satisfied in our own minds that there are two aspects to be frankly recognised.

4. There remain to be noticed two other statements in the Pauline epistles respecting faith's functions which appear to have a bearing on the subject of justification. I refer to *Romans* iv. 25, and x. 9, in both of which faith seems to be viewed as having for its proper object the *resurrection* of Christ, and faith in Christ's resurrection seems to be regarded as the ground of justification. How are these

texts to be understood? The suggestion that when St. Paul represents Christ as raised *διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν* he uses the term *δικαίωσις* in the sense of sanctification, is justly put aside on the ground that this interpretation is not in accordance with Pauline usage, or in keeping with the connection of thought in which the word here occurs. More acceptable is the explanation offered by the majority of commentators that the apostle in these passages means to represent Christ's resurrection as the ground not of our justification but of our faith in the atoning character of His death. "The resurrection of the sacrificed One was required to produce in men the faith through which alone the objective fact of the atoning offering of Jesus could have the effect of *δικαίωσις* subjectively."¹ But M. Ménégos has propounded a new theory, which, because of the ability, freshness, and real value of his contribution to the elucidation of the Pauline system of thought, claims respectful consideration. Briefly it is this; that the resurrection of Christ was necessary in the first place for His own justification, and that through faith in that resurrection we become partakers of Christ's justification. The author of *Le Péché et la Rédemption* finds in *Phil.* iii. 8-10 the most precise statement of the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith which he thinks no theologian has perfectly understood. "The key of the system," in his view, "is on the one hand the notion of the justification of Christ by death and resurrection, and on the other hand the notion of the identification of the individual with the person of Christ by faith."² "That which is peculiar to Paul is the mystic notion of the identification of man with Jesus Christ by faith, and the appropriation by that means of the justification of Christ."³ The idea of Christ needing to be justified by resurrection may appear strange, but the author quoted is quite in

¹ Meyer *in loco*.

² *Le Péché*, etc., p. 270.

³ *Le Péché*, etc. 271.

earnest in broaching it. Its presuppositions in the Pauline system, as he understands it, are these:—Death is the punishment of sin; He that has paid the penalty of transgression has satisfied justice and is entitled to go free. The thief when his term of imprisonment is at an end must be set at liberty. In like manner Christ who died for our sins had by death squared accounts with justice and was entitled to return to life. If it be asked, would it not have sufficed that the crucified One should continue to live on in the spirit without a physical resurrection? our author replies that according to the Pauline system, death is the destruction of life, and death in that sense, not the endurance of eternal pain, is the penalty of sin. Paul was a monist, a man for him was an animated body, and the destruction of the body by death was the destruction of life. Therefore it is not by accident that nowhere in his writings can we find a trace of a resurrection for the wicked. Hence also it follows that had Jesus not risen it would have meant that he had perished with the wicked.

Space will not admit of a detailed criticism of this theory on all sides, and especially in connection with its anthropological and eschatological presuppositions. A few remarks only can be offered here. It certainly has the merit of assigning a strong reason for the resurrection of Christ in viewing it as what was due to One who had borne the full penalty of sin. Nor can we object to the theory that it leaves no room for an objective justification of sinners; inasmuch as, while the author certainly seems to lay chief stress on subjective justification by the mystic power of faith, he might quite legitimately regard the resurrection of Christ as a general justification of the world. But this novel and ingenious explanation of the apostle's doctrine is at fault in other directions. In the first place, under it justification bears two different senses, in reference to Christ on the one hand, and to believers on the other.

In reference to us, it means either, according to one school, accounting those righteous who are not yet really righteous, or making them righteous by a gradual process, according to a different understanding of the apostle's meaning. In reference to Christ it means neither of these things, but acknowledging that the Just One had vicariously paid the full penalty of sin so that sin had no more right over him: He was *justified from sin*.¹ Then, secondly, a double meaning lurks under the word death also, as applied to Christ and to sinners. If death be the wages of sin, and Christ died in the capacity of a sinner, why should He rise any more than any other man who dies as a criminal? If one by death can be justified from sin so as to be entitled to rise again, why not all? Obviously in the case of Christ death is not taken in the sense of destruction, which it is held to bear in reference to the wicked, but simply in the sense of death's *pain*. The propounder of the theory now under consideration, admits that this double sense of death is involved, but he charges it as a fault against the apostle's system of thought, not against his own interpretation of it. Finally, it is strange that this view, if really held by St. Paul, has left so little trace in his vocabulary. He is rich in words expressing co-partnership between the believer and Christ. There is a co-crucifixion, a co-dying, a co-burial, a co-rising, a co-living, a co-suffering, a co-glorification. The diapason would be complete if a co-justification found its place among these joint-experiences. But it is not forthcoming. If the apostle meant to teach the doctrine M. Ménégoz ascribes to him, he has not been happy in his language.²

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¹ Rom. vi. 7.

² In the new Edition of *Der Paulinismus*, Pfeleiderer, while not adopting the theory of Ménégoz, speaks very favourably of it, as reasonable in itself and consistent with Pauline texts. *Vide* p. 160.

*A PROPHET'S VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
ETHICS.*

AMOS departed from Bethel feeling that his message had been rejected, and his further stay there would be useless. The higher classes of Israelite society were too comfortable and too much engrossed in the pleasures of sense to be moved by the appeals of a wandering shepherd. The official head of the religion of the kingdom had begun by despising him, but had rapidly passed through the stages of suspicion and dislike to that of hatred. The king's contemptuous tolerance was more unpromising than active hostility would have been. No good end would be served by remaining longer. Even a prophet could not make—

“Figs out of thistles, silk from bristles, milk
From burning spurge, honey from hornet-combs,
And men from beasts.”

There is not a trace of alarm in his withdrawal. He repels Amaziah's attack (chap. vii. 10-17) with absolute fearlessness: then he finishes the account of his visions (viii. 1, 2) just as though he had not been interrupted: to these he adds severe rebukes and threatenings. This done, he returns to his sheep in the pastures near Tekoa, where he had left them, probably in charge of some lad like that David whom God in earlier days had taken from following the ewes great with young in this same neighbourhood.

But the Spirit that brought him from Tekoa to Bethel did not leave him now that he had taken up again his daily work. Preaching had proved a failure. But the matter of the preaching had been true. Why not record it? To us that seems natural. At that time the idea was quite novel. The prophets of whom Amos knew (ii. 11) had been messengers sent on special occasions to speak their word in season and then pass away. To none of them had

it occurred to leave behind them the abiding *litera scripta*. The distinction of having been the first to entertain this thought and carry it out belongs to Amos. Perhaps he sent the roll containing the substance of his sermons to the proud monarch who had been utterly careless whether they were preached or not.

In the written *résumé* there are touches that do not belong to the spoken harangue. For example, the frequently employed phrase, "Oracle of Yahweh!" [Eng. Verss., "saith the Lord,"] which clenches so many of the sections into which the book naturally falls. We may be quite sure that the speaker did not stop every few minutes and exclaim "Oracle of Yahweh!" When, however, he came to write, he judged it well to call attention to the gravity of his messages by this impressive rubric. But we are chiefly concerned in the present paper with a quite different kind of addition. Amos had been sent to Israel. To and of Israel, accordingly, he had spoken. What had he to do with them that were without? Yet he was not unacquainted with or indifferent to the conduct of the surrounding nations. He was not so prejudiced against his brethren in the north as to think them the only sinners. If such an impression had been produced, the prelude to his written work (i. 3-ii. 3), would correct the mistake. Give him a congregation of Israelites, and he will cry aloud and spare not and show them their sins. But when he writes in calmness and solitude, he will prefix this rapid survey of the doings of Syrians, Philistines, Phœnicians, Edom, Ammon and Moab, this series of just sentences for the wrongs they have done to Israel or to one another.

1. As was to be expected, he begins with the relations between Damascus and Israel. The entire history of the northern kingdom was affected by the proximity of the Aramæan race that had Damascus for its capital. After

Shalmanezzer the Second's unsuccessful attempts on that city in 842 and 839 B.C., the Aramæans invaded and wasted Israel. We have a brief but pregnant record of this at 2 Kings x. 32, 33, and in another reference to it, 2 Kings xiii. 7, the same expressive word (*dûsh*, threshing) as is employed by Amos describes the treatment undergone by the vanquished. No milder figure will bring out the manner in which the victors behaved to that unhappily situated district of Gilead, to the east of the Jordan, which must needs bear the brunt of their attack. It was as bad as driving over the naked bodies of the people with threshing-sledges, thick boards with pointed pieces of iron on their under surface. The imagery is too painful. But the plain prose of ancient inscriptions exonerates the writer from any charge of exaggeration. "Phraortes was taken prisoner and brought before me," says Darius, on the rock of Behistun. "I cut off his nose, his ears, his tongue . . . He was kept chained to my door, and all the people saw him. Then I crucified him at Ecbatana and his accomplices with him." Tiglath-Pileser is as proud to use the figure employed by Amos as Darius is to employ literal language: "I trampled down the land of Beth-Amukkan as it were by threshing." *Væ victis!* The East has ever been cruel. Religion there, to say nothing of war, has treated man as though his were, indeed, a "vile body." Witness the abominable ceremony of the Dôseh,¹ practised in Egypt till Tewfik Pasha's reign!

Damascus had not been privileged with the full revelation of the divine will. Her responsibility was lighter than that of Israel. But cruelty to the conquered is a sin against the law written in the heart. The aptness to deny "the rights of man," when the man is a beaten foreign foe, is the first misdeed against which the shepherd of Tekoa testifies.

¹ See Lane's *Mod. Egyptians*, ii. 221, for a full account of the ceremony.

Many are the sins of the Damascenes.¹ This is the one that renders the threat of punishment irrevocable. For it shall royal palaces be destroyed,² the city gate that has defied Assyria be forced open by a more successful besieger, the land swept bare of every inhabitant from prince to peasant, the whole people be carried back to the region whence it had emigrated centuries before.³ The course of modern history would make one doubt whether such a proclamation of the law of retribution can have been made so long ago as the middle of the eighth century before Christ. A dispassionate outsider cannot pretend to decide how much truth there is in the novelist's description of what happened at Bazeilles. But, unhappily, there can be no doubt about what is implied in the fact that Poland is only a "geographical expression."

2. We turn now to a meaner vice. The Syrian campaigns in the north-east occupy all the attention and claim all the forces of Israel. These enemies are pitiless, but they are men; they bring armies to fight armies:

"Blood hath bought blood, and blows have answered blows;
Strength match'd with strength, and power confronted power."

Meanwhile, on the undefended south-western frontier, the Philistines make raids for slaves. Once a formidable enemy, able to compete with Israel on equal or more than

¹ For a definite number used in place of an indefinite large one, see Micah v. 4; Job v. 19; Eccles. xi. 2; Sirach xxv. 7.

² According to Josephus, *Antiqq.*, ix. 4, 6, the names of Ben-hadad II. and Hazael, his murderer, were long remembered in connection with their buildings. Μέχρι νῦν αὐτός τε ὁ Ἀδαδος καὶ Ἀζάηλος ὁ μετ' αὐτὸν ἄρξας, ὡς θεοὶ τιμῶνται διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας καὶ τὰς τῶν ναῶν οἰκοδομίας, οἷς ἐκόσμησαν τὴν τῶν Δαμασκηνῶν πόλιν. With the language of Amos compare Shalmaneser the Second's: "In his palaces I cast fire."

³ The precise localities of Aven, Beth-Eden, and Kir are uncertain. The first is commonly identified with Baalbek. Shalmaneser II. claims to have captured a city called Adennu, belonging to Hamath, and some think that Beth-Eden is meant. Kir has been generally supposed to be the modern Georgia: for it see Amos ix. 7; Isa. xxii. 6; 2 Kings, xvi. 9.

equal terms, they are now petty communities, their former chief city, Gath, having fallen into such decay that it is not mentioned. But if their power is limited, their spite is great, and such means as they possess they will use against the ancestral foe.¹ Simple as are the words in which the foray is described, they call up immediately the pictures which travellers in Central Africa paint, of villages where every house has been burned to the ground and only the skeletons remain of former inhabitants. These are the scenes of slave hunts. And the Philistines "carried away a whole captivity,"² swept a village, a town, or a district clean, left not a single person remaining. An Arab slave hunter is the nearest modern analogue to one of these Philistine chiefs. Or we might compare him to one of those Italian bravos of the Middle Ages, who had the twofold gratification of receiving pay for assassinating men with whom they were at feud. The craftiness, the pitilessness, the sordid selfishness of a people, small in every sense of the word, is branded here. The slaves whom they take are meant for the market, and the Philistine captors, caring for nothing but the price, hurry the stolen wretches³ along the caravan route from Gaza⁴ to Petra, and hand them over to the traders, who will sell them further south. Under no light can the slave hunter appear a noble creature. And the smallness of a nation, its

¹ τῦτθδν

θηρίον ἐντὶ μέλισσα, καὶ ἀλῖκα τραύματα ποιεῖ.

—*Theoc.*, xix. 5, 6.

² Cf. Jer. xiii. 19: "Judah is carried away captive, all of it; it is wholly carried away captive."

³ How pathetically the Vendidad expresses the sadness of this experience! "O Maker of the material world, Thou Holy One! Which is the fifth place where the earth feels sorest grief? Ahura Mazda answered: It is the place whereon the wife and children of one of the faithful, O Spitama Zarathustra! are driven along the way of captivity, the dry, the dusty way, and lift up a voice of wailing."—*Farg.*, iii.

⁴ Then, as now, one of the principal towns in Philistia. At present it contains about 16,000 inhabitants.

inferiority in numbers and power, does not excuse meanness. Philistia's petty cunning is as blameworthy a departure from the ideal as Assyria's crushing tyranny. Gaza, therefore, the strongest of its cities,¹ shall be smitten where it is strongest, and when the rest have been mentioned, lest any loophole of escape should seem left, the threat is rounded off completely: "The remainder of the Philistines shall perish."

3. After the slave hunters the slave-dealers. The Philistines make whole districts desolate, sweeping away all that dwelt there. The Phœnicians are ready to buy and sell again all these captives. There had been a time when the latter people had done a little man-stealing on its own account. Herodotus begins his history with the mythical narrative of the treacherous carrying off of Io. Eumæus, in the *Odyssey* (xv. 415), describing his own capture and sale, has no difficulty in identifying his captors:

"And so it fell,
Phœnicians with a thousand things to sell,
Came, very wolves for lucre, false of heart."

When these practices were discovered to be hindrances to more legitimate trade the purchase and re-sale of men was not discontinued. Ezekiel knew Tyre to be a mart which welcomed alike "the persons of men and vessels of brass" (xxvii. 13). Phœnicians are represented on the Egyptian monuments bringing slaves in tribute. And no doubt the "merchants of the country" who accompanied the army of Gorgias to buy the expected prisoners (1 Macc. iii. 41; 2 Macc. viii. 25) were members of the same race, travelling southward with the Syrian troops.

The distinguishing feature in this charge against Tyre is that its traffic in men was a breach of "the covenant of

¹ Μεγάλη δὲ πόλις ἡ Γάζα ἦν καὶ ἐπὶ χύματος ὑψηλοῦ ἔκτιστο καὶ τεῖχος περιβέβλητο αὐτῆ ὀχυρῶν.—*Irriani*, ii. 27.

brothers." Who, then, were the brothers towards whom they behaved so unnaturally? More than one answer has been returned to the question. Whichever of them we acquiesce in, we shall learn something concerning the writer's theory of the relations that should prevail between nations and communities. In a book recently noticed in *THE EXPOSITOR*¹ the view has been propounded that this crime was committed by Tyre against other Phœnician or Canaanite peoples. If this is the meaning, the word "brothers" is used almost literally, and we shall have to think of the miserable scenes that may have formed the sequel of one of the many conflicts between "the merchant of the peoples" and weaker states of the same blood. The Phœnician sailors, who constituted the most important part of the Persian fleet, refused to obey Cambyses when he would have had them sail against Carthage, a city founded and peopled by their own countrymen. But Tyre, on the hypothesis before us, paid no heed to considerations of this kind. Amos brands such disregard as fratricidal. The modern poet makes his ideal king lament :

" Ill doom is mine
 To war against my people and my knights.
 The King who fights his people fights himself.
 And they, my knights, who loved me once, the stroke
 That strikes them dead is as my death to me."

The ancient prophet would have each people cherish a like feeling. If Tyre must needs sell men into slavery, she need not sell those of her own race. Let the ties of blood be recognised.

There is, however, at least one strong reason for rejecting this interpretation. The language used in verses six and nine respectively points to altogether different activities in the two cases. The Philistines make captives. The Syrians merely receive and dispose of them. Are we then

¹ Wellhausen's *Kleine Propheten*, p. 69.

to understand that whereas the Israelite prisoners might have been sold to other purchasers without involving Tyre in the guilt of unnatural conduct, it was the disposal of them to the Edomites that constituted the breach of "the covenant of brothers?"¹ Now it must be admitted that this relationship of brotherhood between Israel and Edom is repeatedly insisted on. Malachi's question, "Was not Esau Jacob's brother?" would have been unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative by every Old Testament writer. But the idea of there being a "covenant of brothers" between them is nowhere expressed. No trace exists of the sentiment which this would imply. Even Amos would have found it difficult to urge so refined a consideration. "When you sell slaves be careful to ascertain that there are no affinities of race between the purchaser and the purchased." "What is that to us?" would be the immediate reply. "Let the parties concerned see to it." Trade cannot pause to entertain such considerations. The bargain's the thing! Whether, indeed, this is quite so axiomatic as the commercial spirit holds, may reasonably be doubted. The wounds received in the house of our friends are remembered by communities no less than by individuals. The sentiment of brotherhood binding together the various portions of a race which space and circumstances have severed is of far too great value to be sacrificed for a commercial advantage that one may gain over the other.

We come back to the explanation recommended by the context. The brotherly covenant is that friendly relation which had long subsisted between Tyre and the Hebrews (see 2 Sam. v. 11; 1 Kings v. 1; ix. 11-14, especially v. 13). This had been cemented and brought into peculiarly close

¹ "Wäre die Drohung gegen Tyrus ein späterer Einsatz, so könnte der Bruderbund auf der Verhältnis von Israel und Edom bezogen werden können." Well., *Kl. Proph.*, p. 69. And he treats it as a later interpolation.

connection with the northern kingdom by the marriage of Ahab and Jezebel, on which occasion it is possible that a formal covenant between the two nations may have been made. Amos, at all events, admits the validity and insists on the sacredness of the bond. He is intensely interested in the fortunes of his own people, but he is no fanatic bent on barring off every tribe that is not descended from Abraham. A covenant is a covenant. Israel has never broken the covenant by waging war on Tyre or Sidon. Why should Tyre indirectly violate it? Phœnicians and Israelites may be as brothers. Alas, at a later day Judaism will repudiate the assertion. Alas, too, that amongst Christian nations unions of a similar kind, old comradeship in arms, association in discovery, co-operation in industrial enterprise, connection in blood as near as or nearer than that of Phœnicians and Israelites, fail to ensure chivalric unselfishness. These considerations *ought* to weigh.

4. Edom has been mentioned twice already as the receiver, the intermediary, in the slave trade. Now it is put forward as an independent actor, violating a closer brotherhood than that of Tyre and Samaria. "He pursued his brother with the sword." There is no record to tell us when this was done. Later writings, such as Obadiah and some of the Psalms, indicate that when they were composed the habit had become ingrained, and Edom might ever be counted on as ready to take advantage of his brother's misfortunes. If the same holds good of the time before Amos, we must ascribe our ignorance to the scantiness of the documents relating to the history of Judah.¹ When Judah was forced to flee, Edom was only too glad to follow up his

¹ Wellhausen argues with considerable force that the section referring to Edom is a later interpolation, partly because of our never hearing of Edom being in a position to act thus till the Chaldean period; partly from the fact that no early prophet denounces them as Amos does here; and also from the mention of Teman and Bozrah, not elsewhere named before the exile, and the omission of Sela, the capital town.

advantage. The description of Edom's dealings with his own feelings is even more interesting than that of his conduct towards "his brother." He "destroyed his compassions, and kept his anger perpetually, and retained his wrath for ever."¹ Natural feelings of pity could not be prevented from stirring. Edom fiercely crushed them down, doing violence to his own better nature at the bidding of bitter animosity, as a Brutus quenched his fatherly compassions from patriotic motives, or a Sir Thomas More banished pity when religion seemed to demand this. The disasters with which Israel was overwhelmed had almost succeeded in "Turning despiteous torture out of doors." But no! By a vigorous effort these gentler feelings may be expelled. The general who at last succeeded in destroying Carthage remembered his Homer and his history: "Rome's day might come next." But there was a fiercer type of Roman who would have quelled every thought of compassion by his incessant *Delenda est Carthago*. Edom kept his wrath and retained his anger. It required an effort. Time has a tendency to soften national animosities as well as personal ones. Darius needs his attendant to remind him thrice a day: "Sire, remember the Athenians." The Edomites carefully treasured up and guarded their hate lest it should die or sleep. It is kept up by what you might almost call an artificial process. But there is nothing artificial in the grim will which insists on this. We see, then, what was the sin of the people most nearly allied to Israel. The repression of those gentler feelings which the sufferings even of a foe evoke. The fostering and perpetuating an anger

¹ With the first of these expressions cf. Ezek. xxviii, 17: "Thou hast destroyed [R.V. corrupted] thy wisdom." There is a fairly general consensus of opinion in favour of Olshausen's conjecture ויטר for ויטרף: perhaps the similarity of ל and פ in some periods of Hebrew writing may justify the conjecture that the Massoretic reading is due to a mistaken reduplication of the ל in לער. The Peshitta has ;Δ both for ויטר and יטר in this verse. For ישמר לנאח read ישמר ננח.

that should be allowed to die. Modern politicians have too often been guilty of one or both these.

5. Amos had no sympathy with the very natural desire for an increase of territory. He would have agreed with Scipio Africanus, who, in laying down the censorship, substituted for the customary petition that the gods would *increase* and *magnify* the power of Rome the prayer that they would *preserve* it. "It is great enough already," he said. The sin of Ammon springs from a desire to "enlarge their border." The prophet would have each keep his own, and leave others in undisturbed possession of theirs. He uses different language from Jephthah's (Judg. xi.); but he would have concurred in the spirit of Jephthah's appeal: "Will not thou possess that which Chemosh thy god giveth thee to possess?" It is at least an open question whether the same kind of appeal might not have been addressed to more than one European nation by the uncivilized tribes that have been "eaten up" one after another. Humanitarian considerations may render some encroachments necessary. It is difficult to see how an enlargement of the border can be other than theft, unless it be carried out for some unselfish reason. Ammon was so hungry for land, hungry as perhaps only a little kingdom, no bigger than an English county, could be, that the bloodiest atrocities did not seem to big a price to pay. "They ripped up the women with child of Gilead; that they might enlarge their border." Anything more repugnant to that widespread Semitic feeling which regards the processes of generation and birth as possessing a certain sacredness we cannot well imagine. But herein consists the fascination of it, in inflicting the very evil that you would most dread. "Do unto your enemies the thing you would least like doing to yourself." And this is to be perpetrated in order that terror may seize the opponents, and the invaders be left free to occupy the land. The object aimed at is not great enough

to justify the means taken: Pheretima of Cyrene crucified the men who had assassinated her son, cut off the breasts of their wives, and placed these on the walls opposite the men as they hung on their crosses. We can understand even that brutality; revenge will go any lengths. But the outrage on all modesty, the contempt for human nature, the exaggeration of cruelty on the part of these Ammonites, when nothing more was to be gained than a new province—this fills the prophet with indignation. He is more deeply stirred; he waxes more eloquent, than at any of the misdeeds previously proclaimed. We hear the very war cry of the avenger. We see the rush of battle sweeping all before it like a whirlwind. The king¹ of Ammon and his princes together are carried off by foes as unscrupulous as themselves.

6. Jerome says: "Tradunt Hebræi, ossa regis Idumææ jam sepulti, qui cum Joram rege Juda ascenderat adversum Moab, in ultionem doloris a Moabitis postea convulsa atque succensa." It would be unsafe to insist on this identification of the crime denounced by Amos with the sequel of the campaign described in 2 Kings iii. The petty wars of

¹ Professor Guthe, in Kautzsch's *Bibelwerk*, renders "And Milcom must go into captivity, his priests and princes together." The textual note on this is: "Follow the LXX. of Jer. xlix. 3 in reading מלְכִים instead of מְלִכִים (their king). Also read with the Hebrew text of Jer. xlviii. 7, xlix. 3, כְּהֵנִי instead of the M.T. הוּא ("both himself and his great lords.") He might have made his case stronger. The Pesh., Vulg., Aq., Symm., and many cursives of the LXX. have the proper name Milcom at Amos i. 15. And in the same passage the LXX. and Pesh. presuppose כְּהֵנִי. Yet both these should be rejected. Jeremiah is thinking of the gods of these nations (xlviii. 7, 46): Amos is not. Nothing could be more natural than that the princes should accompany their king into exile, whereas if כְּהֵנִים were mentioned here, we should have to understand the word as meaning "great men," a possible sense, *but not the sense in the Jeremiah passages referred to*. If Jeremiah had before him the words of Amos, there was no reason why he should not give them the turn he desired and complete the description with the addition, "his priests." The latter words found their way into the LXX. and Pesh. of Amos under the influence of the passage in Jeremiah. And it would not be at all difficult to suppose that הוּא had been corrupted into כְּהֵנִי, or, if it still stood, was believed to be a misreading for כְּהֵנִי.

these neighbouring tribes have been rich in exemplifications of the ingenuity of revenge. Yet the Biblical history presents us with no more suitable occasion: the losses undergone by Moab, especially that mentioned at 2 Kings iii. 27, account for any savagery of reprisal. Whenever it occurred it was the very height of indignity. Ziska, the Taborite chief, ordered that his own dead body should be flayed and his skin used for the covering of a drum, at the sound of which the enemy would flee. If it were allowable for a man to dishonour his own body thus, it does not follow that others may. And to burn the bones to powder was worse treatment still. It involved an interference with the profoundly cherished privilege of being gathered to the fathers (1 Kings xiii. 22). An even more cruel purpose may have been in view, the making the dead suffer through the ill-treatment of his body (see Job xiv. 22; Isa. lxvi. 24). In any case the cremation of Achan and his relatives (Josh. vii. 25) and the burning the bones of the priests of the high places (2 Kings xxiii. 16; cf. v. 18) are examples of utter ignominy. Amos protests against this insult to the dead king. His conscience reclaims against the degradation of one's enemy, the treatment of his body as though it were a thing¹ and not part of a person. It was not an Israelite prince that had been dishonoured; it was not that Edom especially attracted the sympathy of the prophet; the deed in itself was a national disgrace and crime. The story of all lands and times evinces that the root of malignity out of which it grew lies deep in human nature.²

To sum up. The God of Amos was not concerned exclusively with the conduct of the Hebrews and of other

¹ The Targum has caught the idea: "He burnt the bones of the king of Edom, and spread them on the house like lime."

² The Scythian custom of wearing the skins of their slain enemies; the treatment of the corpse of Amasis by Cambyses; the exhumation and hanging of the bodies of the English regicides are specimens of what hardly needs any exemplification.

nations only in so far as it affected them. Wrong-doing is wrong-doing whoever be the doer or the sufferer. The obligations by which nations are bound to each other cannot be transgressed with impunity. And those obligations are delicate and far-reaching. Cruelty to the conquered: the low craft of the slave hunter: the greed that obliterates all memory of old comradeship and fraternity: the bitter animosity that feeds the fires of hatred: the lust of conquest, counting no price too high that is paid in the sufferings of others: the petty revenge that tramples on the dead: all these are crimes. The code, perhaps, is not large enough to embrace all the international rights and duties that might now be insisted on. It is chiefly occupied with war, its incidents and consequences. Amos himself may not have been able to see with sufficient clearness that his own people had frequently violated some of the rights that he enforces. But whatever defects be recognised, whether in the prophet or in his prophecy, it is indisputable that this section of the Book of Amos exhibits a loftier standard of international ethics than the nations of Christendom have observed. It was not until the seventeenth century that a Grotius arose to initiate the modern movement for the reform of International Law. It is only in our own day that arbitration has obtained a narrow foothold. *E pur si muove!*

JOHN TAYLOR.

THE CHURCH AND THE EMPIRE IN THE FIRST CENTURY.

II. THE PASTORAL EPISTLES AND TACITUS.

IN regard to a subject dependent on a very small number of authorities, which have been discussed over and over again, it is of the utmost importance that each party to the discussion should fully understand the position and opinion of the other. It is therefore necessary to define with the most scrupulous care one's own position and relation to the opposite side. Further, where evidence is so scanty, it is always necessary to keep in mind the whole first-century period, and to constantly glance over it in order to see what bearing our opinion about the Neronian action has on the surrounding periods.

The non-Christian authorities do not afford sufficient evidence to show step by step the character of the relations between the Church and the State during the first century. But the contemporary Christian authorities enable us to complete the picture. The method adopted in my book is to take the fair and natural interpretation of the scanty non-Christian accounts, and then to show that the tone of the Christian documents agrees with the opinions formed from the examination of the witnesses on the opposite side. I regard the Christian documents as being by far the better class of witnesses in this case, because they give unconscious and unintentional evidence. The authors of these documents are not writing history; they give no express account of the attitude of the State towards them; they hardly ever make any direct reference to the government. But incidentally the tone and spirit of the practical advice which they give to their correspondents betrays the spirit in which they looked on the State and the society around them. Evidence of this kind must be true, because it lies

in the nature and the deepest feelings of the men, and not merely in their words.

The interpretation given in my book of Tacitus's account of the Neronian action towards the Christians is at present under criticism. I gathered confidence after much thought to state it formally and finally in its present form, against the opinion of scholars for whom I entertain the most profound respect. I have reconsidered it with the utmost freedom from prejudice that I am capable of, in the light of Prof. Mommsen's and Dr. Sanday's criticisms, and I can see no reason to swerve a hair's breadth from what stands printed in my chapter on the subject. But it is possible to state more precisely the points that bear on the special questions, now at issue, viz., in the first place, the degree in which Tacitus and the Christian documents confirm one another; in the second place, their relation to the brief but most weighty words of Suetonius; and thirdly, the bearing on the position of Christianity in the Empire during the remainder of the first century.

Dr. Sanday and I are fully agreed in the belief that persecution began under Nero; and I have put emphatically and strongly the fact that Nero's action furnished the precedent according to which Christians became liable from that time onwards to suffer to the death at the hands of the Roman magistrates (see pp. 242, 245, 258, 277 note, 278 note, 307, 392, etc.). We differ on the question whether Nero introduced the fully developed procedure popularly known as "persecution for the Name." Is it quite agreed between us what is the meaning of the expression, "persecution for the Name?" It is implied by it that Christians on trial were confronted with the direct and simple question, "Are you a Christian?" and that, on answering in the affirmative, they were liable to instant execution.¹ Anything

¹ But, it may be objected, we find in the *Acta* of martyrs frequent instances where confession of the Name does not entail immediate execution. For ex-

short of this is not "persecution for the Name" in particular, if, as a preliminary to condemnation, any question is raised, or any evidence required, as to misdeeds committed by Christians (magical arts, tampering with the constitution of society, exercising unfair and improper influence on the conduct of others, gross crimes of an immoral character, violation of the law prohibiting secret societies, etc.), the procedure is not "persecution for the Name": the Christian then suffers, not for the Name, but for the particular crime charged against him. Now the latter is the kind of procedure implied in all detailed information that we have about the Neronian period. Crimes are always referred to as connected with the trial and condemnation of Christians, charges seem to be brought and evidence (slight indeed and flimsy, but still evidence) offered; and the Christians are advised by their leaders and advisers to guard against acting in such a way as to afford any ground or appearance of ground for such charges.

Advice to act in such a way as may guard against persecution is quite in place during the Neronian period, as I conceive it; for there is nothing in the slightest degree unworthy in striving to avoid persecution of this kind. The most sensitive and high-strained sense of honour and preference of the divine law to the world's law are both consistent with, and likely to be conducive to, the shrinking

ample, Tarachus was tried three separate times before being put to death (*Acta Sanct.*, 11 Oct., p. 573). But the reason for this and many similar cases lay in the desire of the governors to succeed in bringing back these misguided persons to a right course of action. It would have been esteemed a great triumph to make any prominent Christian turn renegade; and no severer blow against the influence of Christianity could have been struck than through the reconversion of some of the leaders to compliance with the State religion. Hence opportunity after opportunity was given to Tarachus to recant. He was tried and condemned to torture in order to break his obstinacy; but the aim of the State was to put an end to this wrong and dangerous principle, not to exterminate the misguided persons who professed it. I quote the *Acta* of Tarachus, as they have every appearance of being genuine. They are included in the *Acta Sincera* of Ruinart.

from trial for gross and unworthy crimes. The very imputation of such crimes is terrible; and one rightly tries so to live, and rightly advises one's disciples so to live, as to afford no handle to the most suspicious and prejudiced enemy for making such imputations.

But the case becomes quite different when "persecution for the Name" is the rule, and when the question is "Are you a Christian?" Then it becomes a point of honour not to shrink from the inquiry; the thought of trying in any way to avoid the charge of "the Name" seems to be a weakness and a declining from the loftiest line of conduct. The advice to one's pupils to try to avoid such a charge is apt to seem like a dubious and low-toned prudentialism.

In the three great groups of documents, (1) the Pastoral Epistles, (2) First Peter, (3) the Apocalypse, it appears to me that we trace a distinct progress: (1) the straightforward and downright and thoroughgoing advice to all Christians to avoid all ground for rousing charges against themselves, (2) the stage of double advice to glory in being charged for the Name but to avoid giving ground for charges of crime, (3) the final stage of resolute and uncompromising advice to despise the State and its procedure, to refuse to recognise its courts, its officers and its rights, to ignore its authority, and to regard it as absolutely evil and entirely hateful. Yet these three groups are by many modern scholars treated as almost contemporaneous works, emanating from the same general situation in the relations of the Church to the Empire. To me the idea that they are contemporaneous is unthinkable; if they are so, I must renounce the attempt to think about the subject. It would be easier for me to admit that some of them are forgeries than that they are contemporaneous; but I see that they are as certainly genuine as the poems of Lucan and Martial, and also that they are as certainly the product of situations essentially different from each other as are the Satiricon

of Petronius and the First Satire of Juvenal. The fact stands out clear before me in the works; I cannot ignore it, or admit a theory that is inconsistent with it.

Is it the case then that I have misconceived and misrepresented the tone of these documents? Otherwise I can see no escape from the inferences that I have drawn.

As to the Apocalypse, there will probably be no question. Its tone is so marked and impressive that no one who studies it can mistake it; and until there is an express question raised, the correctness of the account which I have given of its tone towards the State may be assumed.

The contrast between the tone of the Apocalypse and that of the Pastoral Epistles must strike every reader, and is undoubtedly part of the reason why those Epistles have so often been considered spurious. If we assume that the tone of Christian documents in reference to the State was uniformly the same throughout the first century, then there can be no question that, if the Apocalypse is genuine, the Pastoral Epistles cannot be genuine. But if my contention be right, the variation and even contradiction in tone is natural and necessary; and no argument can be founded on it against the genuineness of either group of documents.

The tone of the Pastoral Epistles is to me incomprehensible on the supposition that they were written after the fully developed procedure of "condemnation for the Name" had been introduced. Throughout them all runs the same tone of patience, of allowance for the natural inability of the Pagan State to comprehend the Christian position and practice, of deference to the established methods and practices of society. In my chapter xi., p. 246, it is pointed out that the Christians are counselled "to avoid the appearance of interfering with the present social order." Christians in Pagan households are to maintain their previously existing relations of family life (slaves towards masters, wives towards husbands), "that the word of God be not blas-

phemed." "Any vain interference with the established order will give rise to calumnies and accusations against the Christians who bear the name of God, and against the doctrine which they teach."

Again, as to the persecution alluded to in the Pastoral Epistles, the writer "suffers hardships unto bonds as a malefactor" (2 Tim. ii. 9), not "as a Christian," or "for the Name." "All that would live godly in Christ shall suffer persecution"; but the persecution is described as being like what Paul suffered at Lystra, etc., from which patience and blamelessness will set them free, as Paul himself has been set free (2 Tim. iii. 10-12). Persecution is an evil to be avoided, and the divine aid will save Paul and all others from it. How different is this from the spirit which is right and proper, and which Paul of all men would have felt most strongly (if I can sympathise at all with his character), had he been writing at a time when the Name was the one cause and motive of persecution!

The inference from these Christian authorities seems to me unavoidable; and, as has been stated, their value seems to me so much higher, owing to the entirely unconscious and unintentional character of their evidence, than that of any of the non-Christian historians who touch consciously and intentionally on this subject, that I should not hesitate, in case of disagreement, to prefer the Christian authors to the non-Christian. But is there any disagreement? To me there appears to be the most striking and impressive agreement between Tacitus and the idea that we have gathered from the tone of the Christian writers. From the Pastoral Epistles we learn that the result of Paul's trial before the supreme court was an acquittal, *i.e.*, it was formally decided that the Name was legal. In A.D. 64 Nero was as much bound by this decision as any of his subordinate officials;¹ and when in the following year he found

¹ It is, I presume, hardly necessary to protest at the present day against the

it convenient to play down to the popular dislike of the Christians, he could not punish them directly as Christians; he could only accuse them of some definite crime, and punish them as criminals (2 Tim. ii. 9) In the popular excitement and panic the charge found credence and witnesses to support it as readily as the charge of complicity in an imaginary popish plot did in England in A.D. 1679. Dr. Sanday is, I think, in full agreement with me on this point. We are also agreed that Tacitus describes Nero's action as falling into two stages, the first in which only the crime of incendiarism was used as a charge, and the second of a more general character; the first stage furnished no precedent for provincial governors to follow in their action towards Christians; but the second did, and it thus inaugurated the general rule of persecution, which continued in force for more than two centuries and a half. Hence Suetonius rightly says that the Christians were made liable to severe punishment as a mischievous class of criminals (p. 230); he considered "that the permanent principle of condemning Christians originated under Nero"; but it was no part of his duty as a biographer of the individual emperors to recount the precise development and modification which the principle underwent (p. 276 f.).

But in the second stage of Nero's proceedings, the Christian's were accused of "hatred of the human race, *i.e.* hostility to the social organization actually existing in the Roman Empire." Dr. Sanday "accepts my analysis of the meaning of the phrase." The principles of Christianity led

old-fashioned idea, that a Roman emperor could act with the caprice of an oriental despot and reverse next year the action of the preceding year. The whole value and interest of imperial history, the importance of Rome in the world's development, lies in the fact that even a Nero was the sovereign of a constitutional State, and that the imperial law and organization was stronger than the emperor himself, and not liable to be twisted according to his mere whim. The emperor's action required to be directed by reason, precedent, and a general view of public welfare (*utilitas publica*); and Tacitus expressly says that Nero claimed to be acting for this end.

to the commission of acts that involved interference with the existing facts and usages of society; and Christians in great numbers were arrested, tried and punished for the crime of hostility to the existing fabric of society, as shown in acts which they were proved on evidence to have committed. Dr. Sanday says that "we see here the origin of the name of Christian being regarded as penal." That I fully accept: we have here the origin, but not the fully developed form, of punishment for the Name. Only one more step had to be made, and that a very easy one, to reach the final form. The one point of difference between us is on the question, Was the step taken by Nero? I quite acknowledge that we cannot fully prove from Tacitus that it was not; but it has to be well weighed that (1) the Pastoral Epistles show that the step had not been taken when they were written, (2) Tacitus's language is on the whole more easily reconcilable with the same view, on account of his pointed reference to crimes and charges of crime throughout the chapter. I have fully admitted (p. 229) that it is always difficult to disentangle from Tacitus's oratorical and artistic style "the precise and exact facts which he is describing"; but we must also remember that he was trained and had lived his life as a lawyer, and that he must as proconsul of Asia (p. 228 *note*) have been familiar with the later procedure against the Christians. If we do him the credit of understanding his strong reference to charges of crime as indicating a different and earlier method of procedure (which, as has been said, appears to me the more natural interpretation), we find him not merely more accurate in his statement of legal facts, but also in full accord with those Christian documents which must be either contemporary or forgeries.¹

¹ There is no other alternative about the Pastoral Epistles: if they were not written 65-67 A.D., they cannot be ascribed to St. Paul. About the precise date of other epistles doubts and differences of opinion may and do exist, but none can exist about these.

On this question Dr. Sanday says, "Hatred of the human race is not a definite charge. No doubt it included a number of definite acts. . . . But in all this there would be no definite tangible breach of the law, nothing that in itself would involve the extreme penalty." This is all perfectly correct and clearly put. If these acts had been breaches of the law, requiring the extreme penalty, there would have been no reason for saying that Nero introduced the principle of punishing Christians. But the point is that the ordinary law had not hitherto been interpreted as sufficient to condemn the Christians; but Nero treated as crimes all acts leading to changes in family life, divisions between converted and unconverted relatives, and other such interferences with existing social facts (acts which were often the unavoidable effects, as human nature is, of conversion). The mere fact of conversion was treated as a proof of undue influence acquired by witchcraft; and the preacher who had converted another was held to be a magician, and punished with the terrible penalties meted out to magicians by the Roman law (pp. 236, 392, 410).

Dr. Sanday "argues the question without introducing Christian documents" (p. 411); but in this I do not wish to imitate him. It is natural for him to do so, shunning the charge of over-estimating them; and it is the established method of treating this subject. But my aim throughout has been to treat the Christian and the non-Christian documents side by side, to apply the same principles of interpretation to both, and to accept the results of comparative study (p. 174 f., p. 182 f.). Why dismiss from the case the contemporary witnesses? Some critics think they are not contemporary; but the best and the convincing answer to them is to show how history benefits, how the obscure becomes clear, and new facts are elicited, by studying them in their surroundings. Nothing new is ever elicited from forgeries: minute comparison with the other

authorities of the period to which they pretend to belong is the one way of unmasking the forgery and vindicating the genuine historical document.

W. M. RAMSAY,

(*To be continued.*)

HEBREWS VI. 4-6.

IN this paper I shall say a few words of criticism about Dr. Milligan's exposition of this difficult passage; and shall then endeavour to shed some additional light upon it by careful examination of some of the grammatical forms therein used.

Dr. Milligan interprets Hebrews v. 11, 12 and chapter vi. 1, 2 and verses 4-6 as all describing the spiritual condition of the readers to whom this epistle is addressed. But, as we shall see, this identification is so unlikely that we cannot accept it without clear proof; and of such proof we have none, either in the verses before us or in their context.

It is quite true that in chapter v. 11-14 we have words of blame. The persons addressed are "dull of hearing"; they need that some one teach them the rudiments of the beginning of the oracles of God, and they need milk, being unfit for solid food. But this is very different from "having fallen away" and from "crucifying afresh to themselves the Son of God and putting Him to open shame." The one class of persons had failed to go forward, the others had lost the position they once possessed and were now openly hostile to Christ. This difference is not overturned by the word *γεγόνατε* in verse 12: "Ye have *become* men having need of milk." For even their stagnation was a sort of evil development. They who fail to grow become dwarfs, and thus become as different from

what they were in earlier years as a dwarf differs from a growing child. But even a dwarf is not necessarily an apostate or an enemy.

There is no indication that the men referred to in verses 4-6 are the same as those directly addressed in the preceding and following verses. The opening words of verse 4 rather suggest that the writer is turning from his readers to another class of persons: and this suggestion is raised to certainty by verse 9, "But we are persuaded about you, beloved ones, better things and things taking hold of salvation, if even we thus speak." He remembers, in verse 10, their kindness to the saints; and in verse 11 exhorts them to greater confidence and hope. Language so encouraging could not possibly be addressed to persons who had fallen away and were putting Christ to public dishonour.

On the other hand, verses 4-6 are given in support of the foregoing exhortation "Let us go on to maturity. . . . For it is impossible, touching those once enlightened . . . to renew them again to repentance." Evidently this description of the fallen ones for whom nothing can be done is given as a warning to the dull ears of the readers of the epistle. This implies that the two groups had something in common, but by no means implies that they were the same. The point in common is that even the apostates had once actual spiritual life. That they had fallen away, was good reason why those who were still, in spite of lapse of time, babes in Christ should press forward to maturity.

In his endeavour to prove that verses 4-6 describe the readers to whom the epistle is addressed, Dr. Milligan strangely dilutes the force of the terrible words here used. He says on page 370 that "no indication is given us that, after having for a time believed, they had at length completely rejected Christ." On page 372 he suggests that the

sacred writer may have somewhat overstated his case : " he may speak with some measure of greater sharpness than the strict circumstances of the case demanded." He adds, " but, even though it be not so, though every reproof spoken is to be taken in its utmost literalness, it is obvious that we have before us something very different from a complete departure from the faith of Christ." So on page 374 : " Our contention therefore is that *παραπεσόντας* in our present passage, while describing a condition into which the Hebrew Christians had fallen, does not speak of it as absolute apostacy, as a condition of alienation from God, in which they were sealed by His just judgment, in which no change of mind could be experienced, and from which there could be no hope of return. . . . They had sinfully departed from Christ as He was; but they did not wholly and consciously deny Him." Here two different matters are confounded, absolute apostacy and final apostacy. It is quite conceivable that a man may be " rejected and near to a curse " and yet be capable, under certain conditions, of restoration. But if the words " crucifying afresh to themselves the Son of God and putting Him to open shame " do not describe persons who " wholly and consciously deny Him," it seems to me that no words can describe such persons.

We come now to look at the grammatical structure of the verses before us.

Nearly the whole sentence consists of accusatives governed by the active verb *ἀνακαινίζειν*. Touching certain persons whom he describes at considerable length, the writer declares that " it is impossible . . . to renew them to repentance. These persons are described by a series of aorist participles noting events in their past lives. They had been enlightened; they had tasted the heavenly gift and had become partakers of the Holy Spirit; and had tasted the good word of God and powers of the coming

age. But these happy events had been followed by another event widely different: they had "fallen away." This can only mean that they had lost the standing ground on which these heavenly gifts had placed them.

Of these persons, the writer says that "it is impossible . . . to renew them to repentance." Notice carefully the present infinitive, ἀνακαινίζειν. The comparative rarity of this form of the Greek verb gives emphasis to the word here used. It does not mean that it is impossible to renew them at some future time. This idea would be expressed by the more common aorist infinitive; as in verse 18, "impossible for God to lie," *i.e.* at any time; and in chapter xi. 6, "apart from faith it is impossible to please" God. The present infinitive is found in chapter x. 4, "impossible to take away sins"; in reference to a supposed process of pardon going on day by day. What is denied in the verse before us is a present renewal.

This grammatical meaning of the present infinitive is confirmed by the present participles following. These are accusatives in apposition to the accusative aorist participles preceding. Evidently the description begun by the aorist participles is supplemented by the present participles. And the change of tense from aorist to present, places the present participles in relation to the present infinitive immediately foregoing. The present participles describe here, as always, an action going on at the same time as, or a state contemporary with, the action described by the main verb to which the participle is subordinate. We have here two sets of participles, one aorist, the other present, describing the same persons, and both subordinate to one main assertion, "it is impossible to renew them." They have been enlightened, and have become partakers of the Holy Spirit: they are now crucifying to themselves the Son of God, and are putting Him to open shame. Of such persons, the writer declares, not that they will never be

restored; but that it is impossible now to be restoring them. So long as this description remains true of them, their case is beyond reach of renewal.

This assertion by no means implies that the men referred to will never cease to dishonour Christ. And if they cease so to do, these terrible words still leave open to them a path of repentance.

It may be objected that it is tautological to say that repentance is impossible till men forsake open sin. But I think that the exposition just suggested gives a rational sense. The writer asserts that efforts to lead men to a better mind are wasted on those engaged in high-handed sin. And he says this in order to hold up as a warning certain actual cases of open and conspicuous apostasy, in order that these examples may prompt his readers to diligent effort after spiritual progress.

The distinction between the aorist and present tenses to which I have here called attention may be illustrated by a comparison between 1 John ii. 1, *ἐάν τις ἀμάρτη* and chapter iii. 9, *οὐ δύναται ἀμαρτάνειν*. Here an apparent contradiction is removed by a distinction of tenses which cannot without circumlocution be reproduced in English. John writes in order to save his readers from falling at any future time into sin: *ἵνα μὴ ἀμάρτητε*. He goes on to say that if, in spite of this effort of his, any one does fall into sin, we have an Advocate with the Father who is Himself a Propitiation for our sins. In apparent contradiction to this, he says in chapter iii. 9 that whosoever is born of God cannot sin. Notice here the perfect participle, *γεγεννημένος*. The writer means that, so long as the life received at the New Birth continues, its recipient cannot be committing actual sin, that sin and the new life are incompatible. But this by no means excludes the possibility that through lapse of faith the new life may cease, and that then one who was a child of God may fall into

sin. And in chapter ii. 1, even this possibility is graciously provided for.

It is now quite clear that in the verses before us the present participles attach a limit of time to the main assertion of the sentence. The impossibility of renewal is asserted only for such time as the apostates continue to dishonour Christ. This temporal use of the present participle may be illustrated by Romans vii. 3: "while the man lives (*ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνδρός*) she will be called an adulteress, if she become another man's." So Acts v. 4, "while remaining, did it not remain thine?" *οὐχὶ μένον σοὶ ἔμεινε.*

It is also evident that the present participles give a reason and condition of the impossibility of renewal. The attendant circumstance contains the cause of that which it accompanies. Consequently here the present participle notes, as frequently, both a temporal and casual relation. Of these relations the Revisers put the latter in their text, "seeing they crucify"; and the former in their margin, "the while they crucify." This last rendering, Dr. Milligan commends. But why the definite article *the* should be put before the sufficiently definite adverb *while*, he does not say. Each of these renderings contains a part of the truth; but the Greek text does not distinguish between them.

We can reproduce accurately both the form and the meaning of the Greek by rendering, FOR IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, TOUCHING THOSE WHO WERE ONCE ENLIGHTENED, AND TASTED THE HEAVENLY GIFT, AND BECAME PARTAKERS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, AND TASTED THE GOOD WORD OF GOD AND POWERS OF THE COMING AGE, TO RENEW THEM AGAIN TO REPENTANCE, WHILE CRUCIFYING TO THEMSELVES AFRESH THE SON OF GOD AND PUTTING HIM TO OPEN SHAME.

This rendering does not reproduce fully the significance of the infinitive present *to be renewing them again to repent-*

ance. But, even in this English rendering, the present participles limit the main assertion to the continuance of the open apostacy. The pronoun rendered *to themselves* is the dative of disadvantage, and describes the men in question as themselves receiving the results of their rejection of Christ.

This awful description of actual apostates is held up as a warning to men who had become slow of hearing, and who after many years had still need to learn the rudiments of the Gospel. And experience has often proved that the terrible condition of the fallen has been a potent stimulus to rouse the flagging energy and watchfulness of those who have become weary in the Christian course.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

THE DEMONIACS OF GERASA.

WHETHER we can, as an abstract question, believe in possession by evil spirits at all, or accept that doctrine of fallen angels upon which the belief rests, has already been considered in connection with earlier narratives.¹

It was then urged that every *a priori* argument against the existence of evil spirits goes as far to disprove that of evil men, and especially of wicked men in high places, wielding the powers of Attila or Napoleon—unless indeed one falls into the common error of supposing demons to be absolutely and infinitely evil, in the face of several direct assertions that some are more wicked than others. It was shown that our utter inability so much as to conceive of the origin of evil gives support to the doctrine that its origin was in natures unlike ours, and yet able to infect ours with the virus of their wickedness. It was pointed out that the plain teaching of the New Testament, affirming that we are in danger from personal tempters, falls in with and explains many phenomena of the inner life, conspicuous among these being the persistent manner in which evil, even when sad experience has shown it to be joyless and indeed painful, still urges itself upon fallen men, and subdues their will by sheer clamour and importunity within the mind. It was observed on the other hand that the word *possession* goes beyond what is written, for Scripture speaks of men who have a devil (*δαιμόνιον ἔχει*) but never the reverse; and it is quite possible that this expression overstates the case, although Christ, in a passage plainly figurative, represents the usurper as returning at will to his house whence he went out.

We note also that our Lord, when dealing with these cases, behaves with an austere severity quite unlike His

¹ EXPOSITOR, October, 1892, p. 272.

treatment of mere disease ; but, on the other hand, though here alone we find outcry, resistance, the evidence of an antagonistic volition and an immoral force, yet He never once admonishes a rescued demoniac as if he had been a special sinner with a consenting will, nor adds pardon to emancipation, nor warns him to beware lest a worse thing come upon him. All the phenomena are those, not only of a double consciousness, but of a real division of which the consciousness takes note. This is especially true of the case which we now approach, the case of the demoniacs of Gerasa.

But before examining this remarkable narrative, there is another preliminary question to be considered. What is to be understood by the evil spirit entering into a man, going out of him, and returning into him as into a house which he had forsaken? The answer is especially important when we read of the demons entering into swine, and much awkward merriment has been derived by unbelievers from the notion of evil spirits finding a residence in "pigs."

What then is it necessary to receive, if one would fain accept the words of Jesus frankly, and yet intelligently, neither refusing any statement which He actually makes, nor yet resting in that dull literalism from which transubstantiation and half the heresies of Christendom have sprung?

When the question is thus put, we are already half-way to the answer. For we are at once reminded that the same and stronger language is found in passages where no one dreams of a literal dwelling-place and mansion. Christ dwells in our hearts by faith. The Spirit dwells in us. God dwelleth in us and we in Him. Where the door is open, Christ comes in and actually sups. The Father and the Son come into men, and make their abode with them. Do we believe these assertions? We believe them implicitly ; but neither we nor any believe that they

are to be construed like the expressions in a lease. They speak of abiding influence, immediate, personal and intimate, not of localized physical presence in a body as in bricks and mortar. Now the same is true of fallen angels. The two influences are connected by identical language when we read that the Spirit of the Lord departed from Saul and an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him (1 Sam. xvi. 14), and in the parable of the stronger man spoiling the strong man's house. Of Judas, who was not possessed but wicked, we read that after the sop Satan entered into him. Satan also filled the hearts of Ananias and Sapphira, but it was no physical occupation of the carnal organs which impelled them to lie against the Holy Ghost. Nor, when we read that Satan had his throne in Pergamum, do we think of a golden or ivory seat in any palace there.

And what reason is there to suppose that Scripture makes even demoniacs the house of demons any more carnally and literally than it makes spiritual men the temple of the Holy Ghost? The sway exercised is of a peculiar and dreadful kind, but it is mastery, direction ("indwelling" if one likes the phrase, which, however, is usually applied to a very different Spirit); and what is wild, fierce and impulsive in its character reveals to us the lawless nature of the fallen beings who exert it.

Now what has science, represented by so powerful an exponent as Mr. Huxley, to object against all this? His attack, delivered with great vigour and parade of mastery, addressed itself to the special case before us, the case of the Gadarenes, and the swine. Now that the dust has settled down, and his weapon is no longer flashing, we may safely ask what has come of it all. The present writer can find only what a few sentences suffice to express. And, strange to say, one of these is a distinct admission that the whole narrative contains nothing which science really contradicts at all. "I declare, as plainly as I can, that

I am unable to show cause why these transferable devils should not exist; nor can I deny that not merely the whole Roman Church, but many Wacean" (=so-called) "‘infidels’ of no mean repute, do honestly and firmly believe that the activity of such-like dæmonic beings is in full fling in this year of grace 1889. Nevertheless, as good Bishop Butler says, ‘probability is the guide of life,’ and it seems to me that this is just one of the cases in which the canon of credibility and testimony, which I have ventured to lay down, is in full force.”¹

Quite so, but credibility and testimony come into play, just where scientific demonstration calls a halt. No one will say that the laws of crystals, or the mutual relation of the angles in a triangle, or the structure of a crayfish are questions of credibility and testimony; nor indeed is the profoundest demonstration of astronomy such, except so far as I am not a scientific expert, so far as my knowledge is at secondhand.

Now this does not break the force of any arguments which Professor Huxley has to adduce, nor is it quoted with any such intention. But it does something else. It quite dispels the glamour which is felt by many minds, concerning the pronouncement of so great a man of science. The talkers who do not think, the readers of magazines and not of books, the not incurious young men and women who are not well informed, but pickers up of wisdom’s crumbs, all these are profoundly impressed by finding that a great man of science has declared against the story of the demoniac. But the declaration does not come from Professor Huxley as admirable man of science; as such he disowns any part in it; it comes from the amateur in biblical criticism, from the author of an assertion in that line so amazing that I have never been quite certain whether Professor

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1889, p. 177.

Huxley meant to say the wonderful thing which his words convey to me. Here is the yard-stick wherewith to measure his attainment in this direction. "Let any reasonable man ask himself this question. If after an approximate settlement of the canon of the New Testament, and even later than the fourth and fifth centuries, literary fabricators had the skill and the audacity to make such additions and interpolations as these, what may they have done when no one had thought of a canon?"¹ Now what are these additions and interpolations, of which he thinks it safe to assume as a thing conceded, without adducing further evidence than he finds in the revised margin, that they are "even later than the fourth and fifth centuries?" They are the closing verses of St. Mark, and the story of the woman taken in adultery.

We now breathe freely. We can exercise our judgment without being overweighted by undue awe, for it is evident that the high and deserved position of the assailant has been attained not only in other fields, but also by other processes.

And in this matter of credibility and testimony, we have first of all to ask what sort of examination has he given to the facts? Was his rejection of the scriptural theory of "possession" the result of a careful and accurate diagnosis, or the reverse? Another citation enables us to answer this question pretty confidently. "If physical diseases are caused by demons, Gregory of Tours and his contemporaries rightly considered that relics and exorcists are more useful than doctors" (p. 174). Two things are here to be observed. The alleged consequence would only follow if we grant the further assumption that demons are the usual cause of most diseases, since the healers of a few exceptional maladies cannot be held to be "more useful" than the healers of many. Now the New Testa-

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1889, p. 176.

ment draws a clear and sharp contrast between possession and nine-tenths of the diseases treated by our Lord, so that on any showing he who deals with the latter retains his superiority in usefulness. The ethical significance of the events is quite another thing. But this is a small matter compared with the monstrous assertion that exorcism and the use of relics follow from the scriptural doctrine of demons. The scriptural doctrine is fatal to them both. It is impossible to believe in exorcism, in the inherent efficacy of mystic words and invocations, in the face of the story of the sons of Scæva. It is impossible to believe in either exorcism or relics in the face of the explicit word of Jesus: "This kind goeth forth by nothing but by prayer and fasting." And yet this is no mere *obiter dictum*, dropped lightly, and without bearing upon the main argument. That argument relies entirely upon its identification of the phenomena in the New Testament with the disgraceful superstitions of the middle ages, and of the New England puritans, who were beset by savage men and strange and cruel circumstances, in a wilderness, with overstrained nerves, and full of morbid imaginations. Mr. Huxley carries the identification so far as to declare that "if the story is true, the mediæval theory of the invisible world may be, and probably is, quite correct; and the witchfinders, from Sprenger to Hopkins and Mather, are much-maligned men" (p. 173). The latter clause, one observes with interest, is not even qualified by the word "probably." And then of course it is easy to conclude that the same common sense which dismisses the later stories should reject the earlier, since the one follows upon the other. The only objection to the argument is that it begs the question. The difference between the stories is radical and profound. A witch in the middle ages was the willing accomplice of the evil one, to whom her soul was sold. She could be detected by the spot on her body

which a needle would not pierce, and this should be indecently and cruelly searched out. The devils of the middle ages were creatures whose horns and hoofs betrayed their pagan origin, and they would play dice, or draw plans of a cathedral, or win a sweetheart for you, if only you would sign a document which straightway became irrevocable.

The demons of the New Testament were invisible. No wizard or witch is ever said to cross the steps of Jesus. No soul of men is ever described as forfeited by a deed of gift. Christ and His followers do not cruelly destroy the demoniac because they fear him; on the contrary they claim and exercise a moral mastery over his tyrant, and have no feeling except pity for himself. It follows therefore that Scripture is no more responsible for the witchfinder than (as we have seen) for the exorcist or the relic-monger; and has on the contrary laid down principles which, if observed, would have made them all alike impossible. It is surely unscientific to declare that "the most horrible persecutions and judicial murders of hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children" were "justly based" on narratives which distinctly assert that even if every one of them was really possessed, the Church could recover them, and was bound to do so, narratives which say not a word about witches, and which exhibit the demons in a character wholly unlike the mediæval conception. If we are asked how the mediæval Church neglected these palpable distinctions, we have now a ready answer, How did Professor Huxley neglect them? And this entirely draws the sting of yet another pronouncement. "Everything that I know of physiological and pathological science leads me to entertain a very strong conviction that the phenomena ascribed to possession are as natural as those which constitute small-pox" (p. 172).

This no longer alarms us, when we see him ascribing

to possession phenomena which he has picked up in other centuries and distant lands, phenomena which we might with equal confidence expect to show themselves in ignorant and fanatical ages, whatever be our view of the gospel narratives, because hysteria and madness reproduce in burlesque alike true things and false, and there will be found in the same asylum aspirants to the rank of the deity, and of the man in the moon, of Napoleon the Great, and Aladdin and Queen Victoria.

There is one other consideration, of a kind entirely different. Professor Huxley thinks Jesus behaved improperly if it is true that He destroyed the swine. "Everything that I know of law and justice convinces me that the wanton destruction of other people's property is a misdemeanour of evil example."¹ In this little sentence only three questions are begged: that it was Jesus who destroyed anything; that what He did was wanton; and that the swine were the property of the Gadarenes in a sense which barred the claim of One, whose are the cattle on a thousand hills, and whom on any theory which upholds the miracle, Jesus represented. All this is afterwards repeated in a cruder form: "Suppose a modern English sabbatarian fanatic . . . sees a fellow Puritan yielding to the temptation of getting in his harvest on a fine Sabbath morning, is the former justified in setting fire to the latter's corn?"² As if (on the only supposition with which Professor Huxley has to deal), there was no more in the position of Jesus than that of a fellow citizen. It is asserted that "the kingdom of God has come unto you," and that "I by the finger of God cast out devils." In this power He has just wielded the elemental forces of nature, calming the tempest on the lake. And yet He, armed by God with forces meant to attest His divinity, may only treat men as it is lawful for

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, Feb., 1889, p. 172.

² *Ibid.*, Dec., 1890, p. 978.

one Puritan to treat another. But Professor Huxley will not deny that (on the theory with which he is grappling) God does, by storm and plague, destroy not only property but life. Nay, His human agents, not the fellow Puritan but the judge, and the national forces, habitually do the same. And it is a bold thing to refuse a revelation of God in humanity, merely because it professes to act as God acts, and not as a common man. One is not disposed to insist over-much on the distinction between destroying the swine and allowing the demons who destroyed them to enter in, yet it is not one which an antagonist can afford entirely to ignore. For many reasons unknown to us, perhaps to assure the demoniacs of the reality and completeness of the removal of their tormentors, perhaps to deepen the public impression of the great deed, perhaps to rebuke a violation of the law (for even Mr. Huxley cannot flatter himself that he has quite proved that the owners of the swine were certainly Gentiles), Jesus may have permitted the demons to enter the swine, at the cost of the destruction of the animals. That is not the same as the throwing of fire into a cornfield, simply in order to destroy it. And certainly it is a bold thing to describe the act as "wanton," merely because one does not himself approve of it.

One use of it is palpable, and bears all the appearance of having been designed when it was wrought. Jesus came not to judge the world but to bring a new life into it. And therefore He never wrought even one such act of penal judgment as was familiar to every student of the Old Testament. Such deeds of vengeance are common in the Apocryphal Gospels, in which we find many specimens of what would have happened if Jesus had obeyed an impulse to "wanton destruction." They were entirely alien to the plan of His first coming, and the divine purpose which it revealed.

And yet the absence of all severity, the revelation of God

without any judgment, the total ignoring of a stern side in the divine character, would have been equally unlike His teaching and the reality of things. Here, and in the symbolic fate of the barren but pretentious fig-tree, there is seen, yet without human suffering, that God can act otherwise than softly. To enforce this lesson, every theist holds that agony and death are constantly inflicted. Why not also the loss of two thousand swine?

Moreover, when the miracle, true or mythic, is compared to a mischievous flinging of fire into a cornfield, we might have looked for some recognition of the fact that it brought large compensation with its loss, the pacifying of two human tigers, and the opening up of a way which no man had dared to traverse.

It is now time to examine the narrative itself. Fresh from His victory over the tempest, the Lord is confronted by a sterner fury, the rage of hostile spirits. Two men meet Him, as St. Matthew is aware, although the subsequent evangelical energy of one has made him better known, and in the other Gospels he only is the hero of the tale. Both are exceeding fierce, the terror of the countryside, scorning restraint and decency, and haunting the cave-tombs whose melancholy associations harmonized alike with their own ruin, and that of the spirits which impelled them. At the sight of Jesus, their duplex personality produced conflicting cries and actions, so that they ran to meet Him and yet bade Him let them alone. Madmen, even if attracted, would not have known Him who He was; but this was certain to the followers of that dark spirit, who after His Baptism had assailed the Holy One of God in vain. Jesus sets Himself at once to awaken and to calm the real humanity within the sufferer by asking *What is thy name?* but the demons break in with a boastful self-assertion, claiming to be many, and taking the name of such a mail-clad host as they had often seen trampling

down the reluctant land. Then, when they feel themselves overpowered, they beseech not to be utterly driven into "the abyss," but allowed to linger in that borderland between Israel and paganism, even if their dominion must be limited to the brutes. But these, when permission is given and acted upon, utterly lose all self-control, and fling themselves into the waters of the lake. It is impossible to explain the nature either of such brute "possession" or of its effects. But those who know the effect produced upon animals by many sights and sounds, by blood, sometimes by the chime of bells, and by hypnotism, will not deny that they possess a nervous excitability at once mysterious and far-reaching, the bounds of which cannot be so drawn as certainly to exclude strange impulses from sources unknown to man. The keepers told the story in the city, and the multitude came out to see the demoniacs recovered, whereupon a serious difficulty is made out of the question, Where had the two men got raiment, since clothed they were? As if a boat's crew could not have provided them with as much as decency required.

If any further vindication of the penal loss of property were needed, it is supplied by the inhabitants themselves, in their covetous and pitiless repulsion of Him on whom they lay the blame. They dared not expel Him, but they prayed the Saviour of their brothers to depart out of their coast; and Jesus "gave them their desire," though it implied, as of old, "leanness 'for' their souls." It was not His manner to force grace upon the reluctant, and we to-day may reject His counsel, against ourselves.

It was most natural that one whom He had rescued from fathomless degradation should earnestly desire to follow Him, even if he had no superstitious fear of the demons returning when Jesus was at a distance. But it was right that he should learn a bolder faith; and his testimony, comparatively useless elsewhere, was the last

benefit which Jesus could secure for the ungrateful inhabitants, to whom it was of paramount importance.

Thus the whole narrative is coherent and edifying, utterly unlike the miserable witchtales with which its enemies would confound it.

G. A. CHADWICK.

WEIZSÄCKER ON THE RESURRECTION.

WEIZSÄCKER'S important book on Apostolic Times¹—a new edition of which has recently come out, embodying the writer's latest conclusions—opens with an explanation of the New Testament account of the resurrection of our Lord that invites our inquiry, not only because it represents the opinion of a very acute critic, but for the weighty reason that the view it sets forth seems to be gaining favour as a refuge from a perplexing problem, even among persons who are far from accepting the standpoint of the author and his school. The secret of this view may be divined from the statement that we can *easily* ascertain the nature of the appearances of Christ to the predecessors of St. Paul referred to in 1 Corinthians xv. by considering what the Apostle tells us of his own experience. In his list of the appearances of the risen Lord he includes that with which he himself was favoured, saying, "And last of all, as to one born out of due time, He appeared to me also" (1 Cor. xv. 8). St. Paul makes no distinction between this last manifestation to himself and the five earlier ones. He does not scruple to use the same word (*ὄφθη*) for all six cases. Therefore, Weizsäcker argues, if we can discover St. Paul's experience, we shall know what he understood to be the experiences of St. Peter, St. James, the twelve, "all

¹ *Das Apostolische Zeitalter der Christlichen Kirche.* Von Carl Weizsäcker. Zweite neu bearbeitete Auflage.

the apostles," and the five hundred. What then did St. Paul mean when he claimed that Christ had appeared to him? Weizsäcker will not rely on the "Acts of the Apostles" for an answer to this question because the three accounts of the occurrence on the road to Damascus preserved in that book do not quite agree together, although he points out that not one of those accounts contains any allusion to a visible appearance of Christ. In each case we only read of a light and a voice. It is to St. Paul's own words that we are referred for an authentic description of what the Apostle really experienced. This, Weizsäcker maintains, was a spiritual vision, so that when, as St. Paul tells us, he saw Christ he could only have seen Him in spirit ("das was er sah nur im Geiste sehen konnte"). In Galatians i. 16 he rejoices in the thought that God had revealed His Son *in* him, and this revelation he connects with his apostolic call. On the other hand, he never writes of any external seeing of Jesus Christ with the eye. Therefore we are to conclude that he only saw a spiritual being with spiritual vision. Weizsäcker points out that we should be in error if we inferred that the Apostle supposed there was any contrast between such a vision and actuality. To him it was no delusion, it was not a mere idea or fancy, it was a reality,—still, a spiritual reality seen inwardly, not a substantial presence perceptible to the senses.

Of course this will not harmonise with the gospel accounts of the resurrection, where we encounter the empty grave, the invitation to St. Thomas to overcome his doubts by touching the very wounds of his Master's body, etc. We can scarcely identify any of St. Paul's statements with the narratives in the Gospels, if the order in 1 Corinthians xv. is chronological. The Apostle is silent on the subject of the empty tomb, and he says nothing about the women and what they saw. Weizsäcker thinks that the Evangelists avoid the cases cited by St. Paul, for the most part, just

because those cases are not of a kind to satisfy the craving of their contemporaries for corporeal manifestations. Accordingly, while he confines the allusions to the resurrection in St. Paul's unquestionable writings to inward, spiritual experience, he sets aside the gospel accounts of physical phenomena as mythical aftergrowths. One point only will he allow in common to the two sources. They both show that what the Christians experienced in the resurrection of our Lord was sufficiently potent to constitute the summons to their great mission. It must therefore have contained some real and fruitful influence.

Now, as I have said, there seems to be a tendency in some quarters to take refuge in this view of the resurrection as an escape from the difficult questions that bristle round the gospel accounts of the revival of the dead body that had been buried in Joseph's tomb. There is a subtle simplicity about it. It professes to preserve all that is essential to the resurrection, since it gives us the continued life and the returned presence of our Lord. What more do we want?

The present question, however, is, What did St. Paul believe and teach? In order to enter into his ideas we must detach ourselves as far as possible from Greek modes of thinking, and endeavour to enter into the Jewish atmosphere in which he had been reared. Since the days of Origen and Augustin Christianity has been strongly infused with Platonism. But in all probability St. Paul knew little or nothing of Plato or of Platonic thought. At all events he did not approach questions with unconsciously Platonic prepossessions as we do to-day. That the body is a prison to the soul and death its liberation—a conception with which we are perfectly familiar—is purely Platonic. The later Greeks taught the "immortality of the soul." That phrase never occurs in the Bible. The Jews shared with the Homeric Greeks and other early races in a gloomy con-

ception of Hades, where the unclothed soul, a dim and doleful shade, shudders at its own nakedness. There is no life in Hades, which is just the abode of enduring death. All life is associated with some organism, some body. Man is not a soul only; he consists of body, soul, and spirit. Sharing this conception, how could St. Paul expect the future life otherwise than in some sort of bodily resurrection? What he was concerned about was not the saving and restoration of the old fabric. He was thinking of the reality, the intensity, the glory of the life beyond. But to him must it not necessarily have presented itself under the form of a rising from the grave, although he was able to purge the idea of resurrection from the coarse materialism that his Jewish contemporaries revelled in? Accordingly should we expect him to be satisfied with any form of the renewed conscious life of our Lord short of a visible bodily resurrection? We must start with a decided presumption against the idea that St. Paul thought only of a spiritual existence spiritually discerned.

An examination of the Apostle's utterances on the subject more in detail will, I believe, confirm this presupposition with a definite conclusion.

In the first place, he not only mentions certain appearances; he also speaks of a "resurrection of the dead." According to St. Paul's account the Christ who *appeared* on the six occasions gathered together in 1 Corinthians xv. had been first *raised up*. The *ᾠφθη* is preceded by *ἐγήγερται*; and if anybody should say that the latter word may be taken to mean simply "roused," the same cannot be asserted of the substantives *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, which St. Paul uses to describe the process through which our Lord passed. Surely if words have any meaning, this expression must point to something quite different from the subsequent appearances which Weizsäcker understands to be of a wholly spiritual character. Moreover it must not be forgotten that these

are the familiar words used in the New Testament for the resurrection. They are the very words used in the Gospels and the "Acts of the Apostles" for the raising from the dead which Weizsäcker thinks so different from that believed in by St. Paul. Thus in Matthew xxviii. 6 the angel says: "He is not here; for He is risen (*ἠγέρθη*)"; and in Acts i. 22 we read of a "witness of His resurrection" (*ἀναστάσεως*), and so *passim*. But if the Apostle meant something quite other than what was always understood by these very common words, why did he throw dust in our eyes by using the familiar language?

2. Further, it is to be observed that although St. Paul does not make any allusion to the empty tomb or to what happened to the women and others by the grave—a strong point with Weizsäcker—he distinctly asserts that our Lord was buried. Taken by itself this may not seem to be very particularly significant, because it is agreed on all sides that the dead body of our Lord must have been put away somewhere. The hypothesis of catalepsy and the hiding of the comatose sufferer until he was fit to be seen again, is not worth a moment's consideration; it has never been maintained by any number of serious thinkers. But we must not overlook the striking juxtaposition of statements in the language of St. Paul. "For I delivered unto you," he writes, "first of all that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that He was buried; and that He hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4). Here the Apostle notes a succession of three events—death, burial, resurrection. It is impossible not to connect the third with the second as well as with the first. Grammatically, of course, the connection between the second and the third term is the closer. To skip the second so as to understand the resurrection to refer entirely to an awakening from death, without any relation to the burial,

is to throw the whole series of sentences into confusion. Inasmuch as the resurrection is named immediately after the burial, it must be understood by St. Paul to have some reference to it; he must mean that it was in some way a raising up of the body from the grave as well as an awakening of the spirit from the sleep of death.

3. Again, St. Paul's reference to a definite time points to the same conclusion. He agrees with the Evangelists in the statement that our Lord was raised up "on the third day." Here is some occurrence which St. Paul conceives to have taken place at a particular date. The use of the perfect tense is only explicable on this supposition. The Apostle is careful to repeat his words in the same form: "He *hath* been raised" (1 Cor. xv. 4); "Now is Christ preached that He *hath* been raised from the dead" (ver. 12); "Now *hath* Christ been raised from the dead" (ver. 20), etc.—the perfect ἐγήγερται in every case. But is it not the characteristic of this tense that while it describes a present state it does so by representing this to be the result of some previous occurrence? Still more clear is the use of the aorist where St. Paul refers to the action of God in raising up Christ—*e.g.*, "We are witnesses of God that He raised up (ἤγειρε) Christ" (ver. 15). This can only refer to one distinct Divine action.

4. Here we are introduced to another fact that points in the same direction. St. Paul always describes the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a work of God's wrought upon Him, not as a self-originated action of His own; *e.g.*, "We are witnesses of God that He raised up Christ" (1 Cor. xv. 15). This pregnant idea is obscured by the mistranslation in the Authorised Version, where we read, "He rose again" (ver. 4), "Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the dead" (ver. 12), "And if Christ be not risen" (ver. 14), etc. In every one of these instances the Greek verb is in the passive voice (ἐγήγερται); and this is now

correctly rendered in the Revised Version, so that we read there, "He hath been raised," "Now if Christ is preached that He hath been raised," "And if Christ hath not been raised," etc. Such an idea as is here presented to us certainly implies some real experience on the part of our Lord, and this of a most momentous character, and the effect of an action of God. But where shall we find room for anything of the kind, if after His spirit had been freed from His body nothing further happened, as far as His disciples knew, except their spiritual perception of His spiritual presence?

5. The natural understanding of St. Paul's language in regard to the resurrection is confirmed by what he says of the series of appearances that followed that event. The word *ὤφθη* certainly suggests something more external as its subject than a purely spiritual presence that can only be inwardly discerned. It is true the Apostle writes elsewhere of the "eyes of your heart" (Eph. i. 18). The inward vision of the pure in heart was not unknown to him. But surely a more external procedure is suggested by the use of this definite passive term, "he was seen," or "he appeared."

6. Next, it is to be observed that these appearances are sharply distinguished from one another and limited to a certain number. They are six in all. The aorist (*ὤφθη*) is used in every case, showing that each appearance was conceived as a separate, definite occurrence. Such an event would be entirely different from the spiritual contemplation of the indwelling Christ, which is no peculiar, abnormal vision, like the glimpse of the Holy Grail vouchsafed to one or two of King Arthur's knights after long toil and search. That spiritual contemplation is not confined to a few favoured spectators, it is free to all Christ's people; nor is it the rare privilege of a single crisis; it is an abiding and deepening experience of consciousness. St. Paul frequently refers

to the indwelling Christ. There is then a very marked distinction between the six unique manifestations of the risen Christ, so carefully recited and so solemnly attested, and the equally real but happily widespread experience of the indwelling Christ, which is the heritage of the Church at large. Deep and vital as the spiritual experience of the Christ-consciousness is, it can scarcely be described with the sharpness of definition or with the numerical and temporal limitations that St. Paul employs in writing of the six appearances. It is not a vision; it is a life. And yet we can scarcely differentiate it from Weizsäcker's "spiritual vision of a spiritual being," for what is a spiritual vision but an interior consciousness? Such a vision is not the seeing of a spirit with the bodily eye. Weizsäcker does not mean that St. Paul and his predecessors saw a ghost, such as people are supposed to see in haunted houses, *i.e.*, some manifestation of a spirit perceptible to the senses. But if this is not to be thought of, it is difficult to separate the spiritual vision of the risen Christ from the spiritual experience of Christians generally; and yet, as we have seen, St. Paul's language plainly requires us to do so. It may be said, indeed, that there is a difference in intensity and significance, practically amounting to a difference in kind, between the normal Christian experience and some rare moment of rapture when the soul is ravished with a sudden and overwhelming consciousness of the presence of its Lord. This may well be the case. But then it points to such an experience as that which St. Paul describes in 2 Cor. xii., where he comes to "visions and revelations of the Lord," and tells how he was "caught up even to the third heaven," and that at a definite time "fourteen years ago." He never identifies this mysterious occurrence with the unique experience he shared with the apostles in seeing the risen Christ. No catching up to the third heaven, no question of being in the body or out of the body, no notion

of catalepsy can be associated with those sober events. But on the theory of Weizsäcker how can we separate the two forms of experience?

6. Weizsäcker directs our attention to Philippians iii. 21, where our Lord's resurrection body is described as a "body of glory" (*τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*), and to the more elaborate description of the resurrection body of Christians in 1 Corinthians xv. Certainly, as Weizsäcker remarks, if Christ is "the first-fruits from the dead," there must be a similarity of kind between the first-fruits and the general harvest. Now St. Paul rejects the materialistic notion of popular Judaism. According to his description, the resurrection body is not of "flesh and blood"; it is not subject to corruption; it is not *ψυχικόν*. What then is it? It is a spiritual body (*σῶμα πνευματικόν*). It is by no means easy to determine how the Apostle really imagines this resurrection body. To suppose, however, that he is thinking only of a purely spiritual existence, *i.e.*, only of a *spirit*, must be an error. Clearly he distinguishes between a spiritual body and a spirit. The former rises from the dead, and in its resurrection clothes the spirit. We can scarcely illustrate his idea by calling in Prof. Clifford's hypothesis of "mind-stuff," for St. Paul means more than that. His spiritual body may be an organism of finest texture, readily responsive to the thought and will of the spirit, and perhaps not consisting of what we know as matter. Still it is a body (*σῶμα*). The Apostle never confounds body and spirit. Thus in another place he writes of the longing "to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven . . . not for that we would be unclothed, but that we would be clothed upon" (2 Cor. v. 2-4). Here the Jew is speaking, though with a refinement of spirituality far beyond the habits of his contemporaries. St. Paul positively shrinks from the chill thought of becoming a "naked" spirit. Therefore, if he teaches that the resur-

rection body of Christ is of the same type as that of His people, it too must be more than spirit, spiritually discerned.

Gathering up the evidence, we find that St. Paul wrote of a resurrection of our Lord as something preceding the appearances, that he closely connected this with the previous burial, that he assigned it to a particular day, that he attributed it to God and referred to Christ as passive under the divine action; then that he detailed the subsequent appearances as happening definitely on six distinct occasions; lastly, that his refined idea of the glorified spiritual body, of which our Lord's resurrection body was the first-fruits, implies some existence over and above that of the eternal, deathless spirit of Christ. Do not these considerations concur in driving us to the conclusion that the Apostle meant more than what Weizsäcker attributes to his words, and that, in fact, there was no essential difference between his conception of the resurrection and the conceptions of that event which found their way into our gospels? Nor is this result only one of formal consistency. The resurrection of our Lord must be more than the optical appearance of a ghost or the spiritual contact of spirit with spirit if it is to take the place assigned to it in the New Testament. It is in the historical event of which St. Paul and the Evangelists wrote that we recognise the seal of God's acceptance of the sacrificial work of Christ, the proof of His own victory over sin and death, the assurance of His full present activity, the pledge of the ultimate establishment of His kingdom, and the type and promise of the glorious future life of all who fall asleep in Him.

W. F. ADENEY.

SURVEY OF RECENT BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

INTRODUCTION.—In connection with the text of the New Testament much good work has been done in our time, but probably that which will be most conspicuously monumental is the edition of the Vulgate by Bishop Wordsworth and Vice-Principal White. The editors have the satisfaction of knowing that their work need never be done over again, and that theirs will be the critical edition for all time. With such reward, scholars such as they are compensated even for the enormous labour spent upon this edition. Great credit is due also to the Clarendon Press for the perfect form in which it is issued. The part now issued [*Partis Prioris Fasciculus Tertius*] contains the Gospel according to St. Luke. The title of the whole is *Novum Testamentum Domini Nostri Jesu Christi Latine secundum editionem Sancti Hieronymi*.

A not ignoble rivalry between the Oxford and Cambridge University Presses is productive of great advantage to the public. The *Oxford Bible for Teachers*, which in previous editions has become so deservedly popular is now issued in a form which should secure for it a still wider acceptance with all English-reading peoples. The *Helps to the Study of the Bible* are issued in a separate form, but even when bound up with the beautifully printed Bible, they do not swell the volume to an inconvenient size, indeed scarcely to an appreciable extent. But the size does not measure the importance of these *Helps*. In this edition whatever accuracy and whatever completeness are possible have been attained. This will be understood when it is mentioned that among the contributors are numbered such authorities as Canon Churton and Mr. Deane, Canons Maclear, Rawlinson, and Girdlestone, Dr. Stubbs, and Professors Earle and Skeat, and from the British Museum Drs. Murray, Wallis Budge, and Maunde Thompson. That the knowledge of these and kindred authorities should be put within reach of all classes of the community is a triumph of enterprise and probably the greatest achievement hitherto made in the popularizing of recondite information.—Less cannot be said of *The Cambridge Companion to the Bible*, which includes among its contributors Bishops Westcott and Perowne, Professors Davidson, Robertson Smith, Lumby, Stanton, Armitage Robinson, Gwatkin, and Ryle, and others of almost equal emin-

ence. If these men cannot give us an account of the contents of the Bible, which is scholarly and up to date, we may look in vain for it elsewhere. Whatever part we examine, Antiquities, Geography, History, Introduction, we find the same evidence of perfect familiarity with the subject, and the same skill in presenting precisely what the ordinary reader requires. With such a *Companion* a Bible Dictionary may almost be dispensed with. Though it has not the illustrations which adorn the Oxford *Helps*, the maps are beautifully executed, and in every respect the volume is one which does credit to the Cambridge University Press and which will certainly be prized by all lovers of the Bible.

Mr. W. E. Barnes, B.D., Theological Lecturer at Clare College, Cambridge, has issued a small volume entitled *Canonical and Un-canonical Gospels* (Longmans, Green & Co.). It contains a brief but well-judged argument in favour of the truth and early origin of the narrative contained in our four canonical Gospels. The witnesses adduced are those which are uniformly relied upon in every argument for the genuineness of the Gospels; but their testimony is cited for a purpose somewhat more special than that which is usually cherished by Apologists. The writer justly considers that he proves that after 180 A.D. our four gospels occupied the place of authorities throughout the Christian world; that other gospels are quoted as inferior authorities; that the gospels publicly read in Justin's time were in substance identical with our St. Matthew and St. Luke, and that there are indications that Justin was acquainted with St. Mark and St. John; that the authorship of St. Mark and its dependence on St. Peter are attested by one who was in all probability a personal disciple of the Lord; and that the Apostolic Fathers and the Epistles of Paul witness to the same story as our four gospels narrate. Another argument for the authenticity of our gospels is vigorously and conclusively conducted by one of the Professors of Stonyhurst College, in his *Recent Evidence for the Authenticity of the Gospels: Tatian's Diatessaron*, by Michael Maher, S. J. (Manresa Press: Rockhampton). In this tractate of eighty-four pages the Author republishes two articles from the *Month*. Nowhere, not even in Hemphill's volume, can the English reader get so full an account of the Diatessaron, or find so convincing an exposition of its bearing on the integrity and authenticity of the canonical gospels.

Prof. Maher has mastered the literature which has so rapidly sprung up around this precious find, and his criticism is of a calibre not unworthy of being matched against Harnack. The publication is convenient, accurate, and useful.

The Synoptic Problem for English Readers, by Alfred J. Jolley (Macmillan & Co.) is not intended to popularize the history of the attempted solutions of the Synoptic Problem, nor to bring before English readers the critical detail which its investigation has brought to light. The writer's object is rather to present the few main factors which enter into the composition of the gospels, and on these to base a theory of their origin. Mr. Jolley's theory is that about the year 66 A.D. the floating reminiscences of the words and deeds of Jesus took shape under some unknown hand. This Primitive Gospel was in Aramaic but was shortly translated into Greek. It contained no history of the Birth, the Passion, or the Resurrection of the Messiah. These events were first recorded in the gospel of Mark, who freely used the Primitive Gospel, but mainly relied on his knowledge of St. Peter's teaching. Our first gospel is a somewhat modified reproduction of the Primitive Gospel to which a traditional narrative of the birth of Jesus has been prefixed, while Mark's account of the Passion and Resurrection has been added and expanded. St. Matthew cannot have been the author of this gospel, and it was written after the year 70 A.D. The third gospel is by Paul's companion, Luke, and is based on St. Mark expanded from the Primitive Gospel, a lost Ebionite Gospel, and tradition. This theory, it will be seen, is but a slight modification of the current two-sources hypothesis.

EXEGESIS.—The late Canon Liddon left an *Explanatory Analysis of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, which he intended for publication and which is now published (Longmans, Green & Co.). With the instinct of a practical teacher Canon Liddon perceived that what was wanted by English students was not a minute verbal commentary giving an account for the hundredth time of unimportant words and turns of expression, but an analysis which should present an outline of the argument and show the relevancy of each part, and call attention to the important points either in substance or expression. This is an example which, it is to be hoped, will be largely followed. By omitting all notice of things self-evident, room is secured for ample treatment of the really significant. Great attention is given to the language, and it is

needless to say that Dr. Liddon here, as in his other works, betrays his fondness for theology and his knowledge of its history. Apt quotations from Augustine occur on almost every page, while Aquinas, Bernard, and the Greek Fathers seem as familiarly known as the great English divines and the modern German critics and theologians. With his well-known proclivities and firmly held opinions it was impossible that Canon Liddon should write on this doctrinal epistle without provoking dissent at several points. His justification of Paul's statement about the connection of the race with Adam by supposing a break between Pre-Adamite man and the present denizens of earth, will hardly convince the scientific. On p. 153 his argument from the use of the article is not sound; and on p. 128 the inference regarding the Scotist view of the necessity of the Incarnation is not justified. But a more inspiring and trustworthy guide through the epistle the student cannot desire, and is not likely to find. The method is beyond praise and the application of it is excellent.

In the department of popular exposition some valuable contributions have been made. To the Expositor's Bible Principal Rainy has added a volume on *The Epistle to the Philippians* (Hodder and Stoughton). It is massive and spiritual, and interspersed with passages of rare insight and beauty.—Dr. Joseph Parker in his *People's Bible* has reached the New Testament and has already published three volumes on the Synoptic Gospels. Here he is on familiar ground, and indeed he has naturally and justifiably adopted into the volumes now issued much of what he had already given to the public in "The Inner Life of Christ." After all that has been written on the gospels a fresh voice is heard in these volumes.—*From Advent to Advent* by C. E. Stuart (E. Marlborough & Co.) is really an exposition of the Gospel according to Luke. It is intelligently written and will be found useful either for private reading or Sunday-school work.—Messrs. Williams & Norgate have issued in three volumes a study of the four gospels entitled *The King and the Kingdom*. It is an attempt to get at the real meaning of the gospels irrespective alike of dogmatic prejudices and hostile criticism. The anonymous writer is evidently sincere and earnest, but the task he has undertaken demands preparation of a still severer kind than he has given.

To the series of "Books for Bible Students," edited by the Rev. Arthur E. Gregory, and published by Charles H. Kelly, Mr.

Thos. F. Lockyer, B.A., has contributed an exposition of *The Gospel of John*. Without exhibiting the process of minute verbal analysis and examination of the Greek text, Mr. Lockyer gives the results which such study yields, so that the English reader is put as nearly as possible on a level with the scholar. Deductions of a practical kind and brief applications of the text are not wanting, and altogether Mr. Lockyer's small volume forms a handy and trustworthy exposition of the Fourth Gospel.

Considerable care has been spent by R. Milner on the compilation of a series of *Lessons to an Adult Bible Class on the Life of Christ* (vol. i., Elliot Stock). The volume now issued overtakes only a third of the material. This is too bulky for ordinary use: and a more attractive form would have given the book a better chance of sale. But the Lessons, although rather wanting in brightness and illustration, are substantial and sometimes suggestive.—Few, if any, books have ever been published more likely to promote the practical study of the Bible than *Clews to Holy Writ* by Mary Louisa Georgina Petrie, B.A. (Hodder and Stoughton). The volume has arisen out of the endeavour to guide the study of that vast host of alumni who are now connected with the "College by Post," and each of whom devotes half an hour daily to the study of the Bible on some regular system. Miss Petrie arranges the Bible chronologically and divides it into nine terms to be overtaken in three years. Each term is furnished with dates, the names of the books of scripture included in the period, a good bibliographical guide, tabular views, and in short, everything that a student can desire. Here and there statements occur which will provoke question, as when she assigns seventy Psalms to David—a much wiser extreme than its opposite—or when she boldly speaks of "the now generally accepted hypothesis of an original oral gospel." But these are trifles. The book as a whole is most satisfactory. It is what it professes to be, a real help to the study of the Bible, affording precisely the aid which has practically been found needful.—After long experience of Bible-class work, Mr. Alexander A. Cuthbert has issued a small volume of five hundred *Questions on the Holy Scriptures* (James Maclehose & Sons). These Questions follow no order and are very miscellaneous and sometimes grotesque; but they are ingenious and thoroughly test one's knowledge of the facts of scripture. They are a welcome contribution to Sunday-school literature, and will keep many

a family well employed and heartily interested on Sunday evenings.

Three notable works have recently appeared, which, although they rather belong to the department of doctrinal than of exegetical theology, yet so materially aid our fuller understanding of the New Testament that it cannot be considered out of place to notice them here. One of these is Principal Fairbairn's *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology* (Hodder and Stoughton). This volume has at once been recognised as of the greatest importance. It aims at building up a theology on the foundation of Christ's consciousness of God. After exhibiting the insufficiency of the theologies which were determined by other elements, and after showing the process by which criticism has brought Christ and His consciousness to the front, he sketches the main features of this Christo-centric theology. The determinative element in the consciousness of Christ, and therefore in the theology founded upon it, is the Fatherhood of God. And from this, Dr. Fairbairn, with admirable clearness and firmness, develops all the principal doctrines of the Christian creed. He modestly calls it "a sketch of the first lines of a Christian Theology," but many important principles and truths and arguments are not only indicated or tentatively put forward, but receive their final and most felicitous expression. Among the parts of the book which seem to be most complete and final are the discussion of the relation of paternity to sovereignty, the exposition of the doctrine of sin, and the chapters on the Church. But the whole volume is one to be read and re-read by the theological enquirer. It meets the needs of our time by availing itself of the results of past investigation. It is written by one whose mind is strong enough to move independently though burdened with the knowledge of all preceding philosophies and theologies. Learning so lightly carried is as rare as the ability which puts the study of theology on new lines and not only points the way to others, but itself pushes to the limit of enquiry. For the study of theology nothing could be more promising than the publication of a work so fresh and attractive, so timely and well-informed, so able, reasonable, and convincing.

Another theological work to which reference may be allowed is *The Christian View of God and the World as centring in the Incarnation*, by James Orr, D.D. (Edin.: Andrew Elliot). This volume contains the first course of Lectures delivered on the Kerr Founda-

tion in connection with the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland. The aim of the Lecturer is to justify the Christian View of the World or "Weltanschauung" in the face of other theories which either wholly or partially contradict it. This opens up, as will be obvious, a very wide field; and in point of fact Dr. Orr's book is practically a guide to and criticism of the philosophies and theologies of modern times. The Christian view, affirming the existence of a Personal, Ethical, Self-Revealing God, is established in the face of all the modern systems which deny this. Affirming the creation of the world by God, His immanence in it and transcendence over it, and His holy and wise government of it for moral ends, affirming the self-revelation of God in the history of Israel, the Incarnation of the pre-existent Logos, the redemption of the world by the Atonement, this Christian "Weltanschauung" is carried round the whole circle of modern thought, and wherever a denial is elicited, an enquiry into the grounds of it is instituted and carried through. The student is thus furnished with a complete map of modern thought, while the lay reader will find himself captivated and drawn on to read the whole by the superlative clearness of the exposition and the importance of the subjects brought under review. More thoroughly equipped for the work he undertakes, no writer could well be. Dr. Orr shows a minute and familiar acquaintance with every modern movement of importance in philosophy and theology. The only part of the book in which disappointment is likely to be felt is that which discusses evolution in its bearing on the origin and sin of man. Dr. Orr's caution, which serves him so well elsewhere, may be thought to hamper him here; and many readers will be of opinion that instead of denying the descent of man from the beasts, he might rather have shown us that the Christian View is independent of theories of the origin of man. In the present state of scientific investigation it is unsafe to join the Christian faith to the doctrine of "a pure beginning of the race," or to pronounce with any confidence that evolution as applied to the origin of man "is not likely to be proved." Regarding the antiquity of man Dr. Orr is conservative in his opinion, but surprises us by declaring: "I am not aware that the Bible is committed to any definite date for the appearance of man upon the earth." In fact this whole chapter, and not least the authorities cited in it, manifest that Dr. Orr is more at home in philosophy than in science.

But the work as a whole will take rank with the best theological writing of our time. There was great need of a trustworthy pilot to buoy out the channel for us, and save faith from shipwreck, and by discharging this function Dr. Orr has earned the cordial gratitude of all interested in theology.

A third work of importance is Prof. Edward Caird's *Evolution of Religion* (2 vols., James Maclehose & Sons), being the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of St. Andrews in sessions 1890-91 and 1891-92. It is generally believed that hitherto the Gifford endowment has been considered rather a reward for past services than an incentive to fresh effort. The present series effectually removes that reproach. The results reached by Prof. Caird will not be generally acceptable, but there can be no hesitation in admitting the very great philosophical ability with which the investigation is conducted, and the abundance of fruitful thoughts suggested to the reader. As the title which he has chosen for his book indicates, Prof. Caird believes that all forms of religious belief from the lowest to the highest are connected, as the tree at each stage of its growth is connected with the seed, by a natural development. This development is governed by the law of human thought in accordance with which man is first conscious of the objects present to sense, then of himself as the subject distinct from these objects, and lastly, of the higher principle in which subject and object are reconciled. Christianity is the highest type of religion, because "God is now conceived, not, as in all objective religions, as a merely natural power, or as the unity of all natural powers: nor again is He conceived, as in subjective religion, as a spiritual Being outside of nature, and dominating over it. He is conceived as manifesting Himself alike in the whole process of nature, and in the process of spirit as it rises above nature. In other words, God is to Christianity a spirit, as in subjective religion; but He does not exclude nature, nor is He external to it, except in the sense that He is not limited to it. He is immanent in nature, as in objective religion, but He also transcends it, and makes it a means to the higher life of spirit." It is no doubt satisfactory to find that the most thorough-going philosophy of the day accepts Christianity as the [highest type of religion; but this satisfaction is considerably modified when Prof. Caird explains what he understands by Christianity. It is a Christianity without miracle and without

a Johannine or Pauline Christ. He thinks that Paul, by ascribing Divinity to Christ, went far to undo the essential lesson of the life of Jesus, the union of the human and the Divine. It is certain that the Christianity here expounded is not the Christianity of the New Testament, nor that which has been generally accepted by Christians, and which has made itself felt in the world. Can the theory be correct which requires that Christianity be so pared down before it will fit it? And what is true of Christianity is true also of the other religions, for Prof. Caird declines to attempt to exhibit them as precise stages of his scheme of development. Unfortunately this has always been the vice of the philosophical school he represents; nothing can be more fascinating than the theories devised, but the historical facts refuse to be accommodated to them. The theory of evolution here put forward is too purely psychological to explain so complex a phenomenon as religion. At the same time Prof. Caird's book is one of the most stimulating in modern literature. It is serious, sincere, and full of insight. Above all, it gives a clear and authoritative statement of the attitude which the most influential modern philosophy must assume towards Christianity.

MISCELLANEOUS.—The Rev. W. L. Paige Cox, M.A., in *The Scientific Study of Theology* (Skeffington & Son) makes a praiseworthy and in part successful attempt to show how the study of theology may be prosecuted on the same method as that which is applied to the inductive sciences. "Such doctrines as the Fatherhood of God, the Divinity of Christ, and the existence and influence of spiritual beings, are to be examined with reference to the teachings of science and experience, so that it may be ascertained whether there is a reasonable basis for belief in them." This amounts very much to a building up of what goes under the name of Natural Theology. But Mr. Cox allows more weight to the character of the enquirer than perhaps the purely scientific mind will be disposed to allow; for one of his principles is "that in the investigation of the subject matter of religious belief very high authority is to be attached to the opinions of men of the most approved wisdom, and the most conspicuous purity of life." Mr. Cox's book is well worth reading, if only to remind us how many of the fundamental Christian positions can be plausibly made good by reason. Some parts of the volume, as the chapter on miracles, are less satisfactory than others, and no reader may accept all the

author's reasonings; nevertheless a residuum of probability remains.

Survivals in Christianity, by Charles James Wood (Macmillan & Co.), is a book which may be read with interest and profit. It contains six lectures delivered before the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge, Mass., in 1892. The writer is convinced that there survive in Christian Theology incongruous and alien elements, derived from ethnic religions and popular superstitions, and that these survivals must be eliminated if we would retain in its purity the Christian Revelation. The method by which these survivals may be discovered and discarded is exhibited in connection with the fundamental articles of the Christian Creed. A book so hearty, progressive, reverent, and learned must always find a welcome with sincere enquirers; and if it remain doubtful whether all that is here branded as incongruous survival be really alien to the Christian faith, there can be no question that the method of study is a sound one, and that Mr. Wood has excellently discharged the function of pioneer. He opens, if not an absolutely new, yet a comparatively unwrought field, and has collected an amount of material which will be most useful to future students, and which makes his book well worthy of elaborate and serious criticism.

The welcome given to Mr. Wilfrid Ward's volume on his father's connection with the Oxford movement has encouraged him to supplement it by another entitled, *William George Ward and the Catholic Revival* (Messrs. Macmillan & Co.) This is a work of extraordinary interest. The biographer's task has been executed with the very perfection of skill. From first to last the attention is enchained. The very singular figure of the English landowner who could not ride, and did not know the difference between wheat and barley, and preferred burying himself in Hertfordshire and teaching candidates for the Romish priesthood, to living on his estate, who equally fascinated Cardinal Newman and Prof. Huxley, and received tributes of regard from the Pope and from John Stuart Mill,—this most attractive personality almost eccentric in its simplicity and blunt candour, and large enough to combine apparently opposite qualities, is drawn for us in this volume with a steady, skilful, and remarkably unobtrusive hand. In many recent volumes of reminiscences the interest largely consists in the abundant anecdotes of celebrated contem-

poraries; in the present volume, although many of the best known men of our time are introduced, it is always in Mr. Ward himself that the interest centres. But while the interest of the book is mainly personal much light is shed on Romanism in England, and the uninitiated will be especially surprised to find how deep are the clefts that divide parties in the Church of Rome.

Mr. Lewis Sergeant has contributed a well-informed, vigorous, and sympathetic biography of *John Wyclif* to Messrs Putnam's "Heroes of the Nations." The name of Wyclif has stood out, according to Mr. Sergeant, "for five centuries like a patch of warm colour from the neutral tints of the later middle ages." And it has done so because being himself a theologian he joined hands with the statesmen of his age and admitted the right of laymen to reform abuses in Church and State. Wyclif's relation to the schoolmen, and their relation to the Reformation, have especially interested Mr. Sergeant, and if he takes his ideas of the schoolmen too exclusively from Ockham and Marsiglio, this is better than the ignorant abuse of the whole body of mediæval theologians which is still sometimes met with. The volume is profusely and suitably illustrated and holds the interest of the reader from first to last.

In *Hebrew Idolatry and Superstition; its place in Folk-lore*, Mr. Elford Higgins (Elliot Stock) has collected some interesting facts which have a bearing on early Semitic religion. The small volume may be considered an Appendix to Prof. Robertson Smith's great work, but there is too little critical sifting of the information conveyed, and too little elaboration of argument to make the book as serviceable as it might have been.—A second edition of Mr. Charles Newton Scott's *Foregleams of Christianity* (Smith, Elder and Co.) has been called for. The purpose of the book is to show that all the elements of truth contained in previous religions and philosophies are gathered up and unified in Christianity. The accomplishment of this task leads the author into many interesting regions, and his volume will be read certainly with instruction and probably with pleasure by all who are interested in the history of religions.—Spiritualism has found a convinced and cordial advocate in a clergyman of the Church of England, who records his experiences in a small volume, *Do the Dead Return?* published by Mr. T. Fisher Unwin. The narration is simple and straightforward and evidently truthful, but it is so scanty in detail that

it is quite impossible to judge whether the writer has or has not been the dupe of others. The rooms in which the séances took place and the persons who took part in them should have been more exactly described. As the volume stands it may be read with interest, but it will not advance the cause.

The Superhuman Origin of the Bible inferred from itself, by Henry Rogers, has reached an eighth edition (Hodder and Stoughton). It is now enriched with a memoir of the author by Dr. R. W. Dale, who was one of his most intimate friends. The biography, as was to be expected, is written with a lively interest that betrays both knowledge and affection. A book in the eighth edition needs no recommendation. But it may be said that the varied information and fluent style of Henry Rogers were never used with greater effect than in this his last publication. The thesis of the book is that "the Bible is not such a book as man would have made if he could, or could have made if he would." By the "Bible" is meant all it contains, the teachings of Christ and His Apostles, so that really it is rather the superhuman origin of Christianity that is dealt with. Many parts of the argument are impressive, and the whole is pleasant reading. *The Pastor in Prayer* (Elliot Stock) is a selection of the late Mr. Spurgeon's Sunday morning prayers in the congregation, chiefly from the years 1878-80. They are fluent and warm, but betray no careful pondering of the less obvious wants of men.

Messrs Samuel Bagster and Sons have issued a very handy little edition of Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, with the quaint cuts which so took the fancy of Mr. R. L. Stevenson.—It is a triumph of condensation which the Rev. John Macpherson has achieved in furnishing us with an *Universal Bible Dictionary* in 350 large octavo pages. (Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton.) He has aimed at including the names of persons, places, and articles in the Old Testament together with the principal names of places and persons occurring in the Apocrypha. Doctrinal terms are not included. Mr. Macpherson acknowledges his indebtedness especially to Riehm, but also to Schenkel, Winer, Smith, Fairbairn, and Kitto. The work has been carefully and intelligently executed and should be in the hands of all who do not own one of the larger dictionaries.—Messrs Hodder and Stoughton judiciously continue their Devotional Library by issuing Bishop Hall's *Christ Mystical*. The book, which has always been prized for its own sake by devout

readers, is here reprinted in a beautiful form by R. and R. Clark of Edinburgh from General Gordon's copy, and with a reproduction of his marginal markings and a brief sketch of his religious character by the Rev. H. Carruthers Wilson. The volume is in every respect attractive.—Mr. Frank Ballard has done well in publishing two addresses on *The Penitent Prodigal and his Elder Brother*. (S. W. Partridge and Co.) They are characterized by vigorous thinking, sound sense, tenderness and warm Christian feeling.

Readers of Sermons will welcome a new volume from Dr. Hugh Macmillan. It is entitled *The Mystery of Grace, and other Sermons* (Hodder and Stoughton) and is an excellent specimen of the preacher's work. No one so abundantly or happily illustrates spiritual truth by the laws and phenomena of nature or by the facts of life and history. In the sermons now published Dr. Macmillan draws upon an apparently inexhaustible store of antiquarian, historical, and scientific observations, and in his skilful hands facts interesting in themselves receive an added interest from their analogy to facts in the spiritual world.—Canon Newbolt's *Penitence and Peace* (Longmans, Green & Co.) is a small volume of addresses on the fifty-first and twenty-third Psalms, the work of a devout, keen, and intelligent mind warped and blinded by ceremonialism. Nothing could be better than his diagnosis of the disease (unless it tend to a morbid introspection): nothing could well be worse than parts of the treatment he recommends. There is much in the little volume that is beautiful, moving, stimulating, much also that will repel and grieve many intelligent Christians. The man that can bewail the loss of extreme unction has been born too late. Canon Newbolt should study Paul's teaching, and should ask himself whether the High Church use of the word "priest" is in a true Apostolic succession to Paul's use of the word "presbyter."—Dr. John Pulsford has issued through Messrs. Simpkin, Marshall & Co., the second volume of his *Loyalty to Christ, These Sayings of Mine, and His Parables*. In these pages the reader never finds what he expects, but often what is much better. In interpreting the parables the obvious meaning is passed by, and some unthought of significance found in an unimportant word. As a contribution to exegesis the book cannot be recommended, but as nourishment for the devout spirit it stands high.—In Messrs. Macmillan's reprints of

Maurice's writings we have five of his most valuable works: the *Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament*, the *Gospel of St. John*, the *Kingdom of Heaven* (which has frequently been reprinted), *Lectures on the Apocalypse*, and a fifth edition of *The Friendship of Books and other Lectures*. This volume contains some of Maurice's most spontaneous writing, and appeals to a wider public than his more theological writings. We trust the publishers will find that the public appreciates their enterprise in reprinting these valuable books which certainly should hold their own even among the numberless products of contemporary writers.

The *Sermon Bible* issued by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton has reached its eleventh volume, and will be completed by one more. The present issue contains sketches of the best sermons on texts from that part of the New Testament which lies between the Epistle to the Colossians and the Epistle of James. The editor of the volume is not named, but he has done his work with praiseworthy industry and judgment, and if weary preachers are to use any helps in preparing sermons, no better aid can be recommended than the *Sermon Bible*.

[Prof. Boyon's *Theologie du Nouveau Testament* (Vol. I.) and Prof. Godet's *Introduction au Nouveau Testament* (Vol. I.) have come to hand, and will receive separate notice.]

MARCUS DODS.

SIN.

“SIN is lawlessness” (1 John iii. 4). John means that lawlessness is of the very essence of sin; that in every sin there is a disregard of that divine law which should determine not only the acts and the words of men, but their spirit and temper. It may be necessary, for some purposes, to distinguish between careless sins and deliberate sins,—between sins for which some palliation may be found in the circumstances in which they were committed and sins which cannot be palliated; but to a man who considers the true nature of sins, every sin is grave, for in every sin there is lawlessness—a disregard of the divine authority, a violation of the divine order of human life.

There is something difficult and abstract, perhaps, in this account of sin as “lawlessness.” In the Authorised Version the passage reads: “*Sin is the transgression of the law.*” The old translation, though less accurate, seems simpler and clearer than the new.

I.

“*Sin is the transgression of the law*”: this is an account of sin that a child can understand. We are born under a Law which has an absolute authority over conduct. It determines how we ought to regulate our *personal life*; and we transgress it when, for example, we are guilty of drunkenness, or of gluttony, or of indolence, or of any other sensual sins. It determines our *duty to others* and we transgress it when we deceive other men or treat them unjustly, harshly, or ungenerously; or when we disregard any of the obligations which arise out of the structure of human society,—

the mutual obligations, for example, of husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers and sisters, masters and servants, rulers and subjects. It determines our *duty to God*, and we transgress it when we fail to reverence Him, to trust Him, to love Him, or to obey Him. All the demands of this Law, whether they relate directly to the ordering of our personal life or to our conduct to other men, or to the duties which we owe to God Himself, are sustained by God's authority. The Law is God's Law; and as the old version reads: "Sin is the transgression of the Law."

That account of sin is perfectly clear; and, as far as it goes, it is perfectly true. The awful crimes and the foul vices which darken the history of mankind—murder, adultery, nameless deeds of lust, drunkenness, lying, theft, the injustice and oppression of tyrannical governments, the furious violence of nations in revolt, the cruelty of parents to children and of children to parents, perjury, blasphemy, profanity—all these are transgressions of the Law of God; they are all sins. The men who have been guilty of them have God to reckon with. The Law they have broken is God's Law.

We ourselves have been guilty of transgressing that Law. We can recall the definite acts by which we transgressed it. We have transgressed it knowingly. We have transgressed it after making solemn resolutions to obey it. We have, perhaps, committed the same transgressions over and over again after we had been filled with distress by them, after we had confessed them to God, and entreated Him to forgive them. If "sin is the transgression of the Law," we ourselves have sinned.

II.

But have we discovered the whole truth about sin when we have learnt that it is the transgression of the Law of God?

Transgression—what is it? According to the common meaning of the word, it is a definite and voluntary act. To transgress the Law which requires us to speak the truth is to tell a wilful lie; to transgress the Law which requires us to be honest is to commit—and to commit voluntarily—an act of dishonesty. To transgress the Law which requires inward purity, is voluntarily to surrender ourselves to foul thoughts and sensual desires. This, I say, is what the word means according to its common use—it stands for a definite and voluntary act. But there are sins which are not included in the definition. It is sinful for a child not to love a parent and for a parent not to love a child; but love is not a volition, and it cannot be commanded by the will. It is sinful not to be grateful for kindness; but though a man may be ashamed of his ingratitude and feel the guilt of it, the will has no power to command gratitude. Some of the fiercest and most prolonged conflicts of the moral and spiritual life are against evil passions which, though beaten down by the will, are not destroyed. Envy, jealousy, covetousness, suspicion and distrust, pride, vanity—all these are sinful; they are resisted by a good man because they are sinful; they could have no place in a heart perfectly free from sin; but the will, though it may prevent them from breaking out into evil words and evil deeds, cannot extinguish them. They may gradually lose their strength and, at last, disappear under constant repression; they may be cast out by the power and grace of Christ in answer to prayer, as the evil spirits were cast out of men during His earthly ministry, but while they remain in the heart a man is conscious of sin and of guilt, even when the whole force of the will is being exerted to conquer them.

Human conduct is not a succession of isolated acts: it reveals certain permanent moral qualities which constitute what we call character. There are elements of good and of evil in the very life of a man. What he says and what he

does disclose what he is. He is a bad man—not only because he voluntarily says and does many wicked things, but because he himself is wicked ; his very life is corrupt. He is a good man, not only because he voluntarily says and does many good things, but because he himself is good ; his very life is pure and just and kindly. An habitual liar is a liar not only while he is actually telling a lie, but before and afterwards ; while he is silent he is a liar as well as when he is speaking falsely, for in his very life there is a want of reverence for the authority of truth. And so a man who is habitually truthful is truthful, not only when he is speaking the truth under strong temptation to speak falsely, but before he has spoken and afterwards ; for in his very life there is an intolerance of falsehood. There is sin and there is righteousness, not merely in acts which are voluntarily done, in words which are voluntarily spoken, in thoughts and feelings which are voluntarily permitted to take possession of the mind and heart, but also in the very elements of our life. No doubt this is a great mystery. Life is known to us only in its activities ; and I suppose that we are wholly unable to conceive how the moral and spiritual life can have a vicious taint in it, or how it can have in it qualities which can be described as good and virtuous. But we are certain of the fact for which the words stand ; and every conception of sin is fatally defective in which this fact does not hold a large place. There is sin and there is righteousness in what we are as well as in what we do.

III.

It may, however, be contended that all a man's sin may be ultimately traced to his will, because what he is to-day is the result of all that he has voluntarily thought and felt and said and done in past years. If to-day he has a covetousness which his will can check, but cannot expel from his heart, it is because he has allowed himself for many years

to think too much of money and to care too much for it, and has not voluntarily encouraged the spirit of generosity. If to-day he can no more rid himself of vanity, or jealousy, or suspicion by an act of the will, than he can rid himself of some bodily disease by an act of the will, it is because, in past years, he has voluntarily yielded to vanity, to jealousy, or to suspicion. The evil passions which have acquired such enormous strength that they defy all his efforts to extinguish them, have become strong by his own consent; he might have quenched their fires years ago, but he voluntarily allowed them to burn more and more fiercely; he fed the flames; and therefore, though they are now beyond the control of his will, he is responsible for them.

In this there is a very large measure of truth, and the truth is of immense importance in relation to self-discipline and the formation of character; but it is not the whole of the truth. For is it not certain that the vices and imperfections of parents and of still remoter ancestors reappear in their children and descendants? Are not men so born that if they are to live a good life some will have to fight hard against tendencies to drunkenness, some against tendencies to gluttony, some against tendencies to indolence, some against tendencies to still graver forms of sensuality? Are there not men who may be described as constitutionally cowardly, so that when a lie promises to save them from trouble they find it hard to tell the truth? Are there not others who are constitutionally cold, selfish and suspicious? Others who are constitutionally vain? Others who are constitutionally proud? Others who, by some fatal fault of nature, seem incapable of pity? Others who inherit a temper which makes them tyrannical and cruel? Whatever explanation we may give of these mysterious facts, are not the facts too obvious and certain to be doubted?

Many of us can remember that tendencies to certain forms of sin appeared in our childhood—appeared before our con-

science was sufficiently developed to condemn them as evil ; and against these very tendencies we have had to maintain a conflict for years. Through God's grace we may have mastered them at last ; but they had to be mastered, or we should have been ruined for ever. They were therefore evil—very evil. They were not temptations which came upon us from without ; they were part of our very life ; we were born with them.

Under the law of heredity, the definite moral evils which are constitutionally present in parents are transmitted—we cannot tell how—to children and to children's children. I am not sure that the word "transmitted" accurately represents the facts. It may ; I cannot tell. We are, perhaps, on surer ground when we say that the definite moral evils which are constitutionally present in the parents *reappear* in the children. Families have their characteristic vices and their characteristic virtues. Sometimes, indeed, a generation escapes the taint and it appears in the next. Even when there are great moral contrasts between the individual branches of the same stock, it is often possible to discover that their character has a common root and that the contrasts are due to accidental differences of condition and environment. There is what may be described as a community of moral life between those who have descended from the same ancestors ; for good as well as for evil they are one. And so we say that certain vices or certain virtues run in the blood of particular families. In other words, qualities, whether good or evil, which belong to the very life of a man are derived, in part at least, from his parents ; they are not wholly the results of his own volition.

It may be objected that if, in any sense, a man derives any of his moral qualities from his parents he is not responsible for them ; but I do not find that we regard the truthfulness, the justice, and the generosity of a man with diminished

admiration or honour, if we discover that his father and his grandfather and his great-grandfather before him were truthful, just and generous; nor do I find that if a man is hard, selfish, grasping, tyrannical, merciless, our moral condemnation of him is diminished by the discovery that these vices disgraced the long line of his ancestors. We make very large allowance for men whose *circumstances* have been against them, for men who in their childhood and youth lived among coarse, reckless, immoral people, who had hardly a chance of knowing their duty, who breathed a poisonous moral atmosphere from their birth; but we make no such allowance for men whose vices are the expression of their own life, and not in any sense the almost inevitable results of their circumstances.

A vice like drunkenness which in some extreme cases appears to be a physical disease as well as a vice, and which may perhaps admit of cure by physical remedies, may be judged mercifully; the man who inherits from drunken parents an almost unconquerable physical craving for drink may be pitied, as we pity a man who inherits a weak heart or weak lungs. But reckless and unscrupulous ambition, intense selfishness, lying and other sins of the spirit—for these we regard a man with no pity, even though it be notorious that his fathers through twenty generations have been guilty of the same vices. It is enough that he himself is wickedly reckless in pursuit of greatness, that he himself is hard-hearted, that he himself is a liar. Whatever his ancestors may have been, we condemn him for his own crimes.

Nor do I believe that when the moral life is quickened and the conscience awakened, and a man discovers the evil of sins of this description, his condemnation of himself is at all lessened by his knowledge that the sins of which he is guilty are the sins of which his fathers were guilty. I appeal to those who are earnestly endeavouring to live a

righteous and Christian life, not to those who are morally careless, for you are not judges on these questions. The sins into which you are sometimes betrayed are, perhaps, the very sins which you remember in your father or your mother. The moral weaknesses of which you are conscious were the moral weaknesses which you saw in one or other of your parents when you were children. The evil temper or disposition which mars your life is the very temper or disposition which marred their life. Your sins, your moral weaknesses, your evil temper, were theirs as well as yours. But does your conscience for this reason condemn you for them less sternly? Do you for this reason feel less humiliation, less shame, less self-reproach, when you entreat God to be merciful to you and to grant you forgiveness? On the contrary, are there not some, at least, to whom it seems that it is precisely in these sins, in these weaknesses, in these evil dispositions, that they find the last and most decisive proofs of their own sinfulness? Other moral failures may perhaps be in some sense the result of accidental circumstances. These are the certain indications of deeply rooted moral evil; they are the proof that the very life is corrupt.

IV.

I have spoken of the community of moral life which exists between members of the same family, descendants of the same parents, and which is illustrated in the appearance and reappearance through successive generations of the same virtues and the same vices. Is there not also a community of moral life between all mankind? And does not the common life of the race include a certain "lawlessness" which is impatient of the supreme authority of God and resents His grace, a lawlessness which is sometimes at first vividly revealed, though afterwards subdued, by the Christian Gospel?

The experiences of those who have found in Christ the Son of God and the Lord and Saviour of men are, indeed, infinitely varied. Sometimes as soon as the great discovery is made it inspires perfect faith and perfect submission, and there follows an instantaneous sense of restoration to God. I have seen the face of a man troubled and distressed at one moment, filled the next with a sudden glory. But in other cases there is a prolonged agony before the soul finds life and peace in Christ. There is a self-assertion which refuses to receive eternal salvation as the free gift of God's grace and which revolts against the personal authority of God. The man knows that he ought to receive the grace and to submit to the authority; but at the very centre of his life there is a hostile force which resists the authority and rejects the grace. He is conscious that it is he himself, and not another, that resists and rejects. The powers which are acting upon him to produce submission and trust, powers which he welcomes and whose victory he longs and prays for, are divine; the resistance and the rejection are his own, and he knows it. The very freedom and glory of the Divine grace fill him with despair. What must be the malignity of the sinfulness which refuses this wonderful redemption, a redemption achieved by the incarnation, the death, and the resurrection of God's eternal Son! He says that he "*cannot*" receive the divine grace, and that he "*cannot*" submit to the divine authority. "*Cannot*"; and yet while he pleads that he "*cannot*" he is conscious that this is the supreme and damning proof of his guilt.

This awful discovery of the evil which has corrupted the very springs of life is sometimes made long after a man has really begun to serve God. There are many persons who have sincerely trusted in the Lord Jesus Christ for eternal salvation, who love Him, and are honestly desiring to do His will, but who have the most imperfect conception of the nature of Christian righteousness. Their morals are the

traditional morals of the people among whom they live, with some slight modifications and corrections suggested by the traditions of the Church with which they are associated. There are wide provinces of their life over which the will of Christ has no authority. Many of His precepts are wholly forgotten. Others are regarded as "counsels of perfection"—intended for elect souls, and imposing no obligation on ordinary Christian men. But sometimes, to Christian people who have been living an easy and self-complacent Christian life, a life without any gross sins but without any of the intensity and energy which are inspired by a true conception of the perfection to which we are called in Christ, there comes a great moral and spiritual crisis. There is an experience under the Gospel which is analogous to Paul's experience under the Law: "I was alive apart from the Law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived and I died." The endeavour to do the will of God perfectly, to bring the whole of conduct or, indeed, any considerable part of it under His authority, results in the discovery that in the obscure depths of the inward life there is an appalling antagonism to God's will. Resolutions are formed to forsake sins which had not previously been regarded as seriously sinful, and almost as soon as they are made they are broken. Attempts are made, earnest and vehement attempts, to discharge duties which had not previously been regarded as obligatory, and though they are renewed again and again they are defeated. In some happy hour a great passion of love for God is kindled in the heart, and there is exulting hope that in the power of it all righteousness will become possible; but before the day is over its fires are extinguished. The miserable man dwells on the "exceeding great and precious promises" of the divine grace, recalls all that he has ever heard of the power of the truth and of the Spirit of God, appeals earnestly to Christ, who came to preach deliverance to the captive and

the opening of the prison to them that are bound, but is terrified by the consciousness that he is still held fast by some evil power and that freedom has not come. It is he himself who is at fault; and while these awful experiences last it sometimes seems to him that deliverance is impossible. If the evil power that held him were altogether an alien power, then, indeed, he might escape, or he might be liberated by the grace of God; but in his anguish it seems to him that he would cease to be himself if he ceased to be sinful. He exclaims, not in order to palliate his guilt, but to express his full sense of its enormity, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me!"

V.

What explanation is to be given of these fierce agonies and terrible conflicts? And how are we to account for the common experience of ordinary men who know nothing of the darker tragedies of the moral life, but who are conscious every day of the infirmity of their better purposes, and who exclaim with Paul, "to will is present with me, but to do that which is good is not." Is it possible to resist the conviction that there is present in the very life of man a force, a tendency, a bias, an element—call it what you will—hostile to righteousness? Can any other explanation be given of the appalling fact that in all countries and in all ages men have failed to illustrate the divinely ordained order of life? The virtues and the vices of mankind have assumed a great variety of forms—forms determined partly by differences in what seems to have been the original constitution of particular races, and partly by differences in the material conditions of men, differences in their intellectual development, differences in their political and social institutions, differences in their religious beliefs and discipline; but always and everywhere, according to the testimony of poets,

historians, moralists, and the founders of the great historical religions, men have failed to live the perfect life. The sense of failure has been most intense where the consciousness of personality and of moral freedom has been most vivid, and the ideal of goodness the noblest. Men have confessed that they saw and honoured the better life but did not live it. "All have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God"; this does not rest on the authority of a Christian apostle merely; history bears witness to it; and whenever a man's conscience becomes keen and vigorous conscience condemns him and says, Thou, too, art a sinner. There is a mysterious community of moral life between men of all countries and all ages. Individual men cannot stand absolutely alone and apart, isolated from the life of the rest of mankind. Within limits every man is morally free; but we are members one of another; and in the life which is shared by the whole race, whatever other and nobler elements there may be—and there are many—there is a power which makes for unrighteousness.

This is what theologians mean when they speak of the race as a fallen race. The race itself has fallen—not merely individual men, and from the fall the race needs redemption.

VI.

When we consider the immense importance which is attributed in theological systems to discussions concerning the sin of Adam, and the effects of that sin in the physical, moral, and spiritual ruin of his descendants, there is something surprising in the inconsiderable place which is given to this account of the origin of human sin in the Holy Scriptures. There is the story of the creation of Adam, of his sin, and of his expulsion from the Garden of Eden, in the second and third chapters of the book of Genesis; and in the fifth it is said that "Adam lived a hundred and

thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his own image, and called his name Seth," which may perhaps mean that Seth inherited those imperfections of Adam's nature, which had resulted from his fall, although it may be fairly contended that it means that Adam transmitted to his child that likeness to God which he himself had received in his creation—that is, the intelligence and moral freedom by which he was distinguished from the beasts; but there is not a solitary passage in all the rest of the Old Testament in which the sin of Adam is represented as having inflicted any injury of any kind on his descendants. Only twice indeed is the sin of Adam referred to at all; once in Job (xxx. 33), where Job protests that he had not, "like Adam," covered his transgressions by hiding his iniquity in his bosom; and once in Hosea (vi. 7), in which the prophet declares that Ephraim and Judah, "like Adam," have transgressed the covenant. In the New Testament Paul, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, attributes the physical death of all men to Adam, as he attributes the resurrection of all to Christ—"As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive"; and in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans he illustrates the transcendent glory of the redemption resulting from the obedience of the Lord Jesus Christ by contrasting it with the results of the disobedience of Adam. The passage is one of immense importance as well as of great difficulty; and whatever uncertainty there may be about the precise meaning of particular sentences and particular clauses, it indicates very clearly that Paul believed that the sin of Adam had brought vast evils on the human race, just as the righteousness of Christ had brought infinite blessings. But even in this passage—the critical passage on the doctrine—the account of the evil results of Adam's sin is incidental; Paul speaks of Adam's transgression and of the effects of it, not for the sake of giving an explanation of human sin, but for the sake of

illustrating the greatness of the Christian salvation. In no other part of the New Testament is this relation between the sin of Adam and the moral and spiritual condition of mankind spoken of. Our Lord never speaks of it, nor does Peter, nor does John, nor does Paul himself except in the passages to which I have referred.

What the Gospel assumes, and what is insisted upon throughout the New Testament, is the fact that men are actually sinners—all men; that the race has fallen away from God and needs redemption. It is assumed that all men need the infinite mercy of God for the forgiveness of their sins. It is declared that that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that apart from the divine life which is given in the new birth, no man can have a place in the kingdom of God. The universality of human sin is assumed; about the mystery of its origin, except in the single passage in the Romans, the New Testament is silent.

But, explain it how we will, it remains true that we share the life of the race, as the branches share the life of the tree, and that in this life there is an evil power which must be resisted and overcome if we are to do the will of God. The question, whether we are guilty merely because we share it, or whether all our guilt lies in yielding to it, is one which it is not necessary to resolve, for we have all yielded to it, and have done evil things innumerable which we might have left undone.

Having yielded to it, we have become confederates with the evil power which is working in all men against the authority and the grace of God. There are times when, in addition to the burden of my personal transgressions, I seem to share the responsibility of that "fall of man" which has "brought death into the world and all our woe." There are times when I cannot think of the sins, even the grossest sins of other men, as though I were wholly free from the guilt of them; for, as I have said, we share a

common life ; there is a solidarity of the race in sin ; and there are times when I feel that in condemning other men for their sins I am condemning myself ; for we are all members one of another.

But, thank God, if we share the sin of the race, we also share its redemption. The race was created in the Eternal Son of God, and was destined in Him to eternal perfection and eternal joy ; nor has the divine purpose been finally thwarted by human sin. If, as members of a race which has fallen away from God, we are born to an inheritance of appalling evils, as members of a race which has the roots of its life in the eternal Son of God, we are also born to an inheritance of infinite glory. The whole race has sinned, but its sin has been atoned for ; Christ is the propitiation for the sin of the world. There is a power of evil in the life of the race—a great and awful power, which, if unresisted, will destroy us ; but the grace of God in Christ is infinitely mightier to redeem and to save. We are born to that redemption, to that salvation ; it lies with each one of us to determine whether we will receive or reject it. If we are finally lost, it will not be because we belong to a sinful race, but because we have rejected the infinite mercy of God which has achieved the redemption of the race in Christ.

R. W. DALE.

THE ARAMAIC GOSPEL.

REPLY TO DR. DRIVER AND MR. ALLEN.

OXFORD has at length broken silence. More than two years ago Dr. Sanday, in a brief foot-note, ominously warned the readers of THE EXPOSITOR that there were some Semitic scholars in Oxford who were unable to endorse the warm encomium he has pronounced upon the author of the papers on the Aramaic Gospel. One of Oxford's youngest sons has given voice to the local dissatisfaction, and Dr. Driver, his instructor, has written a prefatory note "commending" Mr. Allen's "papers to students interested in the subjects on which they deal." To what extent Dr. Driver commits himself to all the statements of his disciple has been disputed. One periodical belonging to Canon Driver's own communion—*The Church of England Pulpit*—has gone so far as to charge the Canon with "evading the real question at issue" and indulging in "misleading verbiage" instead of stating plainly whether Mr. Allen or myself is the better Aramaic scholar. Dr. Driver's remarks are certainly condensed, and perhaps not marked by his customary lucidity; but, though the above review was prompted evidently by the kindest feelings towards myself, I must frankly admit that I consider it scarcely just to Dr. Driver. He intended, no doubt, to endorse Mr. Allen's papers—to "countersign them," as I am informed on good authority, and must be held responsible for *all* that they contain. For my own part I very much wish that Dr. Driver had replied *in propria personâ*. In the first place, I am unwilling to think that if Dr. Driver had really worked at the subject there would be so many blemishes as disfigure Mr. Allen's papers; and then I am quite certain that Dr. Driver would have written more modestly. The arrogance which Mr. Allen has

thought proper to assume is now happily seldom used by scholars in Biblical research, and is, in the present instance, woefully misplaced.

The remarks I have to offer on Mr. Allen's papers arrange themselves under five divisions :—

I. The papers ignore the cumulative nature of the argument.

II. They contain blunders due to sheer carelessness in consulting the materials before him.

III. They contain numerous errors due to a deficient acquaintance with Palestinian Aramaic literature.

IV. Many of the objections urged are hypercritical and unreasonable.

V. Mr. Allen ignores certain phenomena which are inseparable from the work of translation.

I. Mr. Allen manifests no appreciation of the cumulative nature of the argument.

This can best be understood by my giving a brief *résumé* of the history of the development of the hypothesis. When first the idea struck me that possibly the divergences in the Synoptics might be explained by an appeal to a written Semitic gospel, I began my investigations in total ignorance of the writings of those who had held the same theory, and under the pre-supposition that this document would be in Hebrew. The results however were very meagre and unsatisfactory. Then I took up the study of Aramaic, and under the belief that in the Targum of Onqelos we have the purest classical type of Aramaic, I carefully studied Onqelos, with such success that I was confident I was on the right tack, for the divergent Greek words yielded in several instances closely similar Aramaic words, or were explainable by the diverse meanings of the same word. Then I carefully studied the Samaritan Targum, and was much struck by its peculiarities, especially by the great carelessness in

spelling any word that contains a guttural. Almost any one guttural may be substituted for another, or any sibilant for another, and 𐤎 often takes the place of 𐤍. To my immense pleasure I then noticed that in many instances the Aramaic equivalents of the divergent Greek words simply differ from one another in one of the above ways. Then I read the Targum of Jonathan ben Uzziel and the Hagiographa, noting the improved yield which I received from the Hagiographa as compared with the earlier books. Afterwards I procured a copy of the two Palestinian Targums of the Pentateuch, studied them through and through, and was delighted to find that almost every word which I had appropriated from my earlier reading of the Targums was here; and not only so, but that several words which accorded best with the requirements of my hypothesis were to be found only in these Palestinian Targums. Then quite recently I have made a thorough study of the *Evangeliarium Hierosolymitanum*, as edited by the late Paul de Lagarde. This version of the gospels was used by the Christians of Palestine from the fourth or fifth century to the time of the Arabian supremacy; and, though written in Syriac characters, it belongs essentially to the same type of dialect as the Palestinian Targums. This has in several ways confirmed the accuracy of my investigations; but as the purport of the present article is, alas! polemical rather than constructive, I may not here dilate on this. As specimens of Palestinian Aramaic we include then:—the Targum of the Hagiographa, the two Palestinian Targums, known as that of Pseudo-Jonathan and the fragmentary Jerusalem Targum; the Samaritan Targum, the so-called Jerusalem Lectionary, the book of Tobit, and the Aramaic portions of the Bible.¹ There are decided differences among all these specimens, but there is in the vocabulary a resemblance which is

¹ This list should also include the Jerusalem Talmud, but my acquaintance with this is limited.

deeply interesting. I have taken the trouble to draw out lists of those words which they possess in common, but which are *not* found in Onqelos and "the Prophets," and find that a fair proportion of them has been claimed by me for the Aramaic Gospel.

It may perhaps be asked, Why, when the primitive Gospel was, *ex hypothesi*, a Palestinian document, I did not begin my investigations with the extant specimens of Palestinian literature. I may candidly confess that I did not at first know what the nature and importance of the difference was, between the different types of Aramaic. But was I not in this also "fortunate in my limitations?" Does not the groping, tentative way in which I proceeded confirm the reliableness of my conclusions? If I had not been working in the right vein, why was I unsuccessful in the application of Hebrew? Why, in the study of Onqelos, was I successful only with words which proved to be common to Onqelos and the Palestinian Targums?

When it is considered (1) that with a mind totally devoid of preconceptions, I was led to a vocabulary overwhelmingly Palestinian; (2) that the clerical errors, etc., which I found it necessary to assume, were the same *in kind* as those which manifest themselves in other Greek writings *known* to be a translation from a Semitic original—the Hebrew Scriptures; (3) that these kinds of divergence exist in almost the same ratio as in other works known to be translations; (4) that, according to tradition, the author was a Galilean, and there are numerous clear indications of Galilean dialect; and (5) that taking the linguistic clue into our hands, and following it solely and implicitly, we find that the contents of the Aramaic original were almost coterminous with the Galilean ministry—we have here a focussing of evidence which is really irresistible. The line of attack pursued by Mr. Allen is certainly trenchant, and of my first paper—the one designed to show that the

divergences in the Greek are due in some cases to the diverse vocalization of the same consonants—he makes sad havoc; but of the rest he only selects one here and one there for censure and deletion. So that if the whole memorable thirty and nine cases cited by Mr. Allen were dropped, the argument is so multiform that Mr. Allen's attack leaves the strength of the position almost intact. That this cannot however for one moment be conceded, it is now my purpose to show.

II. In some instances the objections raised by Mr. Allen are mere blunders due to a careless consultation of the materials before him.

1. In the June number (pp. 462, 463) Mr. Allen, with much gaiety, charges me with vacillation as to the type of Aramaic in which the primitive Gospel was written. Since my contention is for Truth, and not merely for Victory, I concede that a more decisive utterance on this point was called for. I now consent that no case shall reckon as evidence of the first rank, unless the word claimed to have occurred in the Aramaic original is found, with its Greek meaning, in extant *Palestinian* literature. If there are any words thus claimed by me which are found only in Onqelos, and consequently eschewed in the Pal. Targg., I gladly surrender them to the one who finds them. Words found only in the Targum of "the Prophets," and probably uncalled for by the subject-matter of extant Palestinian literature, shall be allowed to remain as evidence of the second rank. In view of the history just given of the development of my theory, it might have been supposed that Mr. Allen would have scored well in this respect. But it is not so. He adduces (VII. 463)¹ from my papers two words

¹ My papers appeared in Volumes III., IV. and V. of the Fourth Series of the EXPOSITOR; Mr. Allen's in Volume VII. For brevity, I indicate thus by the number of the volume.

found *only* in Pal. Aram.—which is of course as it should be. Then, to prove my vacillation, he claims to cite two words *never* found in Pal. Aram. The first of these is אָרִי = “for.” Instead of this word, Pal. Aram. literature decidedly prefers אָרִים; but does not Mr. Allen know that in the fragmentary Palestinian Targum אָרִי is not uncommon, as *e.g.* Genesis xxi. 7, xxxi. 15? Next, Mr. Allen charges me with using בָּבְעֵי, the Babylonian word, instead of בְּכַטִּי, the Palestinian. Here, strange to say, are two blunders. (1) I do *not* use בָּבְעֵי; כְּכַטִּי is the word I make use of (III. 463). (2) Had I done so, there would have been no error; for בְּבַעַי appears side by side with בְּכַטִּי all through the Pal. Targg. Was not Mr. Allen aware of this? This is rather a startling basis for the loud assertion that I have “scoured the range of Aramaic literature in search of linguistic curiosities.” In all the four cases cited I adhere quite consistently to Palestinian Aramaic.

2. On page 393 (VII.) Mr. Allen avers that “the translation “wither,” for פָּרַךְ, is based on an unsound etymology, and must be abandoned,” and charges me with neglecting to read Dr. Fleischer’s Appendix to Levy’s Lexicon, where it is stated, he says, that “פָּרַךְ is not equivalent to φρύγειν—‘to parch,’ but to θρύπτειν—to ‘crush by rubbing.’” Now this is quite wrong. The point at issue between Levy and Fleischer is simply as to what is the *primary* signification. Levy says that פָּרַךְ means (1) φρύγειν, (2) θρύπτειν. Fleischer says the primary meaning is θρύπτειν, and that φρύγειν is secondary. I am amazed how Mr. Allen could assert that פָּרַךְ does not mean to *wither*, in view of such passages as Ps. xc. 5, Isa. xxiv. 7, and especially of Lam. iv. 8, “The skin is parched, withered, like wood.” Indeed, I can conceive of no stronger proof of the accuracy of our hypothesis than that, in the description of the condition of the demonized boy, ξηραίνεται = “is *withered*,” should stand parallel to συντριβόν = “*crushing* him” (Mark ix. 18 || Luke ix. 39).

3. Another case in which Mr. Allen has made imperfect use of his Lexicon, is, when he affirms (vii. 398) that טללא cannot mean the same as στέγη in Mark ii. 4. Now στέγη means a "covering" or "roof," and the kind of roof in the present case was one composed of brushwood, marl and mortar, which could be "dug out." But טללא means "Bedachung," "a covering affording protection," "tectum." If Mr. Allen will consult Levy again, he must see that its associations are precisely those of such a roof as is here described, and he will find the reference Zeph. ii. 14. "They destroy the door, they demolish the *roof*," and the passage from Berachoth, of the rod which fell from the *roof* כִּטְּלֵלָא.

III. Mr. Allen makes numerous mistakes from which he might have been preserved by a first-hand acquaintance with the literature—especially the Palestinian Aramaic.

Dr. Chalmers warned atheists of the folly of affirming "there is no God," because, unless they were prepared to traverse every region of space, if they left any part unvisited, God might be there. Similarly it was somewhat rash on Mr. Allen's part to deny that words possess the meanings I assign, because, unless he was prepared to read every line of Palestinian Aramaic literature, that very meaning might be there in the line not read. I should be sorry to do Mr. Allen an injustice, but in his papers I fail to find any traces that he has studied the Palestinian Targums. Lexicons are very useful, but sometimes incomplete, as we shall see.

1. In the passage last cited, Mark ii. 4, "They *removed* the roof," I used סְלִיק, Pacl of קְלֵק, to represent the verb. The Pacl = "to go up." The Pacl, to "lift up, carry away, remove" (like Greek *aίρω*). But Mr. Allen doubts the suitability of the word, selecting examples to show that the word has only a figurative sense, and does not "de-

generate into the general idea of 'lifting up.'" A few illustrations from the Palestinian Targums dispel this idea.

Exod. xxxiii. 12: 'Thou saidst to me *Carry up* this people.

xxxiii. 15: *Carry us* not up hence.

Lev. xxiv. 9: Ye shall eat the bread after it has been *removed* from the tables.

Num. xii. 9: The cloud of the glory was *lifted up* from upon the Shekinah.

Esther ii. 21: Is not the queen desiring to *remove* them and to raise up Mordecai?

Will my critics still maintain that a word which could be used for the *removal* of shewbread from upon a table could not be used of the *removal* of a thatch or roof from upon a house? In the Lectionary we have, for ἀπεστάγασαν, אַרְיָנוּ, which is the precise equivalent of סִלְקִי.

2. I would now speak of the parallels "carried by four," Mark ii. 3; and "lying on a couch," Matt. ix. 2. As to the word "four," this is certainly אַרְבַּעַ. A couch is, of course, that on which one *reclines*, and I suggested that the verb "to recline" is רָבַעַ. But Dr. Driver, in a letter which I had the honour to receive from him some two years ago, says that רָבַעַ can only be used of *cattle*, and Mr. Allen seems to share the same opinion (vii. 395-6). This is true of the Targum of Onqelos, but in Pal. Aram., רָבַעַ is used of *men*. Levy gives a hint of this, and some uncertain examples; but in the Lectionary, in every instance where ἀνακλίνω or κατακλίνω occurs in the Greek, רָבַעַ is its equivalent. "Guests" are רַבְעִין (Matt. xxii. 11). "Couches" are כַּרְבְּעִין (Luke xiv. 7, 8). Can it be a mere coincidence that in parallelism with the word "four" = אַרְבַּעַ, we have the word "couch," κλίνη = אַרְבַּעַ, a place on which one reclines, as I suggested; or, perhaps better, כַּרְבְּעַ, the word found in the Lectionary for "couch"?

3. In the same connection, I used טַלְטַל in the sense of "carrying," and my critics deny that the word has this

meaning (vii. 396). Again they trust to Onqelos, and show lack of acquaintance with the Palestinian Targums. Are not the following cases conclusive:—J. Exod. xvi. 23, “Ye shall not *carry* anything from place to place on the Sabbath more than four cubits.” Sam. Deut. xix. 14, “Thou shalt not *carry away* thy neighbour’s landmark.” J. Lev. xxv. 14, “When ye buy anything which is *portable*, דְּמִיטְלָא אֶלְמַלְא, from the hand of your neighbour, ye shall not defraud one another”? Will it now be said that כִּטְלָא is unsuitable for the phrase “*carried by four*”?

4. We next deal with Mr. Allen’s assertion, “כִּטְלָא does not mean being thrown down” (vii. 396). Again, in that dialect of Aramaic desiderated by my theory, we find what we need. J. Exod. xxiii. 8, “A bribe blinds the eyes of him that receiveth it, and *throws down* the mighty from their seats.” (Compare Luke i. 52. This is one of several coincidences with the New Testament, which I have noted in this Targum.) And also in Isa. xxii. 17, “Jehovah will *throw* thee down, like the throwing of a man, and shame shall cover thee.” Verbs of “throwing” have a tendency in the passive to mean, “to lie down.” Does not the rare passive form, βεβλημένον ἐπὶ κλίνης, almost of itself suggest an Aramaic passive, as would be כִּטְלָא, “thrown,” “lying”?

5. On page 456 Mr. Allen affirms that אֶלְאָע cannot be the equivalent of ὑψηλός, but means “higher” or “highest,” the objects of contrast being expressed or implied by the context. This is not correct. In Hebrew and Aramaic, there are no adjectives whose primary meaning is either comparative or superlative. The initial meaning is positive. It is true that the word “high” is a relative term, and necessarily connotes objects lower; but this does not prevent אֶלְאָע from being used in the positive degree. It usually denotes greater altitude than רָם (as our word “lofty” differs from “high”), and is used most frequently

of Him who is lofty *par excellence*. Here are some instances of עלאה in the positive degree :—

1 Kings ix. 8: And this house, which is *high*, shall be a hissing.

Deut. xxvi. 9: To make thee *high* above all nations.

Psa. lxxxix. 27: I will make thee *high* above all kings.

Job xxxvii. 9: From His *lofty* chambers cometh the storm.

In the first and third of these cases ὑψηλός actually occurs in the LXX. as the equivalent of עלאה. The others are paraphrastic additions. If the Mount of Transfiguration were Hermon, this explains why it should be called עלאה rather than רם.

6. Levy says that, with שְׁמָא, “name,” or בְּשֵׁמָא, “by name,” the word רַבִּי means “to call on some one by name”; and on the strength of this Mr. Allen felt secure in censuring me (vii. 465) for using רַבִּי in this sense, *without* שְׁמָא or בְּשֵׁמָא (iv. 381). If Mr. Allen had read the Targums as microscopically as I have, he would have come across Isaiah xlii. 6, I have *called* thee in righteousness, רַבִּיתְךָ בְּקִשׁוּט.

7. In iv. 447, as the equivalent of τὸ ἐσπαρμένον, I suggest דְּרָרִיא; but Mr. Allen objects that דְּרִי does not mean “to sow,” but “to strew or scatter” (vii. 461). I reply, σπείρειν does not always mean “to sow”; indeed this very seed referred to as falling on the footpath was *strewn* or *scattered* there, rather than *sown*. So that דְּרִי and σπείρειν are equivalents. In fact in the very passage that Mr. Allen quotes, Exod. xxxii. 20, “Moses strewed it (the powdered gold) upon the water,” the LXX. has καὶ ἔσπειρεν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τὸ ὕδωρ.

8. In Luke x. 21, my explanation (iv. 288) of ἡγαλλιάσατο τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ Ἁγίῳ would require this translation, “He *gave glory* to the Holy Spirit, saying, I thank Thee, O Father . . . that Thou hast revealed,” etc.; but Mr. Allen says that this is “a meaning which the Greek words

do not even hint at." A more perfect acquaintance with the Septuagint would have prevented this remark. The verb ἀγαλλιάω was coined by the LXX. for ἀγάλλω, to avoid the heathenish associations of the latter word. Ἀγάλλω means (1) to glorify, honour; (2) to exult, rejoice in; and ἀγαλλιάομαι has, in the LXX., precisely these meanings. Instances of the former are Isa. xli. 16, "The poor and needy shall give glory," Jer. xlix. (xxx.) 4; Psa. lxxx. (81) 1, xc. (96) 1, cxliv. (5) 7. These passages show that ܓܘܠܘܘܘܘܬܐ and ἀγαλλιάομαι are close synonyms. The insertion of the words τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ Ἁγίῳ in Luke x. 21, as compared with Matt. xi. 25, is just in accordance with Luke iv. 1, iv. 14, xi. 13, xii. 12, when compared with their parallel passages.

IV. I wish now to speak of cases in which Mr. Allen's objections are hypercritical and unreasonable.

In the foregoing cases, some of Mr. Allen's remarks have been very trying and vexatious, but I have had the satisfaction that it allowed me an opportunity of giving additional evidence for my case. Now, I regret that my remarks will be chiefly, though not exclusively, polemical.

1. The first case of hypercriticism is (vii. 465), where Mr. Allen objects to my use of ܠܘܥܝܐ, of "kindling a lamp," as the equivalent of *κατεν* in Matt. v. 15, and of *ἀπτειν* in Luke viii. 16. I quote (iv. 459) Isa. xlv. 15, "He taketh thereof (of the fallen cedar) and warmeth himself; yea, he *kindleth* it (LXX. *καύσαντες*) and baketh bread," but this is judged insufficient. To object that a word cannot be used of kindling a *lamp*, because, in extant literature it is only used of kindling *wood*, is preposterous.

2. In Mark ii. 16 the Pharisees say, "Why doth your Master eat and *drink* (πίνει) with publicans and sinners." I postulate ܡܢܝܐ as the equivalent of *πίνει*, but to this Mr. Allen objects, because *πίνει* = to drink, and ܡܢܝܐ = to drink

profusely. Does not, we would ask, even the context show that *πίνειν*, in the lips of those calumniators who are said to have called Jesus a "glutton and a winebibber," meant, in this case, to drink excessively? *πίνειν* is frequently so used in the LXX., and of such a meaning רִי is the natural representative.

3. In the narrative of lowering the man through the tiles I (iii. 219) postulate for "tiles," the word פְּחָרִין; but Mr. Allen says that "further proof is desiderated" before this can be accepted. The proof which I would respectfully submit is this, פְּחָרָא = a potter, *κεραμεύς*; פְּחָרָא = earthenware; as in J. Exod. xii. 22. כֵּן דְּפְחָרָא = vessel of earthenware. The plural of nouns of material denotes pieces of that material. Hence פְּחָרִין must mean *κέραμοι*, tiles.

4. In Matt. xiii. 6 || Luke viii. 6, we have the parallels *διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ῥίζαν* and *διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἰκμίδα*. The word for "root" is שֵׁשׁ, and for *ἰκμίδα* I suggested שֵׁרֶף, which denotes "the juices or fluid parts of animals and plants." Now *ἰκμῖς* has precisely this meaning; but it can also denote "moisture in the soil," and therefore Mr. Allen claims that this last is the meaning of *ἰκμῖς* here, and rejects שֵׁרֶף. Against this, I would urge (1) that the ancient versions understood *ἰκμῖς* to denote the "humor" or sap of the plant. The Lectionary *e.g.* has לִיהָא = the sap of life. (2) It is more in accordance with what we should expect from Luke the physician, for *ἰκμῖς* was a decided medical term. (3) The parallelism suggests that both *ρίζα* and *ἰκμῖς* are parts of the plant.

5. The objection offered to שֵׁרָא (vii. 395) is by no means convincing. I claim that שֵׁרָא = *πληθος*; and Mr. Allen says that in the Targums it is only used of a "caravan." This may be so, but its real meaning is *a crowd*, "Menge," "turba," "caterva." Levy, in his larger Lexicon, cites from the Jerusalem Talmud a passage in which שֵׁרָא denotes "a crowd gathered in the street." We infer then that שֵׁרָא

was used of a caravan from the promiscuous nature of its crowd; and thus the word admirably suits the crowd of Gadarene swineherds and their sympathisers.

6. In iii. 218, I used כַּטְלָלָא of the δῶμα upon which the friends of the paralytic climbed, to lower him into the presence of Jesus; but the accuracy of this is challenged. Now, of a substantial house, כַּטְלָלָא could *not* be used; but as for such a building as is here described, with a roof of sticks and mud that needed to be “dug out,” I insist there is no word in the language so suitable. I was formerly of opinion that the building thus referred to was a cottage; but the gathering of the Scribes, and the reconstruction of the passage into Aramaic, seem to render it more probable that a verandah or light structure of wood, with a roof of reeds and mortar, covered perhaps with slabs or tiles, and erected over a part of the courtyard, suits the circumstances best. Such a structure could certainly be called כַּטְלָלָא. See vii. 398.

7. I have twice used שָׂרָא (iii. 285, 6) as the equivalent of καθήσθαι, and to this Mr. Allen raises objection. Certainly, if καθήσθαι could *only* mean “to sit,” in the rigorous sense of the word, my critic would be right. But when we read of Jesus (Matt. xiii. 1) as the centre of a great multitude, “καθημένος by the sea-side,” this suggests the restful posture of שָׂרָא rather than יָתַב. And similarly the occupation of the house in Capernaum (Mark ii. 5, 6) by the Scribes and others, suggests a temporary retreat from the scorching heat of Gennesaret, which would be suitably expressed by שָׂרָא. When Christ went to *lodge* with Zacchæus the Lectionary uses שָׂרָא. Indeed, in three passages of the Old Testament, שָׂרָא and καθήσθαι represent the same Hebrew word: Psa. lxxx. 2; Isa. vi. 1, xxxvii. 16.

8. Mr. Allen’s objections to אָוֹר are very extravagant (vii. 456, 7). Whatever may be the final decision as to אָוֹר in Dan. ii. 5, where even the Revised Margin renders: “The

word is *gone forth* from me," it still remains true, as Kautzsch says, that "the existence of an Aramaic stem $\text{רן}=\text{לן}$ cannot be doubted." If so, and Mr. Allen is at the pains to prove that this is so, there can be no reasonable objection to my assuming that $\epsilon\xi\epsilon\rho\chi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota = \text{רן}$ in Matt. xxiv. 27.

9. As to בְּעֵינַי (vii. 392), which certainly is the equivalent of $\mu\acute{o}\gamma\iota\varsigma$ or $\mu\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma = \text{cum molesti\`a}$ (as the numerous usages of עֵינַי in Ecclesiastes fully prove), I did not postulate that this word occurred in the original document, but was mistaken for בשני (iii. 210, 11) by a scribe or the translator.

V. Mr. Allen has no sympathetic appreciation of some phenomena which are inseparable from the problem.

a. He does not admit the possibility that a translator may give a *free* rendering. This has been evident on previous occasions. We will here cite one or two flagrant instances:—

1. In iii. 210 we spoke of the demon which had afflicted the boy whom Christ met at the foot of the mount of transfiguration. In Luke ix. 39 we read $\mu\acute{o}\gamma\iota\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\chi\omega\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota} =$ "with difficulty he departs." For the verb "departs" I suggest $\text{קע} =$ "fled," but Mr. Allen suggests that the idea of "flight" is unsuitable to the Greek verb and also to the departure of a demon. I am surprised at this, when Mr. Allen claims to have read Neubauer's Tobit, for on *three* occasions, when the departure of the demon from Sarah is referred to, קע is the very word employed.

2. In Matt. x. 28 || Luke xii. 5, we have "to destroy ($\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha\iota$) in Gehenna," "to cast into Gehenna." I explained these (iii. 284) by $\text{שנר} =$ "to cast out"; and a second verb, spelt the same, $\text{שנר} =$ "to burn, consume with fire." Mr. Allen objects to this latter word, because $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha\iota$ means to "destroy," not to "burn." But when we know that, in accordance with the Christian *usus loquendi*, the

usual Greek word for the sufferings of Gehenna was ἀπολλύναι, this objection is quite swept away.

b. Mr. Allen takes no account of a fact familiar to all who have had experience of translation work, namely, that in rendering two or three connected words, if the translator gets on the wrong tack with the first word, he is likely to give a rendering not quite literal of the other words.

This principle may be applied to the parallels αἱ περὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐπιθυμίαι (Mark iv. 19), and ἡδοαὶ τοῦ βίου (Luke viii. 14). "The desires for the remaining (or, other) things" is certainly רגניא דכוּתר, as Mr. Allen admits, after having, at the outset, denied it (vii. 391). But there is a very similar word רגנתא, which means "pleasures"; and is so used in the Lectionary in this very passage. After translating the text-word by "pleasures," to render דכוּתר, "of the residue" or "remaining things" would not be suitable. But might דכוּתר suggest τοῦ βίου? Certainly. The lexicographer Hesychius says that βίος means (1) ζωή, (2) περιουσία. But περιουσία means, according to Liddell and Scott, surplus abundance, wealth, luxury: and כוּתר means residue, abundance, superfluity. Indeed in the Lectionary כוּתר and its cognates are regularly used of περισσεύμα and its cognates: "the having more than enough." *E.g.* Luke xv. 19, "bread enough and to spare." Luke xxi. 4, "They cast in of their *superfluity*, but she of her poverty." Therefore I can only repeat that כוּתר would naturally suggest βίος in the sense of "luxury," after the word "pleasures."

c. Mr. Allen makes no allowance for the fact that our Aramaic Gospel is *ex hypothesi* composed in a dialect of which we have no contemporary representative. A study of the extant specimens of Palestinian literature discloses the fact that amid deeply pervasive agreements, each one has its peculiarities as to vocabulary. Each one has its list of peculiar words and peculiar meanings: and therefore some words may have had meanings of regular occurrence

in Galilee, which are somewhat rare in extant literature. I should not be disposed now to assign such cases to the first rank of evidence, but still they are not to be treated lightly. A very strong case of this nature is that of *דרך*, for which I claim the meaning "to come," in Matt. xiii. 4. It clearly has this meaning in a metaphorical sense. Prov. vi. 11, "Thy poverty shall *come* upon thee like an armed man"; and where *ותדרוך* is used as a doublet, with *ותיתי*. It is a word common to Hebrew, Targumic Aramaic, and Syriac; and in each case the Lexicons give as the meaning (1) *calcare*, (2) *ingredi*. In every case *but one*, where *דרך* occurs in the Hebrew, it is transferred to the Targums. There is a string of these, where the rendering "to enter" seems to me demanded by the context, though the R.V. gives "tread." *E.g.* Micah v. 5, 6; Hab. iii. 15; Deut. xi. 25. The one exception above referred to, is Num. xxiv. 17, "A star shall *come* out of Jacob." Here surely the notion of "treading" is eliminated; but here, unfortunately for our present purpose, all the three Targums paraphrase the passage, by referring it to the Messiah. All this makes a very strong case for the identification of *ἡλθε* with *κατεπατήθη*.

And now, in conclusion, I have one or two words to add by way of *concession*. Pioneers must be prepared for the possibility of error. In the advocacy of a theory, "so novel in its conception," and elaborated in absolute seclusion, I should have been more than human, if I had not taken too roseate a view of some few of the suggested explanations of the divergent Greek words. I have for some considerable time had misgivings as to three of the Aramaic words suggested in my earlier papers. These are, *חסל* (iii. 212), *רשא* (iii. 288), and *הדר* (iii. 288): three cases out of a round hundred! There are I find some few words in Mr. Allen's list, which I have not alluded to in this paper: the reason is simply lack of space. As to Mr. Allen's "considerations

of my theory from a general point of view," they are altogether too brief and superficial to be taken seriously. What the Synoptic problem has long desiderated is *facts*: theories swarm; every possible theory has found advocates; we need one or two facts as stepping stones; and unless Semitic scholars have vastly more to say against the hypothesis than has yet been said, the existence of one (or perhaps two) primitive Aramaic documents embedded in our present Synoptic Gospels is a *fact*. Many scholars who have long studied the Synoptic problem, and who have accepted the theory tentatively, have found it most elucidating; and while it does not perhaps explain everything, it goes a very long way to reduce the *chaos* which has hitherto prevailed, to an approximate *Kosmos*.

J. T. MARSHALL.

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

IX. THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

OF the four lessons which Jesus taught His disciples concerning the significance of His death, the first was that in enduring a violent death at the hands of men He should be suffering for righteousness' sake. In this earliest lesson the Master presented His approaching end under a purely ethical aspect, and consistently therewith He spoke of it not as an isolated event, but as a fact falling under a general law according to which all who are faithful to the Divine interest in an evil world must endure suffering. From this point of view it is obvious that it is not for the death of Christ alone that a *rationale* is wanted. The question may legitimately be raised, What is the final cause of the sufferings of the righteous generally? a question on which the thoughts of Old Testament prophets, psalmists and sages had been much exercised. There is

need of a theodicy along the whole line. Does the same theodicy suffice for the case of Jesus and for that of all His fellow-sufferers? May we reason about the latter as Paul reasoned about the former and say, if death be the penalty of sin, there are only two alternatives: either all who suffer, suffer for their own sins—the theory of Job's friends; or some who suffer, suffer redemptively, for the sins of others—the theory hinted at in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah interpreted historically as referring to the afflictions of God's faithful ones in Israel?

The ethical aspect of Christ's death is hardly touched on in the Pauline literature. What the apostle might have done had he written copiously and systematically on the subject one cannot guess, but it is certain that in the epistles which form the basis of the present study he contemplates the death of Jesus by itself apart, and exclusively from a religious and theological view-point. His whole aim in all his statements regarding that event is to point out the significance for faith of a unique experience befalling One believed to be personally sinless, who could not therefore be conceived as in His Passion suffering for His own sin. What we have to do now is as far as possible to ascertain the meaning and estimate the value of these statements.

In our rapid survey of the four principal epistles we lighted on certain texts bearing all the appearance of being forms of language into which the brooding thought of the writer on the death of Jesus had finally crystallised. Among the great Pauline *logia* relating to that theme, fall to be classed those which speak of Christ being made a curse and sin for us that we might become curse-free and sinless.¹ To these, as not less important, must be added the word in *Romans* iii. 25, in which God is represented as publically exhibiting Jesus in His death in a propitiatory

¹ *Gal.* iii. 13; 2 *Cor.* v. 21.

capacity. Having already used the passage in which that text occurs for the purpose of throwing light on the righteousness of God, and the faith which justifies, we may begin our study of St. Paul's teaching concerning the significance of Christ's death by returning to it to consider the instruction which it contains on the latter topic.

The word *ἱλαστήριον* has given almost as much trouble to commentators as *θυμιατήριον* in *Hebrews* ix. 4, though not for the same reason. In the latter case there would be little doubt as to the meaning were it not that the true rendering, "the altar of incense," seems to involve the writer in an inaccuracy as to the location of that piece of furniture in the tabernacle. In the case of the former, the difficulty arises from the paucity of material of kindred character in the Pauline literature to guide us in interpretation. On first thoughts one is inclined to assume that the term *ἱλαστήριον* is employed to represent Christ in His death as a propitiatory sacrifice or sin offering. But then it is noticeable, and has indeed been insisted on by expositors of weight,¹ that St. Paul makes very little use elsewhere of the Levitical sacrificial system in the formulation of his doctrine of the cross, and there is force in the remark that that system would be far less congenial to his mind as a vehicle of thought than prophetic utterances concerning the suffering servant of Jehovah such as those contained in *Isaiah* liii. Then, further, it has to be considered that in the Septuagint the term in question is not employed to denote the sin offering. It is rather used as the Greek equivalent for the Kapporeth, the lid of the ark, or the mercy-seat. Accordingly the older interpreters assumed that the apostle followed the Septuagint usage, and found in the text the, in many respects attractive, idea that in Christ God had provided for a sinful world the mercy-seat of the new dispensation, a mercy-seat sprinkled with Christ's

¹ So Weiss and Pfleiderer.

precious blood, like the lid of the ark with the blood of the victim on the great day of atonement. Those who, like most recent interpreters, reject this sense as fanciful, and not suitable in an Epistle written to Romans, have to choose between two other alternatives, either taking *ἱλαστήριον* as a noun signifying definitely a propitiatory victim, or as a neuter adjective signifying generally means of propitiation.

In our perplexity it may be well to see if we cannot to a greater extent than has been thought possible make St. Paul his own interpreter. For this purpose it is important to observe that in *Romans* iii. 21–26, he resumes the thought of *Romans* i. 17, 18. At least it is quite certain that *Romans* iii. 21 resumes the thought of *Romans* i. 17. In the latter text the apostle had spoken prelusively of a righteousness of God which he had not at that point the opportunity of further explaining, his mind going off immediately on the topic of the world's sin. The sin-section ended, he returns to the theme at *Romans* iii. 21, and tells his readers what the righteousness of God to which he had alluded really is. Now this being the fact with regard to the topic of the *righteousness* of God, is it not every way likely that the same thing holds true regarding the other topic, mentioned in *Romans* i. 18, and that the apostle has in his mind the *wrath* of God when he speaks of God as publicly setting forth Christ as *ἱλαστήριον* in His blood? The suggestion needs only to be made to commend itself; but confirmation, if needful, may be found in *Romans* v. 9, where we find God's wrath and Christ's blood associated in the apostle's thought. But if at *Romans* iii. 25 the apostle reverts to what he had said in *Romans* i. 18, then it is natural to suppose that in the death of Jesus he sees two things: a *revelation* of Divine wrath, and a *means of averting it*. Both point in the direction of a sacrificial victim; not necessarily after the analogy of Levitical sacrifices, for

the apostle may have had in view the human sacrifices with which Greek and Roman story makes us familiar. That would be indeed a bold collocation; but boldness is what we expect from St. Paul, not to mention that what he says in *Romans* v. 7, about one man dying for another, tends to show that he would not have regarded the use of heathen instances in illustration of the Gospel as improper or inadmissible. His appeal is to general human history.

The fact basis of the idea that Christ suffered death as a sacrificial victim is that His blood was shed (*ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ αἵματι*). His death was a violent one, and looking away from subordinate, human causality, the apostle sees in it only the hand of God; it was God that put Jesus to death as a lamb slain for the sin of the world. And by this act God in the first place, as St. Paul views the matter, demonstrated, revealed his wrath against sin. For this I take to be the revelation of wrath whereof the apostle speaks in *Romans* i. 18. Commentators have been at a loss to know what the revelation consisted in, or how it was made, and in their perplexity have taken refuge in the unnatural vices of the pagans as the divinely appointed penalty of sin. It seems to me that we should find both the revelations spoken of, of righteousness and of wrath, in the death of Jesus. By that death, according to the apostle, God shows what He really thinks of sin. Apart from that death, men might be inclined to ask: If God be so angry at the wickedness of the world, why does He not make some signal display of His indignation? To judge from appearances, one would say He did not care. Men go on sinning, from bad to worse, and He makes no sign. Paul replies: Look to Calvary, there is the sign. God's wrath against sin is such that He inflicts that bloody, cruel death on His own Son occupying the position of a propitiatory victim.

While assigning to Christ's death the double function of revealing and averting Divine wrath, like the thunder-storm

which at once reveals and heals electric trouble in the air, the apostle has in view chiefly the latter aspect. His aim is not to proclaim the fact that Christ was slain as a sacrifice, but rather to emphasize the gracious purpose for which He suffered. Therefore *ἱλαστήριον* is to be taken as an adjective rather than as a noun, because so understood the word makes the gracious purpose more prominent. The apostle leaves the revelation of wrath in the background, and brings to the front the revelation of love, providing a way of escape from wrath. He says here in effect what he says further on in express terms: "God commendeth His own love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us!"¹ He means to accentuate the love of God, not His wrath, or even His righteousness. He does indeed speak of God's righteousness—that is, of His regard for moral interests, but not dogmatically by way of teaching the necessity for the manifestation or "satisfaction" of Divine justice in connection with human salvation, but rather apologetically by way of pointing out that the actual method of salvation is such that God cannot rightfully be charged with moral indifference; the death of Christ showing that, whatever facts in the world's history might seem to point in a contrary direction, sin is not really a trivial matter in God's sight.

By finding in the word *ἱλαστήριον* a real though tacit reference to the wrath of God, we bring this Pauline text into line with the two referred to on a previous page, and also with the *logion* in *Galatians* iv. 4. In these three passages one principle is involved, viz., that in His earthly experience Christ was subjected to all that is unblessed in man's unredeemed state, with the result of man being delivered from it. This is the principle of redemption. Christ's whole state of humiliation was the *λύτρον*, the resulting benefit for us is *ἀπολύτρωσις*. He was made under

¹ *Rom.* v. 8.

the law, by circumcision and otherwise, and we are redeemed from subjection to law into sonship. He was made a curse, and we are redeemed from the law's curse. He was made sin, and we are made sinless. Adding to these three instances the fourth suggested in *Romans* iii. 25, Christ became in lot an object of Divine wrath, with the effect that men guilty of sins provocative of God's indignation are shielded and saved from wrath. This principle, or law, well established by these examples, may be used as a clue to the meaning of a text which has given much trouble to commentators—*Romans* viii. 3. It has commonly been assumed that the condemnation of sin in the flesh referred to in the last clause took place in Christ's death, *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* being taken in the sense of a sin offering. God sending His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and as an offering for sin, in His sacrificial death condemned sin in the flesh—such is the traditional interpretation. Is it quite certain that this is the true meaning? Let us see. It may be assumed that St. Paul here points to an experience of Christ that meets a need of man which has been the subject of remark in the preceding context. But of what need has the apostle been speaking? Our need of help to resist and overcome the law of sin in the members, the preponderant and domineering influence of the flesh. But what is there in Christ's earthly experience that can give us help here? One would say not His death, but rather His holy life in the flesh, demonstrating that bondage to the *σὰρξ* is not inevitable, embodying in a successful experiment of resistance God's condemnation of sin in the flesh, as a thing that ought not to be and that need not be, Christ's life in the spirit being not less than His death a Divine appointment for man's good. The application of the principle exemplified in the other four texts to this fifth one would lead to the same conclusion. That principle requires that the experience of Christ which is to benefit us in any

given way must correspond to the nature of the benefit. The benefit in the present instance being emancipation from hopelessness as to the possibility of walking in the spirit in spite of the flesh, the redemptive experience of Christ ought to be the proof supplied in His life that to walk in the spirit is not impossible. It may indeed be asked, Where is the element of humiliation in that experience of Christ? The reply must be, In the fact that He was sent in the *likeness of sinful flesh*. In other words, that His life on earth was enacted, like ours, under conditions involving temptation to sin. God's whole aim in sending His Son into the world was with reference to sin (*περὶ ἁμαρτίας*), that by every part of His earthly experience He might work in one way or another towards the destruction of sin. Christ's personal struggle with temptation arising out of the flesh was designed to make its contribution to this end; and it does so not merely by way of example, but by way of a Divine proclamation that the malign dominion of the flesh is at an end, and that henceforth men shall be enabled to walk in the spirit, even while living in the flesh. As the reign of law was doomed by the mere fact that Christ was made under the law, so the reign of the flesh is doomed by the mere fact that Christ was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh.¹

It is important to note that in all these instances of the principle or law of redemption the apostle gives us what he conceives to be the religious significance of the *obvious* facts of Christ's experience. When he says, *e.g.*, that Christ was made under law, he has in view mainly the fact that He was circumcised. In like manner he conceives of Christ as made sin by enduring physical death, the appointed and historic penalty of sin; as made a curse by enduring death in the form of crucifixion; as made under God's wrath by

¹ This is in substance the view of this text taken by Godet and Weiss. *Vide* Godet's *Commentary*, and Weiss's *Lehrbuch der Eibl. Theologie des N. T.*, p. 303.

enduring death in a manner which involved blood-shedding, as in the case of sacrificial victims; and as made in the likeness of sinful flesh, because subject to temptation arising out of the affections of the flesh, as in the case of the first temptation in the wilderness. To a dogmatically trained intellect the fact-basis for the corresponding theological categories may appear slight, and the temptation is strong to supply for the doctrinal superstructure either from the evangelic history, or from imagination, a broader, more adequate foundation. The procedure may be very natural, but it is not exegesis. We must remember that St. Paul's problem was not the same as that of the scholastic theologian. When he became a believer the imperative task for him was to read in a new light the plain surface facts of Christ's earthly history. The question he had to ask and answer as best he could was: What meaning am I to put upon the facts that One whom I now believe to be the Messiah and the Holy One of God was circumcised and endured death, by crucifixion, and by blood-shedding! On the other hand, the problem of the systematic theologian is to verify and justify the theological categories supplied to him in the apostle's answer to that question by an exhaustive statement of the relative facts. In doing this he is in danger of stepping out of the region of history into the realm of imagination, a danger which has been proved to be very real in connection with Christ's endurance of the wrath of God, and of death as the penalty of sin, representatives of Protestant scholastic orthodoxy not hesitating to say that Christ endured the essence of eternal death, and was the object of God's extreme hatred.¹ In so doing they might be very consistent and thoroughgoing as theorists, but the doctrine they thus taught is at once unscriptural and incredible. Let not St. Paul be made responsible for such extravagances.

¹ For examples *vide* my *Humiliation of Christ*, Lecture vii., note B.

Under the Pauline law of redemption the benefit resulting to men from Christ's mediation is in the first place to be conceived objectively. Thus, Christ having been made under law, redemption from legalism *forthwith* ensues as the objective privilege of humanity. That, in the view of God and in the religious history of the world, is the significance of Christ's subjection to legal ordinances. The era of legalism therewith ended, and the era of liberty began. Very different was the construction the Judaist would be inclined to put on the fact. Christ was circumcised, therefore the law must be perpetual, for has not the Lord of the Church given it the sanction of His example? so he would reason. On the contrary, replied St. Paul, the circumcision of Jesus was the death-knell of the law; He underwent the humiliation of subjection to law for the very purpose of putting an end to legal bondage; His experience in that respect was the ransom He paid for our emancipation. Similarly with all the other applications of the principle. Thus because Christ was made sin for us by subjection to death, therefore, *ipso facto*, God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing unto men their trespasses. So again, because Christ was made subject to temptation arising from the flesh, God condemned sin in the flesh, declared that the dominion of the flesh, as of the law, must take end, and be replaced by the benign dispensation of the Spirit. In a word, at whatever point in our low estate Christ comes in contact with us, in life or in death, His touch exercises a magical emancipating influence, beneficently altering in relation to God the situation of the world.

But this is not the whole truth. The objective change takes place with a view to a corresponding subjective one, without which the former would remain an abstract ideal and a barren benefit. The objective privilege must be subjectively realised. The position of sonship must be accom-

panied with the spirit of sonship, otherwise I shall be a slave of legalism, though living in the era of grace. The general amnesty which ensued from Christ having been made sin must be realised individually as a Divine forgiveness of personal sin. So the apostle views the matter, hence the stress which he everywhere lays on faith. For it is faith's function to transmute the objective state of privilege into a subjective experience; to turn an ideal redemption into an actual one all along the line. Thus it is to be noted that the apostle is careful to represent Christ's sacrificial death as propitiatory *through faith*. Codex A omits the words, but there can be no reasonable doubt as to their genuineness. The idea they express is so essential to the Pauline system of thought that even if they were not in the text they would have to be understood. It is through faith, and only for the believer, that Christ's death becomes effectively propitiatory, a real shield against the Divine wrath. And so throughout the whole range of benefit. There must be appropriating faith if God's goodwill to men for Christ's sake is not to remain comparatively barren and inoperative.

But not even yet have we got to the bottom of St. Paul's mind. I have not hitherto attempted to translate the principle of redemption obtained inductively from Pauline texts into the technical terms of theology. It is not imperative on an interpreter to undertake the task of translation, and he might excusably feel some measure of perplexity in an endeavour to fit in such non-scriptural terms as "substitute" and "representative" into his exegetical results. But perhaps it is not far off the mark to say that while the idea of Christ as a substitute fits into the conception of His death as sacrificial, the idea of representation best accords with the whole group of texts from which I have gathered by induction the Pauline law of redemption. In these texts Christ appears as a central person in whom the human race

is collected into a moral unity, having one responsibility and one interest, all things as far as possible common, even sin and righteousness, which one would think inseparable from personality, being treated as separable entities passing freely from one side to the other, sin to the sinless One, righteousness to the unrighteous. It is a case of *objective identity*. And the point I wish to make now is that this objective identity does not content St. Paul, not to speak of substitution which expresses too external a relation to have any chance of satisfying his mind. He cannot rest content with anything short of *subjective identity* between Redeemer and redeemed, implying that Christ is not only by Divine appointment and in outward lot, but in conscious sympathy, one with men, and on the other hand that they are one with Him in the same manner, making His experience their own. The former aspect of this subjective identity is not at all so prominent in the epistles of Paul as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which the sympathy of Christ is one of the great outstanding ideas, the whole earthly career of the Captain of salvation, not excluding His passion, being regarded as a curriculum of trial and suffering designed to develop in Him the spirit of compassion essential to the priestly vocation. But there are significant hints of the truth, as when the apostle adduces as a motive for Christian consideration of others the fact that Christ pleased not Himself,¹ urges the duty of mutual burden bearing as a fulfilment of the law of Christ,² and represents the Lord Jesus as becoming poor for our sakes.³ There can be no doubt that he would include in the self-improvement of Jesus the whole state of humiliation as voluntarily endured out of sympathy with men, though in mentioning the details of that state he presents the experi-

¹ *Rom.* xv, 3, which, however, is proved not by facts taken from Christ's history, but by a quotation from a psalm.

² *Gal.* vi, 2.

³ *2 Cor.* viii, 9.

ence of Christ as something to which He was subjected rather than as something He voluntarily incurred.

The other aspect of the subjective identity, the sympathy of believers with Christ, is made very prominent in St. Paul's teaching. It is all due to the action of faith, which, as he conceives it, cannot be restricted to the act of appropriating a benefit, but, like ivy clinging to a wall, lays hold of everything in the experience of Christ that is capable of being turned into a source of spiritual life. As Christ in love made His own every detail in our unredeemed state, so faith in the exercise of its native clinging power makes its own every critical stage in Christ's redeeming experience, His death, burial, resurrection and ascension, and compels the redeemed man to re-enact these crises in his own spiritual history. "I am crucified with Christ";¹ if One died, then all died."² So St. Paul judged; so he viewed the matter; so judge all like-minded. To put it so may appear to be making it a matter of opinion, a mere affair of personal moral idiosyncrasy. And there can be no question that many who pass for believers do not so judge, at least with anything like the earnestness of St. Paul, and the fact gives urgency to the inquiry as to the guarantees for ethical interests in the Pauline system. This will come up for consideration hereafter; meantime our business is to understand the apostle's own way of conceiving the believing man's relation to the Redeemer. And the thing to be noted is that in his view the function of faith is not merely to lay hold of a purchased benefit, but to impose a serious ethical task, that of dying to live. The fact suggests the query whether after all he so entirely overlooked the ethical aspect of Christ's own death as I said, and as on the surface it seems. If for us being crucified with Christ is an ethical process, must not crucifixion for Him also have had an ethical motive and end? So it naturally appears to us,

¹ *Gal.* ii. 20.

² *2 Cor.* v. 14.

but it does not follow that that view of the matter was much or at all present to the apostle's mind. We must take his ideas as they stand, and the fact is that he does not present the death of Christ and the co-dying of Christians under the same categories of thought. Death in Christ's case is physical, in the case of the believer mystical. The reason for dying in the one case is a transcendent theological one, in the other it is moral. On this account the dying-to-live to which the Christian is summoned loses the impetus arising from its being presented as the ideal and universal law of all true life, and is based on the weaker though not lower ground of a believer's sense of congruity and honour.¹

In St. Paul's own case the new life lost nothing on that account, partly because the moral ideal was operative in his reason and conscience under disguise, but chiefly because the religious fervour and energy of his faith and the grateful devotion of his love were of themselves all-powerful motives to Christ-like living. The love of Christ who died for him "constrained" him to die with Him and to live unto Him. Then his faith, with its power of vivid imaginative apprehension, laid Christ under contribution as a source of inspiration in every conceivable way. For it Christ was at once Vicar, Representative, and Brother blended together in indissoluble unity. There was therefore no risk in his case of justification taking place without sanctification, through faith laying hold of a certain benefit, objective righteousness, procured by Christ's death, and looking to nothing but its own private interest. His faith so contemplated Christ that He became at once and with equal certainty unto him believing, the ground of pardon and the source of a new life, Christ for him and Christ in him. And it was such faith as his own he had in view in

¹ *Vide Green's Witness of God*, Works, vol. iii., p. 230, where a purely ethical view of Christ's death is presented.

all his discussions on justification. It was a yielding of the heart to the love of God and of Christ, and as such not merely the reception of the gift of salvation, but the entering into a mystic unity of life and of love with the source of salvation.

It will be well for the interests both of theology and of religion that we earnestly endeavour to make this Pauline conception of faith our own. The consequence of losing sight of it in theology is that the living organism of Paulinism becomes resolved into a dead collection of scholastic dogmas standing side by side in a system, but having no vital affinities; and in religion that the unseemly spectacle is presented, in the case of many professed believers, of men looking to Christ for deliverance from guilt and wrath without devotion to Him as the Lord, or any trace of that all-pervading moral sensitiveness one expects to see in a Christian.

These dangers are by no means imaginary. They beset us both as Protestants and as Evangelic Christians. As Protestants, because our bias in that capacity is to empty faith of all moral contents on which a doctrine of merit might be based; and, as controversy with Romanist theology leads the Protestant dogmatist to give a very exceptional prominence to justification, it may readily come to pass that he shall hardly find leisure or opportunity, to say nothing of inclination, to regard faith under any other aspect. As Evangelic Christians, because in that character we naturally interest ourselves much in those whom Jesus pitied, the lost, and having them in view speak often and with emphasis of Christ as the sin-bearer, inviting them to lay their sins on Him by faith that they may have peace with God, and probably endeavouring to make the act of faith as easy as possible by use of such phrases as "only believe that Jesus died on the cross in your stead and you are saved." A natural and yet a serious mistake. For it

is a short-sighted evangelism which looks only to the beginning of Christian life and makes no provision for its continuance and progress; which thinks of justification and forgets sanctification; which cares not about the quality of faith provided only faith of some kind of which Christ is the object be awakened, with as little delay as possible; which deems it the one thing needful to bring every sinner into a state of conscious peace, instead of aiming at rousing the conscience of the sinful into energetic activity and leaving them, as we so safely may, in God's hands. The true, healthy evangelism is that which offers Christ to men's faith as He is offered in the New Testament, in Christ's own teaching and life, and in the apostolic epistles, in all the aspects of His character and work. That cannot be done in a day or in a single address, still less in a single sentence. But it can be done by giving prominence now to this side of truth, now to that, always aiming at exhibiting the manysided wisdom of God in the Gospel. The result will be a faith to which Christ is wisdom by being at once righteousness, sanctification and redemption; a Prophet, a Priest, and a King; a Christ for us and a Christ in us; a Christ who died in our stead, and a Christ with whom we die daily; a faith which will work through fellowship with Christ in His sufferings to the effect of making us Christlike as surely as it will rest upon Christ as the Saviour from sin.

A. B. BRUCE.

*THE PARALLEL PASSAGES IN "JOEL" IN
THEIR BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF DATE.*

THE question of the date of Joel has been reopened in England by Prof. Kirkpatrick,¹ who, unlike recent English critics, regards the prophecy as early. At the same time, he is with them in admitting that, if Joel was not written in the 9th century (and to be more precise, during the minority of King Joash, 2 Kings xi. f.), it must be post-exilic. This important point of agreement,—the reasons for which need not be restated here, since they can easily be found in the works of Prof. Kirkpatrick, W. R. Smith (*Encyc. Brit.*, art. "Joel"), A. B. Davidson (EXPOSITOR, 1888—3rd series, vol. vii., pp. 208 ff.), and Driver (*Introduction*, pp. 290 ff.)—will form the basis of the present discussion; for it is only by the recognition of this agreement that the argument from parallel passages can become really effective. But there are other evidences which, in the light of this agreement, acquire fresh force; a brief reconsideration of these will make this point clear, and will indicate how the argument from the parallels contributes to the whole cumulative proof.

The chief evidence is that which is drawn from the social and religious conditions reflected in the book. Passing over points of agreement, it will be enough here to re-discuss what continue to be points of disagreement.

1. The references to the surrounding nations.

Egypt, Edom, Philistia, Phœnicia appear as enemies of Judah; the first three are known to have been hostile previous to the reign of Joash; that Phœnicia was also hostile is possible enough, though the fact is not mentioned even at 2 Chronicles xxi. 16. While, however, such references would thus be intelligible in a writing of the 9th

¹ In his valuable work on the *Doctrine of the Prophets* (1892).

century, they would be little, if at all, less intelligible¹ in one of post-exilic origin. On the other hand the mention of the sons of the Greeks (iv.² 6) and of "all nations" (iv. 1, 2, etc.), rather than the specification of particular foes, points more to the later than the earlier date.

Turning to the more special references, we must admit that no known facts of post-exilic times *fully* explain them: explanations based on records of the earlier period are fuller but neither complete nor certain. Thus, *e.g.*, Prof. Kirkpatrick explains the reference to Edom by the war of revolt recorded in 2 Kings viii. 20-22; but he has to *assume* that at that time a massacre of innocent Israelites took place (Joel iv. 19): granted the assumption, in itself far from improbable, does a massacre during a regular war of independence justify the terms in which Joel speaks? do they not rather suggest the malignant conduct of the same nation (when independent) which is described more particularly by Obadiah, but also by Jeremiah (xlix. 7 ff.), Isaiah (xxxiv.; lxiii. 1, 7) and Malachi (i. 2 ff.). Again, the reference to the Philistines (iv. 4 ff.) is explained by 2 Chronicles xxi. 16 f.: but this narrative, even if we admit its historical accuracy, refers to a rifling of the king's house (ver. 17), Joel to a rifling of the temple (ver. 5). No satisfactory account of the terms in which Egypt and Phœnicia are referred to by Joel can be found in the records of the 9th century (Kirkpatrick, pp. 61, 62; Driver, *Introd.*, p. 291).

This argument then may be summed up thus: if Obadiah describes events of the 9th century and 2 Chronicles xxi. 16 f. is historical, then while the majority of Joel's references to the nations find fuller explanation in what is

¹ For the post-exilic hostility of the Philistines cf. Neh. iv. 1; Zech. ix. 5-7; of Edom, Mal. i. 2 ff. Egypt, owing to the earliest traditions, was at all times a type of hostility.

² References throughout are according to the Hebrew enumeration.

recorded of the 9th century than in what is recorded of the 5th (or subsequent) centuries, and none can be said to be absolutely incompatible with the former, all the references agree with what is known as to the *general* circumstances of the post-exilic period, and one ("the sons of the Greeks") is by that period much more satisfactorily accounted for. At best the balance is but slightly in favour of the early date, and in the opinion of many not at all.

2. The references to the internal condition of the country.

That these excellently suit the post-exilic period is admitted by Reuss, himself an advocate of the early date. He sums them up thus: "The Jews are already scattered throughout the world (iv. 2): they have no king but only elders (i. 2. 14); city and temple exist, but in the midst only of a quite small territory throughout which the trumpet can be heard when it is blown in Jerusalem (ii. 1. 15). The cultus is the chief concern and special attention is paid to fasting (i. 14; ii. 12. 15). Moreover no particular charges are made against the people; nothing is said of idolatry or the high places as in the time of Amos or Hosea."¹ Here then is a condition of affairs which actually existed after the exile, each of the facts finding a natural, complete and satisfactory explanation in the *known* circumstances of that time; on the other hand, to harmonize the facts with the earliest period, assumptions—in some cases probable, in others improbable—have to be made. Two illustrations will suffice to make this clear.

(a) Chap. iv. 1 ff. Adopting the 9th century origin of Joel, Prof. Kirkpatrick has to explain these verses thus: "The dispersion of Israel among the nations . . . is not the deportation of the people *en masse* by its Assyrian and

¹ *Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften* (A.T.), 2nd ed. p. 260. In two or three cases I have added references to justify particular statements. The significance of ii. 1. 15 is increased by comparing Jer. iv. 5.

Babylonian conquerors, but, as the context shows, the sale of captives to distant nations, vers. 6, 7." But does this satisfactorily account for the words, "I will gather all nations, and I will plead with them there *for my people and for my heritage Israel whom they have scattered among the nations, and parted my land.*" It is surely more probable to explain them as a reference to the captivity of the whole people than as one to a mere sale of captives, extensive as this at times may have been (cf. Amos i. 6). Again, a forced interpretation of "my land" at the end of the quotation is necessitated by the assumption of an early date; naturally it means the territory permanently possessed by Jehovah's people; here it would only indicate the additional country conquered by preceding monarchs, but in the reign of Jehoram won back again by the neighbouring nations. In any case the term הָאֲרָצָה contains a considerable metaphorical element, but as a metaphor it exactly describes the settlement, during the exile, of the surrounding peoples over the deserted country.

(b) The prominence given to the cultus *might* be accounted for in a writing of the time of Joash, by the priestly regency of Jehoiada: but the narrative of 2 Kings xii. 5 f., in which the priests appear in no very favourable light, suggests that his influence was not lasting, and therefore casts doubt on its supremacy even during his lifetime.

In these cases, therefore, and to a less extent in others, assumption is called for by a theory not of late but of early date; the records of no period completely account for every reference in Joel, but they need to make fewest assumptions in explaining the historic background as a whole, who see in Joel not a product of the 9th century, but of post-exilic times.

A similar statement may be made with regard to the linguistic argument: it has sometimes been over-stated, yet it is not devoid of force. The facts upon which it must be

based have been collected by Holzinger in the ZATW for 1889: these justify two general statements. (a) That Joel contains *several* usages, isolated instances of some of which are found in early writings, but which are frequent only later,¹ e.g., הַוַּאם (instead of הַוַּאִם); דָּוִד וְדָוִד: the form דָּוִד to the exclusion of אֲדָוִד. (b) That it contains words otherwise confined to the later, and, in some cases, the latest literature. These two facts in themselves scarcely warrant Holzinger's conclusion that the book *plainly* belongs to the *latest* period of O.T. literature; but they do render it improbable that it belongs to the earliest (9th century). For Joel, if early, was, as will be shown below, a popular and much read book; this being so, the hypothesis of early date requires this improbable assumption: a word (סוף)—to cite a single instance—expressing the common idea of "end" is used by a widely studied author of the 9th century, disappears for five centuries (so far at least as extant literature is concerned), reappears in the latest books of the O.T. (Eccl. and Chron.), and from that time forward continues to be frequent (for in the Mishna it is common). In the case of Joel the linguistic argument is free from much of the suspicion which in some cases rightly attaches to it.

The evidence for date is becoming cumulative: granted that neither the political and social allusions nor the linguistic phenomena are absolutely incompatible with an early date, yet they are more naturally explained by a late one. I think the same can be shown to be the case with the parallel passages. Hitherto it has been the custom to discuss particular pairs of these parallels by themselves; and the discussion has thus been largely subjective. Reuss points the way to a more conclusive method: "The question fairly arises," he says, "whether

¹ For details and further instances *v.*, besides Holzinger's article, Driver, *Introduction*, pp. 203, 127, 505 (No. 35).

the book as a whole is calculated to give the impression of the author's incapability of writing a single line without stealing a phrase now here, now there, from the older literature" (*Gesch. der H. S.* (A. T.), 2nd ed., p. 259). In effect, therefore, he argues from the *parallels treated as a whole*, assuming that, if Joel quotes any, he quotes all the passages in question. In this assumption he is justified; for if the only alternatives are that Joel wrote before the close of the 9th or after the beginning of the 5th century, it follows that *the parallel passages contained in his book are all quoted from him or¹ all quoted by him*. Reuss regards the latter alternative as improbable; yet when what the former involves is correctly stated, it can scarcely seem less so. It is this: the prophecy of Joel must have been so influential that, in spite of its extreme brevity, it was quoted by an unusual number of later prophets, viz.: Amos, Isaiah (ii. 4), Micah, Nahum, Zephaniah, Obadiah, Ezekiel, II. Isaiah, Malachi, the author of Isaiah xiii., and also by some Psalmists. Is it easy to point to anything in the book calculated to give it this extraordinary influence? On the other hand the dependence of Joel involved in the other alternative is not so unlikely as Reuss's exaggerated remark suggests.

But the combined argument which Reuss has suggested may be made more detailed and exact, and in consequence more forcible also. For:—

1. Several of the parallels—either in their entirety or in virtue of certain words which they contain—have their affinities solely or chiefly in the later writings; this alone is significant in determining between the alternative theories. But the significance is increased when the very difference between a passage in Joel and its parallel in another book consists in a word or phrase characteristic of the later

¹ The possible exceptions are the parallels in Pss. xlii., lxxix., cxv. None of these exceptions materially affect the argument.

centuries. That a passage in a writer of the 9th century should differ from its parallel in a subsequent writer by the presence of a word elsewhere confined to the later literature would be strange; a single instance would not, indeed, be inexplicable in view of the scantiness of extant writings; but every additional instance—though itself not very convincing—renders the strangeness greater.

2. The variations in some of the parallels as found in Joel have other common peculiarities.

This also finds its natural explanation in the fact that Joel quotes: for that the *same* author, even when quoting from different sources, should quote with variations of the same character is natural: but that *different* authors, quoting from a common source, should follow the same method of quotation is improbable.

Both these statements must now be proved from the available data.

I.

Parallels which have their affinities in writings of the later centuries.

- (1) כתו אתיכם להרבות ומוזרותיכם לרמחים Joel iv. 10.
 וכתתו חרבותם(יהם) לאתים והניתתיהם למוזרות Isa. ii. 4
 = Mic. iv. 3.

On the inversion of the saying *v. II. A. infra*. The linguistic variation here consists of רמחים (Joel) for הניתות (Isa., Mic.). הנית is a word common to all periods; the case of רמה is different.

(a) It occurs in two early N. Israelitish narratives. Judges v. 8; 1 Kings xviii. 28.

(β) Otherwise it occurs first at the close of the 7th century, and then, with some frequency, in exilic and post-exilic writers. Thus Jer. xlvi. 4; Ezek. xxxix. 9; Num. xxv. 7 (P)¹; Neh. iv. 7, 10, 15; 1 Chron. xii. 8, 24; 2 Chron. xi. 12, xiv. 7, xxv. 5, xxvi. 14.

¹ The present argument is weakened, though not wholly invalidated, if the

The use of רמה by Joel would therefore be perfectly intelligible if he were

(a) a northern Israelite of the 9th century.

(β) a Judahite of the 5th or subsequent century.

He was not the former, for cf. ii. 1, 15, iii. 5, iv. 1, 6, 16, 17, 20, 21.

In reference to this quotation as a whole it may be added that Zech. viii. 21 shows that the passage containing it drew attention to itself in post-exilic times.

(2) אשפך את רוחי על כל בשר Joel iii. 1, 2.

שפכתי את רוחי על בית ישראל Ezek. xxxix. 29.

One of these can hardly but be dependent on the other, for the phrase שפך את רוח is peculiar; with the suffix it is found only in these two passages: שפך רוח הן ותחנונים occurs at Zech. xii. 10; and a similar idea in the phrases אצק רוחי (Isa. xlv. 3); נתתי רוחי (Isa. xlii. 1; Ezek. xxxvii. 14), cf. ערה רוח, Isa. xxxii. 15. Otherwise the contact of the spirit with men is differently conceived, cf. צלחה רוח, and 2 Kings ii. 15.

It is however in the variation that the chief, if not the whole, evidential value of the parallel lies. Here again the phrase peculiar to Joel (כל בשר) is highly characteristic of the later literature. It is used thus, in Deuteronomy, once (v. 23); Jeremiah, 4 times; Ezekiel, 3 times; II. Isaiah, 5 times; P¹ 18 times; Zechariah², once (ii. 17); Psalms (lxv., cxxxvi., cxlv.), 3 times; Job, once (xxxiv. 15); *i.e.* outside Joel it occurs first at the close of the 7th century, and then constantly down to the latest period (Ps. cxxxvi.); if therefore Joel be early, a phrase subsequently so fre-

publication of the Priests' Code be placed earlier than the 6th century. The following abbreviations will be used: P for Priests' Code, JE for the prophetic narratives in the Pentateuch, and H for the Law of Holiness.

¹ In P however the sense of the phrase is often peculiar, *i.e.* "all living things" rather than "mankind."

² In Zechariah also, כל בשר significantly occurs in a quotation (from Hab. ii. 20), replacing the כל הארץ of the original.

quent occurs once in his book, then disappears for nearly two centuries—(during which however the following authors, who "quote" from him, lived and wrote—Amos, Isaiah (ii. 4), Micah, Nahum, and Zephaniah), and then reappearing, became a favourite expression.

(3) ואל עמי ידו גורל Joel iv. 3.

ועל נכבדיה (ירושלים) ידו גורל Nah. iii. 10 = Ob. 11.

The phrase *ידו גורל* occurs nowhere else: the verb *ידה*, itself somewhat rare, is found besides only at Lam. iii. 53; Jer. l. 14; Zech. ii. 14; *i.e.* in the immediately pre-exilic, exilic, and post-exilic literature.

(4) למה יאמרו בגוים איה אלהיכם Joel ii. 17.

In this instance the evidence turns on the saying as a whole, which has an interesting, though in some respects a doubtful, history. The nearest parallels are Pss. lxxix. 10, cxv. 2, where, as in Joel, the sentence itself suggests that it is the heathen who use the words *איה אלהי* as a taunt; the same is implied by the context in Micah vii. 10, and Ps.¹ xlii. 4, 10. If Micah vii. 10 be exilic, this passage too will have its affinities entirely with the exilic or post-exilic literature (the Psalms in question being certainly late); while even if Micah vii. 10 be early, the Joel passage will still have most affinity with the later literature. It must, however, be added that the kernel of the phrase (*איה אלהי*) occurs from the earliest period downwards, and with a variety of meanings, sometimes referring to false gods (*e.g.* Deut. xxxii. 37); sometimes to Yahweh (Mal. ii. 17); cf. further the similar phrases Isa. lxiii. 11; Jer. ii. 6, 8; Job xxxv. 10.

The way in which the saying is introduced in Joel is noticeable: probably the correct translation of the preceding words—*למשל בם*—is "(that the nations) should use a taunt against them"; then the whole expression—*למה יאמרו*

¹ For another point of contact between Joel and Ps. xlii., cf. Joel i. 20 with Ps. xlii. 2.

וּנְי—may perhaps be taken as the taunt, which would consist in the heathen mockingly repeating the very words which, as the post-exilic literature suggests, were frequently used by the Jews in their appeal to God for help. But the whole expression was certainly no proverb so early as the 9th century, whatever the kernel may have been. If however only the last words constitute the taunt, then the use of the whole is awkward, and may, not unreasonably, be attributed to the fact that in that form it was running in Joel's head, *i.e.* that he quoted it.

(5) כִּי הִנּוּן וּרְחוּם הוּא אֲרֶךְ אַפַּיִם וּרֵב חֶסֶד Joel ii. 13.

Combined with other instances, this has some significance. It occurs once in the earliest literature, Exod. xxxiv. 6 (JE), otherwise only in the post-exilic writings (Pss. lxxxvi. 15, ciii. 8, cxlv. 8; Neh. ix. 17; Jonah¹ iv. 2; and the first half only, 2 Chron. xxx. 9; Neh. ix. 31; Ps. cxl. 4, cxii. 4; cf. also Deut. iv. 31). The following words (וְנָחַם עַל הָרַעַד) occur in this particular connection only at Jonah iv. 2; in other connections twice in JE (Exod. xxxii. 12, 14), otherwise only in Jeremiah and later writers.

For the sake of giving full force to the argument three other (comparatively) late phrases found in parallel passages in Joel must be added,² these are (1) וַיִּדְעֶתֶם כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה, iv. 17; (2) אֲנִי יְיָ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם, iv. 17; (3) אֲנִי יְיָ וְאִין עוֹד, ii. 27. These will be more fully considered in another connection below.

There is practically nothing to weaken the force of this argument, *i.e.* there are no clear cases of parallels containing words or phrases used in the earlier but not in the later literature. The only points that could be cited are: (1) The use of גִּזְּמָה (Joel i. 4), perhaps connected with Amos iv.

¹ For another striking point of contact with Jonah cf. Joel ii. 14a with Jonah iii. 9a.

² Cf. also Joel ii. 3a and Ps. l. 3, xvii. 3 (where for תִּלְוָה Syr. reads תִּתְּבֵל—
לְכֹסֶם־לְ).

9. The word is found only in Joel and Amos. (2) The expressions ידה גורל (iv. 3)—found only in Nahum and Joel—and קבץ פארור (ii. 6), also only found in Nahum and Joel.

In each case the usage is too slight to admit of argument; moreover in the case of (2) it may be noted that Nahum stands about half way between the two possible periods for Joel.¹ At the same time the occurrence of these rare expressions in an imitative writer would be quite explicable; it would merely show a fondness for out-of-the-way expressions used in his models.

II.

Parallels possessing (in the form used by Joel) common peculiarities.

A. Two of the passages in Joel are the reverse of the parallels in Micah (Isaiah) and the Deutero-Isaiah (Ezekiel).

(1) Joel iv. 10 = Isa. ii. 4 = Micah iv. 3. *v. supra* I. (1).

(2) כגן ערן הארץ לפני ואחריו מדבר שממה Joel ii. 3.

וישם מדברה כערן וערבתה כגן י"י Isa. li. 3 (cf.

Ezek. xxxvi. 35).²

Treated singly, it might be difficult to say which form *must* be original, but considered together the case is different; it is more probable that Joel³ reversed sayings from two different writers than that two different writers took and reversed sayings from the same short work.

B. Two (three?) of the passages as they appear in Joel

¹ The phrase in iv. 1a (בימים ההמה ובעת ההיא) recurs only in Jeremiah xxxiii. 15, l. 4, 20.

² Necessary connection between these passages might perhaps be doubted, but it is rendered, to say the least, highly probable by the fact that Joel contains other striking parallels to Ezek. and II. Isaiah. Joel ii. 27 = Isa. xlv. 5, 17; iii. 1, 2 = Ezek. xxxix. 29; iv. 17 = Ezek. xxxix. 38, 17b = Isa. lii. 1b.

³ Notice also the traces in exilic and post-exilic literature of a free criticism of proverbs and popular sayings, cf. the (probable) parody of Ps. viii. 5 (exliv. 3) in Job vii. 17, 18, and Ezekiel's treatment of proverbs—xii. 23, xviii. 2.

consist each of two or more parts—one part reappearing in one author, another in a different one.

(1) Joel ii. 3 = Ezek. xxxvi. 35 + Isa. li. 3.

(2) Joel ii. 27 (cf. iv. 17) = Isa. xlv. 5 + (*e.g.*) Ezek. xxxix. 28 + (*e.g.*) Lev. xviii. 2, and

(3) Joel iv. 16 = Amos i. 2 + Isa. xiii. 13.

The most noticeable of these is the second—**וידעתם כי**—**בקרוב ישראל אני ואני יהוה אלהיכם ואין עוד**. If Joel is late, it is capable of easy explanation; phrases characteristic of II. Isaiah, Ezekiel, and H, impressed upon his memory by their frequency, have been combined into one. These phrases are: (*a*) **וידעתם כי אני יי'**, Ezek. xxxix. 28 and above 50 times; *v. Driver, Introd.*, p. 279; (*β*) **אני יי' אלהיכם**, Lev. xviii. 2, 4 and often—*id. ib.*, p. 45; (*γ*) **אני יהוה ואין עוד**, Isa. xlv. 5, 6, 18, 21, 22: (*a*) and (*β*) were already combined by Ezekiel, *e.g.* xxxix. 28; cf. in P, Exod. vi. 7. Occurrences in earlier books are redactional; so at least Kautzsch marks Exodus x. 2 and 1 Kings xx. 13, 28.

It is certainly conceivable that each of the authors who first made frequent use of the phrases combined in Joel's sentence, disentangled from the whole what suited their purpose, but—especially in view of other similar instances—less probable than the theory stated above. It would be additionally strange that three writers should all have borrowed their *characteristic phrases* embodying their fundamental conceptions from one and the same short work.

One other point is worthy of notice: II. Isaiah's phrase, **אני יי' ואין עוד** is in Joel (? under the influence of H's phrase), **אני יי' אלהיכם ואין עוד**—a form manifestly unsuitable for II. Isaiah's purpose of emphasizing the uniqueness of Yahweh, not merely as God of Israel but, as the one true God of the universe; but with Joel there could have been nothing to resist the tendency to combine phrases. This particular combination is indeed in the context suitable; for the prophet's immediate purpose is to assert that in the

future the prosperity which is to take the place of the prevailing distress will show that Yahweh in Israel's midst is their only God.

The other passages need little special notice; of the third, however, it should be said that, if Joel be early, it does not follow that the author of Isaiah xiii. 6 had to disentangle the part he uses from the whole sentence; he might equally have been influenced (if at all) by ii. 10. The same, indeed, should be added of Ezekiel and Joel ii. 27; the former might have borrowed his phrase equally well from iv. 17.

C. In two passages common to Joel and Amos—Joel iv. 16 (cf. also Jer. xxv. 30) = Amos i. 2*a*, iv. 18 = Amos ix. 13—Joel's version is more highly coloured than that of Amos. This has been frequently discussed with different conclusions (*v. Driver, Introd.*, p. 292); but, especially in view of other instances already adduced of parallels in Joel possessing common characteristics, it is more probable that Joel has exaggerated Amos's sentences than that Amos has toned down Joel's. As another instance Joel i. 4 (= Amos iv. 9) may be cited; of the four terms here used for locust nowhere else do even three occur together.

D. The relation of the parallels to their respective contexts:—It has often been urged that in Joel the passages in question are "embedded in the context" (*e.g.*, Kirkpatrick, p. 64). This is a delicate point to decide, but before it can have much weight it must be shown: (*a*) that *all* the parallels are so "embedded" in the context in Joel; (*β*) that at least some are not so embedded in the context of the other books in which they occur.

Even here consideration of the parallels taken as a whole is, if anything, against the priority of Joel. The following passages: i. 4 = Amos iv. 9, i. 15 = Isaiah xiii. 6, ii. 10 and

iv. 15=Isaiah xiii. 10, iii. 1, 2=Ezekiel xxxix. 29, iv. 3=Obadiah 11 and Nahum iii. 10, iv. 4=Obadiah 15*b*, iv. 10=Micah iv. 3 (Is. ii. 4), iv. 17=Ezekiel xxxix. 28, iv. 18=Amos ix. 13, seem equally suitable to their respective contexts in Joel and elsewhere.

Only in one case (iv. 16=Amos i. 2) could something be said in favour of Joel's priority; the passage, it may be said, comes abruptly at the beginning of Amos's prophecy. But on the other hand: (*a*) the passage stands very appropriately as an exordium in Amos; (*b*) the נאות הרעים is very suitable to the shepherd prophet. Again, against the originality of the passage in Joel we note that (*a*) the scene of the theophany is the ענין יהושפט (iv. 2, 12): the כניין of iv. 16 seems therefore to be unsuitable, and points to the phrase being borrowed; and (*b*) the order in verses 15 and 16 (physical portents—15: divine activity—16*a*: physical portents—16*b*) suggests dependence: in a freshly conceived scene we should expect the divine activity to be mentioned first, and all the physical portents to follow. Moreover, if Joel be late, almost the whole description in verses 15–17 is composed of reminiscences.

In the following cases something can be said against the suitability to the context in Joel as compared with the context in the other prophecies:—

(*a*) ii. 2=Zephaniah i. 15. In Zephaniah this comes as a climax; in Joel it anticipates ii. 10*b*, which in its turn is very suitable to the context in Isaiah xiii.

(*β*) ii. 3=Ezekiel xxxvi. 35; Isaiah li. 3. In Ezekiel the contrasted picture of the bright future forms a fitting conclusion to the scene of desolation just depicted; in Joel no mention of the extreme fertility of the land has preceded.

(*γ*) ii. 6=Nahum ii. 11. In Nahum "paleness of the face" forms one of a *series* of statements as to the effect of anguish on various parts of the body; in Joel it stands alone alongside of a general statement of anguish.

(δ) ii. 17, *v.* note under I. (4).

(ε) ii. 27 = Isaiah xlv. 5. This could not be more embedded in any context than that in which it appears in Deutero-Isaiah; *v.* note under II. B.

(ζ) iii. 5 = Obadiah 17. Here the appended words "as Yahweh said," show that the passage is quoted. As against Prof. Kirkpatrick, who places Obadiah earlier in the ninth century than Joel, this proves nothing; but if Obadiah is dated at the close of the seventh century, it is important.

These instances may or may not form a good argument in favour of a late date, but they more than outweigh anything of the kind that can be cited in favour of the contrary.

Thus the whole argument from the parallels, itself cumulative, points somewhat strongly to the same conclusion that the arguments from the historical allusions and linguistic phenomena suggested; *viz.*, that Joel is a post-exilic writing.

This being so, it may be of interest to focus the light cast by this study of quotations on the nature of Joel's acquaintance with the earlier literature, and on the literary character of the post-exilic age.

(1) The *extent* of Joel's acquaintance with the existing Hebrew Scriptures is shown by the number of different writers whom he quotes; to wit, the JE narrative (?), Amos, (Isaiah ii. 4, or) Micah, Zephaniah, Nahum, Obadiah, Ezekiel, II. Isaiah (chaps. xiii., xlv., li.), and possibly, though I think not probably, some psalmists.

The most notable writers unquoted are Jeremiah and the Deuteronomist, and perhaps Isaiah. Considering the brevity of Joel's prophecy, the mere absence of direct quotation from any author in no way proves that he was unfamiliar with him, though it may suggest preferences. On the other hand, it would be a little strange that, if Joel were early, he should be quoted so often, both before and after Jeremiah (and Isaiah?) and not at all by him (them?).

(2) The *minuteness* of his acquaintance is shown by the almost unconscious way in which he sometimes quotes (cf. above under I. (4), *ad fin.* and II. B), showing that the rhythm and language of the earlier literature had largely become his own; with him quotation is not the result of laborious memorizing, but of constant reading of the older writings and habituation to their music, seen sometimes in a sentence transferred in full to his own composition, at others in a phrase woven into a sentence (cf. ii. 6), and constantly in the easy rhythm of his periods. At the same time his own later age, with its customary language, betrays itself now and again by the intrusion of words and phrases unknown to the early literature, or else by a halting sentence (cf. Kuenen, *Onderzoek*, § 68, n. 19).

Both his ideas and his words are, no doubt, largely due to his predecessors, and there is so much truth in Reuss's rhetorical question; but the thoughts and language, which he borrowed, passed through his own mind and issued from it, bearing the stamp of his own individuality.

The extent and minuteness of his acquaintance with the the earlier literature age are, therefore¹, quite enough to account for what has by some been felt to be a difficulty in assigning to Joel a late date, viz., the fluency of his style, which is in striking contrast to the dull—not to say stilted—style of Haggai, and the semi-Rabbinic periods of Malachi, whose writings show few signs of linguistic or phraseological influence of the older writers.

A comparison with the style of Zechariah i.-viii. is also of interest; of this Kuenen (*Onderzoek*, § 80, 4) says: "To some extent also the purity of his (Zechariah's) language must undoubtedly be explained from his dependence on earlier models." Zechariah has more "style" than Haggai, but less fluency and fewer echoes of the earlier rhythm than

¹ Cf. also the style of Zechariah xii.-xiv., on which v. Driver, *Introd.*, p. 293 top).

Joel; his superiority to Haggai is due, it would seem, to a closer acquaintance than his contemporary possessed with the earlier literature; not only does he refer in general terms to the prophetic teaching (Zech. i. 4-6) but also frequently to particular statements, *e.g.*, in i. 12 to Jeremiah xxv. 11, xxix. 10; in iii. 10 to Micah iv. 4; in viii. 13^b to Zephaniah iii. 16; and in viii. 21 to Isaiah ii. 3 (=Mic. iv. 2). In these passages there is little or no attempt to reproduce exactly or even approximately the rhythm of the originals; Zechariah is indeed indebted to his predecessors mainly for his ideas, and only secondarily, perhaps only unconsciously, for his style; enough, however, to render even that better than Haggai's, not enough to give it the ease which for the most part marks Joel's. His actual quotations are fewer than Joel's, though his work is almost twice as long. Moreover, the way in which he sometimes quotes only strengthens the conviction that his ear for rhythm was inferior to Joel's; cf. especially Zech. ii. 17 הס כל בשר מפני יהוה with the original in Habakkuk ii. 20 הס מפני כל הארץ. The other most noticeable quotation is Zech. iii. 2 from Amos iv. 11.

The post-exilic prophetic authors are, therefore, from a literary point of view, of three types: the first, represented by Zechariah, had largely assimilated the ideas and in some degree the style of the older prophets, and consequently wrote plain but not inelegant Hebrew; the second, represented by Joel, were influenced by the ideas and greatly attracted by the style of their predecessors, and so wrote Hebrew, frequently possessing the vivacity and rhythm of earlier days, but now and again unconsciously admitting some characteristic of the later period; the third, represented by Haggai and Malachi, had no doubt a general acquaintance with the teaching of the prophets, but little or none with their language; their style suffers in consequence and forms the transition to the Rabbinic Hebrew.

This is of the more interest inasmuch as it establishes an analogy between the post-exilic prophetic writings and the "Wisdom" and poetical literature of the same period (cf. Cheyne, *Bampton Lecture*, p. 463); and in regard to the last it raises the question afresh: must not the authors of the post-exilic Psalms (especially those possessing a bright and vivid style) have had pre-exilic Psalms as models, just as the post-exilic prophets and "Wisdom" writers had within their own peculiar class of literature classical models?

The comparison with the Psalms is in another respect of some significance; Reuss finds a difficulty in believing that Joel could have been so largely dependent on preceding writers. The general impression given by the book is, he thinks—and rightly—not one of slavish reproduction. But a study of the Psalms shows that in Hebrew, as in other literatures, there may be other reproduction than that which is slavish. The dependent Psalms are of two types: the conventional, "slavishly" reproductive type is illustrated by Psalm lxxxvi., fully analysed by Robertson Smith in *Old Testament in the Jewish Church* (2nd ed.), p. 435; the other type is illustrated by Psalm xcvi., an examination of which shows that it is—in all probability—largely composed of quotations from and reminiscences of older Psalms. Thus *v.* 1 = xcvi. 10, 11 (parts); *v.* 2*b* = lxxxix. 15; *v.* 3 = l. 3; *v.* 4*a* = lxxvii. 19; *v.* 4*b*, cf. xcvi. 9*b*; *v.* 5*a* = Micah i. 4; *v.* 6*a* = l. 6; *v.* 8 = xlvi. 12; *v.* 9*a* = xlvi. 3; *v.* 9*b* = xlvi. 10; and yet this Psalm gives the general impression of vigour, the individuality of the author coming out in the effective way in which he uses the older poems.

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¹ I take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to the kindness of Professor Driver for several suggestions and criticisms, of which I have availed myself in giving the above paper its final form.

THE PARALYTIC.

MATT. IX. 1; MARK II. 1; LUKE V. 17.

WHEN Jesus healed the leper, his disciples must have had strange hopes and convictions stirred within them. The shadow of death, "the veil spread over all people," was visibly shaken. The doom of sin, in its deadliest and most loathsome type, was turned aside. We know how long it was before they shook off their dream of temporal dominion, but such hopes were surely now tinged with some expectation of a more spiritual dominion, an empire over sorrow and disease and sin, already becoming visible, as often as their Master said to the direst curses of humanity, Go, and they went. He had words of everlasting life, attested by temporal healing.

When the leper violated his instructions, and blazed abroad the story of his recovery, it is true that he may have aroused, here and there beyond the circle of the disciples, some reflections, some hopes, like these. But since the larger public was utterly unprepared to feel anything better than astonishment, his disobedience forced upon them issues for which they were quite unripe. And because they could not advance to a true discernment of the import of the marvel, its announcement was premature and mischievous. To explain our Lord's retirement we do not need any gratuitous assumption, such as that the contact with uncleanness had inconvenient consequences, and forced Him to seclude Himself for a time. We have seen already that a man "full of leprosy" was unclean no longer; and we shall find no trace of any such consequences, even from contact with the dead, and at a time when hostile criticism was much more embittered. It suffices that His intentions were frustrated, His work vulgarized, and the popular feeling was over-stimulated, and far from

spiritual in its near expectations. The true work of Jesus was not done through excited sensationalism, but in spite of it.

Accordingly we read that He withdrew Himself, and was without in desert places.

Moreover the miracle thus made notorious, and the ceremonial irregularity which He had strenuously forbidden, drew down upon Him the hostile attention of the Jews in Jerusalem. This would be still more inevitable if we could be certain, with Edersheim, that the feast without a name had already passed, in which Jesus healed the impotent man in the metropolis itself, and brought upon Himself a controversy, first about Sabbath observance, and then about His claim to infer His own immunities from those of God. But apart entirely from this hypothesis, it was perfectly natural that Jesus should henceforth be jealously watched by men who valued their own prerogatives much more than any evidence of a divine benevolence. Accordingly we read, for the first time, that the next miracle was performed under the jealous eyes of "Pharisees and doctors of the law which were come out of every village of Galilee and Judæa and Jerusalem." Such a concourse was evidently premeditated, and the place and time of its occurrence are exactly what we should expect, as also is their supercilious whispering among themselves, upon the smallest provocation, that He is guilty of a capital offence.

Jesus has now returned to Capernaum, where such an inquisition would naturally seek for Him; and St. Mark alone tells us that He was in "the house," probably His accustomed dwelling in "His own city." St. Matthew does not so much as inform us of any proof of special faith on the part of the bearers of the paralytic; and yet he mentions that Jesus recognised and rewarded it; and although Keim insists that his simple story has been exaggerated and elaborated "in a forced manner" by the

other two, yet it would puzzle him to explain the behaviour of Jesus in St. Matthew, without using the reflected light from them. Moreover, the great inquisitorial concourse of doctors and Pharisees, only recorded by St. Luke, is the simplest explanation of their hostile attitude, their mutual confidential reprobation, and the resolute manner in which our Lord confronts and refutes them. Very signal and significant is this interdependence and reciprocal support of the three narratives, such as comes out under a searching cross-examination in the narratives of truthful witnesses.

There is not the slightest ground for Schenkel's assertion that Jesus had now retired from the ministry of healing, having had melancholy experiences of the insincerity, selfishness, and ingratitude of men, the individuals cured having mostly disappeared again (many of them, be it observed, having been expressly ordered back to their own homes, where alone their witness would have any special value), and even the leper, who promised silence, when hardly out of sight of Jesus, having broken his pledge. It therefore required "peculiar circumstances" to induce Jesus to work this cure, contrary to His new policy. All this is quite a different thing from saying that as our Lord stood more prominently forward, and had increasing claims upon the public faith, He more expressly required some evidence of confidence from His supplicants. Even this would be harder to establish than is commonly supposed, some of the most triumphant examples of faith being early in His ministry.

But it is one thing that healing should now be granted upon conditions, and quite another thing that it should be exceptional, and as a rule discontinued as having missed its mark. This is insinuated with no facts to go upon, except a quotation which proves nothing; namely, that Jesus now preached, He "spoke the word," an assertion which would be more to the point if it were not closely

linked with this other, that the "power of the Lord was present to heal."

And yet Schenkel's criticism interests one through its direct and valid contradiction of that of Strauss and Keim. He feels and is "touched" by the eagerness and the pains taken by the four bearers of the sufferer; this is, indeed, in his view, what wins the exceptional grace of his recovery, but this is the very point in the story which the others assail, even though Keim is quite content to admit the healing of the paralytic. What he fails to see is the connection between our Lord's words of absolution, words quite unlike anything elsewhere spoken in such a connection, and the action, the only distinguishing and signal action, which raised their faith above the common level.

We are to think of a great crowd surging all around the house, the same modest house perhaps in which Peter's mother-in-law had been healed of her fever, and at the doors of which, that evening also, all the city had been gathered. Jesus had not gone out to them, either because His comparative retirement had begun already, or else, more probably, because He was already encompassed by the doctors, who were present more or less officially. (A formal embassy had, not long before, cross-examined the forerunner both about his person and his baptism, John i. 19.) These we find proudly seated in the centre of a crowd which densely filled what we may suppose to have been a large upper room, low-built, and extending over all the lower apartments of the house. It is just possible that, according to Dean Plumptre's conjecture, our Lord stood so as to address, from such a vantage ground, a concourse in the courtyard around which the rooms were grouped. For the roof of the house, poles had been laid about three feet apart, according to the present usage, and across these, short sticks covered with brushwood. Mortar was spread over this, and on it sometimes a coating of thick earth, and sometimes tiles.

St. Luke distinctly tells us that in this case the tiles had to be taken up, (*διὰ τῶν κεράμων*), and this may be added to the many indications that the apostles lived in humble comfort.

Dr. Thompson tells us that he has himself seen stone slabs used for the purpose, which could be quickly removed, and that grain and other commodities are still introduced into upper rooms in this very way, by the outer stairs and the roof. The idea, therefore, would not be unfamiliar to these people, urged by a dire necessity, and debarred by the crowd from any other access.

It was, nevertheless, an expedient of despair. The noise, the falling rubbish, the inconvenience inflicted upon that dignified and haughty group in the centre (if the bearers knew of them) made such an interruption as no common teacher would have endured. When the veneration for Jesus deepened, long before sceptical theories could suppose it to have risen to adoration, so audacious an intrusion could never have been invented: the story attests itself as primitive. And it bears a glorious witness to the true character of Him, whom suffering could not think of as rejecting its appeal, in the most untoward circumstances, at the most inconvenient time. But how does Schenkel suppose that such confidence was attained when, as he tells us, numbers of the suffering were actually being repelled? ¹

The faith which Jesus honours is not distinguished by its scientific theology. The plan of salvation, or even the doctrine of His own Person, is not what it is most concerned about. Human want and His power to relieve it, and, above all, that effort of strong volition which brought the want into immediate contact with His power, this was the essential thing throughout His earthly story. May it not be still the same? Is it not more likely that the Plan

¹ "Of those who gathered around Him seeking help, He resolved to heal only this man."

of Salvation, and the doctrine of the Incarnation have been revealed to us to strengthen our trust, to encourage our fears, to persuade us to rely upon Him, than merely to remove inadequacies of intellectual conception? God only knows how abjectly inadequate are even the most subtle of our formulæ. Presently our knowledge shall vanish away. Yet faith, we read, abideth. And whoever knows, whoever can draw fine distinctions and demonstrate delicate theorems—that man has need, perhaps more than most, to search whether he has actually brought his own sin, the plague of his own heart, to Christ the Healer.

When faith is real, it goes beyond itself. God has joined us together in families, friendships, nations and the church, in order that none may live to himself or die to himself only. And it is quite clear that the most isolated unit in a nation is better, through its organization, than if he had grown up alone, a wild man of the woods. The rearmost man in that vast army has marched some way from absolute savagery. And so it is in religion. There may seem to be theoretical hardship, for the isolated, for the friendless, in the advantage enjoyed by the child of many prayers; but he is himself the better for it; and his soul is stronger than if the knot were untied which binds others in a closer sympathy than he experiences.

Accordingly Jesus, seeing the faith of five, spoke words of grace to one of them. This is the principle on which our children are holy, as St. Paul plainly tells us; and therefore we gladly receive them into the visible church of God.

But the words of Jesus are startling. He gives no apparent heed to the malady which brought them there, but pierces deeper, and says, "Son, thy sins are forgiven thee." Here it is right to observe a characteristic of the teaching of Jesus. Not one example can be produced of His dragging religious truth by violence into contexts where

it does not easily and gracefully suggest itself. Often He waits for another to give the cue, as when the woman said, "Blessed are they that shall eat bread in the kingdom of God." The vulgar and rude attempt to edify by injecting into any conversation whatever, anything whatever that has a religious sound, the stupid notion that good is done because folk are too polite to resent an interruption and an impertinence, the coarse and selfish notion that even if resentment is provoked that matters nothing because the speaker has borne his testimony—who has not groaned under these? who has not longed to point out how unlike they are to the exquisite courtesies of Jesus?

Yes, but some of us groan also for a very different grief. Without clumsy violence, how hard it is to speak to edification at all! How often are we ashamed and self-condemned, because we must either do outrage to social use, or else be dumb in our Master's cause! And the reason is indeed a sad one. It is lack of that deep and clear-sighted spirituality which discerns the spiritual bearing of many subjects, and the spiritual desires which lurk in many hearts, as deep answers unto deep; which finds its opportunity quite as instinctively as a truly kind and graceful nature finds constant occasion for suave and gracious utterances, and acts of unobtrusive love—as instinctively too as a man of sour temper and loveless heart finds numberless chances to shoot out his arrows, even bitter words which are wondrously unforced and apposite.

Jesus never was at fault. As He never forced religious talk artificially and unspontaneously into unsuitable collocations, so always, out of the good treasure of His heart, He brought forth good things. Out of the abundance of His heart, His mouth spoke naturally and without strain. His words were always apposite and sympathetic. Least of all is it credible that He should speak, to an unfit hearer, the assurance of sins forgiven. And this hearer proved his

fitness by receiving, in silence and content, perhaps awe-struck, perhaps adoring, the blessing which had not been his professed and apparent object. Christ's further word and act were not evoked by remonstrance from him, but by an unworthy criticism of the bystanders.

We have to think, therefore, of one to whom bodily trouble has become a revelation. Instead of querulous murmurings against Providence, he had learned the great lesson of his own demerit. The shadow of a depressing and melancholy complaint, its gloomy memories and yet more gloomy forebodings, had taught him self-knowledge. Perhaps his malady was directly connected with some act of sin or course of excess ; perhaps he had only discerned the more subtle connection between all suffering and all sin. It is clear that when the news of a great and gentle Teacher, who was also a supreme Healer, reached him, his soul connected pardon with recovery, and longed for health as being indeed one thing with salvation.¹ Who can tell how much this profound desire, inspired of God, had to do with the ingenious and audacious pertinacity by which at last his spiritual hunger reached the Bread of Life. As Jesus looked on him, and saw all this sacred sorrow, this hunger and thirst after righteousness (which desire He had already blessed) appealing to Him out of hollow eyes, the first two Gospels tell us with what a word of love He first broke silence. In St. Luke it is "Man, thy sins are forgiven to thee"; but doubtless the true word is "Son,"

¹ Observe the double use, all through the Gospels, of the word *σώζω*, as for example, "He shall save His people from their sins." "If I may but touch His garment I shall be saved." (Matt. i. 21, ix. 21). Besides ambiguous passages, the secular use is, as I reckon, indisputable in St. Matthew in eight cases out of a total of fifteen; in St. Mark in seven out of fourteen; and in St. Luke in eight out of eighteen. In St. John it occurs only once (of Lazarus, "He shall do well," John xi. 12); and in the epistles twice (1 Tim. ii. 15; Jas. v. 15). This is good evidence for the early date of the synoptics, before the word had begun to settle down into its theological meaning. The double sense of *σωτηρία* also is instructive (cf. Acts iv. 12, xxvii. 34).

τέκνον, the same affectionate epithet with which His own mother had once addressed her lost son in the Temple.

The appeal was to Christ, and it was Christ who answered it, taking to Himself the place of a father, and forgiving sins with authority. This the bystanders felt. This He presently avowed; and it is quite unreasonable to quote, against their censoriousness, such words as those of Nathan, "The Lord hath put away thy sins, thou shalt not die." What mention of pardon from Jehovah is here? Especially would they feel certain of His meaning, if the miracle and the controversy of John v. had already taken place, which must not however be assumed.

There is much dramatic propriety in the contrast between the full rich flow of our Lord's expostulation with the scribes, and the short, broken, snapping words they speak among themselves, as given by St. Mark, "He blasphemeth. Who can forgive sins but one, God?" But it is more important to remark in these words the first sign (at least in Galilee) of the hostility which hunted Him to the cross. For blasphemy was a capital crime; and what they now speak guardedly among themselves is the same that we hear openly when they drop the mask, and avow to Pilate the true motive of their hostility to Jesus: "By our law He ought to die, because He said I am the Son of God." In opposition to this charge of blasphemy, and as if defying it, Jesus sets a title which Schenkel is probably right in believing that he now employs for the first time; for although he omits to mention that in St. Matthew's arrangement we meet it once before (Matt. viii. 20) yet there is good reason for preferring the sequence in St. Luke. But nothing can be more unhappy than Schenkel's treatment of the tremendous phrase "The Son of Man." He tells us that by it Jesus could not have meant to claim the Messiahship, both because he would have chosen some less ambiguous phrase, and because at this time He was found-

ing upon inner and moral principles a community quite opposed to the theocratic system, a kingdom of God, a community of the saints, which He sought to establish among the poor. He appeals to the fact that Ezekiel is called son of man, and even to the mention of daughters of men, in opposition to sons of God. He therefore infers that Jesus used the phrase in a sense diametrically opposed to its use in the Messianic prophecy of Daniel, and that Jesus claimed to forgive sins as a lowly and gentle man, a mere son of the race, declaring the clemency of God. But His arguments are utterly beside the mark. We grant that a phrase built on the same model, such as daughters of men, need imply no special dignity, and that Ezekiel was a son of man. What concerns us is not so much to know the meaning of a son of man, but how there comes to be one sole and emphatic bearer of the title, "The Son of Man." Thus if we are all kings and priests unto God, this only heightens the dignity of Him who bears the same title after a unique fashion, being the King, the High Priest of our profession. Moreover, when the name was claimed after this unique fashion, it is impossible that any hearer should not remember how illustrious a rank had been predicted for the bearer of this title. The Scribes and Pharisees had the Book of Daniel in their hand. They knew that One like unto a son of man should come nigh unto the Ancient of Days, and should be brought near unto Him, and His kingdom should last for ever. It is simply incredible that they should fail to recognise the most sublime of all descriptions of human glory. It was impossible for Jesus to use the phrase without claiming messiahship, and much more than the mere word messiah carried with it. As a matter of fact we know that He did claim, as the Son of Man, to execute judgment and to come in His Father's glory, surrounded with angels, exactly as Daniel foresaw.

It is true that He was now establishing a gentle kingdom

of God, a community of the Saints, most unlike the vulgar notions of the theocratic system. But this is so far from refuting the reference to Daniel, that it explains and justifies it. For what is there? Other monarchs might bear sway by violence. As earthly kingdoms still compare themselves to brutes—the lion of England, the American and German eagles, the Russian bear—so were these ancient monarchies like unto a lion, a bear, a leopard, a dread creature without a name.

In the same sense, the divine kingdom, which rose not from the stormy waters of human politics, but descended in mystery from the clouds of heaven, was like unto a son of man; its character, motives and suasions were all humane: it was the kingdom of the Good Physician, of the Gentle Shepherd. And it is in this last kingdom alone that the personal element becomes prominent, the kingdom becomes a king, unto whom there is given dominion to a kingdom.¹

It was surely this accurate characterization of His rule as well as Himself the ruler, which made this title so dear to Jesus. It is a humble epithet, but only upon the lips of Him who held a divine title in reserve. In itself, it was the loftiest name which could be claimed by mortal, and implied the bringing of Him nigh unto the Ancient of Days. As Son of Man, Jesus now claimed to forgive sins, as elsewhere to raise up and to judge the dead; and the phrase no more proves that He has delegated one of these functions to His ministers than the rest. It does not prove anything upon the subject.

But when they accused Him of blaspheming, He was quite ready to submit His pretensions to the test. To carnal men, it was easier to say to the fearful heart, "Fear

¹ This passage was written before the appearance of an interesting article in *THE EXPOSITOR* for December, with which I am glad to think that it is in substantial agreement.

not," than to strengthen the feeble knees. To us, the pardon of sin is the last and highest victory of divine grace, and to the fatalism of modern science there is no pardon anywhere for the past: its retributions are inevitable: the chessplayer of Professor Huxley knows nothing about revoking a move. But to Jesus the two were on one level. All healing conveys a pledge of pardon, pardon which is only lost by failure to discern the reality of the love which speaks in recovered health, as in every innocent joy.

Therefore He bade the impotent man arise and walk; and now there is no difficulty in moving through the admiring crowd.

Clearly the multitude, which glorified God, who had given such authority to men, did not suppose it to be given broadcast. No doctrinal ecclesiastical inference can be safely drawn from their joy that the gift was in human hands, for human benefit. But their view of it was quite inconsistent with the notion that it was exercised grudgingly, in this exceptional case only, and had been all but withdrawn from use.

It remains to be observed that the recovery of this man is seldom denied, simply because it is not so high in the scale of marvel as many others. There are many well-established cases of nervous failure and long debility, which a sudden shock or violent excitement has restored. Why not this case? And therefore Keim, and most sceptics, are willing to accept the narrative, while denying its evidential force.

It is no concern of the Christian apologist to dispute the point with them.

If Jesus were kind in miracles only, He would not be the Jesus of our faith; nor would He be truly and vigorously dealing with the sorrows of our stricken humanity, if the boundary between the natural and the miraculous in His story were always broad and high, a kind of Chinese wall.

There is no such line of severance, in fact, between incurable ailments and maladies, in other respects equally deplorable, which yield to treatment, and our Lord was not likely to restrict His benevolence to actions which could not be explained away.

What interests the wise apologist is to observe how readily the evidence receives credence, the very moment it is supposed that credence does not involve submission to the divine claim. Up to this point (which differs for different sceptics), the "touching" eagerness of the friends, and the verisimilitude of the behaviour of our Lord and of the people, these and such like evidences are admitted to carry conviction with them. This conviction is only withheld when the pressure of the miraculous becomes crushing. That is to say, it is withheld entirely upon *a priori* grounds, in flat defiance of the evidence. But what would any jury think of an advocate who admitted the evidence as quite convincing at all points except where it palpably refuted his case, and then impeached it for no other reason than that his brief must not be compromised? Neither the behaviour of Jesus nor of the people, nor the general colour of the narrative, is one whit more convincing here than in many of the most astounding narratives, pre-eminently the most wonderful of all, the raising of Lazarus from the dead.

G. A. CHADWICK.

NOTE ON GALILEAN FISH-CURING.

IN Prof. G. A. Smith's masterly account of the Lake of Galilee in the *EXPOSITOR* for May, he lays stress upon the important local trade of fish-curing, "which spread the Lake's fame through the Roman world"; he adds, however, that of this industry "there is no trace in the Evangelists." I venture to suggest that it was this familiar trade which prompted or at least pointed our Lord's references to salt.

It can hardly be doubtful that fish-curing would require salt to be imported in considerable quantities to those towns where it flourished. Moreover, on the shores of that "torrid basin" no fish could be kept fresh for many hours after it was caught; it must be cooked, or cured, promptly. Now the fisherman's success is everywhere a proverb of fluctuation; we read in the Gospels of long and fruitless toil followed by immense hauls, most of which must have been taken off at once to the curing house, or salted down provisionally until it could be transported there. I remember how it was once my fortune to spend some weeks on board a North Sea herring lugger, where we carried barrels of coarse salt with which to preserve any fish which we could not take fresh into market ashore; and I have heard bitter complaint among the crew when this salt was found to be of bad quality. It seems to me certain that the Galilean fishermen were as familiar with salting as with fishing, though the latter was their own especial work; they would understand their Master whether He called them "fishers of men," or "salters of men." How forcible to them the command "Have salt among yourselves." How natural for them the similitude, "Ye are the salt of the earth," when, as Prof. Smith says, "the pickled fish of Galilee were known throughout the Roman world." We

can understand in this connection why our Lord speaks of refuse salt in such a *wholesale* fashion, "cast out and trodden under foot of men." And we see that His references to salt, like most of His other illustrations, were actually suggested and coloured by His familiar surroundings.

There is one other possible trace of the same local trade in the parable of the draw-net, where the word for vessels (*ἀγγεῖα*) only occurs elsewhere in the New Testament for the oil-vessels of the wise virgins. Now newly caught fish, meant to be sold fresh, are gathered into baskets, from which the water can drain away. May not this use of *ἀγγεῖα* point to curing tubs, into which the fishermen sorted the fish that were fit for curing? Prof. Smith quotes Strabo as stating that "at Taricheæ the Lake supplied the best fish for curing."

More competent scholars will correct or perhaps reject the above suggestion. If it is valid, it only shows the seal of the fisherman impressed on one more page of the Gospel.

T. H. DARLOW.

ARISTION, THE AUTHOR OF THE LAST
TWELVE VERSES OF MARK.

THE object of the following note is to adduce and estimate the value of some new evidence with regard to the authorship of the last twelve verses of Mark's Gospel. The question of their authenticity has been constantly under discussion, and perhaps no one so well sums up the evidence for and against them as the late Dean Burgon in his monograph on the subject (Oxford, James Parker, 1871), to which monograph I am much indebted.

The evidence with regard to these twelve verses is this. In the 4th century codices B and Aleph these verses are omitted; and Eusebius states that in a vast number of copies the verses were in his day absent, and that the Gospel ended with the words *ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ*. Victor of Antioch,¹ writing a century later, A.D. 400-450, declares that they were missing in some copies, though not in the accurate copies, nor yet in the ancient Palestinian copy. He believed them to be genuine. Later Greek MSS., among which the three great uncials A, C and D are, however, almost contemporary with B and Aleph, include the twelve verses, often adding a scholion to the effect that they are genuine. One uncial, however, L, of the eighth century, prefaces the verses in question with the following note: *εστην δε και ταυτα φερομενα μετα το εφοβουντο (sic) γαρ*.

The majority of ancient versions add these verses, though the old Armenian copies of Mark, with one exception, which I shall soon dwell upon, omit them. The evidence of the

¹ Westcott and Hort, however, estimate Victor's evidence for the twelve verses less highly than Dean Burgon.

Fathers in favour, if not of the authenticity, at least of the antiquity of these twelve verses is very strong. Irenæus certainly quoted v. 19. Papias¹ doubtfully alludes to v. 18. Justin Martyr² probably alludes (*Apol.*, I. c. 45) to several of them.

In the third century, according to Dean Burgon, Hippolytus (A.D. 190-227) cites vv. 17, 18. The *Acta Pilati*, which Tischendorf assigns to the third century, contains vv. 15-18 (Tischendorf, *Evangel. Apocr.*, 1853, pp. 243 and 351). Burgon sums up the Patristic evidence thus:—That three Fathers of the 2nd century, four of the third, six of the fourth, and four of the fifth, cite one or more of these last twelve verses.

The late Dean Burgon was convinced, on a review of the above evidence, that these twelve verses really belong to Mark's Gospel, and are from the hand of that evangelist. Tischendorf, however, and many other modern editors reject them, and Westcott and Hort decide against them on several grounds, and in particular because the style in which they are written does not agree with the style of the rest of the Gospel. All critics, however, admit the antiquity of these verses, whether they be Mark's or no.

Now if these verses be not Mark's, whose are they? In the Patriarchal library of Ecmiadzin, at the foot of Mount Ararat, I recently collated, in November, 1891, an Armenian codex of the Gospels, which seems to furnish an answer to this question. It is an uncial codex written in the year 986. Externally it is remarkable as having for its covers two

¹ Burgon, p. 23, writes: "It is impossible to resist the inference that Papias refers to Mark xvi. 18, when he records a marvellous tradition concerning Justus, surnamed Barsabas, 'how that after drinking noxious poison through the Lord's grace he experienced no evil consequence.' He does not even give *the words* of the evangelist. It is even surprising how completely he passes them by; and yet the allusion to the place just cited (*i.e.* Mark xvi. 18) is manifest." See Enseb., *II. E.* iii. 39, and my remarks below.

² For his evidence, see an article by the Rev. C. Taylor, in *THE EXPOSITOR* of July, 1893.

ivory plaques beautifully carved in relief by some Ravennese artist of the 5th or early 6th century. Within it also are bound up several Syriac paintings of N.T. subjects, which cannot be later than the beginning of the sixth century. The covers as well as the paintings are reproduced by photolithography by Strzygowski in his valuable monograph on this codex (Vienna, at the Press of the Mechitarists, 1892). Besides collating this codex throughout, the writer of this article photographed on the spot some of its pages.

Now in this codex the Gospel of Mark is copied out as far as *ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ*. Then a space of two lines is left, after which, in the same uncial hand, only in red, is written "Ariston Eritzou," which means "Of the Presbyter Ariston." This title occupies one whole line (the book is written in double columns) and then follow the last twelve verses still in the same hand. They begin near the bottom of the second column of a verse, and are continued on the recto of the next folio.

Now here the name Ariston is probably no other than the Greek name Aristion, badly spelt—as was natural—by a 10th century Armenian scribe. In the Armenian version of Eusebius' *Hist. Eccl.*, made from the Syriac *c.* 400 A.D. the name Aristion is transliterated in the same way. In the same version of Eusebius' *Hist. Eccl.*, the name of Ariston of Pella, it is true, is transliterated in the same way; and Prof. Sanday has suggested to me that he might conceivably have written the twelve verses. Ariston of Pella was a Jewish Christian, and wrote about A.D. 140-150. Against this view, which Prof. Sanday does not prefer to my own, I would urge:—

1. That the date 140-150 is too late. An addition made at that time would hardly have appeared so uniformly in all the Greek MSS. as do these twelve verses.

2. So far as we know anything about Ariston's writings they were not at all similar to these twelve verses.

This Aristion, the presbyter, may have been either

1. The copyist himself, or

2. Some Armenian, who, finding this supplement in a Greek or Syriac copy of the Gospels, translated it into his own language, or

3. The person who composed these twelve verses.

(1) He was certainly not the copyist, for the latter gives his name at the beginning and end of the codex: "To the lord Stephen belongs this Gospel. I, Johannes, wrote it. Remember me."

(2) He could hardly have been the translator of these verses, for Ariston, or Aristion, is no Armenian name, and it is not usual in the Armenian version of the Bible for the translator of any portion of it to mention himself, and if he were to, it would be at the end of the piece translated, and not prefacing it. Neither would he use the genitive. The name Aristion never occurs in Armenian history; nor in Christian literature does it anywhere occur except in Eusebius, *H. E.*, bk. 3.

(3) This is the supposition we must accept. For this alone explains (*a*) the genitive case "*of the presbyter*" or *πρεσβυτέρου*, to which the word "*eritzou*" answers; (*β*) the dignity accorded to the words "*Ariston Eritzou*," which are in minioned uncials, as are the titles "*of Matthew*," "*of Mark*," "*of Luke*," "*of John*," in this evangeliar at the heads of their respective Gospels.

We must then infer that the Armenian translator of these twelve verses had a Greek or Syriac MS. which prefaced them with the words *Ἀριστίωνος πρεσβυτέρου*. A question remains: When were the twelve verses translated? They are absent in most uncial Arm. MSS. of the 10th and 11th centuries. In style they cohere fairly well with the rest of the Armenian Gospels which go back to c. 400. Still, a translator of a later age, who was versed in the Armenian Bible, may have translated them in archaic style. It is related by

a late Greek Father that the Armenians at first had the twelve verses in their version, but afterwards excised them. This would explain their occurrence in many later MSS., translated as they are translated in the Eémiadzin Codex. Perhaps the Armenian copyists left them out because they were prefaced by this very heading.

Who then was the Presbyter Aristion to whom in this codex these twelve verses are attributed, and who must in the scribe's mind have been a writer of almost the same importance as Mark himself, to judge from the prominence given to his name, and the red uncials in which it is written? To my friend, Mr. T. A. Archer, I owe the suggestion that this Aristion is no other than the one mentioned in Eusebius' History, bk. 3, ch. 39, where we have preserved to us the following excerpt from Papias:—

“I will not hesitate either to set out together in my interpretations all the things which I well learned and well recollected from the elders, firmly maintaining and defending their veracity. For I did not, like the run of people, take pleasure in those who have a very great deal to say, but in those who teach the truth; nor yet in those men who recollect alien¹ commandments, but in those men who recollect the commandments given by the Lord in the faith and flowing from the truth itself. And if anywhere one came who had followed and accompanied the elders, I ascertained the discourses of the elders: what Andrew said, or what Peter, or what Philip, or what Thomas, or James, or what John, or Matthew, or any other of the Lord's disciples; and what Aristion and the presbyter (or ‘elder’) John,² the disciples of the Lord. For I did not

¹ ἀλλοτριῶν ἐντολῶν is supported here by the old Armenian version. Rufinus seems to have read ἀνθρώπων.

² Rufinus translates: “Aristion and the presbyter John and the other disciples” “quæve Aristion vel Johannes Presbyter ceterique discipuli,” so omitting τοῦ κυρίου. The Armenian omits οἱ τοῦ κυρίου μαθηταί. Thus both the ancient versions hesitate to make Aristion and the presbyter John actual disciples of the Lord.

suppose that things learned out of the books aided me so much as things learned from the living and remaining voice."

Again, p. 136. 30 Eusebius says: ¹"And the Papias whom we just now mentioned, avows that he received the statements of the apostles from those who had been their immediate followers, but says that he himself had listened direct to Aristion and the presbyter John. At any rate, he often mentions them by name, when he gives in his own compositions their traditions." Eusebius then enumerates some of the traditions received and written down by Papias, one of which is the story of Justus called Barsabas, "how he drank off a deadly drug and yet suffered no ill effects because of the grace of the Lord." In a 12th century Bodleian Codex of Rufinus' Latin version of the *Ecclesiastical History* this story is mentioned in the margin against the name of Aristion (in p. 136. 31), from which we may suppose that the scholiast of Rufinus regarded the story as in a peculiar manner due to or suggested by Aristion. Lower down (137. 26), Eusebius, after mentioning Irenæus as one of the Church fathers who had imbibed wrong Chiliastic doctrines from Papias, makes a final allusion to Aristion, thus: "And he (Papias) in his own writing hands down also other narratives (*διηγήσεις*) of the Lord's words by Aristion, the aforementioned, as well as traditions (*παραδόσεις*) of the Presbyter John."

What do we gather from the above concerning Aristion? The net results may be summed up thus:—

1. Aristion was a *μαθητῆς τοῦ κυρίου*, a disciple of the Lord. But note that the Latin and Armenian versions

¹ Rufinus turns thus: Hic ipse de quo sermo est Papias apostolorum se verba ab his qui secuti eos fuerant, Aristione videlicet et Iohanne presbytero asserit suscepisse, unde et frequenter in commentariis suis a Iohanne et Aristione traditum sibi de singulis quibusque commemorat. The old Armenian version gives the same sense, but is more literal. Both versions therefore lay stress on the fact that Aristion and John the presbyter were *παρηκολουθηκότες τοῖς ἀποστόλοις*. The Greek text is not really adverse to this sense; for *ἐξ* after *Ἀριστιωνος* need not bear an adversative sense.

(both made about A.D. 400, and the Armenian from a still older Syriac version) seem to have omitted τοῦ κυρίου.

2. Aristion was a γνάριμος or pupil, and a παρηκολούθηκώς or personal companion of the holy apostles.

3. Aristion either wrote or delivered orally διηγήσεις τῶν τοῦ κυρίου λόγων, narratives of the words of the Lord.

4. Papias wrote these narratives down in his λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις, often mentioning by name Aristion as the source of his information.

Lastly, is it conceivable that the last twelve verses of Mark's Gospel should be, if not from the pen, at least from the lips of this Aristion? This question is best answered in the words in which Westcott and Hort sum up their judgment with regard to the twelve verses. They consider that these verses constitute an interpolation "inserted at a period when forms of the oral gospel were still current." And in their appendix on select readings (p. 51) they write:—

"There is no difficulty in supposing (1) that the true intended continuation of *vv.* 1-8 either was very early lost by the detachment of a leaf or was never written down; and (2) that a scribe or editor, unwilling to change the words of the text before him or to add words of his own, was willing to furnish the gospel with what seemed a worthy conclusion, by incorporating with it unchanged a narrative of Christ's appearances after the Resurrection which he found in some secondary record then surviving from a preceding generation."

"The opening words of *v.* 9 Ἀναστὰς δὲ πρῶτ', without ὁ Ἰησοῦς or any other name, imply a previous context, and mark *vv.* 9-20 as only the conclusion of a longer record; but to what length the record extended, it is idle to speculate. On the other hand, it is shown by its language and structure to be complete in itself, beginning with the resurrection and ending with the ascension. It thus

constitutes a condensed fifth narrative of the forty days. Its authorship and its precise date must remain unknown; it is, however, apparently older than the time when the canonical gospels were generally received; for though it has points of contact with them all, it contains no attempt to harmonize their various representations of the course of events. It manifestly cannot claim any apostolic authority; but it is doubtless founded on some tradition of the apostolic age."

The hypothesis that Aristion, the master of Papias, was the author or source of these verses would exactly fit in with the above surmises. The only objection is that Papias seems in a marked manner not to recognise Aristion as a presbyter, while he does recognise John as such. In this connection it is remarkable that the Armenian version of Eusebius renders the words of Papias (*Eccl. Hist.*, p. 136, l. 12) ἃ τε Ἀριστιῶν καὶ ὁ πρεσβύτερος Ἰωάννης as if they stood ἃ τε Ἀριστίων καὶ Ἰωάννης πρεσβύτεροι. However, stress must not be laid on this point, for (i.) we have to deal here with a version only, and (ii.) in the subsequent passages p. 136, l. 31, and p. 137. 29, the Armenian reproduces Eusebius' phrase "Aristion and the Presbyter John." On the other hand this objection to our proposed identification of the "Aristion Presbyter," to whom the Armenian Codex ascribes these verses, with Papias' teacher is not a strong objection. He may very well have been a presbyter at some time or other. Nor is it clear what force we should attribute to the title *πρεσβύτερος* which Papias gives to John. Does it mean the presbyter in the official sense, or merely the "Elder" John, in contradistinction with the Apostle John. The true force of Papias' words is probably not so much to withhold from Aristion a title which he is very likely to have had, as to mark off the Presbyter John from the Apostle of that name. A few lines before Papias has by implication called Aristion a presbyter, if not in the

ecclesiastical sense, at any rate as one of an older and more authoritative generation.

Assuming then that these verses were the work of the Aristion who was the master of Papias, how shall we account for their being added to Mark's Gospel? We may suppose, either (*a*) that Papias in his *ἐξηγήσεις* had one or more sections headed *Ἀριστίωνος*, that one of these sections consisted of or included these twelve verses, and that some one, perhaps Papias himself, selected them to complete the—we know not how or why mutilated—Gospel; or (*β*) that Papias was not the intermediary at all, but that they were taken direct out of an independent narrative written by Aristion. Eusebius contrasts the *διηγήσεις* of Aristion with the *παραδόσεις* of the Presbyter John. May we not hence infer that Aristion himself *wrote a narrative* of the works and words of Jesus? If so, a part of his longer narrative may have been chosen as the end of Mark by some editor or scribe who felt the abruptness of the ending *ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ*. The words of Luke (ch. i., vv. 1-3) almost constrain us to give such an interpretation to the *διηγήσεις* of Aristion; they run thus: *Ἐπειδηπερ πολλοὶ ἐπεχείρησαν ἀνατίξασθαι διήγησιν περὶ τῶν πεπληροφορημένων ἐν ἡμῖν πραγμάτων, καθὼς παρέδωσαν ἡμῖν οἱ ἀπ' ἰρχῆς αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρέται γενομένοι τοῦ λόγου*. Here *διήγησιν* means a written narrative.

Either supposition accords well with the fact that Irenæus is the only 2nd-century Father who quite certainly recognises this ending of Mark's Gospel. For we know that Irenæus was in a special way related to Papias. If it was in Papias' circle and neighbourhood that the Gospel received this addition, then Irenæus is of all the Fathers the one in whose possession we should expect to find a copy of Mark with this ending. It may be further remarked that if Aristion was a disciple of the Lord or even a fellow and companion of the apostles, he was probably an inhabitant

of Palestine, and this agrees well with the patristic statement already noticed, that the ancient Palestinian copy of Mark included these twelve verses.

But there is another point of contact between Papias and Aristion on the one hand and these twelve verses on the other. Papias, according to Eusebius, related in his *ἐξηγήσεις* the story of Justus Barsabas drinking poison and being saved by the grace of the Lord. Dean Burgon saw in this a proof positive that Papias had in his hands a copy of Mark which ended with these twelve verses. Eusebius does not affirm that Papias derived this story either from Aristion or from John the presbyter; but, as I have already noticed, in a 12th century Bodleian codex of Rufinus a marginal scholion seems to refer the story in some way to Aristion. It is unlikely that Aristion himself in his *διηγήσεις* told the story in illustration of verse 18, of which he was the author, and that Papias only copied it from him. But the scholiast of Rufinus may have known that these twelve verses were Aristion's, and on that account have connected with Aristion's name a story so aptly illustrative of one of the verses in question.

The occurrence of *vv.* 15-18 in the *Acta Pilati* may be accounted for by supposing either (i.) that the writer of those *Acta* had in his hands Mark's Gospel with these twelve verses added; or (ii.) that he had the very *διηγήσεις* of Aristion; or (iii.) that he had Papias' *ἐξηγήσεις*, in which were embodied these *διηγήσεις*. And of these alternatives (ii.) and (iii.) must not be dismissed off hand, though I have not now space in which to consider them.

There remains the question: Whence did the Armenian scribe Johannes, who wrote the *Ećmiadzin Evangeliar* A.D. 986, get these twelve verses, which so far as I know are not to be found added in any other Armenian codex prior to A.D. 1100? It is probable that they are translated from an early Syriac codex for these reasons:—

1. We know that the scribe John probably had such an early Syriac codex, because bound into the Ećmiadzin Evangeliar at beginning and end are a number of Syriac illuminations at least as old as the beginning of the 6th century. One of these illuminations the scribe Johannes has rudely copied in his text, leaving space for his copy of it in his writing. (On the other hand these illuminations may equally well have belonged to the "true and accurate" Armenian exemplar from which, according to his own statement, he copied his codex. Strzygowski points out in his monograph that up to the 10th century the Armenians regularly sent to Edessa or to Greece for illuminations with which to embellish their books. That "true and accurate" exemplar may have and probably did include these twelve verses, title and all, and must have been a 5th or 6th century exemplar.)

2. The spelling *Aristōn* for *Aristion* is that which we also have in the Armenian version of Eusebius' History, a version made from Syriac. In translating from a Greek text an Armenian would not have neglected the iota before the omega; nor would he have transliterated omega by a short *ō*, but either by *ow* or *au*, according to the fixed and recognised custom of Armenian translators. It is singular that the name *Ariston*, though put first, is yet not put in the genitive. For it is clearly in apposition to *eritzou* = *πρεσβυτέρου*.

3. In *v. 10* and *v. 17* the singular of the relative pronoun is used with a plural verb. This is a Syriacism, but as it often occurs in Armenian versions made from Greek, little stress must be laid on it. More important is a harsh use of the relative pronoun in *v. 14*, which may perhaps betoken a Syriac original, though as not knowing Syriac I can pronounce no judgment on this point.

There is thus good reason to believe that these twelve verses were translated from a Syriac original as old as A.D.

500. It is to be hoped that the same ascription of them to Aristion the Elder will be some day noticed in a Syriac codex. If not taken from a Syriac original, they were copied from an older Armenian codex, probably as old as the 5th century.

Comparing the Armenian text of these twelve verses with Westcott and Hort's text, the following variants are to be noticed :—

v. 9. *πρῶτον* is omitted before *Μαρία*; *τῆ* is omitted before *Μαγδαληνῆ*. So D.—*ἑπτὰ δαιμόνια* is rendered as if the Greek were *τὸ ζ' δαιμόνιον*. Perhaps the original reading was *τὸ ἕβδομον δαιμόνιον*; for confusion of cardinal and ordinal numbers in Greek MSS. is constant. The *seventh* devil was the devil of sexual irregularity, as we know from the Testaments of the twelve Patriarchs. Cp. Test. Reuben, cap. β'. 'Ἐπτὰ πνεύματα ἐδόθη κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ τοῦ Βελίαρ καὶ αὐτὰ εἰσι κεφαλαὶ τῶν ἔργων τοῦ νεωτερισμοῦ . . . ἕβδομον πνεῦμα σπορὰς καὶ συνουσίας, μεθ' ἧς συνεισέρχεται διὰ τῆς φιληδονίας ἡ ἁμαρτία. 'Seven spirits were given against man by Beliar, and they are chiefs of the works of insolence and wrong. . . . The seventh spirit is of reproduction and of chambering, together with which enters sin, because of the love of pleasure.'

v. 10. After *ἐκείνη* add *δὲ* or read *κακείνη*.

v. 11. For *κακείνοι* read *ἐκείνοι*; for *ἐθεάθη ὑπ' αὐτῆς* ? read *ἐφανερώθη*, or *ἐφάνη αὐτῇ*.

v. 12. Omit *δὲ* after *μετὰ*; omit *περιπατοῦσιν*; before *ἄγρον*, add *τὸν*.

v. 13. For *κακείνοι* read *ἐκείνοι*.

v. 14. After *ἕστερον* omit *δὲ*, then omit *αὐτοῖς* before *τοῖς ἔνδεκα* (so L. and versions); omit *καὶ* before *ὠνειδίσειν*; *ὅτι*—*ἐπίστευσαν*, the Arm.=*quia qui apparuit iis resurrexerunt ex mortuis non crediderunt*.

v. 17. Omit *δὲ* after *σημεῖα*; for *γλώσσαις* read *γλώσσας*.

Tischendorf here wrongly ascribes the addition *καιναῖς* to the Armenian.

v. 18. For *καὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν* read *ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτῶν*.

v. 19. Omit *οὖν*.

v. 20. *πανταχοῦ* is rendered "in tota terra."

In the above variants there is nothing very noticeable. Perhaps the transitions in the narrative are even more abrupt than they are in the Greek text. The Paris uncial Greek codex L, as has been already noticed, adds these twelve verses, after an interval, in the same way as does the Ećmiadzin Evangeliar. It may be asked, Why, if the title of the Presbyter Aristion is added in this MS. and in the Syriac, from which presumably it was translated, do we not find the same title in a MS. like the Paris L? If a mere surmise may be allowed on such a point, I would suggest the following explanation. The Church at an early period decided that there were four, and only four, canonical evangelists. Irenæus went so far as to deny *a priori* that there could be more, on the ground that there are only four winds. Now to have retained in the Gospels an addition avowedly made by Aristion would have been tantamount to setting up a fifth evangelist. Here then we have a motive which would explain the action of the N.T. scribes, who *either* omitted the verses altogether, leaving or not leaving a blank space in their books, *or* added them, but at the same time took care to suppress the name of Aristion. Probably the scribe of Codex B (who also wrote the corresponding part of Aleph) had before him in the codex he was copying the twelve verses with the very heading *Ἀριστίωνος πρεσβυτέρου*. He was too conscientious to suppress the title and add them as if they were St. Mark's, and at the same time he did not like to include in his codex of the N.T. an uncanonical addition. He solved the difficulty by leaving a column blank for the reception, should he ever find it, of the true

Marcian conclusion of the Gospel. It deserves to be remarked that Armenian MSS., when they do make the addition, write "Here ends Mark's Gospel," after the words which correspond to *ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ*, and then after a pause continue with verses 9-20.

Thus the net result of our new evidence, if our interpretation of it be correct, is to gain for these twelve verses, if not the credit of being St. Mark's, at any rate the credit of having as their author one who, according to Papias, was a *μαθητῆς τοῦ κυρίου*. Incidentally, also, our discovery of the heading "of Aristion elder," is a remarkable confirmation of Eusebius' chapter upon Papias, and of the citations from Papias which it contains. Such a confirmation would incline one to trust the account given by Papias of the way in which the four Gospels were composed.

F. C. CONYBEARE.

WAS THERE A GOLDEN CALF AT DAN?

A NOTE ON 1 KINGS XII. 29, 30, AND OTHER PASSAGES.

THE question asked at the head of this note will, to many readers, sound quite absurd. They will say, "Of course there was 'a calf' at Dan, and another at Bethel, as is stated in 1 Kings xii. 29, although there is some obvious obscurity or corruption in verse 30." Besides, that there were two calves—one at Dan and one at Bethel, has been a received tradition for at least 2,500 years; to doubt it shows the utmost temerity.

Certainly the statement has been made from early days without dispute down to the time of the latest Rabbis; and that might be considered sufficient proof. But against this argument must be set the fact that the Book of Kings was not written earlier than B.C. 542, and that Samaria fell B.C.

722; and that even if the text of 1 Kings xii. 29 be uncorrupted from the original, there would be time in two centuries of anarchy for some confusion on the subject to arise, especially as Dan lay on the remote northern frontier, and had been the seat of an idolatrous worship since the early days of the Judges, and was destroyed by Tiglath Pileser as early as B.C. 738.

In writing the volume on the First Book of Kings for the *Expositor's Bible* I felt a doubt on the subject, which was not, however, sufficiently strong to make me abandon the traditional view. But in reading 1 Kings xii. as the Sunday Lesson for the Tenth Sunday after Trinity the doubt returned to my mind, and I think that there are some grounds for the view that *there were two calves at Bethel, and that there was no calf at Dan, but only the old idolatrous ephod and images* of Micah described in Judges xvii. 4.

I will return to 1 Kings xii. 29 immediately, but will first of all examine the question independently of it.

Thirty-three or more years ago, in the article, "Calf," in Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, I gave some of the decisive arguments which prove that though the epithet "calf" is given in scorn to the figure made by Aaron in the wilderness, and "calves" to those erected by Jeroboam I., the figures were by no means intended for mere calves, but were nothing less than cherubic emblems of exactly the same character as those sanctioned by Aaron, by Moses in the Tabernacle, and by Solomon in the Temple.¹

On this subject it is sufficient to notice the following facts:—

(i.) Jeroboam's calves neither did, nor were intended to, interfere with the worship of Jehovah.

(a) The prophets of Northern Israel always regarded themselves as prophets of Jehovah. Apostate kings, like Ahab, allowed alien cults to be introduced side by side with

¹ Exod. xxv. 18; 1 Kings vi. 23.

the worship of Jehovah, though, strange to say, to a far less extent in the northern than in the southern kingdom. Yet the worst of them all never persecuted, never suppressed, and never repudiated the worship of Jehovah.¹

(β) The name of Jehovah, after the days of Ahab, grew so extraordinarily common that, not only did Ahab name his sons from compounds of Yah, but every subsequent king of Israel, except the murderers Shallum, Menahem, and Pekah, had that element in their names.

(γ) Not one of the genuine prophets of Israel is recorded to have uttered one syllable of reprobation of the "calf worship" before Amos and Hoshea, and it is doubtful whether Amos did so. Although the word of Elijah "burned like a torch"; although Elisha lived in intimacy with several kings of Israel; although Micaiah, son of Imlah, did not fear the face of Ahab; although Jonah, son of Amittai, prophesied the greatness of Jeroboam II., none of these prophets is recorded to have uttered a word of remonstrance against the irregular cherubic *cultus* which prevailed in the kingdom of Samaria from the beginning of the reign of Jeroboam I., B.C. 937, to the end of the reign of Hoshea, B.C. 722. Nor except in the late speech put by the chronicler into the mouth of Abijah, son of Rehoboam, many centuries later, is there any reprobation of the northern worship in any southern prophet, or in any king before Josiah. The Chronicler—a fact, I think, that has never been noticed, vehemently orthodox as he was for the Deuteronomic law of centralised worship—scarcely does more than mention the "*calves*";² his indignation is mainly against the irregular altars of the irregular *bamoth*, and the non-Levitic priests whom Jeroboam established, although he incidentally mentions that these priests served the calves

¹ Ahab did not do so personally, though he connived at the violence of Jezebel.

² Only in 2 Chron. xi. 15, xiii. 8. In neither place is Dan mentioned

and the *he-goats* (A.V., devils).¹ Nay, more, even the man of God from Judah, who travels to Bethel to denounce the new king of Israel, prophesies against the *altar*, but does not so much as mention the calves at all. Even as regards Hosea it is not certain that when he speaks of the "calf" he is not rather alluding to Baal worship. The Book of Tobit—which of course is a Jewish Haggadah, without the least authority, goes so far as (unjustly and falsely) to describe the imaginary calf at Dan as ἡ δάμαλις βαάλ. This, too, is perhaps implied by the feminine used by the LXX. [τήν μίαν], which might also be a reference to Bosheth, "shame," the word often read instead of Baal.

But if the "calves" were cherubic emblems which were regarded as intolerably wicked by the historians who wrote respectively four centuries and five centuries after Jeroboam, but respecting which the consciences of the kings, and even of the earlier splendid prophets of Israel, seem to have felt no self-reproach, is it not extremely probable that there were *two calves* at Bethel, and not one? Jeroboam's avowed purpose was to provide his people with a substitute for the attractions of Solomon's Temple at Jerusalem. But the central object of reverence in the Temple on Mount Zion was the Ark and its mercy-seat overshadowed by the two small ancient cherubim of Moses (if they were still preserved, for we have nothing explicit on this point)² and by the two colossal cherubim of Solomon. Jehovah was symbolised to the people as

"Thundering out of Zion, throned
Between the cherubim."

These cherubim haunted the imagination of prophets and

¹ 2 Chron. xiii. 8. Heb. (*Scirim*) "he-goats," i.e. satyrs (Luther, *Feldtäufel*).

² The word commonly used for Aaron's calf and Jeroboam's is בָּלָבֵן, which properly means μόσχος, "a young bull." The feminine word בָּלָבֵנִי is used in Hos. x. 5.

psalmists.¹ What were they? It is usually assumed that they were winged *human* figures, but there is very much to be said for the belief, which is by no means a modern one, that they were winged oxen. Not to dwell upon the uncertain derivation of the word cherub,² it is extremely doubtful whether either Moses or Solomon would have tolerated the introduction of winged *human* figures. That Solomon tolerated carved oxen we know, and when Josephus charges him with violation of the law for so doing, the whole tendency of Jewish history shows that he is transferring the sentiments of A.D. 50 back to B.C. 1000. The composite fourfold cherub of Ezekiel was almost certainly a much later emblem; but even in that emblem it is a very remarkable circumstance that in Ezek. x. 14 "*the face of a cherub*" is the equivalent "*to the face of an ox*" in the parallel passage, Ezek. i. 10. Further, the cherubs over the mercy-seat are described as looking down into the mercy-seat, and yet looking towards each other. Without making too much of this description it certainly seems to accord much better with winged oxen than with winged men (Exod. xxv. 20). When Josephus says that no one could tell or even conjecture the real shape of the cherubim, he is probably concealing the fact that they were winged oxen, which would have confirmed the jibes of the Gentiles against the Jews as to their supposed animal-worship.³

Granting, then, that the calves of Jeroboam were identical with the two-winged cherubs which Solomon placed in the Holiest at Jerusalem, is it not much more probable that Jeroboam placed *two* of these symbols at Bethel than that he placed one? Would not one cherubic figure have been regarded as a very maimed and unattractive counterpoise to the two in the oracle?

¹ See Ezek. x. 2, 5, 16, 29; Exod. xxv. 22; Num. vii. 89; 1 Sam. iv. 4; Isa. xxxvii. 18; Ps. lxxx. 1, xcix. 1, etc.

² Perhaps from עָרַב, "he ploughed."

³ Jos., *Antiq.*, viii. 3, § 3.

Further, I may claim for this view the authority of the prophet Hosea, who speaks of "the calves of Beth-aven" (Hos. x. 3). It is no answer to this that he says, "Thy calf, O Samaria, hath cast thee off"; or, as it should be rendered, "Thou hast cast off thy calf, O Samaria," because there, obviously, the word "calf" is only generic.

If then there were two calves in what the priest Amaziah calls "the king's chapel" at Bethel, this fact and the constant reference to them as two in number—would naturally help to stereotype the notion that one of them was at Dan and one at Bethel when once it had arisen; especially since there was *also* a highly irregular cult at Dan, and the growth of centuries tended to obliterate the distinctness of facts which were only preserved for long centuries by dim tradition.

For to the calf at Dan, during all the process of the history of the northern and southern kingdoms, we *have not a single allusion*, unless there be one in Amos viii. 14, to which I will refer later on. To trace so much as the existence of a "calf" at Dan we have to come down from its inauguration, B.C. 937, to the Book of Tobit, perhaps A.D. 70.¹

It has indeed been customary to say (and I repeat it in the article "Calf," in Smith's Dictionary) that the calf at Dan was carried away by Tiglath Pileser III. (Pul) about B.C. 738; and the calf at Bethel by Sargon (about B.C. 722). But what is the authority for this statement? The *Seder Olam Rabba*, a Rabbinic book of no authority on such a subject!² And when we come to think of it, the total

¹ So Hitzig. But even the passage in Tobit does not mention Dan, it only says that Nephthali sacrificed "to the she-heifer Baal." It is only in the *Itala* that we find Dan mentioned. And even here Grätz and Neubauer conjecture that the right reading is *Bethel*.

² The Rabbis had many monstrous *Haggadoth* about the calves:—*e.g.* that they were suspended by magnets; that they spoke, etc. (*Sanhedrin*, f. 107, 2); that the foundation of Rome began the day they were erected (*Shabbath*, f. 56, 2), and so forth.

absence of all mention of this supreme relic—one of the two chief “gods” of the conquered nation—in the records of Tiglath Pileser III., or in any other Assyrian records, or in any Jewish writer, makes the guess of the Talmudists extremely improbable. As to the golden calf or calves at Bethel we read in Hosea that they shall be dashed to splinters, and be taken as a bribe or present to King Combat, but this may not be meant for a literal prediction.¹

Further, it is *a priori* improbable that Jeroboam would think of erecting a golden calf at Dan;—and that for two good reasons.

(i.) The place was indeed nominally in his dominions, but it was on the remote border, and not at all on the road to Jerusalem as Bethel was. It was a town which entered so little into the ordinary stream of Israelitish life that it is only mentioned once in all the history, and only twice in all the prophets.²

And (ii.) there was an overpoweringly strong reason why Jeroboam should *not* take this step. There was an ancient and venerable sanctuary and *bamah* at Dan already; and there was an ancient venerable molten or plated image there known as Micah’s “ephod”;³ and there was an hereditary line of priests who traced their ancestry direct to Jonathan, the grandson of Moses.⁴ In the story of that wandering Levite—the degenerate grandson of the mighty lawgiver who was content to serve a private idol for a few pounds a year—we are expressly told that priests of his family continued to be in charge of this cult “to the *days of the cap-*

¹ Hos. viii. 5, x. 5, 6. See Wellhausen *Die Kleinen Propheten*, p. 118.

² Amos viii. 14. In Jer. iv. 15, viii. 16 it is only mentioned as a northern frontier town.

³ There was, indeed, a complete treasure-house of images there—“an ephod and teraphim, and a graven image and a molten image” (Judg. xviii. 14, 18). They would not want a cherub beside. Was the molten image *a calf*?

⁴ Judg. xviii. 30. Manasseh is a timid Jewish falsification, caused by the introduction of the single letter *n*, which was suspended above the *Q’ri*, and was only intended to mislead the uninitiated.

tivity of the land."¹ Ewald indeed conjectures that the reading should be "till the days of the captivity of *the ark*" (reading ארן for אר), which would bring the priesthood of the descendants of Moses to an end at the destruction of Shiloh by the Philistines in the days of Eli. But there is not a trace in any MS., or version, or Targum, of such a reading; and though I once thought it possible, it now seems to me entirely untenable. All who know the extraordinary tenacity of reverence with which Orientals cling to local sanctuaries and to local cults, will see at once that, independently of its situation, which does not seem appropriate to Jeroboam's object, the last place which seems probable for Jeroboam to have thought of as suitable for the introduction and establishment of an unauthorized image-worship was one in which an unauthorized image-worship so many centuries older was already existing under the jealous guardianship of generations of Levitic though heretical priests.

What then are we to say of the only two passages of the Bible which would militate against these conclusions?

(1) As regards Amos viii. 14 there is little to explain, for it says nothing of a golden calf at Dan. It runs in our A.V. :—

"They that swear by the sin of Samaria, and say, Thy god, O Dan, liveth; and the manner of Beer-sheba liveth; even they shall fall, and never rise up again."

This is corrected in the R.V. into "*As thy god, O Dan, liveth.*"

It is on the face of it unlikely that this refers to any golden calf at Dan. For (i.) there could in that case be no reason for passing over the far more prominent calf or calves at Bethel; (ii.) the sin of Samaria was probably some Baal-image or Asherah there, and "the way of Beersheba" also points to some unknown cult other than that of the golden calves. In all probability, therefore, the special

¹ Judg. xviii. 30.

reference is still to the old ephod—a plated image—of which the worship and the priesthood had by that time acquired an immemorial sanctity.

For, indeed, Amos does not seem to have said one word against the “calf” worship, any more than Elijah or Elisha did. All his stern denunciations are aimed at oppression, robbery and wrong; at luxury, cruelty, and greed; and in accordance with normal message of all the greatest prophets, he denounces the reliance on ritual in place of righteousness. His silence is the more remarkable because it was at Bethel that he exercised his prophetic functions. “Come to Bethel,” he says, “and transgress; at Gilgal multiply your transgressions” (iv. 4); and “I will also visit the altars at Bethel” (iii. 14);¹ and “Seek not Bethel, nor enter into Gilgal, and pass not to Beersheba.” He alludes to unauthorized worship at Bethel, but nowhere mentions the word “calf”; and when Amaziah, the priest of Bethel, complains of him for constructive treason, he reports him to Jeroboam II. for threats of doom especially against the royal house, and tells him to prophesy no more at Bethel, because “it is the king’s chapel and the national temple.”² (Amos vii. 10–13.) But he does not say that Amos had denounced the long-established form of northern worship, which, in the eyes of its High Priest would have been a far more heinous crime. And, in fact, the worship at Bethel, Gilgal, Beersheba—even at Samaria itself—may have been irregular rather than idolatrous; it may have been the worship of Jehovah, but under false and dangerous forms. In any case viii. 14 is the sole mention of Dan, and there is no certainty at all that the reference is to any golden calf.”

The inference is strengthened by reference to the almost

¹ Wellhausen (*Skizzen—Die Kleinen Propheten*, pp. 7, 77) thinks that iii. 14 breaks the connexion, and militates against the things against which Amos really spoke. But apart from this the allusion is quite indefinite.

² Literally, “house of the kingdom.”

contemporary, though somewhat later, prophets, Hosea, and the Zechariah who wrote Zech. ix.-xi.

1. As regards Hosea, he speaks of Gilgal and Bethel, but apparently in connexion with the worship of Jehovah (iv. 15); of Mizpah and Tabor (v. 1); of Samaria (x. 5); of Bethel again¹ (x. 15); and of Gilgal (xii. 11); but

(i.) he does not once mention Dan; and

(ii.) the only passages in which he distinctly refers to "calf" worship are viii. 5, 6, x. 5, xiii. 2, *the only passages in all the Prophets in which "calf" worship is mentioned at all*. And here we may note (a) that this earliest allusion to the cult of the cherubic symbols as "calves" would probably sound very blasphemous and unjust to the Israelites of the northern kingdom at first, familiar as the taunt afterwards became; ² (β) that the use of the plural ("the calves of Bethaven," as x. 5) seems to support the belief that there were *two* there, as well as in the Holiest place of the Temple; (γ) that Hosea seems to mingle up the worship with Baal worship, and even with burnt sacrifice, which certainly did not originally belong to it (xiii. 1, 2, *Heb.*); ³ (δ) that viii. 5, 6, "He hath cast off thy calf, O Samaria, . . . the calf of Samaria shall be broken in pieces," *may* refer to some image of Baal at *Samaria*, not at Bethel; (ε) that when he speaks of "the black-robed ones" (the *Chemarim*, or illegal priests) of Bethaven, mourning for the "calves" of Bethaven, and adds "it (the idol) shall also be carried for a present to King Jareb," he does not say, as is sometimes assumed, that Sargon should carry the calf or calves away captive, but rather uses the reproachful threat, "Your calf is of gold, so that you will have to send it as part of your ransom money to King Combat."

¹ He, or a later editor, calls Bethel "Bethaven," "house of vanity," *i.e.*, of idols; and Aven (x. 8).

² Wellhausen, *Die Kleinen Propheten*, p. 118.

³ The meaning may be, "Let them *that sacrifice men* kiss the calves."

2. As for the Zechariah of Zech. ix.-xi., occupied as he is with Ephraim and her murderous later kings, he does not drop a single allusion to the calves either at Dan or at Bethel.

It only remains to examine 1 Kings xii. 28-30, where we are told that Jeroboam "made two calves of gold. . . . And he set the one in Bethel, and the other put he in Dan. And this thing became a sin; for the people *went (to worship) before the one, unto Dan*"; for which the R.V. gives, in the margin, "before *each* of them, even to Dan."

The unexplained difficulty in verse 30 shows that there has been some early confusion of the text. Little as I am generally inclined to follow the somewhat wild conjectures of Klostermann—and I do not wholly follow him here—it seems to me, that, considering all the circumstances which I have mentioned, the text may here have originally been to the following effect. "And Jeroboam bethought himself of a plan, and went and made two golden calves *in Bethel*, and said to the people (LXX. *πρὸς τὸν λαόν*), "Enough of going up to Jerusalem! See thy Elohim, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt, and who established the one (emblem) in Bethel, and conceded (LXX. *ἔδωκε*) the *ephod* in Dan. And the people went to the *ephod* at Dan (and neglected Bethel). Then made he *bamoth* in Bethel, and made priests of all the people."

I do not of course say that the text stood exactly so; I only say, partially following Klostermann, that it may have been to this purport. The *alteration of a single letter*, reading *בֵּתֵל*, "the *ephod*," in verse 29, for *בֵּתֵל* "the one," accounts for the main confusion; and if "*in Bethel*" stood in verse 31, it may easily have got confused with *Beth bamoth* ("a house of high places," or, as the LXX. has it, *αἴκουσ ἐφ' ὑψηλῶν*).

Every one will see at a glance how well this corresponds

with the conclusion of the passage. For there (xii. 32, 33) Jeroboam makes a great feast at Bethel to the people, and, while not a syllable is said of Dan, we are told that *there* he offered upon the altar, "sacrificing unto *the calves*" (observe the plural) "that he had made; and he placed *in Bethel* the priests of the *bamoth* that he had made, and went up to the altar that he had made *in Bethel*." Attention is as entirely concentrated, as it is throughout the whole history, on *Bethel*: and Dan is passed over as completely as if it never existed.

Of course if this misconception, or error, was early found in the text of the Book of Kings (which was not published before B.C. 542) it would naturally be the case that in the shape of a single marginal gloss, it would get early established in the tradition, as in 2 Kings x. 29. The "two calves" are also mentioned in 2 Chron. xiii. 8, but in that place it is not stated that they were not both at Bethel.

Klostermann, in his very brief note on 1 Kings xii. 28-30, gives a hint of these conclusions, which seem to me not only possible but adapted to remove many difficulties. So far as I know, the matter has never been argued out before. *The alteration of one letter*, and the excision of a brief exegetical gloss in 2 Kings x. 29, gives a clearer and more consistent view of the whole history of Israel. I do not, however, pretend to do more than to invite further attention to the matter.

F. W. FARRAR.

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

X. ADOPTION.

THE idea of Adoption, *υιοθεσία*,¹ can hardly be said to occupy, in the Pauline system of thought, a place of importance co-ordinate with that of justification. It denotes rather a phase in the *Blessedness of the Justified*, than an independent benefit of God's grace. It were, however, a mistake on this account to overlook the idea in an exposition of St. Paul's conception of Christianity. The "adoption of sons" conferred on believers demands prominent recognition were it only because of its connection with the justified man's felicity. For that topic, with all that belonged to it, bulked largely in the mind of the apostle. He descants thereon with evident delight in various places in his epistles, especially in *Romans* v. 1-11, where he describes the justified state as one of triumphant joy, invincible buoyancy, and hopefulness; of joy in an anticipated future glory, in a present full of tribulation but fruitful in spiritual discipline through that very tribulation, in God Himself the *summum bonum*. One cannot but note here how radically optimistic the apostle is; how truly joy is for him the keynote of the Christian life. "Rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, continuing instant in prayer"—so he pithily defines the Christian temper in the hortatory part of his Epistle to the Romans,² and with this definition the whole strain of his religious teaching is in sympathy. And it is well on so important a matter to point out that St. Paul is here not only consistent with himself, but, what is of even greater moment, in thorough accord with the doctrine of Jesus, as when in a memorable utterance He likened the disciple-circle to a

¹ *Gal.* iv. 4; *Rom.* viii. 15.

² *Rom.* xii. 12; with which compare 1 *Thess.* v. 16, 17.

bridal party.¹ The harmony between apostle and Master in this respect points to and rests on a deeper harmony, an essential agreement in their respective conceptions of the relations between God and man.

St. Paul's letters being occasional and fragmentary, brief rapid utterances on urgent topics not necessarily or even probably revealing the full-orbed circle of his religious thought, it need not surprise us that we find nowhere in them a formal doctrine concerning God and man and their mutual relations. We can only expect hints, words which imply more than they say. Such a word is *υιοθεσία*. It has for its presupposition Christ's characteristic conception of God as Father, and of men as His sons. Familiarity with Christ's doctrine of the Fatherhood, and more or less complete insight into and sympathy with its import, is to be presumed in all New Testament writers who all use the new name for God which Jesus made current. The insight and sympathy need not be conceived of as complete; it is no reproach to the apostles to think it possible that in their insight into the spiritual essence of God they came behind the only-begotten Son.² That St. Paul did so this very word *υιοθεσία* may seem to prove. In Christ's doctrine God is always a Father, a Father even to the unthankful and evil, even to unfilial prodigals. In the apostle's doctrine, as commonly understood, God becomes Father by an act of adoption graciously exercised towards persons previously occupying a lower position than that of sons.

The difference is real, and it must be confessed that sonship in St. Paul's way of putting it appears an external and artificial thing compared to the aspect it assumes in the genial presentation of Jesus. Yet the divergence must not be exaggerated. For whatever may be said as to the

¹ *Matt.* ix. 15.

² *Vide* Dr. Fairbairn in *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 293, on this point.

form under which he conceives it, there can be no question that for the apostle the filial standing of a believer is a very real and precious thing. It is as real as if it were based on nature and not on an arbitrary act of adoption. And it is by no means self-evident that the apostle thought of men as, antecedent to that act, in no sense sons of God. For we must note the connection in which he introduces the idea. In both the texts the state of adoption stands in antithesis to the state of legalism. The privilege consists in one being made a son who was formerly a slave. "Wherefore thou art no more a slave (*δούλος*) but a son."¹ But the two states are not absolutely exclusive. The slave might be a son who had not yet attained to his rights. So St. Paul actually conceived the matter when he wrote the epistle in which the idea of adoption is first broached. Those who through the mission of Christ attain to the position of sons had been sons all along, only differing nothing from slaves because of their subjection to legalism.² The apostle had in view chiefly the religious condition of Israel under law and gospel—God's son from the first,³ but subjected to legal ordinances, till Christ came and brought in the era of grace. But may not his thought be generalised so as to embrace the whole of mankind? Are not all men God's sons reduced to a state of slavery under sin, and waiting consciously or unconsciously for the hour of their emancipation out of servitude into sonship by the grace of their Heavenly Father?

It is only when we view the Pauline idea of adoption in connection with the antithesis between sonship and servitude that we can properly appreciate either its theological import or its religious value. Looked at apart therefrom, as an abstract theological term, the word may very readily

¹ *Gal.* iv. 7. In *Romans* viii. 15, the spirit of sonship is opposed to the spirit of bondage (*δουλείας*).

² *Gal.* iv. 1: οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου.

³ *Rom.* ix. 4: "Israelites whose is the adoption" (*νιοθεσία*).

foster inadequate conceptions of the Christian's privilege of sonship, and even give a legal aspect to his whole relation to God. It cannot be denied that to a certain extent such results have actually followed the permanent use in theology of an expression which, as originally employed, was charged with a strong antilegal bias. St. Paul's authority has gained currency in theology for a word which, as understood by theologians, has proved in no small measure antagonistic to his religious spirit. The fact raises the question whether it would not be wise to allow the category of "adoption" to fall into desuetude, and to express the truth about the relation of man to God in terms drawn from our Lord's own teaching. Words used with a controversial reference do not easily retain their original connotation when the conflict to which they owe their origin has passed away. The primary antithesis is lost sight of and new antitheses take its place. So in the case of *υιοθεσία*. In the apostle's mind the antithesis was between a son *indeed*, and a son who is nothing better than a servant; in the mind of the systematic theologian it becomes sonship *of a sort* versus creaturehood, or subjecthood, the original relation of man to God as Creator and Sovereign. We are in a wholly different world of thought, while using the same phrases.

Adoption, in St. Paul's view, is, not less than justification, an objective transaction. It denotes the entrance into a new relation, being constituted sons. Adoption as a divine act must be distinguished from the *spirit* of adoption which is the subjective state of mind answering to the objective relation. The two things are not only distinguishable but separable. All who are justified, all who believe in Jesus, however weak their faith, are in the Pauline sense sons of God, have received the adoption. But not all who believe in Christ have the spirit of sonship. On the contrary, the fewest have it, the fewest realise their

privilege and live up to it ; the greater number of Christians are more or less under the influence of a legal, fear-stricken spirit, which prevents them from regarding God as indeed their Father. The spirit of sonship is therefore not identical with sonship ; it is rather one of the benefits to which sonship gives right, and which in a normal healthy state of the Christian life follow in its train.

The really important contribution made by St. Paul to the doctrine of God's Fatherhood or man's sonship does not lie in his formal idea of adoption, but in the emphasis with which he insists on the filial spirit as that which becomes the believer in Jesus. In this whole matter of sonship we have to do not with theological metaphysics but with vital, ethical and religious interests. What do we mean when we tell men they are sons of God? Not to flatter them or amuse them with idle phrases, or to teach them a Pantheistic doctrine of the essential identity of the human and the divine. We mean to awaken in them an exacting sense of obligation, and a blessed sense of privilege. That was what Christ meant when He said to publicans and sinners, as He did in effect: Ye are God's sons: "Because ye are sons ye may not live as ye have been living. God's sons must be Godlike. Because ye are sons ye may cherish high hopes in spite of your degradation. If ye return in penitence to your Father's house, He will receive you with open arms as if ye had never done wrong; nay, with a warmer welcome because ye are erring children returned." St. Paul deprived himself of the opportunity of enforcing the doctrine of sonship on the side of duty by failing to use the relation as one applicable to men in general; though this cannot be said without qualification if we accept the discourse on Mars Hill as indicating the gist of what he said to the men of Athens. "Forasmuch as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or

stone, graven by art and man's device." ¹ That is, It does not become God's sons to be grovelling idolaters; an excellent example of the *noblesse oblige* argument. But whatever historic value may be assigned to the Mar's Hill incident, it is certain at least that St. Paul did most vigorously enforce the filial dignity and privilege of Christians, and in connection therewith the duty incumbent on all believers to take out of their filial standing all the comfort and inspiration it was fitted to yield. Nothing is more fundamental in Pauline hortatory ethics than the exhortation: Stand fast in sonship and its liberties and privileges.

What, then, according to the apostle Paul, are the privileges of the filial state? The catalogue embraces at least these three particulars: (1) freedom from the law; (2) endowment with the spirit of sonship; (3) a right to the future inheritance, heirship. All these benefits are specified in the place in the Epistle to the Galatians which contains the apostle's earliest statement on the subject. That the privilege of sonship involves emancipation from the law is plainly taught in the words: "To redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons." The second benefit is mentioned in the following verse: "And because ye are sons, God sent the spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba Father." The mission of the spirit of sonship was a natural and necessary sequel to the act of adoption. Of what avail were it to make one a son in standing unless he could be made to feel at home in the house? In order that sonship may be real, there must be a spirit answering to the state, that the adopted one may be no longer a slave in feeling but a son indeed. The third benefit, right to the patrimonial estate, is pointed at in the words "But if a son, then an heir, through God."

With regard to the first of these three privileges of son-

¹ Acts xvii. 29.

ship, St. Paul is very much in earnest. That the believer in Jesus is free from the law he again and again asserts. No better indication of the strength of his conviction on this point could be desired than the fact of his constructing no fewer than three allegorical arguments to establish or exhibit pictorially his view, those, viz., of the bondwoman and freewoman, the two husbands, and the veil of Moses. These allegories show at once what need there was for labouring the point, how thoroughly the apostle's mind had grasped it so as to be fertile and inventive in modes of presentation, and how much he had the subject at heart so as to be proof against the weariness of iteration.

In his doctrine of emancipation from the law, St. Paul had in view the whole Mosaic law without exception. The whole law as a code of statutes written on stone or in a book, put in the form of an imperative: thou shalt do this, thou shalt not do that, with penalties annexed, is, he holds, abolished for the Christian. Whatever remains after the formal act of abrogation, remains for some other reason than because it is in the statute-book. Some parts of the law may remain true for all time as revelation; some precepts may commend themselves to the human conscience in perpetuity as holy, just, and good; but these precepts will come to the Christian in a new form, not as laws written on stone slabs, but as laws written on the heart, as laws of the spirit of a new life. Summed up in love, they will be kept not by constraint, but freely; not out of regard to threatened penalties, but because the love commanded is the very spirit which rules in the heart.

One who dared to represent the state of the believer in Jesus as one of freedom from the Mosaic law, was not likely to have much hesitation in representing Christians as free from the commandments of men. This is rather taken for granted than expressly asserted. Of course all those passages in which St. Paul teaches that Christians

are not bound by scruples as to meats and drinks point in this direction. And the general principle is very adequately stated in the words: "Ye are bought with a price; become not ye the servants of men."¹ For Rabbinical traditions, to which Saul the Pharisee had been a slave, Paul the Christian had no respect whatever. Even the Levitical law which appointed the sacred seasons and their appropriate ritual he characterised as "weak and poverty-stricken elements," to which it were as foolish in Christians to turn again, as it would be for a full-grown man to go back to an infants' school to learn the alphabet.² But for the Rabbinical additions to the law he employed a much more contemptuous term. He called them *σκύβαλα*,³ mere rubbish, never of any use save to puff up with empty pride, and now rejected by him, as a Christian, with loathing.

St. Paul found great difficulty in getting Christians to understand this doctrine of the liberty of a believer in all its comprehensiveness, and to sympathise with his passionate earnestness in maintaining it. He found men everywhere ready to relapse into legalism, and had thus occasion to address to many the warning, "return not again to the yoke of bondage." The history of the Church abundantly proves that there is no part of the apostle's teaching which the average Christian finds harder to understand. In every age, except at creative epochs like the Reformation, the legal spirit exercises extensive sway even over those who imagine themselves to be earnest sup-

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 23.

² There has recently been a tendency among interpreters to revive the patristic view of *στοιχεῖα*, and to find in the word a reference to the heavenly bodies, sun, moon, and stars, conceived of as living beings, by which the dates of holy seasons were fixed. Devotees who scrupulously observed holy times might very appropriately be represented as enslaved to the heavenly luminaries by whose positions these times were determined. This view is favoured by Lipsius in *Hand-kommentar*.

³ *Phil.* iii. 8.

porters of Pauline doctrine, and emphatically evangelical in their piety, causing them to be afraid of new spiritual movements, though these may be but the new wine of the kingdom, and obstinately and indiscriminately conservative of old customs and traditions, though these may have lost all life and meaning. Such timidity and blind clinging to the past are not evangelic: they bear the unmistakable brand of legalism. Where the spirit of the Lord is in any signal measure, there will be liberty from bondage to old things, and from fear of new things; power to discern between good and evil, and courage to receive the good from whatever quarter it may come; there, in short, is not the servile spirit of fear, but the manly spirit of power and of love and of a sound mind. Such was the spirit of St. Paul, and it is much to be desired that his religious temper may ever be associated with profession of faith in his theological doctrine. The divorce of Pauline theology from the Pauline spirit is to be deplored as tending to create a prejudice not only against *Paulinism*, but even against what St. Paul loved more—evangelic piety; even against the very word “evangelical.” Yet what the Church really needs is not less evangelic life, but a great deal more, with all the breadth, strength, freedom, and creative energy that are the true signs of the presence in her midst of the spirit of sonship.¹

2. This spirit is the second benefit which should accompany and naturally springs out of the state of adoption. This spirit is defined by certain attributes which may be taken as the marks of its presence. St. Paul describes it first, generically, as the Spirit of God's own Son, that is, of Jesus Christ. “Because ye are sons, He hath sent the

¹ Harnack (*Dogmengeschichte*, i. 116) says, “Paulinism has acted as a ferment in the history of dogma, a basis it has never been.” But if it has not been a basis in theology, still less has it in its religious spirit exercised a steady ascendancy, to the great loss of the Church.

Spirit of His Son into your hearts.”¹ This might be taken as a summary reference to the history of Jesus as the source of the most authentic and reliable information as to the true nature of the spirit of sonship. We may conceive the apostle here saying in effect: “If you want to know how the filial spirit behaves and manifests itself, look at Christ, and see how He bore Himself towards God. His personal piety is the model for us all: go to His school and learn from Him.” Is this really what he had in his mind? Or is it merely an ontological proposition he offers us, to this effect: the Spirit who dwells in those who have a genuine filial consciousness is a Spirit sent by God and owned by Christ: the Spirit that proceedeth from the Father and the Son? I cannot believe it. The apostle’s thought is dominated here throughout by the ethical interest. He thinks of the Spirit in the believer as a Spirit whose characteristic cry is *Father*, expressive of trust, love, loyal submission and childlike repose. And when he calls that Spirit *Christ’s*, he does not mean merely that He is Christ’s *property*, but that he is Christ’s own spiritual self. The Spirit of God’s Son whom God sends into Christian hearts, and who reveals His presence by the child’s cry, “Father,” is the Spirit who in Him ever uttered that cry in clearest tone and with the ideal fulness of import.

We may therefore find in the expression, “the Spirit of His Son,” an appeal to the evangelic history, and the recognition of Christ’s personal relation to God, as the norm for all Christian piety. How much knowledge of the earthly life of Jesus this presupposes cannot be determined. It may be taken for granted that St. Paul was aware that “Father” was Christ’s chosen and habitual name for God. It may be regarded as equally certain that he knew the characteristics of Christ’s personal religion to be such as justified reference to Him as the model Son, the pattern

¹ Gal. iv. 6.

of filial consciousness as it ought to be. What historical vouchers for these characteristics were known to him we cannot say. We are not entitled to assume that he was acquainted with the prayer which begins, "I thank Thee, O Father,"¹ wherein the filial consciousness of Jesus found classic expression. But we certainly are entitled to affirm that there is no ground for the hypothesis recently put forth by Pfeiderer that this prayer is a composition of the Evangelists, made up of elements drawn from Paul's Epistles, or suggested by Paul's missionary career.² That such an utterance should fall from the lips of Jesus is intrinsically probable if the two inferences drawn from St. Paul's statement be allowed. If Jesus ever called God Father and bore Himself towards God so as to give the ideal expression to the filial consciousness, how natural that He should say in words on a suitable occasion what His whole life said in deed! Pfeiderer's scepticism is based on the assumption that Paul, not Jesus, was the originator of the religion of sonship. The assumption is contradicted by Paul's own testimony in the place before us, where he calls the spirit of sonship the Spirit of Christ the Son. Paul being witness, it was Jesus who first introduced into the world the religious spirit whose characteristic cry Godwards is "Father."

It does not belong to my present task as the interpreter of Paulinism to offer an exposition, however brief, of the classic filial utterance of Jesus.³ But it is competent to point out that the account given in the Pauline literature of the filial spirit in its practical manifestations is in full sympathy with the mind of Christ. The Apostle sets forth the spirit of sonship as a spirit of *trust* in *Romans* viii. 15, where it

¹ *Matt.* xi. 25-27; *Luke* x. 21, 22.

² *Vide* his *Urchristenthum*, pp. 445, 446, and for a criticism of his view, *vide* my *Apologetics*, p. 454.

³ *Vide* *The Kingdom of God*, chapter vii.

is put in contrast with the spirit of fear characteristic of legalism. In other places he gives prominence to *liberty* as an attribute of the Spirit of sonship. The most striking text in this connection is 2 *Corinthians* iii. 17: "Where the Spirit of the Lord—liberty." It is a great word worthy to be associated with that of Jesus: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free," most comprehensive in scope, and susceptible of wide and varying application. Where the Spirit of the Lord, the spirit of sonship, is, there is liberty even from the law of God, as a mere external commandment, with its ominous "thou shalt not"; there is liberty from all commandments of men, whether written statutes or unwritten customs; there is liberty from the dead letter of truth which conceals from view the eternal spiritual meaning; there is liberty from the legal temper ever embodying itself in new forms and striving to bring human souls under its thralldom; there is liberty from the bondage of religious fear, which has wrought such havoc as the parent of superstition and will worship; there, finally, is liberty from fear with regard to the ills of life, and the uncertainties of to-morrow; for to one who knows God as a Father, what can there be to be afraid of? If God be for us, who (or what) shall be against us? ¹ triumphantly asks St. Paul, echoing the thought of Jesus: "Fear not, little flock, it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom."

Here is an ample liberty, though the description is by no means exhaustive. But is it not too ample? men anxious for the interests of morality or of ecclesiastical institutions may be inclined to ask. The tendency has always been to be jealous of Christian liberties as broadly asserted by Christ and Paul, and to subject them to severe restrictions lest they should become revolutionary and latitudinarian. Though not straitened either in Christ or in Paul, the Church has

¹ *Rom.* viii. 31.

been much straitened in her own spirit. This jealousy of liberty has been to a large extent uncalled for, and has simply prevented the Church from enjoying to the full her privilege. That liberty may degenerate into license is true. But where the spirit of the Lord is, no such abuse can take place. For the spirit of the Lord is a holy spirit as well as a free spirit, and He will lead Christians to assert their liberty only for holy ends. What risk, *e.g.*, is there to the interests of holiness in the Pauline antinomianism? The law of God stands no more whip in hand saying, "Do this"; no, but the law of God is written on the heart, and the commandment is kept because it no longer is grievous by reason of the terrifying thunder and the threatened penalty. The only difference is that obedience is made easy instead of irksome. Christ's yoke is easy, and His burden is light. Heavy is the burden when we carry the sense of duty like the slabs on which the Decalogue was written on our back, but light is the burden when law is transmuted into love, and duty consists in becoming like our Father in heaven. What risk to the interests of religion in the Pauline disregard of ritual, in his doctrine that circumcision and everything of like nature is nothing? It is but getting rid of dead works in order the better to serve the living God, with a truly reasonable, spiritual service, in which all the powers of the inner man earnestly take part. What risk, finally, to the peace of the sacred commonwealth in the decided assertion of the liberty of the Christian conscience from the bondage of petty scrupulosity, when the spirit of Jesus, who dwells in all the sons of God, is not only a spirit of freedom, but not less emphatically a spirit of charity, disposing all who are under its guidance in all things to consider their neighbour for their good unto edification, and also a spirit of wisdom which can discern where concession and forbearance *are* for the good and edification of the whole body of Christ?

This reference to the body of Christ recalls to mind an

important result flowing, according to Pauline teaching, from the spirit of sonship. It is its tendency to remove barriers to Christian fellowship arising out of small matters to which the legal spirit attaches undue value. How closely sonship and brotherhood were connected in the apostle's mind appears from the fact that on the first mention of the sonship of Christians in *Galatians* iii. 26, he proceeds immediately after to speak of the new society based on the Christian faith as one wherein is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female, but all are one in Christ Jesus. It is easy to find the missing link which connects the two topics. In St. Paul's view, as we know, the first fundamental privilege of sonship is emancipation from the law. But the law was the great barrier between Jews and Gentiles; that removed, there was nothing to prevent them from being united in a Christian brotherhood on equal terms. The partition wall being taken down, the two separated sections of humanity could become one in a new society, having for its motto, Christ all and in all. The accomplishment of this grand union, in which St. Paul took the leading part, was the first great historical exemplification of the connection between the spirit of sonship and the spirit of *Catholicity*. It is obviously not the only possible one. The tendency of the legal spirit at all times is to multiply causes of separation, both in religious faith and in religious practice; in the former, increasing needlessly the number of fundamentals; in the latter, erecting every petty scruple about meats and drinks, and social customs, and forms of worship, to the dignity of a principle dividing from all whose practice is nonconformist. The legal spirit is essentially anti-catholic and separatist, and manifests itself as such in a thousand different ways. On the other hand, the filial spirit is not less essentially catholic; craves for fellowship with all who are sons of God by faith in Jesus Christ; and has the impulse to sweep away the manifold artificial

barriers which dogmatic, pragmatic, self-asserting legalism has set up to the dividing of those who are one in Christ. What a change would come over the face of Christendom if the Spirit of Adoption were poured out in abundant measure on all who bear the Christian name !

3. The third benefit accruing from sonship is *heirship*. "If a son, then an heir";¹ "if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ."² What is the inheritance, and when do the sons enter on it? Are they expectants only, or are they in possession already? Looking to the connection of thought in the Epistle to the Galatians, the sons, according to St. Paul, are in possession, at least, in part. The adoption means that a son who in childhood differed nothing from a servant, becomes a son indeed at the time appointed. Objectively, that time arrived when Christ came; subjectively, it arrived then for all who, like St. Paul, understood the significance of the Christian era. In natural life the heir enters on his inheritance at his father's death. God does not die, and there is no need to wait on that account. Rather Christians enter on their inheritance when they begin truly to live. The inheritance consists in *autonomy*, spiritual freedom; in *spiritual-mindedness*, which is life and peace; in *spiritual buoyancy*, victorious over all the ills of life, fearing nothing, rejoicing even in tribulation because of the healthful discipline and confirmation of character it brings. Truly no imaginary possessions, genuine treasures of the soul !

Yet, here, according to St. Paul, as we gather from the place in *Romans*, the Christian inherits only in part; he is largely an expectant, "saved by hope."³ For the present is a scene of suffering. Doubtless the tribulations of the present afford the son of God opportunity for showing his heroic temper, and verifying the reality of his sonship. But on the most optimistic view of the present it must be

¹ Gal. iv. 7.² Rom. viii. 17.³ Rom. viii. 24.

admitted that groaning is a large element in human life. The Christian is often obliged to say to himself, It is a weary world. Even the Divine Spirit immanent in him sympathetically shares in his groaning.¹ What is wrong? There is wrong within, defective spiritual vitality.² There is wrong in the body; it is still even for the redeemed man a body of Death, and he will not be an effectively, fully-redeemed man till his body has shared in the redemptive process.³ There is wrong, finally, in the outside world, in the very inanimate, or lower animate creation, needing and crying for redemption from vanity, and travailing in birth-pangs which shall issue in the appearance of the new heavens and the new earth.⁴ In view of all these things, St. Paul seems half inclined to cancel his earlier doctrine of the era of sonship dating from the birth of Christ, and, regarding Christians as still sons who differ nothing from a slave, to project the *υιοθεσία* forward to the era of consummation. For he applies the term, we note, to that era whereof the redemption of the body is the most outstanding feature and symbol. "Waiting for the adoption, the redemption of the body."⁵ In some codices the word *υιοθεσίαν* is omitted,⁶ why, we can only conjecture. The copyists may have thought it strange that there should be two adoptions, or that a term denoting an imperfect kind of sonship should be applied to the final perfect state, wherein sonship shall be raised to its highest power, its very ideal realised in fellowship with Christ in filial glory. No wonder they stumbled at the expression. For, in truth, the use of the word by the apostle in reference to the future consummation raises the doubt whether we have not been on the wrong track in imagining that when he speaks of the *υιοθεσία* in

¹ Rom. viii. 26.

² Rom. viii. 23. The believer has only the *firstfruits* of the Spirit: τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος.

³ Rom. viii. 23.

⁴ Rom. viii. 19-22.

⁵ Rom. viii. 23, last clause.

⁶ D, F, G. omit it.

his epistles, he has the Greek or the Roman practice of adoption in view. That use, at all events, shows that if, when it first entered into his mind to avail himself of the term, he was thinking of adoption as practised by either of the two classic nations, he was constrained by his Christian convictions to employ it in a manner which invested it with a new, nobler sense than it had ever before borne. Adoption in Roman law denoted the investment of persons formerly not sons with some measure of filial status; *υιοθεσία* in St. Paul's vocabulary means the solemn investment of persons formerly sons in an imperfect degree with a sonship worthy of the name, realising the highest possibilities of filial honour and privilege.¹

A. B. BRUCE.

THE CHURCH AND THE EMPIRE IN THE FIRST CENTURY.

III. THE FIRST EPISTLE ATTRIBUTED TO ST. PETER.

THESE papers attempt to prove that the books of the New Testament which are treated give a picture of the relations between the State and the Christians, which is in itself probable, and which takes up every one of the scanty and incomplete statements of the non-Christian writers bearing on the point, puts each in its proper surroundings, and gives to each a much fuller meaning than it has when taken by itself.

Accordingly, to discuss the two classes of authorities, Pagan and Christian, side by side, was the aim of the lectures in which I treated the subject. The two distinguished authorities to whose criticisms I am replying have

¹ Usteri (*Paulinischer Lehrbegriff*) thinks that as Paul uses the word, the idea of adoption is not to be pressed. *Ude* note on *υιοθεσία* at p. 194 of the work referred to.

preferred to discuss the subject purely on the one class of evidence, and to leave the other out of sight. If the point at issue had been the genuineness of the latter class of documents, this procedure would have been quite right. But the question between us is not literary, it is as to what was occurring in the period 64-90 A.D. It is not allowable to leave out of sight the evidence of the only documents that claim to be contemporary except on the ground that their claim is false and that they were produced at a later time. If they are genuine, they are weighty evidence, and ought to be weighed in comparison with the other evidence. Now the sole point of difference between Prof. Mommsen and myself turns on the evidence of the Christian documents. I frankly confess that, if the question had to be decided on the Pagan evidence alone, Suetonius's few weighty words must be accepted as the supreme authority, and we should have to conclude that, where evidence is so deplorably scanty, all that Tacitus adds beyond Suetonius is deficient in authority and precision, and must be disregarded. In that case Prof. Mommsen has said all that can be said, and I should accept his statement without a word of comment as being (like so much of his other work on Roman imperial history) a decisive, impartial, and perfect outline of the view which the evidence accessible suggests. But my point is that the Christian authorities supplement the dozen words in which Suetonius dismisses the subject; that they do not contradict but complete him, since it was not possible for him to express fully a long process of political and social history in a dozen words; and that the additions which Tacitus makes to Suetonius are in perfect agreement with the Christian evidence. It may perhaps seem that I am insisting on this too much and repeating the statement; but it appears to me to be so important and fundamental that it must be insisted on and reiterated. At each point in the examination of the evidence, I am compelled to state that the criticism to which

I reply has not taken this piece of evidence into account. Prof. Mommsen will perhaps reply that the scholars to whose province it belongs to decide as to the genuineness of the Christian documents which claim to belong to the first century have not agreed on the question; and that, till opinion is agreed on that point, he cannot consent to admit them as evidence. To that I can only answer that, in that case, my words at present do not affect him, but appeal only to those who admit the genuineness of the documents. I contend however that the admission of these documents sets the non-Christian authorities in a new light, and makes them more instructive, and that this fact is in itself a very strong proof of their genuineness. But beyond this I do not enter on the question whether the Christian authorities are genuine. The question has now, so far as I can judge, been sufficiently discussed; and, apart from theological issues (on which I do not enter), one need not waste time on it. Some learned and estimable scholars hold that the work purporting to be Tacitus's *Annals* is a fifteenth-century forgery; and many other opinions, which equally outrage literary feeling and historical possibility, can be supported by plausible and elaborate arguments. But such questions are mere curiosities, on which no serious investigator of history would spend more than a footnote; and the question as to the genuineness of the *Pastoral Epistles* would long ago have taken its place in the same category, had mere literary and historical issues been involved in it. That there are serious difficulties for the historical student in the *Pastoral Epistles* I fully acknowledge; and I do not profess to remove them, or even to discuss them. I merely urge that it is no solution of the difficulties to pitchfork these *Epistles* into the second century; that none of the critics who light-heartedly adopt a second century date have ever seriously faced the task of showing that these *Epistles* suit the historical situation into which they have been

tossed; and that it is a mere travesty of historical criticism to thrust documents into a period without proving clearly that they suit the position. One of these difficulties alone here concerns us, and it appears now before us in a very different form from what it had not long ago. The fact that persecution is referred to in these Epistles has ceased to have any weight as an argument against their genuineness. The only question now is whether the type of persecution implied in them is consistent with the supposition that the State had fully determined its attitude and procedure towards the Christians.

To come now to the First Epistle of Peter. I have discussed the evidence derived from it at such length in chapter xiii. pp. 279-94, that I scruple to say more. It would be possible to make the exposition clearer and more detailed; but it may be doubted whether a longer exposition would go far to convince those whose opinion remains unaffected by what has been already said in the pages referred to. The view which I have stated steers a middle course between two opinions, which are as much opposed to it as they are to each other: one that that Epistle is written to encourage Christians exposed to persecution for the Name, and must therefore be a second century production; the other that the Epistle addresses Christians who are not exposed to any persecution beyond social annoyance, and that therefore it may have been composed even before A.D. 64. The view to which my argument led is (1) that the Epistle was written after the Roman government had inaugurated the procedure which was regular and proper throughout the second century (though not always carried into effect), viz., "persecution for the Name"; (2) it was written at the time when this fully developed procedure was newly introduced, and the writer is still partly under the influence of the previously existing procedure, and his tone represents the transition from that of the Pastoral Epistles to that of

the Apocalypse; (3) the period is in the second part of Vespasian's reign, 75-9 A.D. Without repeating the arguments already stated, I shall discuss some criticisms that have been made on various points in this triple inference.

That some passages point to accusations against Christians as criminals and malefactors rather than to simple condemnation for the "Name" is quite true; this fact however constitutes no argument against my view, but is part of my case. There occur passages of both kinds, indicating that "the writer stood at the beginning of the new period, and hardly realized all that was implied in it." This answer applies to one or two criticisms that have been made. When the Epistle was written procedure had developed into the stage of punishment "for the Name." The idea of suffering for "the Name" had become well defined and readily intelligible before iv. 14 and 16 could be written; and that implies a different procedure from the mere putting of Christians to death for certain serious crimes, even though the trial was forced through on notoriously insufficient evidence under the influence of popular panic and hatred. The period of martyrs in the strict sense had begun, the period when the sufferer could feel himself a witness to his faith and to his God, when he could know that the placard before him bore the words "hic est Christianus," and could glory in such a death, and not feel the shame of being proclaimed publicly as "murderer" or "*sacrilegus*" (p. 401, see also p. 294, *note**).

I must here refer to an objection, stated by a writer whose opinion I value very highly, and whose very kind notice of my book has especially gratified me, Dr. Marcus Dodds. Even "admitting that the persecution referred to was directed by Roman officials," he considers it "very doubtful whether the passages adduced will bear the interpretation that Christians were 'sought out' by these officials." I fully admit the truth of this remark. In such

indirect allusions to the action taken by the State as occur in the Epistle, we can hardly expect to find clear and explicit statement as to details in that action. We have nothing to go upon except the general implication and tendency of the passages referring to persecution. Each one, when scrutinized too minutely, fails in the unmistakable directness of a witness in a court of law; the question which we are asking is not the one to which the witness is replying; and we must judge of his testimony according as it was given. Further, we must remember the difference between Roman and modern procedure, caused by the dependence of the latter on private initiative; the action of the Roman law even in criminal cases was to a very great extent dependent on popular co-operation. Hence "throughout First Peter the mixture of official and popular action is very clearly expressed" (pp. 295, 325, 373). I cannot resist the evidence that official action is a necessary part of the situation. Private action became powerful when it had legal proceedings to appeal to, but it "would be of little consequence unless abetted and completed by official judgment." Herein lies the strength of the language in iii. 15, "being ready always to give answer to every man that asketh you a reason concerning the hope that is in you."¹ It is quite true that, as has been stated in criticism of my view, the expression "seems rather to indicate a number of private inquisitors than the one public governor." That is precisely the case; but, in the first place, the words "every one" must not be taken to exclude the governor, and, secondly, the strength of these "private

¹ The proper force of these words is not seen without taking the Greek into account: the language of law is sharply distinguished, in English, from the language of ordinary life and of literature. In Greek it was not so; and in this passage we have language which belongs to all three spheres, rendered in the Authorised Version by words that are wholly non-legal. *ἔτοιμοι ἅει πρὸς ἀπολογία* παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι ὑμᾶς λόγον περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλπίδος: ἀπολογία is strictly an answer to a legal charge; and this idea from the sphere of law underlies the wider popular sense in which it is here used.

inquisitors" lay entirely in the fact that they only put the questions which the state authorised them to put as potential prosecutors, and which the public governor would put as soon as any private prosecutor brought the case to his knowledge. Without this power in reserve the question of the private inquisitor had no terror; but with official action to back him, every private person was armed with the terror of a *delator*. The author of this Epistle is here alluding to one of the most characteristic features of Roman life, one which is described times without number in the Roman writers, the *delatores*, or, to adopt the felicitous expression which I have just quoted, "private inquisitors." There was no regular class of lawyers; the distinction between the lawyer and the private person hardly existed; and every citizen was free to act as a lawyer, pleading not merely on his own behalf, but for his friends, or in prosecution of his opponents or enemies. Volunteer prosecutors could often look forward to a reward for their exertions, if successful; and under the early Empire such private inquisitors were strenuously encouraged by the government. Juvenal speaks of the very coast being peopled with "private inquisitors," on the look out for breaches of the law (iv. 47). Horace mentions two such private inquisitors, who go about a terror to evil-doers, though the innocent can laugh at them. The advice given in the Pastoral Epistles, and in a considerable part of First Peter, is an amplification of the thought in this passage of Horace (*Satires*, I. 4, 64-70). I have pointed out that at a later time a class of lawyers, or "private inquisitors"¹ seems to have arisen, who made a specialty of Christian cases (p. 480, note 4).

¹ It is strictly true that the "private inquisitors" of Roman time have developed into the "legal practitioners" of our modern life; the chief difference between them lies in the fees which the "private inquisitor" is now required to pay, the dinners which he is required to eat, and the legal status and title which he thus acquires.

Intentionally I have enlarged on this detail, as an example "how vividly various passages in the Epistle express the character of Roman procedure," etc. (see p. 294). This and many other such points constitute what I have called the *romanised* character of this Epistle (p. 286 f.), stamping it as written by a person accustomed to Roman life and manners.

It is an important point that the Epistle falls naturally into the place assigned to it, and that many passages in it are seen to be full of reality and applicability to the actual facts of the situation, instead of being vague generalities, when one reads it from this point of view. In particular the strange and practically unique word *ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος*,¹ instead of being an unsolved puzzle, is seen to be a clear, distinct, and apposite term, referring pointedly to a prominent fact in the historical situation. Divorced from its real surroundings the word has seemed obscure and unintelligible. Restored to its surroundings, it introduces us to a new page in the history of Roman procedure, and affords a striking example of the influence of Greek philosophy on Roman law, which through the learning of Dr. E. Zeller, and the kindness of Prof. Mommsen (who sent me a copy of Dr. Zeller's little paper as soon as it appeared), can now be described. Dr. Zeller's paper "on a Point of Contact between later Cynicism and Christianity" was read before the Berlin Academy on 23rd February, 1893, a week before my book was published; and in it he takes the same view of the meaning of the term that I have done, illustrating it with his breadth of knowledge, and setting it in its proper place in the history of ancient thought. As the paper is hidden in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Berlin Academy, 1893, pp. 129-132, it will be convenient for the reader that I should mention one or two points in it that bear on

¹ It occurs only in 1 Peter, iv. 15, and in passages which are imitated from that verse.

our subject, referring him to the author's own statement, if he wishes to enjoy properly a most charming little essay.

The idea was current in Greek philosophy from the days of Socrates onwards that it was the duty of the true philosopher to stir up his fellow men to live rightly and attend to the welfare of their own souls. Beyond all other Socratic schools, the Cynics insisted on this duty of the philosopher; and they expressed it in various ways: sometimes that the philosopher ought to be the physician of souls, sometimes that he ought to be a spy upon (*κατάσκοπος*), or an overseer of (*ἐπίσκοπος*) the actions of man. Dio Chrysostom relates that Diogenes the Cynic went of old to the Isthmian games, not to enjoy the spectacle, but to keep an eye on mankind and its folly (*ἐπισκοπῶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὴν ἄνοιαν αὐτῶν*). Especially was this a prevalent and guiding thought among the Cynic philosophers of the early Roman Empire, who use the same old terms and metaphors as the earlier philosophers. Epictetus urges in particularly strong and manifold ways that the true philosopher must boldly, and without regard to consequences, act the overseer over other men (*ἐπισκοπεῖν*) in every department of their life, directing them, advising them, never shrinking from the reproach that he is interfering in other people's business, for everything that concerns mankind is the true philosopher's business.

I have pointed out that to the Pagan observer the Cynics and the Christians seemed to be "two members of one class, differing in some respects, but on the whole of the same type" (p. 352, *note*); and this extract from Dr. Zeller's exposition shows how deep-seated and real the analogy was, and how natural it was that the same unpopularity, though in very different degrees, accompanied both these schools of morals. Both interfered with the established order of society; both criticised keenly and unsparingly the faults of the time; both committed all the faults enumerated in long

array in the passage which I have imitated from Aristides (p. 351 f.); but the Christians did so with incomparably greater boldness and greater effect, and were correspondingly more hated as being the more dangerous of the two schools. At the same time the very similarity of their aims, combined with the difference of method that they preached, placed the two schools (like rival schools of medicine) in vehement opposition to each other. The cynic could only appear to the Christian preacher a mere charlatan in his attempts to cure the sickness of men's souls; and the Cynic retorted with hatred on the Christian. Thus, for example, as Dr. Zeller has observed, the bitter assault of the Cynic philosopher Crescens on Justin Martyr is a fair example of the usual relations between the schools.¹

It is a curious coincidence, but only an accidental coincidence, that the term *ἐπίσκοπος*, which was so important in the Christian Church, should be so prominent as a description of the true Cynic philosopher. The Christian *ἐπίσκοπος* derived his title from a different idea. But there remains in the remarkable term *ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος*, as Dr. Zeller has pointed out, a trace of the application to the Christians of the same idea that was used by the Cynics. The populace considered that the preacher, Cynic or Christian alike, was an *ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος*, a person thrusting himself into the direction of what was not his own business. The accusation was familiar to Epictetus, and perhaps the very term is referred to in his denial of the charge: "when the philosopher is directing the affairs of human beings, he is not busying himself about other people's business but about his own" (*οὐ τὰ ἀλλότρια πολυπραγμονεῖ ὅταν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐπισκοπῇ ἀλλὰ τὰ ἴδια*, III. 22, 97).

¹ Dr. Zeller is, however, not correct when he connects Crescens's attack with Justin's trial and condemnation in 163 (this, and not 165 as he has it, is the date preferred as probable by Borghesi). I need only refer to Canon Scott Holland's discussion in the *Dict. of Chr. Biography* for the proof that the quarrel with Crescens belongs to a much earlier period of Justin's life.

So far I find myself in entire agreement with Dr. Zeller ; and the coincidence in our views, starting from such opposite premises, is especially gratifying. But at this point, unfortunately, we diverge. Dr. Zeller unhesitatingly dates First Peter in the second century, "hardly earlier than Justin's First Apology" (*i.e.*, about 130-140 A.D.). On the contrary, I find that this use of the term *ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος* points to a first century date, and is very difficult to reconcile with a second century origin for the Epistle. Dr. Zeller is, however, so firmly persuaded of the second century date that he does not even put the question whether the term and the facts implied in its use in the Epistle suit the historical circumstances of the period to which he assigns First Peter. His dating is to him an axiom from which he starts, not a theory which he is testing. The words of the Epistle, iv. 15, 16, seem to me to point to the interpretation that the writer is distinguishing between two kinds of accusation, and advising his correspondents and disciples as to the tone and conduct that are suitable to each (a point discussed in my last paper, *EXPOSITOR*, August, p. 113). They should be proud, and regard it as an honour to be punished as Christians ; but that they should be punished for murder, or theft, or as guilty of immorality, or as *ἀλλοτριεπίσκοποι*, is a thing from which they naturally and rightly shrink, and for which they should strenuously try to avoid giving the slightest occasion. Unless these were charges that had been commonly brought against Christians before the tribunals,¹ and unless Christians had actually suffered in many cases on these grounds, there is no appositeness in the passage.

But during the second century such charges were not

¹ Three of these charges are discussed, or alluded to many times in my book (pp. 205, 237, 247, etc.). Theft is not one that seems specially appropriate, but it was probably brought in to help to give legal ground for charges of influencing by unlawful means the minds of converts, and acquiring possession of their money or other property. The practice was to get up a case which could be sent for trial, and trust to prejudice for success in carrying it through.

those on which Christians suffered. I have described over and over again the procedure, keeping as close as possible to the words of the actual witnesses, and must urge once more that it is essential in investigations of this kind to distinguish clearly the procedure and the charges which characterized the state-action at different periods. The belief that the Christians were guilty of the crimes mentioned in iv. 16 was widely spread, and constituted to those Pagans who reasoned on the matter a justification for their treatment (such as Pliny and Aristides, pp. 205 and 351 f.); but the crimes were not required or used to bring about the condemnation of Christians. It has already been pointed out (EXPOSITOR, July, p. 19) that these charges were employed in the second century only against those Christians who had recanted, and who therefore were not amenable to the more serious charge. But according to the view which has been set forth in my chapter xi., such charges of criminality constituted the ground on which Christians were executed under the Neronian procedure. We have deduced this from the natural interpretation of Tacitus's detailed account; we have found it in perfect agreement with the tone of the contemporary Pastoral Epistles; and we now find that it gives the simple and sufficient explanation of the language of First Peter. In particular, we find that on this theory the punishment of death, in connexion with the charge of "tampering with other people's business," is intelligible. The Epistle puts the *ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος* on a level with the murderer and the thief in respect of the punishment that awaited him. So severe a punishment for such a charge is so unusual that it must arise out of an exceptional state of things; and we have found that Tacitus leads up naturally to the same connexion of charge and penalty. Under the interpretation that the influence acquired by the Christian over his converts was an unlawful interference with the will of others and the ordinary habits of society, and

was gained by unholy and magical arts, the crime of being *ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος* had come to be a capital charge. Nero had given his sanction to this method of judging charges against Christians, and his example had been followed by provincial governors, especially in Asia Minor, whose congregations are addressed in this Epistle. We find, then, that the passage under discussion is out of keeping with the circumstances of the second century, while it is in keeping with the circumstances of A.D. 65-75, as we have described them. Then, and then alone, did the imperial government unreservedly pander to popular prejudice, and mould its procedure entirely to suit popular scandal.

On the other hand the view taken by Dr. Sanday, and the similar view stated by Prof. Mommsen, seem to me not to fully explain the language of First Peter. Nero's action on this view consisted in first punishing a certain number of Christians on the charge of arson, and thereafter in instituting "general measures of repression . . . partly in defence of the public gods, partly against the excesses said, probably not in all cases unjustly, to reign among them." The spirit of Prof. Mommsen's article as a whole shows that he considers (like Dr. Sanday) that these "general measures of repression" were exactly of the type prevalent in the second century. But I can only repeat that we must not ignore the essential difference implied in punishing Christians for excesses, and punishing them simply because they plead guilty to being Christians. The former procedure brought the punishment of Christians under the ordinary criminal law, proving them to be criminals and punishing them accordingly. Prof. Mommsen himself has cleared up the nature of the latter procedure, showing that it was not founded on the ordinary laws, but on the administrative authority of the great magistrates and, in particular, of the Emperor and his delegates.¹

¹ From this statement it appears how far I am from being able to accept one

Even if we can admit that the two methods of procedure were practised side by side for a time, and that the procedure was variable and not yet clearly determined, this very variability would be a fact peculiar to the first century, and specially to the period A.D. 65-80. I find no trace of such variation in the second century. A document like 1 Peter, which bears witness to such variation, would still be marked out as belonging to the first century. But the view to which I incline is that we must take our choice between these two kinds of procedure. They are not consistent with each other, and neither evidence nor natural probability justifies us in saying that they were practised side by side.¹ Nero, as we have said, was precluded from the latter procedure by the formal decision of the supreme court in A.D. 63 acquitting Paul; but the former procedure was quite

point in the criticism of a very generous and friendly reviewer in the *Guardian*. He objects to the view of Prof Mommsen, which I have adopted, that "the persecutions were not based upon definite laws, but were administrative acts"; and he is inclined to think that some definite edict or even law is necessary to explain the "determined attitude of the Imperial Government, and the fact that throughout their treatises the Apologists always speak of Christianity as illegal." Prof. Mommsen has put it in the strongest terms (and I have followed him to the best of my ability) that Christianity was opposed to the most fundamental principles of the Roman State: it was far more than merely illegal, it was anti-Roman. But it seems to me that the language of Pliny is inconsistent with the supposition that there was any formal law or edict against Christianity (pp. 210, 223): the difficulty of the case has always been how to reconcile the existence of persecutions with the utter want of any proof or probability that there was any such law. Then Mommsen showed that no difficulty existed, because the proceedings against Christians were never judicial. That is a matter of fact, not of opinion. The reviewer plunges us back into the difficulty by insisting that there must have been some law. When the reviewer goes on to say that he sees no necessity to explain away the language of Sulpicius Severus, who speaks about laws against Christians, I must point out that, in regard to Sulpicius, the point that has always to be proved is whether a statement in him can be admitted as possessing any value. In this case every consideration is against attaching the slightest value to his word; and I have been even too polite in my treatment of his reflections.

¹ I must explicitly disclaim the opinion that they *could* not exist side by side. I merely think that the evidence is not in favour of it, and that without express evidence it seems natural to suppose that the two procedures were successive, not contemporary.

open to him. The inference appears to me necessary that his procedure was such as I have contended; and First Peter implies that such procedure continued for some years, and that it extended over the eastern provinces.

It has been shown how short was the time during which further developments of Nero's procedure could have taken place. It began in the summer or early autumn of 64 A.D., and in the latter part of 66 Nero left Rome for Greece, and evidently let the government drift. Had he gone on and taken the step, easy indeed in itself, towards the final stage of treating the Christian name as in itself illegal, it would have been this final stage that spread to the provinces. But if Nero did not make the step before he left Rome, there is no room for any further step till the wars of the succession ended, and Vespasian was seated on the throne.

W. M. RAMSAY.

(*To be continued.*)

ON THE PROPER RENDERING OF ΕΚΑΘΙΣΕΝ IN ST. JOHN XIX. 13.

BOTH in the Authorised and Revised English Versions of the New Testament, the verb *ἐκάθισεν* is here taken in a neuter or intransitive sense, and is rendered "sat down." The word is thus made to refer to Pilate himself, and implies that the Roman governor then took his place on the tribunal, as being, at the time, under Cæsar, the supreme ruler among the Jews. Luther, in his translation of the passage, goes so far as to insert the word "sich," *seated himself*, "setzte sich," and in so doing, as we shall see, he has been followed by almost all his learned countrymen down to the present day. But for acting thus, there is really no warrant in the original. The verb stands by itself in the Greek without an object; and, if anything is

to be understood at all, it seems to me quite as legitimate to supply *αὐτόν* as *αὐτόν*, *him*, referring to a different person from the subject of the verb, and not *himself*, which, of course, points to Pilate. The meaning will then be, not that the Roman procurator personally assumed the place of judgment, but that he "seated" Jesus on the tribunal, while he thus emphatically presented by deed, as he had already done by word, the innocent and uncomplaining Sufferer to the exasperated Jews in the character of their "king."

I venture to think that this latter view brings out the real force of the passage. All will probably admit that it appears at once much more in accordance with the strikingly dramatic narrative in which the verse occurs, than is the translation of *ἐκάθισεν* that has been commonly adopted. To be told that Pilate himself "sat down on the judgment-seat" is a merely prosaic and commonplace statement, which implies no more than what might have been witnessed any day in Jerusalem; but to be informed that he brought forth Jesus from the Prætorium, and placed *Him* in the seat of authority and honour, at once calls up before us a picture, which by its unexpectedness, and yet its fitness, has the very strongest power to impress our hearts.

But, of course, the decisive question is,—Will the word *ἐκάθισεν* bear this meaning? We have, in fact, to enquire whether the verb *καθίζω* can mean "to set down," as well as "to sit down"; and, more particularly, whether there is any other example in the New Testament of its being used absolutely in the transitive sense which I claim for it in this passage. We look then, first, at the classical writers, and what do we find? Why, there crowd upon us passages which prove that the active or transitive sense may really be regarded as the ordinary or normal meaning of the word. Thus, to quote only two out of a multitude

of passages, we find the following in Homer (*Il.*, vi. 359, 360) :—

Τὴν δ' ἠμείβετ' ἔπειτα μέγας κορυθαίολος Ἔκτωρ,
Μή με κάθεζ' Ἑλένη, φιλέουσα περ' οὐδέ με πείσεις—

“But helmet-tossing Hector the mighty then answered her (saying): Do not *constrain me to sit*, Helen, loving though you be, for you will not persuade me (to do so):¹ and in Xenophon (*Anab.*, ii. 1, 4)—Ἐπαγγελόμεθα δὲ Ἀριαίῳ, ἐὰν ἐνθάδε ἔλθῃ, εἰς τὸν θρόνον τὸν βασιλείου καθίσειν αὐτόν—“And we promise to Ariæus, that, if he will come hither, we will *seat him* on the royal throne.” The classical usage of the word is thus obvious; and we next proceed to enquire whether a like transitive meaning is found attached to καθίζω in the New Testament. Here again the answer is clear that such is indeed the case. We turn to 1 Corinthians vi. 4, and there read—Βιωτικὰ μὲν οὖν κριτήρια ἐὰν ἔχητε, τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, τούτους καθίζετε—“If then ye have to judge things pertaining to this life, *set them* to judge who are least esteemed in the church.” Still more apt for our present purpose is Ephesians i. 20, because in it ἐκάθισεν occurs absolutely in a transitive sense, as I claim it should be taken in the passage under consideration. The words of St. Paul are—ἦν ἐνήργησεν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, ἐγείρας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν, καὶ ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις—“which He wrought in Christ, when He raised Him from the dead, and *set Him* (or, *made Him to sit*) at His own right hand in the heavenly places.” Here, as all agree, the words καὶ ἐκάθισεν (or, according to a different reading, καθίσας, accepted by some with, however, exactly the same meaning) must be translated transitively, “caused Him to sit,” or “set Him down” at His own right hand. And why

¹ The quotations in Greek and Latin are translated throughout for the sake of English readers who may wish to follow the argument.

should not the same rendering be given to the words as they occur in St. John's Gospel? It is to be observed how naturally the transitive meaning of ἐκάθισεν here fits the context. Pilate is represented in the first clause of the verse as *doing something* to Jesus. "He brought Jesus forth," we read, and the action thus begun is naturally conceived of as continued in the following clause, "and set Him down." The object of the governor's action having already been emphatically pointed out in the accusative τὸν Ἰησοῦν after ἤγαγεν, there was no necessity for following ἐκάθισεν by αὐτόν, but the mind of the reader spontaneously suggests that supplement as implied in the preceding accusative. And thus the action which is represented as begun in ἤγαγεν, naturally finds continuance in ἐκάθισεν, so that the two clauses harmoniously read: "Pilate brought Jesus forth, and set Him down on the judgment-seat."

I confess that it seems to me not a little remarkable that this admirably coherent rendering of the verse has met with so little favour among interpreters of the New Testament. The translation of ἐκάθισεν for which I am pleading has not a place even on the margin of the Revised Version. And this is all the more to be wondered at, because every one who has paid attention to its marginal renderings must have felt how liberally (to use very mild language) alternative translations are presented. But it must be admitted that the Revised Version in thus virtually denying that the transitive force of ἐκάθισεν is here conceivable, stands in full accord with the course adopted by the vast majority of New Testament critics. I have looked into most of the recent Commentaries on St. John's Gospel both by German and English scholars, and I find that almost all of them agree in ignoring that rendering of ἐκάθισεν which I have proposed. They do not argue against it: they simply pass it by as unworthy of notice. Thus Meyer contents himself

with adopting Luther's rendering "seated himself," without the slightest reference to any other possible version. The same course is followed by Weiss, Lange, Luthardt, Lücke, Holtzmann, Schantz, Keil, and others. In our own country, Ellicott's Commentary implies the common rendering, and suggests no thought of any other being possible. The same is true of the *Commentary on St. John* published under the editorship of Dr. Schaff. Dean Alford says not a word upon the subject, and has simply on his margin opposite the word *ἐκάθισεν* the following very weak remark: "intr. Matt. v. 1, al.," implying, of course, that he here regarded the verb as neuter, while he does not even refer to those passages in the New Testament in which, as he himself allows, the word has, of necessity, a transitive significance.

The only recent critical work which, so far as known to me, notices and discusses that alternative rendering of *ἐκάθισεν*, for which I contend, is what is known as *The Speaker's Commentary*. I shall here quote the annotation in full, and then briefly deal with the objections it brings forward to the interpretation proposed. The note is as follows: "It has been suggested that the verb (*ἐκάθισεν*) is transitive (1 Cor. vi. 4; Eph. i. 20), and that the sense is, 'Pilate placed Him (Christ) on a seat,' completing in this way the scene of the 'Ecce Homo,' by showing the King on His throne. At first sight the interpretation is attractive, but the action does not seem to fall in with the position of a Roman governor, and the usage of the phrase elsewhere (Acts xii. 21, xxv. 6, 17) appears to be decisive against it. St. John, it may be added, never uses the verb transitively."

This writer, it will be observed, admits the "attractiveness" of that view of the passage which I am endeavouring to substantiate. He would, apparently, be glad to accept it, were there not certain objections to which he thinks it

is exposed. Let us look, for a little, at these, and see what weight can properly be assigned them.

The first objection is, that "the action does not seem to fall in with the position of a Roman governor." The difficulty thus suggested is somewhat vague; and we cannot readily grasp what it is meant to imply. Probably, we are to understand by it that it would have been inconsistent with the dignity of Pilate that another should, for a time, occupy the place and wear the insignia of office, while he himself stood near, undistinguished by the outward marks of that authority which he possessed. If this be the drift of the objection, it is obviously of a somewhat shadowy nature, and does, in fact, rest upon a total misconception of the national character of the Romans. They cared little *who* might be adorned with the external emblems of power, provided they themselves enjoyed the reality. There is a remarkable passage in Tacitus, which brings this point very strikingly before us. Referring to the anxiety which was shown by the Parthians, that Tiridates, while in fact a prisoner, should be treated with all the outward honours due to a prince, the historian remarks (*Ann.* xv. 31): "Scilicet externæ superbæ sueto, non inerat notitia nostri, apud quos vis imperii valet, inania transmittuntur." "In truth, the Parthian king, accustomed to foreign pompousness, was ignorant of our habits, who attach importance to the realities of power, while its outward show is left to others." So, on this occasion, Pilate, like a true Roman, might readily dispense with the mere *inania* of authority—the place, the robe, and other externals of supreme power—knowing that all the time he retained the supremacy in his own hands, and might give proof of it when and how he pleased.

Secondly, it is said that "the usage of the phrase elsewhere appears to be decisive against" its transitive use in this passage. Acts xii. 21, xxv. 6, 17, are referred to, and

undoubtedly καθίζω has, in these and other passages, a neuter sense, and is to be rendered "to sit down." But, as we have already seen, it has as certainly at 1 Corinthians vi. 4 and Ephesians i. 20, a transitive force, so that nothing can be inferred from its meaning in other places as to its import in the passage before us. The truth is, καθίζω is one of those verbs, not uncommon in all languages, the special signification of which can only be determined by a consideration of the context in which they are found. Take *e.g.* *insideo* in Latin, and we find Cicero using it in a neuter sense when he says (*De Oratore*, ii. 28): "Nihil quisquam unquam, me audiente, egit orator, quod non in memoria mea penitus insederit"—"No orator ever did anything in my hearing which did not firmly *sink into* my memory." But again, Livy uses the same word with an active meaning when he says (xxi. 54): "Mago locum monstrabit, quem insideatis"—"Mago will point out to you the place which you are to *occupy*." Or, take the verb *settle* in English—that, too, may have either a transitive or intransitive meaning, according to the connexion in which it occurs. Thus, when Dean Swift says, "It will settle the wavering, and confirm the doubtful," the word is evidently active; whereas, when Lord Bacon says, "The wind came about, and settled in the west," the sense of the word is as clearly neuter. Nothing, then, but the context can determine the meaning which is to be assigned to such words in any language.

Thirdly, it is objected that "St. John never uses the verb (καθίζω) transitively." Here, the question naturally suggests itself—How often does he use the verb at all? And the answer is—Only *twice* (viii. 2, xii. 14) besides the instance under consideration. Now, the inference is plainly very precarious that, because St. John uses καθίζω twice in a neuter sense, he did not, on a third occasion, attach to it a transitive meaning. This may be illustrated

both from Latin and English. Virgil, *e.g.*, uses the verb *ardeo* many times in the course of his poems in a neuter sense, but none the less certainly does he give it once, and perhaps only once, a transitive meaning, when he says (*Ecl.*, ii. 1), “Corydon *ardebat* *Alexin.*” Again, the verb “to fade” has almost always a neuter sense in English. With this common meaning it may be found not unfrequently in the writings of Coleridge. But, nevertheless, he uses it once at least with a transitive force when he says—

“Ere sin could blight, or sorrow *fade*,
 Death came with friendly care;
 The opening bud to heaven conveyed,
 And bade it blossom there.”

It would then, we see, be totally erroneous to conclude that because the verb *ardeo* almost always occurs in Virgil with a neuter meaning, he can *never* use it with a transitive force; and because the verb *to fade* has almost invariably a neuter sense in English, it does not admit, on any occasion, of an active signification. So in the case before us. It would be utterly unwarrantable and illogical to infer that, because St. John uses the verb *καθίζω* on two occasions intransitively, he may not, on a third occasion, use it with that transitive force which it unquestionably bears in other parts of the New Testament. And thus, I trust, all the objections which have been brought against its being so used in the passage before us have been fairly and adequately answered.

But we have now to enquire whether any sanction can be found in primitive times for the meaning which I have attached to *ἐκάθισεν* in this passage. We look first into the most ancient versions—the Syriac Peschito, and the Latin Vulgate. Now, here it must be admitted that the Peschito renders the Greek by a verb which means “sit,” and not “set,” thus supporting the intransitive sense.

But I am afraid that, by its inconsistency, the Syriac here deprives itself of all weight in settling the question. Thus, at Acts ii. 30, where the same tense of the verb καθίζω occurs, the Greek being καθίσαι ἐπὶ τὸν θρόνον αὐτοῦ, the Peschito uses the Aphel of the Syriac verb "to sit," and thus imparts to the original a transitive sense. All that can be said, therefore, is that the old Syriac translator preferred, as the great majority of modern interpreters have done, to give a neuter meaning to the verb in St. John, while, by attaching a causative sense to the same verb in the Acts, he tacitly admits that it might also have an active meaning assigned to it in the passage before us. The Latin Vulgate, again, can have still less weight ascribed to it. We, no doubt, find in it the rendering *sedit* in St. John, but we also find the rendering *sedere* in the Acts, which is, as all acknowledge, an obvious error. As, therefore, the Vulgate has mistranslated καθίσαι in Acts ii. 30, so it may also have misinterpreted ἐκάθισεν in St. John, and no importance can be attached to its authority either on the one side or the other.

But, happily, we can appeal to a witness more primitive than even the oldest versions as to the meaning which was assigned to our verb ἐκάθισεν in the early church. As is now generally known, some fragments of the Apocryphal Gospel according to Peter have recently been discovered. This work is unanimously dated by scholars (so far as opinion has hitherto been expressed) in one of the early decades of the second century.¹ Now, in the very interesting

¹ The above was in print before I had seen an able paper in *The Month* for January, 1893, by Mr. Lucas, in which he says:—"When Mr. Robinson (one of the two learned editors of the Cambridge edition of the Gospel) writes that "we need not be surprised if further evidence should tend to place this Gospel nearer to the beginning than to the middle of the second century," we feel constrained to express our dissent, and our conviction that further evidence, should it ever be forthcoming, will compel us to assign the Petrine fragment to some date intermediate between A.D. 150 and A.D. 175." But, as Mr. Lucas believes that "the use of the four Gospels side by side in the Petrine Gospel

account which the recovered portion contains of our Lord's Passion, the following words occur: *καὶ ἐκάθισαν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ καθέδραν κρίσεως λέγοντες δικαίως, Κρίνε, βασιλεῦ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ*—"And they placed Him upon the seat of judgment, saying rightfully, Judge, O king of Israel." These words clearly contain a reminiscence of the passage in St. John's Gospel we have been considering, and they show us how the expression *ἐκάθισεν* was understood by the early Christians. Manifestly, it had a transitive meaning assigned it, and was regarded as denoting that Christ was actually set upon the tribunal of judgment. There is a somewhat similar passage in Justin Martyr's first *Apology*, which seems to suggest the same idea, and was probably derived from the so-called "Gospel of Peter." It stands thus (*Apol.*, i. 35): *καὶ γάρ, ὡς εἶπεν ὁ προφήτης, διασύροντες αὐτὸν ἐκάθισαν ἐπὶ βήματος, καὶ εἶπον, Κρίνον ἡμῖν*—"For, as said the prophet, in mockery they set Him upon the judgment-seat, and exclaimed, Judge for us." In this passage there seems to be a reference to Isaiah lviii. 2, where in the Septuagint we find the words—*αἰτοῦσι με νῦν κρίσιν δικαίαν*—"they now ask of me righteous judgment." But whether or not that is the passage of the Old Testament alluded to by Justin, his words obviously blend the phraseology of the Canonical Gospel of St. John with that of the Apocryphal Gospel of St. Peter. It is to be observed that Justin uses *βήματος* with St. John, instead of *καθέδραν* which is found in the spurious *Evangelium Petri*, while he agrees with the latter in stating that Christ was, in reality, placed upon the seat of judgment, thus again suggesting to us what was regarded as the import of St. John's *ἐκάθισεν* by the primitive Church.

Let us now see, in conclusion, how the transitive meaning suggested by a previous Harmony," we are thus carried back by it to an earlier date, and learn from it, indirectly at least, the view of the meaning of *ἐκάθισεν* which prevailed in the primitive Church.

ing which has, I trust, been vindicated for St. John's *ἐκάθισεν*, fits in with the whole narrative in which the expression occurs (chap. xix. 1-15). "Then Pilate therefore," we read, "took Jesus"—led Him into the Prætorium—"and scourged Him. And the soldiers platted a crown of thorns, and put it on His head, and they arrayed Him in a purple robe, and said, Hail, King of the Jews, and they smote Him with their hands." There can be no doubt that, in acting thus, the soldiers reflected those antagonistic feelings which were then at work in the heart of Pilate. On the one hand, he was evidently, to a large extent, impressed with the claims of Jesus, and hence those emblems of pseudo-royalty which he now permitted to be offered Him. On the other hand, he was afraid of being accused of disloyalty to Cæsar, if he too decidedly espoused the cause of Christ, and therefore he did not interpose to prevent that violent treatment of Him by the soldiers. In this wretchedly divided state of feeling, Pilate would fain have got rid of the case of Christ altogether. Accordingly we read (*vv.* 4-7) that "Pilate went forth again, and saith unto them, Behold, I bring Him out to you, that ye may know that I find no fault in Him. Then came Jesus forth, wearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe. And Pilate saith unto them, Behold the man! When therefore the chief priests and the officers saw Him, they cried out, saying, Crucify Him, crucify Him. Pilate saith unto them, Take ye Him, and crucify Him; for I find no fault in Him. The Jews answered him, We have a law, and by that law He ought to die, because He made Himself the Son of God." A new element of disturbance was now introduced into the already distracted soul of the governor. Besides the personal respect he felt for Jesus, and the political terrors which prevented him from allowing that respect to lead to its proper result, there had now been started by the Jews a mysterious theological question which the Roman

governor felt himself utterly incompetent to face. He will, however, make yet another effort to free himself from his difficulties, and to escape from those dangers which seemed on every side to gather round him. So we next read (*vv.* 8-12)—“When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he was the more afraid, and he went into the Prætorium again”—evidently taking the accused with him—“and saith unto Jesus, Whence art Thou? But Jesus gave him no answer. Pilate therefore saith unto Him, Speakest Thou not unto me? knowest Thou not that I have power to release Thee, and have power to crucify Thee? Jesus answered him, Thou couldest have no power at all against Me, except it were given thee from above; therefore he that delivered Me unto thee hath the greater sin. From that time Pilate sought to release Him; but the Jews cried out, saying, If thou let this man go, thou art not Cæsar’s friend; whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against Cæsar.” There is much in these verses which might worthily engage our attention, were we at present attempting an exegesis of the whole passage. But what alone we have to deal with in the investigation we have been pursuing, is the effect which seems to have been produced on the mind of the governor. Personally well-meaning as he was towards Christ, and more and more impressed, as would appear, with a sense of His supernatural character, Pilate was, at the same time, weak and irresolute when he thought of the charges which might be brought against him before the cruel and jealous emperor Tiberius. Naturally, therefore, he felt strongly incensed against those Jews who had driven him into a position of so great difficulty. And he will, of course, retaliate upon them as much as he can. One way of doing this is by continuing to represent Jesus as their king, and by conferring on Him some appearance of that authority and honour which, as such, He should possess. Pilate, therefore, resolves to place Jesus for a time in the

seat of dignity, and to mortify the Jews by bidding them look to Him thus displayed as their true Sovereign. He had thus the satisfaction of at once acting upon the struggling convictions of his own heart, and of galling his Jewish adversaries to the uttermost. Thus, then, we read (*vv.* 13-15)—“When Pilate therefore heard these words, he brought Jesus forth, and *set Him down* in the judgment-seat, in a place that is called the Pavement, but in the Hebrew, Gabbatha. And it was the Preparation of the Passover, about the sixth hour; and he saith unto the Jews, Behold your King!” The whole narrative is strikingly dramatic; and it is evident, I think, that the rendering of *ἐκάθισεν* which I have sought to establish coheres with it in that respect far more admirably than that usually preferred. It is, indeed, a most vivid and impressive touch which is given to the Evangelist’s account, when we regard him as telling us of Pilate, not that he himself sat down on the judgment-seat, but that he set Jesus there, and then called upon the furious Jews to recognise and do homage to their King. They, we are told (*vv.* 15, 16), “cried out,” in their rage, “Away with Him, away with Him, crucify Him.” Pilate then, still adding fuel to their wrath, exclaimed, “Shall I crucify your King?” And then these recreant children of Abraham sink into the lowest depths of voluntary degradation, when, abandoning alike all national pride and all Messianic hope, they turn away from that meek Sufferer who has so often sought to win them to Himself, and rend the air with that fearful cry—the death-knell of all that was noble in Judaism—“*We have no king but Cæsar.*”

A. ROBERTS.

*THE DAUGHTER OF JAIRUS AND THE WOMAN
WITH AN ISSUE OF BLOOD.*

MATT. IX. 18.

MARK V. 22.

LUKE VIII. 41.

IT was while Jesus was at table with many publicans and sinners, and when orthodoxy was shocked at His freedom in such company, that Jairus came to Him. He was one of the rulers of the synagogue; but conventionalities vanish in the presence of grave calamities, whereas real and strong convictions come out like stars in the darkness. The difference is exhibited in every storm at sea, when sectarian estrangements melt away, but the common belief in God grows fervent. Accordingly no unorthodox surroundings could prevent a ruler whose daughter was in her death agony from prostrating himself before Jesus. And it is edifying to observe the perfect readiness for any call, the easy transition from social pleasure to tenderest sympathy with affliction, with which Jesus went from the house of feasting straight to that of mourning.

It is gravely objected that St. Matthew represents Jairus as declaring his daughter was actually dead, and therefore gives him faith enough to expect a resurrection, while in the other narratives she is only at the point to die. There would be no real contradiction, even if we supposed that the evangelist abbreviated the story, by combining the first words of Jairus with the message which came later, since we know that St. Paul in like manner, not to weary Agrippa, amalgamated the later revelation which sent him to the Gentiles with that first vision which struck him down before Damascus (Acts xxvi. 17, 18).

But the true answer is that of which one never wearies; namely, that critics of a life require to know something

about human nature. When a man, full of mental agony, and above all things desiring haste, says that his daughter is at the point to die, he does not really contradict himself if he cries out also that she is dead by this time (*ἄρτι ἐτελεύτησεν*). When a vessel is on the rocks, is there any real difference of opinion between the women who cry that the crew is all lost and the men who run to man the lifeboat? Or when Ebedmelech, with the express object of rescuing Jeremiah from the horrible pit, told Zedekiah that "he is dead," and was consequently bidden to rescue him "before he die," does the critic discover any startling incoherence? (Jer. xxxviii. 9). One is ashamed to argue what is so transparent. As for the further puerility which detects a confusion between the sick woman and the dying girl, because one has been twelve years afflicted and the other is twelve years old, one can only marvel at the ignorance of affairs betrayed by critics who are incredulous of coincidences like these. Let them consult the experiences of a barrister or a postmaster, or, better still, let them keep their own eyes open for a week.¹ In the same helpless way, the name of Jairus is treated as mythical, because it means "the Lord illuminates," which clearly refers to the dissipation of the night of death. Not one Hebrew name in a dozen could be substituted which might not be attacked as plausibly—Peter would allude to his stability of faith, John to the special grace which God bestowed on him, and James to the supplanting of death by victory—and it is plain that a myth would not thus have named the father, but the girl to whom this illumination came.

Amid these follies, it is interesting to find Strauss himself laying down principles which fairly demolish the sceptical position. His object is to show that the aspirations and

¹ Mr. Swinburne lavishes verse upon the fact that Marlowe and Shelley died at the same age.—*In the Bay*.

convictions of the early Church created these resurrection myths. But what he actually affirms (and what we may very readily concede) is not that such aspirations and convictions would gradually weave the narratives; it is the reverse. He peremptorily asserts that the aspirations and convictions could not flourish unless the narratives were already there. "The faith in the resurrection of Christ—*i.e.*, in the fact that He had been raised to life by God—involved indeed the principal guarantee for the future resurrection; but together with this passive resurrection men desired to see also active proofs of the exercise of this power on the part of Him who was to raise the dead; He must not merely have been raised from the dead Himself, but have also Himself raised the dead. . . . Present spiritual awakening could not suffice as a guarantee for the future corporeal resurrection of the dead. Jesus, during His life on earth, must also have raised the corporeally dead, at least in some cases. *Then, and not before, could it be known for certain that there dwelt in Him a power to recall all the dead to life.*" (*New Life*, ii. 205-6.)

"Then and not before!" It follows, if there is any meaning in words, that the miracles of raising the dead supported the belief in a general resurrection, and even in its possibility (in "a power to recall"), and it was not the belief which originated the miracles. Whence it follows again that the stories in dispute were fully accepted as early as the date of the Apocalypse or the First Epistle to the Thessalonians. We accept with modest gratitude this testimony from Saul among the prophets, this benediction from Balaam of the tents of Israel.

Not less astonishing is Keim's suggestion that the story in St. Matthew does not compel us "to exercise an absolute faith in miracles. When Jesus distinctly says, 'the maiden is not dead but sleeps,' it is possible . . . that He was seriously convinced that the maiden's apparent death was

not a real fact, though the superficial multitude did not perceive this" (in which superficial multitude we are to include the experienced professional mourners, as well as whatever medical aid had been invoked) "and that He based upon the presence of the slumbering life the hope of a renewed activity. . . . We know the childlike condition of these people and their medical knowledge, the exaggeration of popular conversation and tradition; and we have a protecting bulwark against both in the preserved verbal utterance of Jesus, which mocks every attempt to establish the decisively miraculous view. This assumption, then, permits us to apply to this incident, *which is on the whole so well attested* by its connection with the healing of the woman, the same explanation as to other healings. . . . Since the nature of the disease and the deathlike weakness are not definitely described, there remains open the possibility that a lethargic faintness, at once the result of exhaustion and the critical point of the development of fresh energy, was, by the entrance of Jesus and the parents, chiefly by Jesus' vigorous and reviving taking hold and lifting up of the patient, shaken off at the most favourable moment." (Keim, *Life*, I. iv. 170-1.)

All this is wonderful enough. The earnest but mistaken appeal, the venturesome and compromising consent of Jesus to restore her by the imposition of His hands, His quick perception of a mere swoon where the experienced and professional attendants upon death were certain of dissolution (but then "we know their childlike condition"), His arrival "at the most favourable moment," the rousing effect of the reverential entrance of six people where the hired mourners had clamoured in vain, these, and the universal conviction, which Keim admits to be correct, that the narrators meant to record a resurrection, and the bystanders took the event as such, all combine to make a singular chain of successful ventures and fortunate coinci-

dences. It seems as easy to believe a miracle, a "decisive miracle"; and one marvels at the credulity which can accept all this, but refuses to suppose that twelve years might be the age of a dying girl, and also the duration of a woman's ailment in the street outside (p. 169).

And yet the absurdity of this version of the story, looked at by itself, is a little thing. To these strange coincidences must be added numberless others which beset the whole life of Jesus. The woman who touched Him happened also to be in a desirable psychological condition; so were the demoniacs at Gadara and elsewhere; so was the man with a palsied hand. No accidents of an opposite kind ever happen to refute His claims. Wherever, as in the first quelling of the storm, it is too hard a thing to deny entirely a historical basis for the story, there is assumed a coincidence between the act of Christ and the operations of nature, or the mind of man, of so extraordinary a kind that gradually a narrative is put together as "contrary to nature" as ever a belated theologian supposed a miracle to be.

From these fantastic speculations we turn to the inspired Word. Jairus makes a natural and pathetic appeal, "My one little daughter is at her last gasp—that coming Thou wouldest lay Thy hands on her, so that she may be saved and live" (*τὸ θυγάτριόν μου ἐσχάτως ἔχει ἵνα ἐλθὼν ἐπιθῆς, κ.τ.λ.* Mark v. 23). His words are choked by a sob in the middle; and they dwell wistfully on the benign process and the much desired result. The neuter form (*τὸ θυγάτριον*), which we ourselves use of a very young child, calling it a "little thing," explains the unexpected, and at first sight unnecessary, statement farther on that "she was twelve years old." In his preaching the Evangelist had perhaps observed the need of mentioning that she was not so young as the passionate words of her father had been taken to imply. How far is this from the manner of a myth! And

how natural that in such a mood the suppliant should also have exclaimed, as in the first Gospel, "she is dead by this time."

Jesus, who elicited the faith of the centurion by saying, "I will come and heal him," rose now, apparently without a word; the father led the way, and His disciples followed. Again, we are bidden to see exaggeration in the assertion that a great multitude also followed, which is not stated in the first Gospel. As if it could have been otherwise when He rose from public controversy to perform a marvel; or as if a miracle is really exaggerated by saying, not even that many people saw it, but that they came as far as the door.

As Jesus pressed through the surging streets, He was conscious of another contact than that of the crowd; and though a life was supposed to hang upon His speed, He deliberately stopped and turned around. For the haste of Jesus never was precipitate: He could always respond to a providential call; and so sensitive was He to the wants of humanity, that no influence, no "power," went forth from Him unobserved. Do we not sometimes think of our prayers, as if they operated by virtue of some spiritual law of nature, automatically, without any direct individualizing act of the divine volition, as if the blessing were obtained, as electricity is discharged from a machine, by contact rather than from a living heart of love, consciously responding to our appeal. It is not so. Because He slumbereth nor is weary, and there is no searching of His understanding, therefore our way is not hid from Him. All the prayers of the universe are (to use the only language possible, though miserably inadequate) considered and granted in detail. So it was now. The usual upper garment of a Jew would have four sacred tassels, one at each corner; and being square, and folded over at the top, the two upper tassels could be touched even in a crowd. And it was not a "pull," however stealthy, that Jesus

observed :¹ it was a touch so gentle, that He inferred it from its effect, from the beneficent influence which it evoked. "Some one did touch Me, for I perceived that power had gone forth from Me." It was a woman, pale with long waste of vital force, worn with anxiety, with disappointment, with the humiliation of constant ceremonial uncleanness, with the sure approach of poverty, as she wandered from one physician to another, suffering torture at their hands, until now her substance was all spent, and she rather grew worse. (Or, as Luke the physician puts it with the greater mildness of one who understood the difficulties of the case, she "could not be healed of any"; it was no fault of theirs.) This nervous and sensitive sufferer must have been quite close to Jesus when He turned, for how could she have drawn away in such a crowd, and surely her features betrayed her agitation, "trembling" to find herself discovered; but Jesus would not point her out; His object being that she herself should be inspired with courage to confess Him. And before even this much is demanded, she is allowed to feel in her body that she is made whole, and strengthened in faith by the mighty reinforcements of joy and gratitude. Thus she gained strength to acknowledge that she had endeavoured to obtain healing unobserved, being thus the counterpart of too many men as well as women, who would fain receive pardon and peace without confessing Christ. He, for his part, makes it as impossible for them as for her to keep silence without disobedience. Yet He sympathises much more with this too sensitive retirement than with the blatant self-assertion of any Pharisee who thanks God that he is not as other men. To her, therefore, alone of all the women who cross His path, He gives a name of personal tenderness, elicited by compassion for her shrinking weakness, and sympathy for her suffering and her appeal: the pure and affectionate, yet

¹ As Keim, iv. 164, and others.

masterful name of Daughter. And he instructs her that not her touch but the faith in her soul had healed her. It only provokes a smile when Keim charges the narrative with healing her a second time, because it adds that she was made whole from that hour.

This incident, no doubt, passed very rapidly, and the nature of it was encouraging; yet the delay must have sorely tried Jairus, and it speaks well for his faith that as yet he needed no words of reassurance.

But a messenger now arrived from one who had no hope, "Thy daughter is dead, trouble not the Master"; and instantly Jesus, who does not suffer men to be tempted above what they are able to bear, puts all His reassuring energy of spirit into the words, "Fear not, only believe, and she shall be saved." This promise had not been formally given until now, when its support was so much needed, and when, without it, the condition upon which it depended would have become impossible. So, in the day of our weakness, His spirit breathes the confidence which He requires.

And now Jesus refused admittance within doors, not only to the multitude but also to nine of the twelve. It is the first time that such a distinction was made; and since there cannot be partiality in Jesus, it showed that even among the Apostles, different grades of zeal and efficiency were marked and rewarded. Such exclusion of the unworthy from solemn revelations attained its highest development when after His resurrection He Himself appeared not unto all the people, but unto witnesses chosen before. And both the danger of privilege and the coherence of the whole narrative was shown when one of the honoured three presumed to separate himself from all others, saying, "though all men should deny Thee, yet will not I," and when the other two endeavoured to supplant even the third in the highest places in the kingdom.

While thus excluding nine of His chosen, Jesus fully recognised the claim of natural affection, and admitted to the house (for the chamber is not yet in question) "the father of the maiden and her mother," whom we thus incidentally discover to have also, in her agitation, wandered out of doors to meet Him (Luke viii. 51).

Within the house, they found the apparatus of an artificial mourning, and St. Matthew specifies the flute players, two of whom were a social necessity. We may assume that professional mourners were not invoked for the sake of any value attached to their hired lamentations, nor yet to supplement with apparent sorrow the heartlessness of survivors; their function was very real; it was to relieve by expression woes which their own intensity struck dumb, to "give sorrow words" when—

". . . The grief that doth not speak,
Whispers the o'erfraught heart and bids it break."

Yet seeing that their lamentation was so hollow that words of hope, which if rejected always intensify a real grief, converted their wailing into scornful mockery, it is no wonder that He who was truth incarnate expelled them as resolutely as He had excluded others. They should neither agitate the minds of the parents by their incredulous mockery, nor the child, when she returned to consciousness, by their equally irreverent astonishment. May it not be added that Jesus Himself, at such a crisis, desired the quiet which they made impossible? Accordingly, He drove them out. Nor is it on record that any such masterful act of his was ever resisted by any one, not even when He cleansed the temple with a scourge.

Strauss is right in contending that the expression, "she is not dead but sleepeth," are a kind of watchword of the New Testament. "It was Jesus who had brought light and immortality to light; Christians were not like other

men who had no hope beyond the grave." But then he must explain how Jesus wrought this wondrous revolution, and "put an end to the inconsolable sorrow for the dead felt by the ancient world." Common sense will continue to believe that He did something adequate to the effect which He produced, and that men would not suddenly imagine the grave to be shallow, and the veil spread over all people to be only a curtain, unless the grave were explored for them, and the veil upraised. Thus the phrase is now applied to those who still sleep, exactly because when He used it first He made the sleep of death so transient. But what an ironical light is thrown by this contention, that the word "sleep" means here what it means of all the dead, upon the contention of a later sceptic that Jesus could not have used the word had He supposed her to be really dead at all. Yet he who argues thus admits that the Evangelists who record it supposed it to be figurative.

And now the silent father, his heart sustained by the lofty and serene composure of the Lord, which overbore the opposition of the crowd, and the mother who shared his agony of hope, beheld Jesus approach the bed of death as quietly as a couch of slumber, not, like Elijah or Elisha, stretching Himself again and again over the corpse, mouth to mouth, and eyes to eyes, and hands to hands, with laborious and continued effort. Serenely, as if it were an ordinary sleep, taking her by the hand, He called, saying, "Maiden, arise." Is it wonderful that the very words which awoke the dead remained in the ears of Peter, and were known to Mark? Is it pardonable that scepticism should intrude itself where those scornors were expelled, with such petty cavils as that, in repeating the original Aramaic, "the object can only be to invest the act with greater mystery?" As if there was any mystery in speaking to a child of twelve in the vernacular of the country. As if any suggestion of charm or incantation could possibly attach to

a word which is published for all the world. The Friend of children did not whisper in her ear any occult formula, but awoke her gently, with a courteous hand as well as a most loving word, calling her by the sweetest name for a child, which is derived from the Hebrew for a lamb.¹

Of course they were swept off their balance by delight, "they were amazed." Of course the child was in danger of being overwhelmed by lavish and demonstrative endearments, of becoming mentally dizzy, perhaps of conceiving some dark and paralysing sense of the danger which had so nearly swallowed her, some apprehension which would disturb her dreams. Apart then from her physical requirements (because her body, long unfed, was now vigorous and needed to be sustained), it was better for the parents, and urgently necessary for the child, that their natural endearments should be interrupted. And yet how could such a one as Jesus bid a mother at this moment think of anything but her girl? His tact was equal to His power; He did not turn their attention elsewhere, but called for exertion on her behalf, which was sweet to them; He commanded that something be given her to eat. This baffles all the ingenuity of myth or legend. The notion that He must outstrip ancient prophets would never have invented this exquisite and subtle stroke. But it is exactly in the manner of the Jesus whom the Church adores.

"He doeth all things well,
Great things and small are one,
To Him who governs heaven and hell:
So when this deed was done
The quiet voice which woke the dead
Desired us give our darling bread."

Yet another cavil. He charged them to tell no man

¹ Compare Blake's poem:—

"I a child and thou a lamb,
We are called by His name."

what was done, and Keim has discovered that the secret was not one which could possibly be kept, which indeed is pretty obvious. It was inevitable that this child of twelve should grow up, remarked everywhere, an object of profound curiosity and surmise, being one (as Lamb finely said of Lazarus)¹ who "has to tell of the world of spirits."

All this is very palpable. And might not Keim bethink himself that it was good for her to have a refuge where the subject was absolutely interdicted; that at least in her father's house she might be as other children are, free from posing as the heroine of a thrilling adventure, being only dearer, and more tenderly treated, for the thought that she had been lost awhile.

For them, also, silence was better than the telling of a story which did such real and deserved honour to their own faith. And we shall do well, in our daily life, to mark the closeness with which this command to be silent about a miracle follows upon the refusal to allow to a shrinking woman a silence which was ungrateful.

G. A. CHADWICK.

¹ Whence Tennyson perhaps derived one of the loveliest passages in *In Memoriam*.

THE PAULINE COLLECTION FOR THE SAINTS.

THREE Epistles of St. Paul, viz., those to the Romans and Corinthians, besides the Acts of the Apostles, make mention of a collection for the saints, set on foot amidst the Pauline churches about the beginning of the year 57 A.D., and presented at Jerusalem by Pentecost in the following year. One particular aspect of this subject has been long familiar to English readers through the prominence given to it by Paley in his *Horæ Paulinæ*. He there pointed out the close coincidence between the narrative of the Acts and the original letters of St. Paul—a coincidence so evidently unstudied and undesigned by the authors themselves, and extending to such minute details and delicate shades of thought and feeling, that it could only exist in documents based on personal knowledge of the facts, or whose materials at least were compiled before the events had faded from the memory. This argument established to the satisfaction of most readers the circumstantial accuracy of the narrative, at the same time that it confirmed the authenticity of the letters; the substantial truth of his conclusions has never been invalidated, and modern criticism furnishes many additional particulars by which his case might, if necessary, be materially strengthened.

It is here proposed, in treating of the collection, to assume the truth of the facts, as gathered indifferently from these two sources, the Epistles and the Acts, to investigate the circumstances which occasioned it, and so connect it with the history of the Pauline churches, and with the apostolic policy in regard to them.

1. A glance at its origin establishes the fact that it was no

spontaneous impulse of Christian charity, but the direct result of an apostolic initiative in a wide circle of Christian communities. The language of St. Paul forbids our regarding it as a casual offspring of circumstances or an occasional incident in the life of the primitive Church, and suggests that he himself designed it as an act of policy in the interest of the Church. It appears, further, that it was not called forth by any exceptional distress in Palestine, which in his judgment demanded a supreme and united effort throughout the Christian world for its relief. The earlier contribution from the church of Antioch, conveyed to Jerusalem by the hands of Barnabas and Paul, had been prompted by a distinct prophecy of impending famine. But in this case there was no famine imminent, nor any urgent cry of distress, so that the circumstances at once differentiate the two contributions.

Several causes probably combined to impoverish the church of Jerusalem: the religious prejudices of the Jews, amongst whom they lived, entailed upon them constant social persecution, even in times of comparative peace; the claims of Christian visitors on their hospitality were heavy; the maintenance of the apostles and of a disproportionate number of Christian teachers threw on them an undue share of Christian burdens. But whatever the causes of their poverty, it was certainly chronic, and not urgent. St. Paul makes no sensational appeal on their behalf; on the contrary, he studiously discourages spasmodic efforts of liberality, forbids hasty gatherings under pressure of time, and adopts on principle a system of continuous and systematic almsgiving by weekly offerings. A perusal of these instructions forces upon us the conclusion that the apostle was contemplating a deliberate act of policy rather than providing for a temporary need.

2. This conclusion is strengthened by calculating the actual length of time which elapsed between the first sug-

gestion of the fund and its consummation. The letter which instituted weekly gatherings at Corinth was written more than a year before the fund was presented at Jerusalem (compare 1 Cor. xvi. 1-8 with Acts xx. 16). But this is not all; the first proposal of the scheme to the Corinthian church is carried back some months earlier; for in a later letter of the same year it is mentioned that Achaia had been ready *last year*, and again that Achaia had been active and willing in the cause *last year* (2 Cor. viii. 10, ix. 2). It appears, too, from 1 Corinthians xvi. 1, that a similar correspondence had taken place previously with the Galatian churches; that they, too, had already returned a favourable answer to the proposal of the apostle, and had received the same instructions for weekly gatherings as those now sent to Corinth. In both cases, therefore, a delay of not less than a year and a half intervened between the original conception of the project and its completion; and the delay may fairly be described as premeditated, for it was the inevitable result of the instructions given to the churches.

3. The most fruitful cause of delay was not the system of gradual collection, but the combination of many separate churches in one common scheme. The apostle lays great stress on this common action of the churches; with a view to it, he expressly directs the Corinthians to await his coming before they appointed representatives to carry their bounty to Jerusalem, and indicates his intention, if a sufficient response should be made to his appeal, of accompanying their representatives himself to Jerusalem. The same instructions were of course given or sent to the other churches likewise, with the result, which he evidently anticipated from the first, that a considerable deputation travelled under his guidance from Troas to Jerusalem, were there introduced by him before a general meeting of the elders at which James presided, and formally presented their offerings to the church. This common action of independent

churches was apparently a novel feature in church organisation; and, taken in connexion with the history of St. Paul, it marks an important step in advance towards a general alliance of all Gentile Christians.

4. We shall best appreciate its importance by reviewing the extent of the combination. Three churches are named in the Epistles as participating in the movement, the Corinthian, Galatian, and Macedonian, none of which were really single churches, but groups of churches. To these must be added the churches of Asia, though the name does not occur in his Epistles, presumably because he was at Ephesus in their midst when he started this movement, and had therefore no occasion to write to them. For the list of deputies given in Acts xx. 4 includes two sent by them. That important group comprehended probably the famous seven churches of the Revelation, besides Troas and others on the coast, as well as Colossæ and Hierapolis in the Lycus valley; for we are told that *all* who dwelt in the great province of Asia had heard the word of the Lord, so fruitful had been his two years' labour at Ephesus. Not that he had visited all these in person—the Colossian and neighbouring churches, for instance, had never seen his face,—but they recognised his apostolic authority, for they had been founded by his disciples, spreading in different directions from the church centre which he had established at Ephesus. Corinth, in like manner, formed the centre of an Achaian group. When St. Paul wrote to Corinth, he addressed himself to all the saints in all Achaia, and Achaia joined in this movement no less readily than Corinth. In Macedonia three churches only had been founded during his first hurried visit, Philippi, Thessalonica, and Berea; but zealous colleagues and ministers had followed up his work, and he had himself, on his second visit, pushed on to the border of Illyricum. The position of the Galatian churches, which formed the fourth group, is less obvious.

The visits of St. Paul to the Galatian district, recorded in Acts xvi. 6 and xviii. 23, have been a mystery to many students of his life, who found it difficult to understand why he turned aside from the main current of Jewish and Greek civilisation, which he had found so fruitful for the diffusion of the gospel, to visit an out-of-the-way region of Celtic settlements. A fuller knowledge of the internal geography and previous history of Asia Minor has solved the problem, and restored these churches to their true position.¹ The name Galatia was not limited, in the ordinary language of the first century, to the ancient settlements of the Galatians in the north of Phrygia. Their last king ruled over much of southern Phrygia, Lycaonia, and Pisidia besides; and when he died, in B.C. 25, bequeathing his kingdom to the Romans, the southern portion, though inhabited by a more mixed population than the northern, was equally known as Galatia; and the name of the new Roman province, Galatia, did but perpetuate a local name already acquired. Southern Galatia became important under the first Cæsars; for the land routes from Syria to the Ægean, which then formed the principal arteries of the empire from east to west, ran across it by way of the Cilician gates through Iconium or Lystra. For their protection, it was studded with colonies and intersected by military roads. The only common name for this region, belonging geographically in part to Phrygia, in part to Lycaonia, and in part to Pisidia, was Galatia; and these Roman and Græco-Roman cities would scarcely have accepted any other designation. The Galatian churches, therefore, were those of the Pisidian Antioch,

¹ I desire here fully to acknowledge my obligations to *The Church in the Roman Empire* in all that relates to the interior of Asia Minor. Before reading that work, I had bowed to the great authority of the late Bishop Lightfoot in regard to the position of the Galatian churches; but he would have been the first, if living, to acknowledge that the additional insight gained by Professor Ramsay into the topography and history of Asia Minor has superseded his own earlier theories, and that the conclusions he has formed as to the journeys of St. Paul are irresistible.

Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe, which St. Paul founded, with the aid of Barnabas, on his first mission journey. There is, on the contrary, no evidence that he ever visited Celtic Galatia, which lay on each occasion at some distance from his natural route.

5. It further appears, from a rapid survey of the Apostle's ministry during the last five or six years, that ever since he had divided the mission field with Barnabas, and started under the guidance of the Spirit on an independent career to win a new kingdom for Christ in the Greek world, his energies had been wholly devoted to these four groups. For, after visiting some Syrian churches round Antioch, he proceeded by way of Tarsus and the Cilician gates or other passes of Mount Taurus direct to southern Galatia, first confirming the Cilician and then the Galatian churches in the faith, and connecting them firmly with their base at Antioch. His own design had been to press on thence to Ephesus; but the Spirit ordered otherwise, calling him first to establish the church at Philippi and Thessalonica, along the main road to Rome. He next fixed his headquarters for nearly two years at Corinth, making it the capital of a new Christian province. On leaving Corinth, he determined to plant himself at Ephesus, to which he at once paid a flying visit, and where he left Aquila and Priscilla to prepare a home for him and form a nucleus of converts, while he made a hurried journey to Jerusalem and Antioch. Returning to Ephesus by way of the Galatian churches, he spent more than two years there, planting those famous churches of Asia, which became, for at least sixty years, the chief glory of the Christian church. The only other city in the province besides Ephesus specially named as attracting his attention, and that on two occasions, was Troas (2 Cor. ii. 12, Acts xx. 6), doubtless because it was the port which connected the churches of Asia and Galatia with Philippi and Rome.

6. Admiration has been freely lavished on the indomitable energy which he displayed in this period of his career; but its solid success was not a little due to the far-reaching wisdom with which his operations were directed. His line of policy from the beginning was to extend the Christian church along the great lines of commerce and civilisation; and from this design, however hunted by enemies or tempted by favourable openings elsewhere, he never swerved. Now pushing forward with rapidity, now returning on his steps to ordain elders, organise and confirm the several churches which he had founded, he was ever advancing, yet never failed to retain his hold over former conquests, and make each in turn a step towards new victories. The Syrian Antioch was for all the eastern world the key to the West, and he clung firmly to it; Tarsus, Lystra, Iconium, the Pisidian Antioch, were the next stages on the way, and he secured them also. Compelled for a time, by a higher wisdom than his own, to break his line of communication and plant the gospel in European Greece, before attempting the conquest of Asiatic, he hastens back, the moment that work is done, to fill the gap between his European and Galatian churches. Perhaps a still more convincing proof of his statesmanlike policy may be discerned in his long stay at Corinth and Ephesus. Though his missionary zeal would naturally have tempted him to press forward eagerly to new adventures, he nevertheless sat down steadily for four years in those two cities; and the decision proved wise, for they were not only important stations on one route to Rome, but capitals of provinces and centres of administration. Accordingly, the Apostle resolved, with God's help, to turn them into Christian centres also; and he succeeded in forming round each a cluster of Christian churches. This was the first step towards such a federal union as might prevent local selfishness on the part of these communities, and teach them to care

each for their sister churches, as the individual Christian was taught to care for his brethren. For the Apostle to the Gentiles was no visionary enthusiast, but a statesman of no common order; he was not content with glorious visions of a universal church, but grasped firmly in his master mind the conditions of internal government and mutual alliance and support which were as indispensable for the permanence of the Church as faith and love were for its birth and growth.

7. And now the Apostle's long labours in these four great provinces of Galatia, Macedonia, Achaia, and Asia, were drawing to a close. Looking round, early in A.D. 57, from his central post of observation at Ephesus, on the churches of Asia, this wise master-builder perceived that the foundations were so firmly and strongly laid as no longer to need his personal supervision, and that he might safely leave to his disciples the charge of further building on those foundations. In Asia he found no call to tarry anywhere save at Troas; if he visited any other church at this time, it was but a passing visit, like that to Troas, by the way. The European churches still claimed a few months' delay, for those of Macedonia had been of necessity committed early to the care of others; while the Corinthian church was torn by intestine factions, and afflicted by moral and spiritual disorders which demanded sharp remedies, and could not be healed without the personal attention and tender care of a wise father in God. The first Epistle to that church, written at this time, presents a vivid picture of its internal condition. The grievous faults there censured ought not to blind our eyes to the vigorous church-life which is there revealed. Comparing this with the other Epistles of St. Paul before his imprisonment, the reader finds himself for the first time in presence of an organised Christian society. These Epistles are all alike rich in personal allusions and personal narrative; all deal with

current controversies and passing events ; all alike appeal to the personal conscience of individual believers, impressing upon them such fundamental truths as man's sin, God's holiness and Christ's redemption, the works of the Spirit and those of the flesh, resurrection and judgment, law and grace, faith and love. But the new feature which differentiates the first Epistle to the Corinthians from the rest is its analysis of a new social life consequent on their conversion, its evils and dangers, its duties and its possibilities. The factious support of rival ministers, the toleration of vices and scandals within the pale of the church, the quarrels of its members, the regulation of Christian marriage, the terms of intercourse with idolaters, the consideration due to weak brethren, the good order of their assemblies, are the kind of topics handled in succession ; finally, the true ideal of a church is set forth as the body of Christ, animated by one Spirit, to which every member contributes its several functions of life and action, while all are cemented by the bond of an all-pervading love. The community thus addressed had evidently passed beyond the stage of infancy. The Apostle determines accordingly, after one thorough visitation of the churches, to venture on a prolonged absence. For he had these many years cherished a longing desire to carry forward the banner of the Cross a step farther, and plant it firmly in the centre of the empire, that he might be enabled thence to pursue his course to its extreme western limits, and win the whole Roman world for Christ (Rom. i. 10-13, xv. 23, 24). It had been necessary to pave the way by first bridging securely the wide interval between Antioch and the Italian seas ; but this work ended with the visit to Corinth in the winter of 57-8. He made there a final announcement to the Roman Christians of his intended coming, for which some preparation had been already made in the departure thither of Aquila and Priscilla, with other beloved disciples from Ephesus

and Corinth. (Compare the list of salutations in Rom. xvi. 1-18.) He had now nothing more to do in these parts except to bid farewell to the old and tried friends whose society he had so long enjoyed, but who would see his face no longer among them (Acts xx. 25),¹ and to speak the last words of counsel and love to the churches which he had planted and watered hitherto, but which he was now leaving to grow up without his fostering care.

8. Still, however, though the time is ripe for his departure from Greece, one duty remains to be fulfilled before he can turn his face towards Rome. This was to present in person at Jerusalem the deputation from the Pauline churches which should convey thither their joint offerings. The Epistles of this season evince plainly how deep an interest he felt in this collection. But the narrative of the Acts exhibits in still stronger light his intense earnestness for its success. We are there forcibly reminded of the imminent risk involved in his present plan. Jerusalem was a dangerous place under any circumstances for the renegade who had once been the foremost champion of Judaism; doubly so at a festival when bitter enemies from Ephesus and Corinth were likely to meet and denounce him; but the danger was infinitely aggravated by his appearance as the public representative and acknowledged chief of Gentile Christianity. Nor was he suffered to forget the peril; for voices of the Spirit met him in every city along his route, warning him that bonds and afflictions awaited him at Jerusalem. Yet, in spite of all these warnings, in spite of urgent remonstrances and entreaties from his companions, he persisted in encountering his doom. Why was this? There must have been some adequate cause; for he had shown again and again, though he was ever ready to face

¹ The impression of a lifelong departure given by the expression *no more* in the Bible version is erroneous; the Greek text intimates only the cessation of their personal intercourse in consequence of his journey to the west.

death for Christ, that he was at the same time duly careful to save his life for Christ. His motive must be sought in this deputation of the churches; for he himself testifies before and after the event that his special object for visiting Jerusalem at this time was to present these offerings (Rom. xv. 25; Acts xxiv. 17). For the accomplishment of this object he counted not his life dear unto him, so that he might finish his course with joy.

To understand the intensity of this desire we must glance at the early history of the apostolic Church, and review for a moment its relation to the Pauline churches. The first great social change effected by the impulse of the Spirit in the Christian community was their provision for the Christian poor; the Church determined with one accord that no brother or sister should lack bread. Nor was this a transitory outburst of enthusiasm; the election of the Seven as regular church officers to assist the Twelve records its adoption with proper safeguards as a systematic principle of Christian society. The claim of the poor for maintenance was primarily local, and devolved upon the several churches as a matter of internal economy. It has been already pointed out that the one exception to this rule hitherto recorded was due to exceptional circumstances. But an extension of this principle was inevitable, if the Church of Christ was true to her profession of universal brotherhood; the whole family of Christ, however widely scattered throughout the world, must be ready and willing to step forward to the relief of a sister church in its hour of need. Even the Roman empire had begun to recognise the necessity of providing for occasional distress in cities or provinces by imperial subventions, and the Church could not fall behind the State in providing as a body for any local distress amongst her own members. This duty had been acknowledged in principle some years before; for when the Twelve met Paul and Barnabas in conference to ar-

range a basis of communion for Jewish and Gentile Christians, they impressed upon them in private the poverty of the churches committed to their care, and urged on them the duty of remembering the poor as a common duty of all the churches alike (Gal. ii. 10). This St. Paul was forward to do ; and now, if not before, his desire bore conspicuous fruit in this contribution. Two motives for liberality are suggested in his Epistles, the debt of gratitude owing by his converts to the church of Jerusalem as their spiritual fathers (Rom. xv. 27), and the relative abundance of their own resources (2 Cor. viii. 14). He preserves a judicious silence as to a third motive, which was probably uppermost in his own mind. The Church of Christ had been on the brink of an open rupture on the subject of circumcision, as Gentile Christians refused to bear the yoke of the Law, and Jewish Christians counted communion with the uncircumcised an unlawful thing. The disastrous schism had been for a time averted by the wise forbearance and mutual concessions of the leaders on both sides, and a treaty of peace had been concluded which had so far secured the unity of the Church. But it left a soreness behind in the church of the circumcision ; conscientious scruples wrought on some, and wounded pride on others ; so that the rapid growth of the Pauline churches could not fail to stir some natural jealousy, even among believing Jews, as they saw the future preponderance in the Church passing away from them to the once despised Gentile. This graceful act of bounty, therefore, was a timely reminder how close and real were the bonds of sympathy which united these new brethren to them. The demonstration, however, must be public and impressive to be effective ; and this was accordingly a notable feature in the design of the Apostle. For though he put forth his scheme at first tentatively until he was assured of a cordial response, the general deputation from the several churches under his own presidency was

distinctly contemplated in his original project (1 Cor. xvi. 4); and all hesitation on this head had vanished when he next wrote, in spite of some decay of zeal for the project in the Corinthian church (2 Cor. viii. ix.).

9. Did then the eventual result correspond to the Apostle's intention? We are fortunate in possessing materials for answering this question in a narrative written by an actual deputy who shared the journey to Jerusalem and attended the reception there; for the author of Acts xx. 4-xxi. 18 (whether he was, as tradition reports, St. Luke or another) distinctly identifies himself with the party who started from Philippi, and went in with Paul to the elders at Jerusalem. From him we learn that the majority of the members met Paul at Corinth, with the intention of crossing thence by sea to Ephesus, picking up there the Asiatic deputies, and proceeding to Palestine; but eventually there assembled at Philippi, besides the author, Sopater of Beroea, two Thessalonian representatives, and two Galatian, viz., Timothy of Lystra and Gaius of Derbe. *As for those of Asia, they (it is said) waited for us in Troas*¹ (Acts xx. 5), that city having now been appointed as the starting place. In this list two churches are conspicuous by their absence, the Philippian, so noted for its liberality, and the Corinthian. As for the former church, there is good ground for connecting the author with Philippi; for in Acts xvi. 10 he pointedly associates himself with the call to preach the gospel in Macedonia; he subsequently took part in preaching at Philippi; he remained there when Paul and Silas were forced to leave the city, and apparently succeeded so well in building up the Philippian church that they sent more than one contribution to the Apostle after his departure (Phil. iv. 16); he rejoined the Apostle there some years later as a deputy. No Corinthians appear in the

¹ I have here departed slightly from the Bible version in order to give what I conceive to be the true meaning of the Greek text.

list, but it is certain that the church did contribute (Rom. xv. 26) ; probably they entrusted their contribution to the two brethren named in 2 Corinthians viii. 18-22, as despatched on behalf of the fund from Macedonia to Corinth. The prominent position of Sopater in this list, though a member of the smallest church, suggests his identity with the brother who is there described as chosen by the churches to travel in charge of the fund ; and the description of the other brother in v. 22 agrees well with the antecedents of the author already referred to. However this may be, there is no doubt that all the Pauline churches were in some way represented, and that at least eight representatives gathered round the Apostle at Troas.

10. Speaking afterwards to the elders of Ephesus of the imprisonment in store for him, he describes this last act of his ministry as its climax, and a crowning joy for which he would gladly lay down his life if necessary (Acts xx. 24). Such language suggests that, as he stood amidst this chosen band of disciples, his mind travelled far beyond any immediate wants of Jerusalem, beyond any temporary differences or jealousies that then disturbed the harmony of the church, to a future federation of all the Gentile churches which should hold forth hands of brotherhood to their brethren of the circumcision across the middle wall of partition which Christ had broken down that He might make of twain one new man, so making peace. The unity of the whole body of Christ was then only a doctrine and a principle which the Apostle had learnt of his Divine Master ; the substantial unity of Christendom, in spite of many unhappy divisions, is now an admitted fact which underlies the thoughts of this generation ; it was then an ideal which he had conceived in the Spirit, but had scarcely begun to reduce to practice throughout the Gentile churches. Under God the Christian future of the Roman world depended

largely on the wisdom and foresight of this inspired statesman, who had been charged with the duty of translating the spirit of Christian brotherhood into rules of united action, and constructing the framework of a world-wide kingdom of Christ. He had already devised chains of continuous churches to link east and west together, he had grouped clusters of sister churches round Christian centres. He was now feeling his way a step further onward to an enlarged federation of churches. The principle of representation, which he now for the first time introduced, was a decisive step towards the creation of a central unity within the church as extensive as the imperial organisation, which should bind whole provinces together, as individual churches had been already linked in groups. This was the more indispensable for the Gentile churches, as they had no such natural centre of authority as the church of the circumcision possessed in Jerusalem; the Apostle himself was their only outward bond of union in Christ, and it rested with him to forge permanent links of association between them. At present their mutual intercourse for aid in distress, or counsel in doubt, for support under trial, for refuge from persecution, for new life in times of apathy or stagnation, centred in him alone. In the next century bishops became a regular channel of intercourse; their synods and councils established in time a common system of church government, and united the scattered members of the Christian commonwealth. But no such system as yet existed, nor any machinery for evolving it out of the apostolic form of government. The impulse of a creative mind was needed to call it into operation. This was given in the modest form of a collection for the saints, and a deputation to Jerusalem; but the policy thus originated was not the less far-reaching. These representatives of the churches were precursors of the future bishops in that important part of their functions which concerned the church

or the world outside their own particular church; and when they met under the presidency of the Apostle, the first decisive step was taken towards a federal union of Christendom. It was full time to banish local jealousies and selfish isolation by a closer alliance of Christian communities; for the peace which then prevailed in the Church could not be lasting; a few years only passed before she provoked the jealousy of the empire, which had hitherto befriended her with contemptuous toleration. She was shortly destined to measure her strength against the most formidable system of centralized despotism which the world had ever known, and to drink the cup of affliction and martyrdom to the dregs. In that fearful conflict with despotic power the purely spiritual power must have succumbed in death without the solid system of church union which the great Apostle to the Gentiles did so much to initiate. Here for the first time that glorious conception of the several churches fitly framed together and growing into a holy temple in the Lord, of which he wrote to the churches of Asia from his Roman prison, began to take material shape. His visit to Jerusalem ended indeed, as had been foretold, in exposing him to the malice of his enemies; but he did not suffer in vain; his policy did not fail, nor were his designs fruitless; for though the only immediate result recorded is the hearty welcome granted by the church of Jerusalem to the deputation, the union commenced under his auspices spread by degrees throughout the provinces of the empire, and proved an invaluable support and strength in the years of trial that were impending.

F. RENDALL.

WHERE WAS THE LAND OF GOSHEN.

IT is impossible to doubt that the authors of the narrative in which the land of Goshen is mentioned were well acquainted with Egyptian matters, and treat the story of Jacob's arrival in Egypt with full knowledge of the places which are supposed to have been the scene of its events.

An argument may be found in the different names used in the Hebrew, Septuagint, Coptic and Arabic versions; in the Targums of Onkelos and Jerusalem; and by individual writers, as Josephus, Jerome, Jonathan, Benjamin of Tudela, Edrisi and Abulfeda. Each of these authors used the appellation with which his readers were best acquainted. He used the geographical equivalent in the language he was employing, or added a word of explanation to the ancient and obsolete name.

In 1883 there was unanimity among Bible students so far as to assign the situation of Goshen to some part of an irregular quadrilateral, bounded on the east by Palestine and the Red Sea, on the south from Suez to Cairo, on the west by the Sebennyitic arm of the Nile and on the north by the Mediterranean. The difficulty lay in reconciling the limiting conditions so as to define the province with reasonable accuracy. The text of Brugsch, Ebers, Lepsius, Payne Smith, Poole, Rawlinson and Wiedemann might be vague. The cartographer had no such latitude. A map drawn for each of these authors shows their inconsistency. It was the same in the last century, when Jablonski said that, while many writers agreed in putting the land of Goshen in the Delta, there was no consensus of opinion as to the part which it occupied. Belbis and Heliopolis could with difficulty be excluded. They could not be included in a district with its centre at Phacusa or San el-Hagar.

The posthumous treatise of Jablonski had failed to pro-

duce any effect, and, in 1883, I was the only person who maintained that Goshen, apart from the small district about Belbis, lay to the south of Heliopolis, on the west of the Nile, extending to Assiout and including the Fayoum. This conclusion had been reached without knowledge of the *De Terra Gosen*, and was founded upon a very careful examination of the physical conditions of Egypt, and a theory or hypothesis of the changes which had taken place, not in the geological conditions, but solely in the varying use of the river and its alluvial deposits, due to the political, social and engineering capabilities of its dominant race. This view has now found some measure of popular recognition. It ought, however, to be submitted to careful critical examination. There is at least this to be urged in its favour, that it agrees with more factors in the problem than any other, while fixing the attention upon a region, which is of such intense archaeological interest, so striking in its unique topography, so rich in monuments, from pyramids and temples to Arabic papyri, and with such promise for the future of the country as to enlist sympathy for any honest effort to establish further claims and link it with the vivid picture presented in the Hebrew records. Little weight can be safely attached to a single chain of evidence. The close concatenation of a coat of chain armour is a better simile of what is required.

The Padre Cesare de Cara, whose treatise¹ deals exhaustively with all that has been written on the subject of the so-called Shepherd Kings, expresses his astonishment that any one could be found bold enough to dispute the results of the excavations and researches which form the first volume of the publications of the *Egypt Exploration Fund*. It may not be possible, he thinks, to define the exact limits of the district. Some may be disposed to give a wider extension to its area. He unhesitatingly adopts the view advo-

¹ *Gli Hyksôs o Re Pastori di Egitto*, Roma, 1889, p. 137.

ated by Mr. Poole, and congratulates M. Naville on the felicitous discovery of a fixed point. The Wadi Tumilat appears to him to have been, without doubt or possibility of further contest, henceforth established as the resting-place of the Jews, from Jacob to Moses. He manifests great surprise that it could have been challenged by me, while giving ample credit for the labour expended.¹ The situation of Pithom-Heroonpolis was the sole aim of M. Naville. My efforts were directed to a larger object, the expansion of Egypt by the restoration of its ancient system of irrigation. The need of a flood escape and an increased supply of summer water are now officially acknowledged.²

When Joseph returned to Egypt, after the burial of Jacob, his brethren fell at his feet and besought his forgiveness. He wept in humiliation that brothers of his could thus attribute to him desigus of vengeance in the presence of the benefits which had resulted from their crime. "Ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as at this day, to save much people alive" (Gen. i. 20). The skilful regulation of the Nile, and not temporary provision for a single famine, is the only satisfactory explanation of the political life of the Hebrew Premier. When a new king arose, who knew not Joseph, the agricultural and sanitary interests underwent a change, similar to that which overtook Egypt under the Persians, and again in the centuries preceding the advent of Islam.

The Arabic traditions which connect the name of Joseph with the two great engineering works still existing, the Bahr Jūsuf, and the conversion of the immense depression of the Fayoum into a fertile province, have been frequently noticed, as, for instance, by d'Herbelot. Their antiquity and historical value were universally denied. In 1882 there was not the slightest doubt, felt or expressed, that the canal

¹ Citing *Proc. Soc. Bib. Arch.*, March 3, Nov. 3, Dec. 1, 1885.

² "Egypt," No. 3, 1893. *Parliamentary Report*.

of Joseph owed its name to Saladin. Yet this magnificent watercourse, with a breadth and volume of discharge exceeding the Thames at Henley, partly artificial and partly the natural drainage course of the water running northward under the foot of the Libyan Hills, must have been under scientific control before the time of Moses. It was ascribed to Joseph, son of Jacob, by Masūdi, from a tradition then venerable in its antiquity, widely current, and surviving to this day in the University of Cairo, and among the peasants on the banks of the life-giving stream. Saladin built the citadel of Cairo in A.D. 1166; Masūdi died, in Cairo, in A.D. 956. These traditions were collected by me, and plainly indicated Middle Egypt as the theatre of the engineering works, which were the earthly manifestations of that Divine guidance to which Joseph attributed his usefulness to the government and inhabitants of Egypt.¹

It was natural to assume that Joseph settled his brethren along the line of this canal and in the Fayoum. From the collection of papyri, purchased by the Archduke Rainer, as well as those deciphered with so much skill and patience by Prof. Mahaffy, it is now generally admitted that something similar took place in the second reclamation of the Fayoum from that lake, which, as I had shown in 1882, filled almost the entire basin when Herodotus saw it in the fifth century, B.C.²

When Ptolemy II. (Philadelphus) had attained secure peace, a large number of veterans were settled in the Fayoum as landholders. There is no evidence of any

¹ Le Bahr Youssouf, d'après les traditions Musulmanes, Institut Egyptien, 1887. *Contemporary Review*, Sept., 1887. See also the Fayoum and Lake Moeris, Major Brown, R.E., 1892, p. 22. *The Saturday Review*, Sept. 24, 1892.

² Compare the maps of Middle Egypt prior to 1882 with those subsequently drawn by me, or embodying my researches: *Athenæum*, July 22, 1882; Proc. Soc. Bib. Arch., June, 1882 *et seq.*; Proc. R. Geog. Soc., 1885 *et seq.*; *Engineering*, Sept. 11, 1885; Sept. 2, 1887; Sept. 11, 1889; War Office Map, revised 1888; Public Works Ministry, Cairo, 1888, 1893.

existing population being dispossessed. These "hundred-acre men," therefore, received allotments outside of that small area, inclosed by a rampart, which, in 1882, was, by a strange inversion of fact, supposed to have been Lake Moeris. Although this opinion has never been expressed by any one else, it seems to me that the Nome was not called Arsinoïte after his Queen, but that she acquired the title with the estate. In that event the derivation of Goshen, or Gessen, from Ha-Sen, brings the word into close philological connection with Arsinoe, and with Asenath, the Heliopolitan wife of the Prince of the Fayoum, Joseph el-Aziz, before whom men cried Abrêk. There is added probability because it is as a dowry for a daughter of his king, Raiyan ibn el-Walîd, that the traditions of those Abrahamids, who have held Egypt for twelve hundred years, ascribe the first reclamation. Herodotus says that the fisheries were farmed in the interest of the Persian Queen. If this derivation be allowed, the question of the situation of Goshen receives an immediate and conclusive answer.

It is equally certain that if, by the neglect of irrigation, or the deliberate sacrifice of the Fayoum and its conversion into a flood escape and reservoir, as proposed to Ismaël by his Minister of Public Works, the depression again became a lake, the Birket el-Qerûn might give its name to the province. The level of the present lake is about 140 feet (43·13 metres) below the Mediterranean. Its present surface is estimated at seventy-eight square miles. The Nile Valley is about seventy-five feet above the sea; but as there can be no cultivation in Egypt above the alluvial deposit, it follows that the entire area of land in the Fayoum is below the level of high-Nile. In two years, after the destruction of the dyke at el-Lahun, the district might justify its name of Fayoum, Phiom, the lake. It would, however, be probably known by a term derived from Qerûn. The 78 square miles would expand to over 500. In the Greek

newspapers, published in Egypt, there would re-appear that Heronopolis, which was the Greek equivalent for Goshen in the time of the Septuagint, the very time when this province of Qerūn was being allotted to the disbanded army of Ptolemy and Arsinoe.

“The Fayoum, this is Pithom,” wrote R. Benjamin of Tudela in A.D. 1173. Pithom is also an equivalent for Goshen. As a descriptive term, it is “the West”; the most natural appellation conceivable for the district lying to the west of the Nile Valley. In the twelfth century there was a small Jewish colony. They identified existing works as constructed by the Israelites before the Exodus. This opinion was obviously entertained also by the learned and powerful members of the Jewish colony in Zoan-Mizraim, now Cairo. “The Rabbi Nathaniel is the President of the Jewish University, and one of the officers of the great king who resides in the fortress of Zoan.” Saadia ben-Jūsuf, the celebrated exegetical scholar, theologian and Talmudist, was born in the Fayoum, A.D. 892, He became Rector of the Jewish Academy at Sora, near Bagdad. In his Arabic version of the Pentateuch he converted the ancient Egyptian name into the convenient Arabic equivalent. Rameses became, in like manner, Ain-Semes. Whenever his co-religionists have had occasion to mention him in their Hebrew works, he is called Ha-Pithomi, but becomes el-Fayoumi in their Arabic writings. This use of wholly different words for the same place finds abundant illustration. Masr is Cairo. It would be Babylon in a modern speech in classical Greek. No doubt R. Benjamin considered Belbis the chief town of a district called Goshen. There was also an Arsinoe on the shores of the Gulf of Suez. The double nomenclature of Egyptian towns points, in my judgment, to the filial relation with the older southern metropolis. This is true of Tanis Parva, the lesser Zoan, which has, in modern times, been universally

confounded with the Zoan-Tanis-Memphis of Josephus, the pilgrim Antoninus and R. Benjamin.¹

As the Fayoum papyri show, two thousand years in their sight is as yesterday. From Joseph to Jeremiah there were not more than fifteen centuries; from Moses to Manetho less; and from Jacob to Solomon, not, probably, above seven hundred years. What are these insignificant periods in the life of a tablet or the records of the Memphite scribes?

If I am right in interpreting the prophecy of Jacob, in its fulfilment, as pre-Exilian, then it places the tribes with extreme exactitude. Nothing can be more certain than that this Prophecy cannot be referred to a period later than the second year of the Exodus. It is inconceivable, that the tribal severalty of Simon and Levi should have been, not simply ignored, but expressly denied, after the Levites were set apart to the priesthood? The land laws of Palestine were in full force under the Judges. Was a Simeonite entitled to a Levite's privilege? For this seer, whether Jacob or another, there is no hierarchy; there are no Levites.

Simon and Levi are brethren. They are as a single tribe, with a common daily duty of warrior or peasant. The Levite, thus classed with the Simeonite, has no priority in nobility of character, exemplary morals, heroism, or success. It is the exact opposite.

“Weapons of violence are their swords.

O my soul, come not thou into their council;

Unto their assembly, my glory, be not thou united,

For in their anger they slew a man,

¹ Num. xiii. 22 is conclusive. There could have been no ancient Zoan-Tanis in the Delta, B.C. 2,300, worthy of mention. Josephus says that Hebron was counted “a more ancient city than Memphis in Egypt” (*B. J.*, iv. 9, 7). Titus encamped at Tanis Parva, *κατὰ πολίχνην τὴν τῶν Τάνων* (*Ant.*, i. 8, 3). In the embassy to Psammetichus, the ambassadors were stopped at Zoan-Memphis, while the messengers proceeded seventy miles south, to Hanes-Heracleopolis.

And in their self-will they houghed an ox.
Cursed be their anger, for it was fierce;
And their wrath, for it was cruel:
I will divide them in Jacob,
And scatter them in Israel."

Believing that this oracle related to Egypt in its fulfilment, it seemed highly probable that the metaphors and similes used in regard to Joseph were taken from "the river of Joseph" and the Fayoum. The son of the fruitful Nile runs by the side of the ever-flowing stream. The daughters, his branches, cross the wall of the Libyan desert. The archers, whether the rays of the sun or the Heracleopolitans, sorely grieve him, seeking to injure the inhabitants of the Fayoum and the western edge of the provinces of Beni-Suef and Minieh by stopping their supplies of water. The perennial canal never fails, however, to nourish those Beni-Israel who are invited by the Shepherd-king to dwell in the desert-girt fortress-province of Avaris-Pithom-Heroonpolis. Here they were safe from the plagues of the Nile Valley as well as contact with the animal-worshipping natives. The Hindoos and Mohammedans in India are an apt illustration of the wisdom of such a policy of separation.

The description of the land of Goshen as the best agricultural and pastoral land in Egypt is commonly overlooked. In none of the learned treatises is adequate force attached to those emphatic words, which constitute the descriptive clause in Pharaoh's concession, firman or deed of gift. "And Pharaoh spake unto Joseph, saying: Thy father and thy brethren are come unto thee: the land of Egypt is before thee; in the best of the land make thy father and brethren to dwell; in the land of Goshen let them dwell: and if thou knowest any men of activity among them, make them rulers over my cattle. And Joseph placed his father and his brethren, and gave them a possession in

the land of Egypt, in the best of the land, in the land of Rameses, as Pharaoh had commanded" (Gen. xlvii.).

There is little to show the ordinary traveller in the winter months the difference between land worth £30 an acre and that which is given free of cost and almost free of rates and taxes to its impoverished occupants.¹

In the month of May this is apparent. Desolation has spread over the entire valley from Assouan to Cairo, except where, close to the Nile or the Bahr Jūsuf, or on the considerable area watered by the modern high-level Ibrahimiyeh canal, luxuriant growths of cotton and sugar cane, and magnificent fields of clover present a striking contrast. Here may be seen long lines of tethered cattle eating their way foot by foot into the rich grass.

From the middle of August, during the inundation period, the parts which were barren in May are converted into sheets of water. The husbandmen with their cattle are confined to island-villages, until the Nile has fallen sufficiently to allow the water to drain back into its bed. It is a period of unmitigated misery for man and beast. These changes do not apply to the Fayoum. Its perennial green turns to gold where the corn is ripening, but the trees and vineyards are proof that the maleficent flood has not been allowed to reach them. Such irrigated areas are not only the best of the land, but they are the only land visible for over two months in the waste of waters. Nowhere outside of the Fayoum, for six months in the year, were there meadows in which kine, fat-fleshed and well-favoured, could feed in the days of Joseph (Gen. xli. 18).

Can there be a doubt that the descendants of Isaac would consider the continuity, abundance, and purity of the water-supply a controlling condition in the selection of their home in this strange rainless land? The wells of Esek and

¹ See *Egyptian Irrigation*, W. Willcocks (London, 1889). *England in Egypt*. A. Milner, 1892. *The Fayūm and Lake Moeris*, Maj. Brown, 1892.

Sitnah had been worth a conflict (Gen. xxvi. 17). They were fed by springs of clear, pure water. The wells of the Delta were unfit for human use before Sesostris as they are to-day. Egypt, as far south as Cairo, is only an estuary filled with alluvial deposit. Hence the wells are brackish. Everywhere in Egypt salt is being constantly added to the land from the old maritime deposits of its tertiary limestone. It was not with men like herdsmen of Gerar, but with that foe whose scythe is the deadly weapon of zymotic disease, that these nomads would have striven, had they taken allotments where, for six months in the year, they would have been subjected to an insanitary condition about as bad as at the present day.¹

If, however, it is urged that the Delta now offers some of these advantages, the reply is obvious that no such Delta, with high-level canals fed from a Barrage, and irrigated areas from which the inundation, with its attendant plagues, is excluded, existed either at the beginning of this century or in the nineteenth century B.C. The narrow strip traversed by the fresh-water canal has been contoured by Col. Ardagh on his large map of Tel el-Kebir. No material change can have taken place in the cultivable area. The traces of the ancient canal show that the physical conditions imposed by nature are unaltered.

How can it be seriously contended, as Michaelis insists, supported by Brugsch, that the Beni-Israel were invited into Egypt to colonize the wilderness to the east of Suez? Is it not at least unreasonable to suppose that those warrior-princes, the Hyksos, whose statues, in black basalt, as Andro-sphinxes, watched the eastern frontier, would have delegated this duty to a handful of Syrian shepherds? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Jacob brought with him but an

¹ See the articles by Brigade-Surgeon Greene Pasha, late Director of the Egyptian Sanitary Department; "England's Duty to Egypt," *Med. Mag.*, June, 1893; "Sanit. Adm. in Eg.," *Provincial Med. Journ.*, Aug. to Dec., 1892; *Brit. Med. Journal*, *passim*; *Nat. Observer*, Sept. 9, 1893.

indifferent reputation for courage and loyalty. Would this valley, the postern gate if not the chief land entrance, have been left by an Osorkon or Ramses without a powerful garrison of trustworthy troops? What attraction would it offer to the sons of Jacob, pasturing their flocks and bringing up their daughters in the immediate presence of these soldiers? Even if the fertile land extended to the Bitter Lakes before the Rameside dynasty, there was no room for a considerable population. If the Exodus ever took place, or if the Jews under David, or even in the time of Jeremiah or the LXX., thought that they had once dwelt in a part of Egypt, the Goshen of their historical romance must have been large enough to support half a million of souls, with their friends, "the mixed multitude," in that luxury whose loss they openly lamented. What force would Pharaoh have been able to use to prevent their emigrating whenever so minded? In the Fayoum they were confined by the desert and river.

If we turn from these general considerations to examine the evidence adduced by M. Naville, it will not stand critical examination. Granted that a stone, not a milestone as it was erroneously announced, but a fragment of soft limestone, with a miliary inscription scratched upon it, bearing the words AB ERO IN CLUSMA M. VIII—Θ, was found *in situ* at Tel el-Maskhuta; that it was genuine, and had been scratched and placed there in the reign of Maximian and Severus. It can only be translated, as marking the ninth mile for the traveller proceeding from Ero to the Red Sea. It follows indisputably that Ero was nine miles distant in the direction opposite to Clysmā. If then Ero is Heroonpolis, and Heroonpolis Pithom, the "store-city" mentioned in Exodus, the underground chambers, which M. Naville supposed to be granaries, were nine miles away from the bricks, with or without straw, which the Israelites, as M. Naville thought, were required to make

for these thick walls. There is no room for further discussion until M. Naville concedes that the extreme unlikelihood of a sign-post in letters, words and measurements not understood of the people, conveying a very slender amount of information as to a singularly unimportant fact, may have found its way into his excavations at a somewhat later period than that in which Greek was the current European tongue of Northern Egypt.

His arguments from Pithom, and the inscription of Ptolemy Philadelphus are challenged by the opinion of the Jews of the twelfth century, as recorded by R. Benjamin. There were hundreds of shrines to the god of the setting sun. His "recorders" may have lived at "Thuku," but the immense breadth of inference gives a result resembling an inverted pyramid, to whose position of unstable equilibrium any number of objections can be taken with fatal effect.

COPE WHITEHOUSE.

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

XI. WITHOUT AND WITHIN.

WE have now gained a tolerably definite view of St. Paul's way of conceiving the good that came to the world through Jesus Christ, that is to say, of his soteriological system of ideas. Our next task, in order, must be to make ourselves acquainted with the apologetic buttresses of that system. The Pauline apologetic, as we have already learned, relates to three topics: ethical interests, the true function of the law, and the prerogatives of Israel. We have now therefore to consider in detail what the apostle had to say on each of these topics in succession, and the value of his teaching as a defence against possible attacks in any of these directions.

The first of the three is a wide theme, and in the highest

degree important. In reference to every religion it is a pertinent and fundamentally important question: What guarantees does it provide for right conduct? No religion has a right to take offence at such a question, or to claim exemption from interrogation on that score. Least of all Pauline Christianity, for, while Christianity as taught by Christ is conspicuously ethical in its drift, the same faith as presented by St. Paul seems on the face of it to be religious or even theological rather than ethical, so that the question as to moral tendency is in this case far from idle or impertinent. The point raised, it will be observed, does not concern the personal relation of the teacher to morality, about which there is no room for doubt, but the provision he has made in his doctrinal system for an interest which he obviously feels to be vital. Theoretic failure is quite conceivable even in the case of one who has a burning passion for righteousness.

Paulinism offers two guarantees for holiness in the Christian: the moral dynamic of faith, and the influence of the Holy Ghost. These therefore we shall consider, each in a separate chapter, with a view to ascertain their efficiency, and how they arise out of the system.

Despite the most circumspect theoretic provision, it is a familiar experience that the reality of conduct falls far below the ideal. The Christian religion is no exception to this observation, and the devout soul may well be moved to ask, Why, with such guarantees as the above named, should it be so? The question did not escape Paul's attention, and his thoughts about it shall be gathered together under the head of the *Flesh as a hindrance to holiness*.

It will help us to understand the apostle's doctrine on these three themes if in a preliminary chapter we endeavour to ascertain what was the precise relation in his mind between the two sides of his soteriology as set forth in *Romans* i.-v. on the one hand, and in *Romans* vi.-viii. on

the other. It is a question as to the connection in the apostle's thought between the objective and the subjective, the ideal and the real, the religious and the moral. This topic forms the subject of the present paper.

On this question, then, various views may be and have been entertained.

1. The crudest possible solution of the problem would be to find in the two sections of the Epistle to the Romans two incompatible theories of salvation, the forensic and the mystical, the latter cancelling or modifying the former as found, on second thoughts, to be unsatisfactory and inadequate. This hypothesis, though not without advocates,¹ can hardly commend itself on sober reflection. That St. Paul, like other thinkers, might find it needful to modify his views, and even to retract opinions discovered to be ill founded, is conceivable. But we should hardly look for retractations in the same writing, especially in one coming so late in the day. It may be taken for granted that the apostle was done with his experimental or apprentice thinking in theology before he indited the Epistle to the Romans, and that when he took his pen in hand to write that letter, he was not as one feeling blindly his way, but knew at the outset what he meant to say. He had thought out by that time the whole matter of objective and subjective righteousness; and if he keep the two apart in his treatment, it is not tentatively and provisionally, but as believing that each represents an important aspect of truth.

2. We may go to the opposite extreme, and find in the two sections not two incompatible theories, one superseding the other, not even two distinct while compatible aspects, but one train and type of thought running through the

¹ Ritschl's treatment of Paul's view in *Die Entstehung der Altkatholischen Kirche*, 2te Aufl., looks in this direction; vide pp. 87-90. Vide also his more recent work, *Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, ii. p. 224.

whole. And as the two parts of the Epistle certainly seem to speak in different dialects, it comes to be a question of interpreting either in terms of the other by ingenious exegesis. Which of the two apparently different types of thought is to be resolved into the other will depend on the interpreter's theological bias. One would gladly find in St. Paul's writings everywhere, and only, objective righteousness; another welcomes not less eagerly whatever tends to prove that subjective righteousness is the apostle's great theme. The latter bias, a natural reaction against the former, is the one most prominent in modern theology. Those under its influence read the doctrine of *Romans* vi.-viii. into *Romans* i.-v., and find in the Epistle one uniform doctrine of justification by faith as the promise and potency of personal righteousness, and one doctrine of atonement, not by substitute but by *sample*, Christ becoming a redeeming power in us through our mystic fellowship with Him in His life, death, and resurrection. Reasons have already been given why this view cannot be accepted.¹

3. In the two foregoing hypotheses an earlier type of thought is sacrificed for a later either by St. Paul himself or by his modern interpreter. A third conceivable attitude towards the problem is that of sturdily refusing assent to either of these modes of dealing with it, and insisting that the two aspects of Pauline teaching shall be allowed to stand side by side, both valid, yet neither capable of explaining, any more than of being explained into, the other. One occupying this attitude says in effect: I find in the Epistle to the Romans a doctrine of gratuitous justification, to the effect that God pardons man's sin, and regards him as righteous, out of respect to Christ's atoning death. I find also, further on in the same Epistle, a doctrine of regeneration or spiritual renewal, to the effect that a man who believes in Christ, and is baptized into Him, dies to the

¹ Vide THE EXPOSITOR for August.

old life of sin, and rises to a new life of personal righteousness. These two things, justification and regeneration, are two acts of Divine grace, sovereign and independent. The one does not explain or guarantee the other. There is no nexus between them other than God's gracious will. Whom He justifies He regenerates, and that is all that can be said on the matter. There is no psychological bond insuring, or even tending to insure, that the justified man shall become a regenerate or righteous man. Faith is not such a bond. Faith's action is confined to justification; it has no proper function in regeneration; here baptism takes the place which faith has in justification.

4. So purely external a view of the relation between justification and regeneration, as handled in the Pauline literature, is not likely to be accepted as the last word, though spoken by a master of biblical theology, even by his most admiring of disciples. Accordingly, a fourth attitude falls to be discriminated; that recently taken up by Dr. Stevens, in his excellent work on *The Pauline Theology*, who in many respects is a follower of Dr. Weiss, the chief exponent of the theory stated in the foregoing paragraph. The basis of the view espoused by this writer is the distinction between *form* and *essence* in Pauline thought. He holds that in form St. Paul's conception of justification is forensic, and that any attempt to eliminate this aspect from his system must be regarded as an exegetical violence. As a mere matter of historical exegesis, it is beyond doubt that he taught the doctrine of an objective righteousness. But this does not preclude the question, What is the eternal kernel of truth enclosed in this Jewish shell? The kernel the author referred to finds in the mystic doctrine of *Romans* vi.-viii. "In chapter iv. he (Paul) develops the *formal* principle of salvation, which is justification by faith, treated in a forensic manner in accord with prevailing Jewish conceptions; in chapters v., vi., and viii. he unfolds the real

principle of salvation, which is moral renewal through union with Christ. The first argument is designed to parry a false theory, and meets that theory on its own juristic plane of thought; the second exposition is adapted to the edification and instruction of believers, and, mounting up into the spiritual realm, deals with the moral and religious truths, processes, and forces which are involved in justification."¹ The writer of these sentences, it seems to me, makes the mistake of imputing to St. Paul a distinction which exists only for the modern consciousness. It is one thing to insist on the need, and claim the right, to interpret Pauline forms of thought into eternally valid truth; quite another to ascribe to St. Paul our view of what is form and what essence. For the apostle, objective righteousness was more than a form, it was a great essential reality; not a mere symbol of a higher truth, but an important member of the organism of Christian truth; not a mere controversial weapon, but a doctrine in which his own heart found satisfaction.

None of the foregoing hypotheses can be accepted as a satisfactory account of the way in which the two aspects of St. Paul's soteriology were connected in his mind. How, then, are we to conceive the matter? Perhaps we shall best get at the truth by trying to imagine the psychological history of the apostle's thought on these themes. The first great stage in the process would be connected with his never-to-be-forgotten escape from *legalism* to a religion of faith in God's grace. What would be the attitude of his mind at that crisis? One of blissful rest in the ideal of righteousness as realized in Christ: "I have failed, but He has succeeded, and I am righteous in Him." That thought would undoubtedly give his eager spirit rest for a season. But only for a season. For the imperious hunger of the soul for righteousness is still there, and no mere pardon, or

¹ *The Pauline Theology*, p. 275.

acceptance as righteous through faith, will satisfy permanently its longings. And as soon as the convert discovers that he has not yet attained, the cry will awake in his conscience, How shall I become all I ought and desire to be? It is not, like the old cry, "Oh, wretched man that I am," a despairing exclamation. It is the voice of Christian aspiration uttered in good hope, grounded on the consciousness of spiritual forces actually at work within the soul. What are these? There is faith incessantly active about Christ, constantly thinking of Him as crucified and risen, winding itself about Him, and extracting nourishment from every known fact in His earthly history. And there is the Holy Ghost, about whose mighty working in believers one living in those days could not fail to hear. How He revealed Himself in St. Paul's consciousness as a factor making for Christian holiness, distinct from faith, is a question that need not here be considered. Suffice it to say that, judging from his writings, the Spirit of Jesus did not leave Himself without a witness in his religious experience. These were two potent forces at work within him, filling him with high hope. But, alas, not they alone; along with them worked a sinister influence, seeming to have its seat in the *flesh*, possessing potency sufficient to disturb spiritual serenity, cloud hope, and introduce a tragic element of sadness into the new life. Here were conflicting forces supplying food for reflection: faith, the spirit, the flesh. How were those facts of the Christian consciousness to be formulated and correlated? The apostle's mind would not be at rest till it had got a way of thinking on these matters, and the results of his meditations, more or less protracted, lie before us in *Romans* vi.-viii., and in some other places in his Epistles. They consist of his doctrine of faith as a spiritual force, his doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the immanent source of Christian holiness, and his doctrine of the flesh as the great obstructive to holiness.

From the foregoing ideal history, it follows that St. Paul's doctrine of subjective righteousness, its causes and hindrances, was of later growth than his doctrine of objective righteousness. This was only what was to be expected. God does not reveal all things at once to truth-seeking spirits. He sends forth light to them just as they need it. Inspirations come piecemeal, in many parts and in many modes, to apostles as to prophets. System-builders may throw off a whole body of "divinity" at a sitting, but in a scheme of thought so originating there is little of the divine. The true divine light steals upon the soul like the dawn of day, the reward of patient waiting. So St. Paul got his doctrine of righteousness, not complete at a stroke, but in successive vistas answering to pressing exigencies. The doctrine of objective righteousness met the spiritual need of the conversion crisis; the doctrine of subjective righteousness came in due season to solve problems arising out of Christian experience.

The two doctrines, when they had both been revealed, lived together peaceably in St. Paul's mind. The later did not come to cancel the earlier, or to put the Christian disciple out of conceit with his primitive intuitions. He conserved old views while gratefully welcoming the new. Why should he do otherwise? The two revelations served different purposes. They were not two incompatible answers to the same question, but compatible answers to two distinct questions. At his conversion, Saul, a despairing man, threw himself on the grace of God, crying, "God be merciful to me, the sinner, for Jesus Christ's sake," and in doing so found rest. On reflection this experience shaped itself intellectually into the doctrine of justification by faith: God regards as righteous any man, be he the greatest sinner, who trusts in His grace through Jesus Christ. At a later period, Paul, the believing man, on examining himself, discovered that what he had utterly failed to accomplish on

the method of legalism, he was now able approximately to achieve, the realization of the moral ideal even as interpreted by the Christian conscience, an ideal infinitely higher than the Pharisaic. The righteousness of the law, spiritualised and summed up in love, was actually being fulfilled in him. A marvellous contrast; whence came the striking moral change in the same man? The earlier question had been, How can I get peace of conscience in spite of failure? The question now is, Why is it that I no longer fail? how comes it that, notwithstanding my greatly increased insight into the exacting character of the Divine law, I have a buoyant sense of moral ability and victory? St. Paul sought and found the answer through observation of the forces which he perceived to be actually at work within him.

In making this statement I have answered by anticipation the question, Whence did St. Paul get the mystic element which formed the later phase in his composite conception of salvation as unfolded with exceptional fulness in the Epistle to the Romans? According to some he was indebted for this directly or indirectly to the Alexandrian Jewish philosophy. Certain modern theologians, while ascribing to him a preponderant influence in determining the character of Christianity, seem disposed to reduce his originality to a minimum. They will have it that in no part of his system was he much more than a borrower. He got his forensic doctrine of imputed righteousness from the Pharisaic schools and his mystic doctrine of imparted righteousness from Philo possibly, or more probably from the Hellenistic Book of Wisdom. So Pfeleiderer, for example, in his *Urchristenthum*, and in the new edition of his *Paulinismus*. Men of sober judgment will be very slow to take up with such plausible generalizations. They rest upon an extremely slender basis of fact, and they are *a priori* improbable. That St. Paul, after he became a

Christian, wholly escaped from Rabbinical influence, I by no means assert; but I am very sceptical as to the wholesale importation into his system of Christian thought of the stock ideas of the theology of the Jewish synagogue. There is truth in the remark of Beyschlag, that it does too little honour to the creative power of the Christian spirit in St. Paul to lay so much stress on the points of resemblance between his views and the Pharisaic theology.¹ Still less justifiable is the hypothesis of dependence in reference to Hellenism. Even Pfeleiderer admits that possibly St. Paul was not acquainted with Philo, and his contention is not that the apostle drew from the great Alexandrian philosopher, but from the Book of Wisdom, which is a literary product of the same Greek spirit. It is in the power of any one by perusal of the book to test the value of the assertion, and for myself I put it at a low figure. Speaking generally, I distrust this whole method of accounting for Paulinism by eclectic patchwork. It attaches far too much importance to contemporary intellectual environment, and far too little to the creative personality of the man. The true key to the Pauline theology is that personality as revealed in a remarkable religious experience. And if we are to go outside that experience in order to account for the system of thought, I should think it less likely to turn out a wild goose chase to have recourse to the Hebrew Scriptures, and especially to *the Apostolic Church*, than to the Jewish synagogue or the literature of Hellenism.

For, while the originality of St. Paul in his doctrines of faith and of the Holy Spirit is by all means to be insisted on, it is at the same time to be remembered that he did not need to be original in order to recognise the existence of faith and the Holy Spirit as real and potent factors in the Christian life. One could not live within the Church of the first generation without hearing much of faith as a great

¹ *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, vol. ii., p. 23.

spiritual force from the men who were acquainted with the tradition of Christ's teaching, and without witnessing remarkable phenomena which believers were in the habit of tracing to the mighty power of the Holy Ghost. Faith and the Divine Spirit were universally regarded in the primitive Church as *vera causa* within the spiritual sphere. This common conviction was a part of the inheritance on which St. Paul entered on becoming a Christian. His originality came into play in the development which the common conviction underwent in his mind. In his conception of the subtle, penetrating nature of faith and its irresistible vital power he distanced all his contemporaries. The *faith-mysticism* is all his own; there is nothing like it elsewhere in the New Testament. The Apostle Peter comes nearest to it when he exhorts Christians to arm themselves with the mind exemplified by Christ in suffering for men in the flesh.¹ But St. Peter's point of view is comparatively external. The suffering Christ is for him simply exemplary: "Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow His steps."² There is no co-dying and co-rising here, as in the Pauline Epistles. So peculiar is this to them that it might be made the test of genuineness in reputedly Pauline literature. On this ground alone there is a strong presumption in favour of the Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Colossians, wherein we find an exhortation to Christians who have risen with Christ to complete the process of mystic identification by ascending with Him to heaven.³ If some unknown disciple of the Pauline School wrote the letter, he had caught the master's style very well, and had noted the faith-mysticism as specially characteristic. It is very doubtful if any imitation, conscious or unconscious, would have reproduced that trait. It was too peculiar, too poetic, too much the creation of individual idiosyncrasy. The ordinary man

¹ 1 Peter iv. 1.² 1 Peter ii, 21.³ Coloss. iii. 1.

would be afraid to meddle with it, and inclined to leave it alone, or to translate it into more prosaic and generally intelligible phraseology, like that in which St. Peter held up Jesus for imitation as the great exemplar.

For a similar reason it may be regarded as certain that St. Paul did not borrow the faith-mysticism from any foreign source. The mind which could not produce it would not borrow it. The presence of that element in St. Paul's letters is due to his religious genius. No other psychological explanation need be sought of his great superiority to his fellow writers of the New Testament as an assertor of faith's powers. He was a far greater man, incomparably richer in natural endowment, than Peter or James, or even than the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, though in some respects the latter excelled him. He was gifted at once with an original intellect, an extraordinary moral intensity, and a profoundly mystical religious temperament. To their united action we owe his doctrine of the believer's fellowship with Christ. As he states the doctrine, that fellowship was a source of ethical inspiration, and so doubtless it was; but it is equally true that it was an effect not less than a cause of exceptional moral vitality. St. Paul's whole way of thinking on the subject took its colour from his spiritual individuality. This does not mean that his views are purely subjective and personal, and of no permanent objective value to Christians generally. But it does imply this much, that the Pauline mysticism demands moral affinity with its author for due appreciation, and that there must always be many Christians to whom it does not powerfully appeal.

One point more remains to be considered, viz., the mode in which the two aspects of the apostle's double doctrine of righteousness are presented in his Epistles in relation to each other. There is no trace of the gradual development implied in the psychological history previously sketched

beyond the fact that the subjective aspect, the later, according to that history, in the order of development, comes second in the order of treatment, both in *Romans*, where it is handled at length, and in *Galatians*, where it is but slightly touched on. In both Epistles the doctrine of subjective righteousness is introduced with a polemical reference. In *Romans* it is set in opposition to the notion that reception of "the righteousness of God" by faith is compatible with indifference to personal holiness; in *Galatians* it is exhibited as the true method of attaining personal holiness as against a false method, which is declared to be futile. Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?¹ is the question to which the doctrine is an answer in the one case; shall we supplement faith in Christ by circumcision and kindred legal works? is the question to which it is an answer in the other.² Over against the patchwork programme of Judaistic Christianity the apostle sets the thorough-going self-consistent programme of a Christianity worthy of the name: "we in the spirit from faith wait for the hope of righteousness," where, as we shall see more fully hereafter, righteousness is to be taken *subjectively*, and the two great guarantees for the ultimate attainment of personal righteousness, faith, and the Spirit, are carefully specified. His whole doctrine of sanctification, as fully unfolded in the Epistle to the Romans, is contained in germ in this brief text in his earlier Epistle to the Galatians. As here stated, the Pauline programme is sanctification by faith not less than justification—faith good for all purposes, able to meet all needs of the soul.

In some respects the earlier formulation is to be preferred to the later. If briefer, it is also simpler, gives less the impression of abstruseness and elaboration, wears more the aspect of a really practicable programme. It makes

¹ *Rom.* vi. 1.

² *Gal.* v. 2-6.

Paulinism appear one uniform self-consistent doctrine of righteousness by faith, not as in *Romans*, on a superficial view at least, a doctrine of objective righteousness imputed to faith, supplemented by a doctrine of subjective righteousness wrought out in us by the joint operation of faith and the Holy Spirit. It addresses itself to a nobler state of mind, and moves on a loftier plane of religious feeling. St. Paul's ideal opponent in *Galatians* is a man who earnestly desires to be righteous in heart and life, and fails to see how he can reach that goal along the line of faith. In *Romans*, on the other hand, he is a man who conceives it possible to combine reception of God's grace with continuance in sin, and even to magnify grace by multiplying sin. Against the latter the apostle has to plead that his gospel is a way of holiness; against the former that it is the only true way to holiness. That it tends that way the legalist does not dispute; he only doubts its ability by itself to bring men to the desired end. Such an one an apostle may without loss of dignity seek to instruct. But how humiliating to argue with one who cares nothing for holiness, but only for pardon; and how vain! What chance of such an one understanding or sympathising with the mystic fellowship of faith with Christ? Is it not casting pearls before swine to expound the doctrine to so incapable a scholar? Perhaps, but St. Paul's excuse must be that he cannot bring himself to despair of any who bear the Christian name. He wishes to lead into the school of Jesus all who have believed in Him, whether they be honest but ill-instructed legalists, or low-minded sensualists. Therefore to the one class he says, "if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing";¹ and to the other, "let not sin reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof."²

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¹ *Gal.* v. 2.

² *Rom.* vi. 12.

THE BUDDING ROD.

THE incident of the miraculous budding of Aaron's rod in the wilderness is an acted parable, full of profound instruction, and requires and deserves that we should take special pains to get at the very heart of its meaning. It was an object lesson taught to the Israelites in their religious childhood, when they could only be taught by what they could see with their eyes and judge by their senses. It was taught to them too at a time when they specially needed to be instructed in this manner. It was not a casual lesson which had no particular significance; it was in every way suited to the circumstances, and the form which it took was shaped by the customs with which the Israelites were familiar.

A feeling of discontent had arisen in the camp. It began in the tribe of Levi, whose families were jealous of Aaron, because the high-priesthood, with all its honours and privileges, was confined to himself and to his house. They said that this was a piece of favouritism on the part of Moses, exalting his own brother over them. Aaron, they insisted, had no more right to the office than any of themselves, or indeed any of the tribes or families of Israel. They wished to revive the old patriarchal system of a household or tribal priesthood. Each man was the priest of his own family, and each chief the high-priest of his own tribe. The whole congregation were holy, and had an equal right to approach God and perform the sacred services of the tabernacle; and therefore there must be no man raised above his fellows, and allowed to exercise exclusively the higher functions of the priesthood, or else each of the heads of families must get the office in turn. With the usual blindness of unscrupulous ambition, the conspirators lost sight of the fact that the gaining of their object would have abolished all the distinctive privileges of their own tribe of Levi, as a

sacerdotal tribe specially set apart for the services of the tabernacle, and reduced it to the common level of the other tribes. They would thus be cutting the bough upon which they were standing, and hurling themselves down to a lower position than that which they already occupied. The leaders of the disaffection were Korah, Dathan and Abiram; and concealing their real purpose of usurping for themselves the place and power of Aaron and his sons, under the plausible pretext of seeking the good of all Israel, they succeeded in enlisting the sympathies of the great mass of the people; and the discontent and disorder spread from the tribe of Levi until the whole camp was in dangerous revolt.

In this crisis it was necessary for God to interfere and put an end to the strife; for it was He Himself who had appointed Aaron and his house to be His priests in perpetuity. The rebellion of the Israelites was a rebellion not against the ambition of man, but against the authority of God. In the most awful manner therefore He punished the presumptuous transgressors, and indicated His own Divinely appointed method of religious worship. The earth opened under the feet of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, and swallowed them up along with their families and possessions. A fire came from the Lord, and consumed the two hundred and fifty who were in haste to assume what they called their right to perform the ministry of the tabernacle, and who dared to offer unhallowed incense in the holy place; while of the multitude who shared in the disaffection of their leaders and murmured at their punishment, upwards of fourteen thousand perished of a grievous plague. In order to prevent all unseemly strife of that kind in future, and to show the Israelites a way that would convince them once for all who had the best right to be the high-priest of Israel, God made an experiment before their eyes.

The trial by lot is one of the oldest and most common of all human customs. It was regarded as a direct appeal in important questions to Almighty wisdom, secured from all influences of passion or prejudice. It was often associated with religious ceremonies of the most solemn character. Its use by Divine command on many interesting occasions is described in Holy Scripture. The land of Canaan was divided among the Israelites by lot; and hence the portion of each tribe was called "the lot of his inheritance." The order of the priests' service was determined by lot. The election of Saul to be the first king of Israel was by lot; and Matthias was chosen by lot to be the substitute of Judas among the disciples. The mode of casting the lot varied among different people and according to the nature of the occasion. Sometimes it was by sticks or wands held aloft and then allowed to fall to the ground, when their position to the right or the left determined the issue. Sometimes it was by writing the name of the persons or things in dispute on a bundle of arrows, and then drawing them out one by one from a bag. And all young people are familiar with the game in which a number of straws or bits of sticks of different lengths are concealed in the hand, their tops brought to a uniform level being alone visible, and one is asked to draw out a single stick or straw, when the longest chosen is the successful one.

The test to which the Israelites in the wilderness were put was founded upon this ancient custom, though it departed from it in some important particulars. Each prince or head of the different tribes of Israel was required to bring a rod, and lay it up all night before the ark of the Lord in the tabernacle. It was not any mere ordinary piece of wood that he was to bring, but the ancestral staff, the symbol of his authority as the priest and ruler of his own tribe and household. In the East the elder or head man of each village carries a staff with him wherever he

goes—not merely to lean upon—but as a badge of his dignity and power. This staff is from five to six feet long, and it is always made of the straight branch of a tree with the bark on it, left in its natural state. It is one of the most precious possessions of the family and is handed down from father to son, so that he who inherits it on the death of its previous possessor, becomes in turn the head of his house and the ruler of his tribe. At the present day in an eastern encampment a white-haired chief may often be seen holding such a staff in his hand at the door of his tent; and in every Mahometan town a long-robed dervish may be met frequently carrying a small stick of almond wood, which is regarded with much superstitious veneration, and believed to be capable of working miraculous cures, and which the son inherits when the father dies. The origin of the custom is very simple and natural. It means that just as a tree produces a branch which is a miniature representation of it, so the person who owns the ancestral staff is the head and representative of the house from which he sprang. We read that Jacob had such a staff, and that he worshipped God leaning upon the top of it when he gave instructions to his son Joseph regarding his burial in the Holy Land. We are told about the staff of Judah, and the staff of Moses. We have a survival of this old-world custom in the sceptre which the monarch holds in his hand when seated on the throne; in the mace of the magistrate which is the symbol of his authority as the representative of the majesty of the law; and in the bâton of the field-marshal which is the badge of the highest military rank.

We thus understand the significance of the rod or staff which each prince or head of his tribe was required to bring and lay before the ark in the tabernacle. As the staves would be all made of the same wood and would look very much alike, it was necessary, in order to distinguish

them, that each staff should have the name of its owner carved upon it. There were thirteen of the staves brought to the inner sanctuary of the tabernacle; twelve to represent the twelve tribes of Israel, and the thirteenth to represent Aaron, who was the object of dispute. The test to which they were to be put was, that whichever rod should be found in the morning covered with buds and blossoms and fruits, the person to whom it belonged would be marked out as being Divinely chosen to be the high-priest of the Lord for Israel. All night the rods lay together in the holy place in the darkness, that was in a peculiar sense the shadow of God's wing. We can imagine how eagerly the princes of Israel would gather together in the morning to ascertain the result of the experiment. And we can well believe that there would be a great disappointment, when it was found that of all the heap of rods the only one that had buds and blossoms and fruits on it was the one on which the name of Aaron was carved. The Lord had in this signal manner chosen the very man against whom they had conspired, and whom they would not have to rule over them in holy things. Bitter as must have been their disappointment when they took back their own lifeless unchanged rods which God had rejected, they had no choice but to submit. The decision had been left to the Lord, and He had shown His will in a way that did not admit of any doubt or dispute. The question was settled forever that Aaron and his house were to be the hereditary high-priests of Israel in all time coming.

It was a wonderful miracle. It was against nature. We have sometimes seen a branch in spring, which, though broken off from the tree and lying on the ground, still kept as much sap in it as enabled it to develop its buds into leaves for a short time, and look as if it were living and growing. But there was no sap at all in Aaron's rod. It was many years since it had been cut from its parent

tree. It was perfectly dry and dead; and being constantly in the hand, it was much worn. That such an ancient piece of wood should bud and blossom seemed beforehand an utter impossibility. Then, too, the conditions in which it was placed were against nature. It is in the sunshine that the life of a tree is quickened and the sap made to flow, and the leaves to expand, and the flowers open, and the fruits form. But it was in the darkness that the rod of Aaron carried on these vital processes. It is in the open air, in fertile places, that trees usually grow and develop their parts; but the rod of Aaron grew in the dry parched desert where there was no green thing, and within the enclosure of the sanctuary shut out from the rain and sunshine of heaven. It had no root in any stimulating soil, it had no connection with any living tree. It was the power of God working directly without any second causes that made it bud and blossom. The development of the rod, which had long before stopped because of its severance from the parent tree, was set agoing and accelerated, because it was united to His power, whose life makes all things grow; so that what in ordinary circumstances required the slow process of months was accomplished in a single night. Aaron's rod, when exhibited to the gaze of the wondering Israelites, quelling at once their rebellion, was brought back into the sanctuary and placed in the ark as part of the regalia of Israel; a most significant symbol to all generations of the danger of approaching God in any other way than that which He Himself had appointed, and of the certainty of God's accepting the ministry of the high-priest whom He Himself had chosen.

I have said that the miracle of the budding rod was against nature; and I have pointed out some things in regard to which this was true. But God usually works even in His miracles along the lines of nature; He honours the ordinary methods of His providence so far as they will go

on extraordinary occasions; He is sparing in His forth-putting of miraculous power, and as a wise Economist makes as much use of existing materials as possible. It was therefore an economy of the miracle that the ancestral staff upon which it was wrought should be made of the wood of the almond tree, which in its natural growth is the foremost of all trees, puts forth its beautiful rosy blossoms before the leaves in its haste to develop itself, and is always the first to awake from the sleep of winter under the first mild breath of spring. Hence its Hebrew name means "the hastener or waker," and there is a beautiful poetic allusion to it in words addressed to the prophet Jeremiah, which he would well understand. "The word of the Lord came unto me, saying, Jeremiah, what seest thou? And I said, I see a rod of an almond tree. Then the Lord said, Thou hast well seen; for I will hasten My word and perform it"; the word for *hasten* and for the *almond tree* being the substantive and the verbal forms of the same root. The miracle of the budding rod was also in the line of nature, inasmuch as it was a branch of an almond tree left in its natural state without being peeled or dressed, and therefore lending itself more easily as it were to the miraculous quickening. And the fact that all the stages of flowering and fruiting appeared on it at once, is in complete accordance with the fact that buds, blossoms and nuts are all found on the natural branch together at the same time. The wonder of this special miracle was also in harmony with the previous history of the rod. We have reason to believe that it was no other than the identical rod with which all the miracles of Moses and Aaron had hitherto been performed. It was the ancestral staff belonging to Aaron as the oldest of the family and the head of his father's house; and as Aaron was the mouthpiece of Moses, so the rod of Aaron was the visible instrument in the hands of Moses by which the power of God was put forth on behalf

of His people. It was identified therefore with miracles; its budding in the tabernacle was of a piece with its becoming a serpent on Horeb, and dividing the waters of the Red Sea for a passage for the Israelites. It always possessed as it were the power of developing a higher or more abundant life. And we are not astonished that "the mighty staff," "the staff of God," as it was called, which had swallowed up the staves of the magicians in the presence of Pharaoh, and thus put an end to the pretensions of a false priesthood by destroying their badge of office, should prove its immeasurable superiority to the staves of the other princes of Israel, who had dared to conspire against the authority of Aaron and to deprive him of his office, by budding and blossoming before the ark of the Lord, while theirs continued leafless and dead.

The budding rod was an appropriate symbol of the Divine election in the case of Aaron. While his own brethren of the tribe of Levi, and the other tribes of Israel, wished to strip him of his dignity, and to impoverish and make bare his life, the Giver of all life and fruitfulness crowned him with glory and honour. Through the Divine favour he obtained more abundant life, and the blessing of God made him truly rich. The darkness of trial and trouble only caused him to blossom and fruit more abundantly, like the *Cereus* and the *Night-flowering Stock*. His ancestral staff was made as beautiful and fruitful in the Divine service as a palm tree, flourishing in the courts of the Lord's house and bringing forth fruit in old age. It was endowed with the special organs by which the seed was to be formed, in token that the office of the high-priesthood was to be continued in the family of Aaron forever.

And was there not this further significance in the blossoming of the rod, that it indicated the spirit of self-sacrifice which specially belonged to the priestly office? What is the meaning of every blossom and fruit in nature? Is it

not self-sacrifice? So long as a plant puts forth branches and leaves only, it lives entirely for itself and can perpetuate its selfish existence indefinitely. But whenever it puts forth a blossom it goes beyond itself and has a regard to another life that is to spring from it, and in this unselfish effort terminates its own existence; for every plant, when it blossoms and ripens its seed, has fulfilled the great end of its life and perishes. A flower and consequently a fruit is an abortive branch, the vegetative, selfish growth being arrested and metamorphosed into the unselfish reproductive growth. And is it not instructive to notice that it is in this self-sacrifice of the plant that all its beauty comes out and culminates? The blossom and the fruit in which it gives its own life for another, are the loveliest of all its parts. God has crowned this self-denial and blessing of others with all the glory of colour and the grace of form and the sweetness of perfume and the richness of nourishment. And so the almond rod of Aaron was to blossom and fruit under the blessing of God, not for his own good alone, but for the good of all Israel. The conspirators sought the office of the high-priesthood for themselves, from selfish motives of ambition. It was the honours and emoluments connected with it that they coveted. They cared not for the privilege of Divine service and doing good to their fellows which it conferred. They lost sight altogether of the spiritual nature of the office and valued only its temporal advantages. They were thus seeking their own, not the things of others, and their rods in consequence of their utter selfishness continued barren; they produced no buds or blossoms or fruits, which are the symbols and the rewards of self-sacrifice. The ancestral staff was to be used by them merely as a rod of power to rule over their brethren, for their own glory and aggrandisement.

And the rod of bare power lording it over others produced no life or fruitfulness. It created instead a desert,

and impoverished life. The man who rules over his fellows not for their good but for his own, does them an injury and not a benefit, and does his best to make his own life poor and bare. Too many have followed in the wake of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, and seized positions of wealth and honour, not that they might be a greater blessing to their fellow creatures, but that they might confine to themselves the advantages of such positions. Kings have reigned for their own glory, and rulers have wielded the rod of office for oppression. And the idea that generally prevails in the world is that rank or wealth or power of any kind is solely for the benefit of the possessor, and not to be used as a talent and opportunity for the good of others. To this worldly idea the Divine idea of the priesthood is wholly opposed. That office was instituted to show God's unselfish treatment of man—the disinterested love that is in His heart—even for those who have rebelled against Him, and refused to love and serve Him, and His desire to save them at the cost of the death of His own Son. The priesthood was not the result of man seeking after God, but of God seeking after man, God taking the initiative. And when there was no eye to pity us, and no hand to save us, His own eye pitied and His own hand was stretched forth to save us. It was God Himself who appointed the high-priest; and as God sacrificed Himself in the appointment for the good of men, so He wished the Divinely chosen priest also to sacrifice himself for the good of men. God's priests were meant to be the servants of their fellows, even as God's own Son came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give His life a ransom for many. God's idea of power is service; and He is teaching us continually that the highest dignity is to be the servant of all, and the greatest blessedness to do good as we have opportunity. Every rod of influence that is wielded for the good of others inspires with new vitality, causes even the wilderness and

the solitary place to be glad and the desert to rejoice and blossom as the rose. Laid on the face of the dead, unlike Elisha's rod in the hands of the selfish Gehazi, it causes the dead to arise to newness of life. It makes the feeblest germs of goodness, in the most hostile conditions, where no light or warmth can reach them, to bud and blossom and fruit. It is the rod of self-sacrifice everywhere that brings into the world new buds, new flowers, new fruits, and beautifies and enriches the world as nothing else can do. We owe to it the whole bright growth of the natural world, and all the glory of the spiritual world.

And as God had chosen the rod of Aaron to bless the Israelites, so He had chosen Israel to be the rod of His inheritance, that in them all the families of the earth might be blessed. The whole nation was intended to be a royal priesthood, to occupy the same position of priestly service among all the other nations of the earth which Aaron occupied among the children of Israel. Its almond rod was meant to blossom and fruit for the good of all mankind. But Israel woefully fell short of this Divine intention. It kept to itself its spiritual blessings, and held itself aloof from all other nations, on the ground of its superior holiness and special enjoyment of the favour of heaven. And because of this, the fig-tree which our Lord cursed on account of its fruitlessness—bringing forth only leaves for its own glory, and not fruit for the benefit of the race—was its appropriate symbol, and it was withered from the roots, and its doom has been that no man should eat fruit of it hereafter for ever.

It is remarkable how history repeats itself. What the Israelite conspirators had meant to do to Aaron in the wilderness, the chief priests and Pharisees had meant to do to our Lord in Jerusalem. They leagued themselves together to deprive Him of His royal priesthood, and to reject His claims as the promised Messiah; and the rod of

Jesse was chosen amid the destruction of Jerusalem and the rejection of the covenant people. The Root out of a dry ground, without form or comeliness, despised and rejected of men, blossomed before God in marvellous beauty. The dry Branch, cut off from all nourishment and withered in death, found the grave to be the hiding-place of God's power, found its circumstances of distress and ruin to be the very soil from whence it should spring forth as the fruitful Bough, that was to bless all the world in a way that Israel at its best could never have done. The resurrection of Aaron's rod was the sign of Aaron's appointment to be God's high priest; the resurrection of Jesus Christ was the Divine testimony to His unchangeable priesthood. And if we are willing to accept Him as our great High Priest and atoning sacrifice, to give up all selfish worldly schemes of our own devising for our salvation, and accept God's appointed way through Christ declared plainly from the first, then for us the rod of power that subdues us and rules over us will be the source of all our blessedness. Out of the sacrifices which it causes us to make will spring our richest and most lasting satisfaction, and our own reigning under Him on earth will help to make the world fairer and happier. Our kingdom will be the throne of men's hearts, and our influence everywhere will make the barest and driest life to blossom and yield the fruit which is unto holiness and whose end is everlasting life.

HUGH MACMILLAN.

FELLOWSHIP IN THE LIGHT OF GOD.

1 JOHN i. 5-10.

RELIGION, as the Apostle John conceived it, consists of two things: true knowledge of God, and fellowship with God, and with each other, in that knowledge. It is to fellowship with God in His Son Jesus Christ that, in the preface (*vv.* 3, 4), the writer summoned his readers. For this communion the facts of the gospel have laid a sure foundation. To establish and perfect His communion with men is the end of all the disclosures which the Father has made of Himself to us from the beginning.

The gospel, therefore, as John delivers it, is, in the first place, and above all things, *a message about God.*

“This is the message which we have heard from Him and announce unto you: God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all.”

When the Apostle says that this was the message which he had “heard from Him” (from Christ), it does not appear that the Lord Jesus had at any time uttered these precise words, or put this message, just as it stands, into His Apostle’s lips. St John was not accustomed to rehearse the sayings of Jesus Christ in a formal and mechanical way. But everything that he had heard from his Master, everything that he had seen in Him and learnt of Him, everything that Jesus Christ Himself was, seemed to him to be crying out: “God is light, God is light; and in that light there is fellowship for men.”

To realize the force of this announcement, we should put ourselves in the position of those who first heard Christ’s message from John’s lips, the converted idolaters of the Asian cities. His readers, most of them, were reared in heathenism. They had been taught in their youth to worship Jupiter and Mercurius, Diana of the Ephesians,

Bacchus of the Philadelphians, Aphrodité of the Smyræans, and we know not how many besides—gods stained and darkened, in the belief of their worshippers, with the foulest human vices, gods so evil that St Paul justly said concerning them: “The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons, and not to God.” They had gods that could cheat and lie, gods licentious and unchaste, gods spiteful and malignant towards men, quarrelsome and abusive towards each other. They had been accustomed to think of the Godhead as a mixed nature, like their own, only on a larger scale,—good and evil, kind and cruel, pure and wanton, made of darkness and of light. Now, to hear of a God who is *all* truth, *all* righteousness and goodness, in whom there is no trickery or wantonness, no smallest spice of malice or delight in evil, “no darkness at all”—a God who can be absolutely loved and trusted and honoured—this was to the heathen of the Apostle’s mission a strange and undreamed of revelation.

Their philosophers had, indeed, conceived of the Divine nature as exalted above human desire and infirmity; but this conception was too speculative and abstract to affect the common mind; there was no power in it to move the heart, to possess the imagination and will. These enlightened men scarcely attempted to overthrow the idols of the populace, and their doctrine offered a feeble and slight resistance to the tide of moral corruption. False religions can be destroyed only by the real. The concrete and actual is displaced by the more actual, never by abstractions. It was faith in a living and true God, in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, as the supreme fact of the universe, the enthroned Almighty and All-holy Will bent upon blessing and saving men, that struck down the idols, and transformed society and reversed the stream of history; not belief in “the Divine” as the highest category of thought, or as the Substance behind phenomena, or the unknown

Depositary of the collective powers of nature. Such ideas, at the best, shed a cold, shadowy light on the path of daily toil and suffering; they prove themselves nerveless and pithless, all too faint to encounter the shock of passion and to master the coarseness and the turbulence of flesh and blood. Not in the name of Pythagoras or Plato did the Greek find salvation.

Now that the providence of God has laid upon the English people so much responsibility for the heathen world, it is worth our while to attempt to realize what heathenism means and is. We must understand the horrible incubus that it lays upon mankind, the frightful mischief and misery of soul that are entailed by vile notions about God. To have untruth, to have cruelty and wrong imputed to the Government of the universe, involved and imbedded in the Divine nature itself, and the fountain-head of being contaminated—what evil can there be so monstrous, so poisonous to society, so pregnant with all other evils, as this one? To own a treacherous friend, a thankless child, this is bitter to the heart, wounding and maddening enough—but to have *a wicked god!* Nothing has ever given such relief to the human mind as the announcement of the simple truth of this verse. To see the sky washed clean of those foul shapes, to have the haunting idols, with their weird and wanton spells and unbounded powers for evil, those veritable demons, banished from the imagination and replaced by the pure image of the God incarnated in Christ, and to know that the Lord of the worlds, seen and unseen, is the Father of men and is absolute rectitude and wisdom and love, this was indeed to pass out of darkness into marvellous light!

Such was the impression that our religion made then, and makes now, upon minds prepared to receive it amongst the heathen. God appeared in a character new and unconceived before, and realistic in the highest degree. Man's

nature was invested with a glory and his destiny lighted up with a splendour of hope that was dazzling and overwhelming in its first effects. The Pagan world had become like a prison vault, gloomy, stifling, filled with shapes of terror. But the door opens, the shutters fall, the sunshine and sweet breath of heaven stream into that death-like chamber, and the prisoner's heart breaks for very joy. Hence the exultant note of the New Testament, the keen and eager sense of salvation that fills its pages. It is the joy of daybreak after fearful night, of health after deadly sickness, of freedom after bondage. Such is the gladness you may send, or yourself carry, to yon Pagan sitting afar off in darkness and the shadow of death. Such is the gladness that comes to ourselves when, at last, behind the shows and forms of religion we gain a sight of what the great, good God really is. Then the dayspring from on high visits us. "For God who said, Light shall shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of His glory."

1. So far our course in the reading of this passage is clear enough. But when we pass from the negative to the positive, from the consideration of that which God *is not* to the consideration of that which He *is* to us, viewed under the symbol of "light," we find ourselves lost in the immensity of the Apostle's thought. This is one of those infinite words of the Bible, which have a meaning always beyond you, however far you pursue them.

The declaration, *God is light*, stands by the side of other similarly brief and epigrammatic sayings: *God is love*, *God is spirit*, and (in the Epistle to the Hebrews) *God is fire*. That "God is love" is the second definition given us in this Epistle (iv. 8). Of the two this is the more comprehensive, as it is the fundamental assertion. Love is one thing; Light is the blending of many things in one. God is love; but love is not everything in God. Light, as we

are now learning better than before, is a subtle and complex element, full of the most delicate, beautiful, and far-reaching mysteries; and in the Divine light there is an infinite sum of perfections, each with its own separate glory and wonderfulness, and all centring in the consummate harmony, the ineffable radiance and splendour of the being of God.

We might say, with Dr. Westcott, that "Physically light embodies the idea of splendour, glory; intellectually, of truth; morally, of holiness." Combining these aspects of the truth, we arrive at the interpretation that God is light as He shines upon us in the splendour of His holiness, His manifested righteousness and love. Light signifies purity, truth, goodness; as darkness signifies foulness, falsehood, malice. There was plenty of these latter in the heathen gods; there is none of them in Ours. He is all love, all rectitude, all goodness and truth, and nothing in the least degree contrary thereto.

And these qualities do not so much belong to God, or distinguish Him and constitute His nature: they are constituted by His nature; they emanate from Him. Their existence in moral beings, and our power to conceive of them and to recognise them, "come down" from Him, "the Father of lights."

Nor does the Apostle's message simply declare that there are these luminous qualities in God, but that they are manifested to us. God is not only shining away yonder in His light unapproachable—in the burning depths of His insufferable glory; He has flung His heavens open, and poured Himself down upon us. This metaphor speaks of the God revealed in Christ, of Immanuel, God with us! "I am *come*," said Jesus, "a light into the world." His coming was "the message." In His incarnation ten thousand voices spoke; as when the rays of dawn strike upon your window, they say, Day is come, the sun is here!

God, whose glory is above the heavens, is shining here amongst us—upon the dulness and poverty of our earthly lot, shooting His radiance, the glances of His love and pity, into the eyes of our heart. “He *gives the light* of the knowledge of His glory, in the face of Jesus Christ.” There is nothing quiescent, nothing grudging or self-confined or exclusive, about light. It is penetrating and diffusive, self-communicating yet self-asserting, streaming through the worlds—the all-piercing, all-informing, all-quickening and gladdening element of the universe. Such is God manifest to mankind in Jesus Christ.

2. Now it is evident that the knowledge of God in this character, wherever it extends, creates *fellowship*.

Light is a social power. It is the prime condition of communion, knitting together, as by the play of some swift weaver’s shuttle, the vast commonwealth of worlds and setting all creatures of sense and reason at intercourse. With the daylight the forest awakes to song, and the city to speech and traffic. As the household in winter evenings draw round the cheerful lamp and the ruddy fire-light; as the man of genial nature, rich in moral and intellectual light, forms about him a circle of kindred minds won by his influence, and learning to recognise and prize each other, so the Lord Jesus Christ is the social centre of humanity. He is the only possible ground of a race-fellowship amongst us—the King of the world-kingdom, seeing that He is the Divine Firstborn and Elder Brother of the peoples. Christ is the Love and Wisdom of God incarnate, and therefore “the light of the world.”

This connexion of thought is self-evident, when in *v. 6* the Apostle passes, without explanation, from the idea of Light to that of Fellowship :

“If we say that we have fellowship with Him [God], and are walking in the darkness,
We lie, and do not the truth.

But if we walk in the light, as God is in the light,
We have fellowship one with another."

For what fellowship can there be in darkness? Is not sin the disruption of all society, human and Divine? When God said, "Let there be light," He said, Let there be fellowship, friendship—a mutual understanding, a commonwealth of thought and joy amongst all creatures. Along the path of light eye runs to meet eye, and heart leaps to kindred heart.

It is a thought full of awe and full of joy for us, that in the light of God we share with God Himself,—“if we walk in the light, as He is in the light.” God is light, and God is *in the light*. He sees and acts in no other light than that of His own being; and in that same light we see and act. God creates around Him a light-sphere, in which all holy souls, men and angels, dwell and “walk” with Him. Each planet subsists and moves in the same light as the sun from whom light proceeds, holding fellowship with the lord of day and with its brother planets in a universe of which the solar effluence is the common element. Even so in the spiritual realm. There is one sun in the sky; there is one God in the universe, one centre of rational and moral life for all creatures, one source of love and truth from everlasting to everlasting, in Him “who filleth all in all and worketh all in all.” The light that pours in ceaseless fiery tide from the heart of the sun, and that gleams on the cottage window and sparkles in the beads of dew and glances on the mountain peak and on the globe of Neptune at the far edge of the planetary world, is one light bringing with it one life and law. The sun is in that light: so is the dancing mote, and the fluttering insect, and the laughing child, and the whirling, rushing globe. God is in the light: so is my believing soul and yours, so the spirits of Abraham and Isaac and all the just made perfect, so the bright squadrons of the angels and the tenants of the farthest outpost stars,

so the vast body of the universal Church. There is one reason, one love, one righteousness for all intelligences—one Name to be hallowed, one Will to be done “as in heaven so on earth,” one Father-hand that holds the stars in their courses and holds thy soul in life. “With Thee,” says the Psalmist to his God, “with Thee is the fountain of life; in Thy light we see light.”

It is this light of God that alone makes possible a true, enduring fellowship amongst men. “If we walk in the light as He is in the light, we have [we keep] fellowship with one another”—*i.e.*, with our fellows also walking in the light (comp. ii. 9–11; iii. 10–12, 23, 24; iv. 7–13). It often appears that religious interests divide men, while secular interests and material pursuits unite them. Christ Himself once said that He had come to “bring a sword” and to “set men at variance.” How many blood-stained pages of history confirm this presentiment. But this is a transitional state of things. After all, no community has ever held together, or can subsist in perpetuity, without the religious bond. Fraternity means a common paternity. God is a partner, tacit or acknowledged, to every sound agreement amongst men. The use of the sacrifice and sacrament in compacts and the oath in public declarations, notwithstanding their abuses, witness to this truth. The Eternal God is the rock and refuge of human society. The material and moral laws forming the framework of our house of life are “the everlasting arms underneath” and around us, which nurse and carry us, feed and school us, fence us in with all our quarrels like birds in the nest, while they hold us to the heart of God.

It is therefore through ignorance of God that men and nations fight each other; in the dark we stumble against our fellows and rage at them. In the light of Christ’s true fellowship we gain the larger human views, the warmer heart, that make hatred and strife impossible. Quarrels in

the Church are due to causes often petty and ignoble in the extreme, and are pursued with a peculiar rancour, because those engaged in them are fighting against the God of peace and resisting a secret inward condemnation. It is in such contention that the bitterness of a heart not right with God finds vent, discharging upon others the suppressed indignation due to the evil in itself. All forms of malice, envy, contempt, backbiting, have their root in unbelief; irreverence towards God breeding disregard for men. Just so far as we see and feel what God is, do we grow humble and tender towards our kind.

Under these conditions, as we gather from the last clause of *v. 7*, it comes to pass that the sacrifice of Jesus Christ wins its full and decisive power over our nature: "The blood of Jesus His Son cleanseth us from all sin." Through continued fellowship with God and men, the cross of Christ gains an increasing mastery within us. On the one hand, fellowship in the Divine light brings a deepening sense of sin, demanding a renewed confession and a deeper pardon; our old repentance and faith are convicted of shallowness in the clearer knowledge of God. At the same time we find that the atonement is not the means only, but the end of our righteousness in Christ; it supplies the ideal of our service to God and man, while it is the instrument by which we are recovered for that service. The cross of Jesus is the alpha and omega of salvation. We do not pass by it as we enter the way of life; we have to lift it up and bear it with us to the end, identifying ourselves with it more completely at every step. So "the blood of Jesus" is sprinkled on our conscience to rest there; it melts the heart, and melts into the heart. His death-blood, if we may so say, becomes the life-blood of our spirits. It sinks into the soul, wounding and healing, humbling and exalting us, burning its way to the depths of our being, to the dark springs of evil, until it reaches and "slays the dire root and

seed of sin." The sacrifice of Christ is the principle of our sanctification equally with our justification.

Accordingly, in *v.* 9, we find this deliverance from sin opening out into its two elements of forgiveness and moral renewal, both turning upon one condition (the subjective condition, as the atonement is the objective ground of salvation), viz., the acknowledgment—the continued acknowledgment—of personal sin, which is virtually the soul's yielding to the light of God's holy presence: "*If we confess* [go on to confess] our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." In this confession penitence and faith meet. With St John we are "cleansed from *all* sin," when with St Paul we are "conformed to the death" of Christ and "know the fellowship of His sufferings." This absolute cleansing, this immaculate perfection of the believer crucified with His Lord, is the crown of a life of walking in the light.

But we observe that the above is not a process carried on in isolation and by the solitary fellowship of the soul with God. "We have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus His Son cleanseth us." There is a world of meaning in that "and." Christian fellowship and Christian perfection are things concomitant. Our social and individual salvation must be wrought out together. The goal is one to be sought for the Church, not the individual; for *us*, not simply for *me*.

3. It is possible, however, to resist the light of the knowledge of God in Christ and to refuse the fellowship which it offers to us. And this resistance takes place in two ways: in the way of *hypocrisy* (*v.* 6), or in the way of *impenitence* (*vv.* 8 and 10). These fatal methods of dealing with religious light are marked out by three parallel sentences, each beginning with the formula, "If we say," as stating things which we may say, but which can never

be. They are alike ways of falsehood. In these various modes "we lie, and do not the truth"; or "we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us"; or (worst of all) "we make Him a liar, and His word is not in us."

Light is a kindly, but often an acutely painful thing. There are conditions of mind in which every ray of Divine truth is pointed with fire and excites a fierce resentment. The "arrows of the Almighty" burn and rankle in the rebellious spirit. The light searches us out, and shows us up. "If I had not come and spoken unto them," said Jesus of the Jewish Pharisees and priests, "they had not had sin: but now they have no cloak for their sin." With Him light came into the world, and men preferred darkness. The preference is their condemnation. St John had seen this preference take a cowardly form in Judas, and a defiant form in the Jewish rulers.

(1) We may oppose the light of God *treacherously*, by hypocrisy, by pretending to accept it while nevertheless we hold fast our sins: "If we say that we have fellowship with Him, and walk in darkness"—like the thief who bare the bag and who stole out at night from the supper table of Bethany and the spectacle of Mary's "waste" of love, to say to the priests, "What will ye give me, and I will betray Him unto you?"

The hypocrite is one who has been in the company of Jesus and has seen the light, who knows the truth and knows his own sin, knows at least enough to be aware of his double-dealing. And while practising his sin, he professes fellowship with God! The holy Apostle does not stand on ceremony with this sort of man, or palter with the deceitfulness of the human heart; he gives him the lie direct: "If we say this," he cries out, "*we lie*, and do not the truth." In such words you see the flash of John's swift lightning; you perceive why the Master called him and his brother James *Boanerges*, Scns of Thunder,—the

thunder not of brazen lungs but of a passionate heart. He is the apostle of love, and therefore of wrath,—of “the wrath of the Lamb.”

But the Apostle John will not separate himself even from such an one as this. He had known a traitor amongst the Twelve. He puts his supposition in the first person plural; he speaks as if such a state were possible to any of us,—possible to himself! At the table of the Last Supper he had said with the rest, when the treason was announced, “Lord, is it I?” Which of us can claim to have been always true to the truth of Christ? It is easy to “say” this or that; but how hard to “do the truth,” to put our best convictions into full act and practice! Yet there is an infinite chasm between Judas and John, between the studied deceit of the immoral, canting professor of religion and the self-accusings of the scrupulous believer, whose very loyalty finds flaws in his best service.

He who professes communion with God while he lives in sin, the dishonest man, the unchaste man, the malicious and spiteful man,—what does his profession mean? He virtually declares that God is like himself! He drags the All-holy One down to the level of Pagan deities. He brings to the Christian shrine the worship due to Belial or Mammon. He sees God through the reek of his own burning lusts. Such an one might have fellowship with Jupiter or Mercury, or Diana of the Ephesians; but not with the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,—no, not he, no more than the bat or the night-owl holds fellowship with the mid-day sun. It needs clean hands and a pure heart to dwell on God’s holy hill. If we walk in darkness, then it stands to reason that we are in darkness.

(2) There is another, a more open and radical mode of opposition to the accusing light of God,—by flat denial of our sin, by taking the attitude of a bold impenitence. And this denial appears in two distinct forms: as a general

denial of sin in principle, or as a particular and matter-of-fact *denial of our individual sins*. Such is the distinction that seems to lie in the carefully chosen expressions of vv. 8 and 10: "If we say that we have no sin," and "If we say that we have not sinned."

We must remember, again, that St John had to do with a moribund Pagan world, in which, as in common Hindoo life to-day, the moral sense was deeply decayed and conscience reduced to the lowest terms, wherein the nature of converted men and sincere believers in Christ the sense of sin, that "most awful and imperious creation of Christianity," had to be formed by degrees. Men might and did deny the reality of sin; by all kinds of sophistries and evasions they had learnt to deceive themselves respecting its import and criminality. Not a few persons, we may suppose, had espoused Christianity for various intellectual or sentimental reasons, with very superficial convictions upon this head. Allowing the distinction of moral good and evil, they were slow to confess *sin*; they refused to admit an inherent depravity involving them in corruption and guilt. Their misdoings were mistakes, frailties, venial errors,—anything but "sin." That is an ugly word; and quite needless too,—a bugbear, an invention of the priests! St John hastens to denounce these notions; he puts them down as self-delusion, as the folly of men who extinguish the light that is in them, the ignorance of a shallow reason that wants the inward substance of truth (v. 8).

This error has deep roots, and may spring up again, with a strange recrudescence, at an advanced stage of the Christian life. The man of "sinless perfection," who imagines he has nothing left to confess, nothing that needs forgiveness, verily "deceives himself"; rarely does he deceive his neighbour on this point, never his God. "The truth is not in him." His moral convictions, his knowledge of the holiness of God have never yet pierced to the heart

of his iniquity. There is a superficial sanctification, which serves thinly to cover a hard and stubborn crust of impenitence, under which a world of pride and self-will lie hidden. As Rothe says: "In fellowship with Christ our eye becomes ever keener and keener for sin, especially for *our* sin. It is precisely the mature Christian who calls himself a great sinner."

The second form of impenitence stigmatized by the Apostle is the most extreme and shameless: "If we say that we have not sinned"; and its consequence the most shocking: "We make Him a liar."

One may deny sin in general and fence a good deal upon questions of principle and ethical theory, who yet, when the word of God becomes to him a personal message and his memory and conscience are fairly challenged by it, will admit practically that he has sinned and is in the sight of God a culpable and condemned man. David had doubtless argued with himself and deceived his own heart not a little in regard to his great transgression; but the prophet's home-thrust, "Thou art the man," broke down his fence utterly; "and David said unto Nathan, I have sinned against the LORD." To contradict a general truth is one thing; to confront the personal fact is quite another.

But when a sinner, with his transgressions staring him in the face and revealed in the terrible light of God's word, declares that he "has not sinned," what can you do for him, what say to him? The Apostle has only one resource with such a man. "God says that you have sinned, that you have broken the law of your being and incurred the penalty of exile from His presence, and brought on yourself moral ruin and misery. You say that you have done nothing of the kind. If you are right, God is wrong. If you are true, then God is false. You make *Him* a liar!" That is St John's final testimony.

Every one who refuses to bow down in penitence before

the revealed Majesty of God in Christ, and to make confession before that white, awful, soul-searching splendour of holiness and love, before the final disclosure of our human guilt and the Divine righteousness made in the spilt blood of Jesus, is doing this. He gives the lie to his Maker and Judge. Impenitence in men who know the gospel, is the most tremendous and daring insolence we can conceive.

GEO. G. FINDLAY.

PROFESSOR MARSHALL'S ARAMAIC GOSPEL.

OWING to absence from home in the early part of September, I was unable to notice Prof. Marshall's "Reply" to Mr. Allen and myself in time for last month's EXPOSITOR. I must at the outset express my very sincere regret that the tone of Mr. Allen's criticism should have seemed to Prof. Marshall to be lacking in courtesy. As I shall hope to show in the course of the present paper, Mr. Allen's confidence in the substantial justice of his case was not misplaced; still, I am sure it was as far as possible from his intention to treat Prof. Marshall with disrespect, or to do him an injustice. In an investigation such as that which Prof. Marshall has undertaken it is always an advantage, where a difference of opinion exists, to hear at length the facts and considerations which may be urged on either side; though I must own that the facts adduced by Prof. Marshall in his Reply do not materially modify the judgment I had previously formed. But I must demur, in principle, to the attempt made by Prof. Marshall to fasten upon me the responsibility for "all" that Mr. Allen's papers contain. My prefatory note indicated indeed that I considered Mr. Allen's criticisms to be generally conclusive, and from this position (as will appear) I find no occasion to recede; but I do not think that the terms which I used can in fairness

be treated as holding me responsible for every single statement, and every single expression, which they contain. No doubt, had I been writing the papers myself, I should have stated some of Mr. Allen's points differently, in some cases, perhaps, expressing myself more explicitly and precisely, in others guarding myself by qualifications which he has omitted; but I could not expect Mr. Allen to accommodate everything that he wrote exactly to my own judgment, without destroying the independence involved naturally in the fact that he, and not I, was the author. I was, and am, perfectly prepared to "countersign" Mr. Allen's criticisms in their general import and tenor; but I must protest against the responsibility which I thus accept being held to extend to every particular statement and expression which his papers contain.

Without further preliminaries, I will take at once *seriatim* the definite objections urged by Prof. Marshall against Mr. Allen's criticisms. It is to be observed that in some instances the issue does not turn upon Aramaic usage, as such, but upon a literary judgment: which of two alternative *ideas* is the more likely to have been expressed by the writer of the original gospel?

II. 1. (p. 180). Prof. Marshall here complains that Mr. Allen (p. 463 of his second article) has imputed to him an inconsistency in the use made by him of two Aramaic idioms, of which he is guiltless. When I read in proof the passage referred to, I understood the usages cited to be meant as illustrations of the varying style of the Targums, without perceiving, or considering, how far the terms in which they were spoken of attributed definitely an inconsistency to Prof. Marshall himself. In so far as they do this they undoubtedly do him an injustice; and Mr. Allen desires to express his regret that he should, by inadvertence of language or any other cause, have imputed to Prof. Marshall the inconsistency complained of. At the same

time, it may be pointed out, Mr. Allen's conclusion that Prof. Marshall is too apt to select his vocabulary from the remoter corners of Aramaic literature does not depend for its "basis" upon the four examples there cited, but upon an induction extending over all parts of Prof. Marshall's papers. And it may be observed, further, *à propos* of **במטו**, that Prof. Marshall makes no attempt to defend either his singular grammatical explanation of this expression, commented on by Mr. Allen (p. 458), or his theory (*ib.*, p. 459) that **מטת** may have had the force of *ἐδείθην*.

2. The Aramaic **פָּרַץ** means *to rub, crumble, break in pieces* (Payne Smith, *fricuit*, in the passive *comminutus, contritus est*). It is not very common in the Targums, but it occurs in the Palestinian Targum of Num. 33, 52 of breaking in pieces an idol, and in that of Eccl. 3, 3 of breaking down a building. In the Talmud it is more frequent: Levy (*N.H.W.B.*) gives numerous examples, representing it by *zerbröckeln, zerreiben, zermalmen, zerstückeln*. In Syriac, also, it is not an uncommon word, being used, for instance, of breaking up clods of earth (for the Greek *διαλύειν*), in the passive to represent *ψαθυρός* (*friable, crumbling, of soil*); and in Luke 6, 1 both in the Peshitto, and in the Lectionary of the Palestinian Christians referred to by Prof. Marshall, of the disciples *rubbing* the ears of corn (Gk. *ψάχειν*). No instance is quoted in which **פָּרַץ** has, even in appearance, the meaning "dry up, parch, fry" (Prof. Marshall, *EXPOSITOR*, March, 1891, p. 210), except the four passages from the Targums, cited by Mr. Allen, Isa. 24, 7; Ps. 80, 17. 90, 5; Lam. 4, 8. If in these passages it really means to *dry up*, it can mean it only in a secondary sense, in so far as the *crumbling* or *breaking to pieces*, which the word properly denotes, is the effect of heat: in other words, it would only denote a thing as parched or dried up in so far as heat had the effect upon it of causing it to crumble and fall to pieces; and thus used, it might be

applied to grass, or a tree, scorched by the sun or (Ps. 80, 17) by fire, or even to the skin (Lam. 4, 8) shrunk and shrivelled up in a protracted famine. But in view of the predominant, not to say exclusive, use of the word elsewhere (to *rub*, *crumble*, etc.), it cannot be regarded as certain that, in the four passages quoted, פֶּרֶךְ does mean *to dry up*: it is at least a tenable view that it simply means *to be crumbled* or *fall to pieces*, being used in this sense quite naturally in the first three passages, and hyperbolically in the fourth. That it was felt to express a different idea from *dry* (יָבֵשׁ) is apparent from the first two passages cited from the Talmud by Levy, Pes. 68*b*, יְבִישָׁה מִיפֶרֶךְ פְּרִיכָא, if (a scab) is dry, it *falls to pieces*; Chull. 46*b*, if the lung is so dry (יְבִישָׁה) that it can be *rubbed to pieces* with the nail, the animal may not be eaten. Clearly, in these passages, פֶּרֶךְ denotes a consequence following from dryness, not dryness itself. When, therefore, Prof. Marshall says (*l.c.*), "There is an Aramaic verb פֶּרֶךְ which means (1) to dry up, parch, fry," he does not quite correctly represent the facts: he gives the reader no opportunity of knowing that this sense of the word is exceedingly rare, and that it is even open to question whether it occurs at all. Prof. Marshall does not say distinctly (*l.c.*, p. 211) which of the two alternatives there given he supposes to represent the original text of the gospel; but from his words on p. 189 of his recent article, it may be inferred to be the second (καὶ ξηραίνεται). But I venture to think that any one who considers carefully the use of פֶּרֶךְ, פֶּרֶךְ, will agree with me that it is exceedingly doubtful whether it is a suitable or probable word to have been used to express that effect of the action of the evil spirit upon the afflicted boy, which St. Mark represents by the verb ξηραίνεται.¹

¹ It was a satisfaction to me, after I had written the above note, to find that Kohut, in his recent elaborate and enlarged edition of the *Aruch* of R. Nathan, recognises no meaning for פֶּרֶךְ, even in Lam. 4, 8, except that of to *rub* or *break in pieces* (zerreiben).

3. It was, perhaps, an omission on Mr. Allen's part not to state the facts respecting טללא somewhat more fully: but Prof. Marshall, also, is too hasty in assuming that it has the definite sense of "roof." Commonly, as Mr. Allen correctly says, it denotes a covering in the figurative sense of *protection*; where it is used with a concrete force, its meaning is not at once apparent. Zeph. 2. 14 does not prove that it means a *roof*; it corresponds here to the Heb. ארז, *i.e.* (as it seems) cedar-work (viz. of the ruined palaces of Nineveh), which makes it probable that it denotes rather the carved *ceiling* of a room: Levy renders it *Gebälk*. In the Talmudic passage (Berachoth 19a) to which Prof. Marshall appeals, it is rendered *ceiling* by both Levy and Jastrow (who cites two other examples of the same meaning). I could grant, reluctantly, that טללא might be used in Mk. 2, 4; but the word does not satisfy me: a term denoting the *lower* side of a roof appears to me to be unsuited to the context.¹

III. 1. סליקו for ἀπεστέγασαν. This was a point on which I was doubtful myself whether Mr. Allen's criticism could be sustained; and, though I suspect ܘܝܝܢܝܘܢ (Pesh., and the Lectionary) would have been the better word in Mark 2, 4, I will not dispute that סליק might also have been employed.

2. Matt. 9, 2 ἐπὶ κλίνης βεβλημένον = Mk. 2, 3 αἰρόμενον ὑπὸ τεσσάρων. Prof. Marshall (*ib.*, p. 215) explains the variation between "four" and "bed" thus: "The Aramaic word for four is אַרְבַּעָא; but one of the synonyms for *bed* is אַרְבַּעָא, strictly, that on which one stretches oneself, lies down at full length, a bed; or rather, may we not say a *stretcher*?" Would not any reader of these words suppose

¹ The Lectionary uses for στέγη in Matt. 8, 8 ܘܘܝܢܝܘܢ, *i.e.* (according to Nöldeke, in his very thorough study of the dialect of the Lectionary, in the *Z.D.M.G.* 1868, p. 517 note) ὄροφος, which is also (*ibid.*) to be restored for ܘܘܝܢܝܘܢ in Mark 2, 4.

that אַרְבַּעָה was as common a synonym for "bed" in Aramaic, as (say) "couch" is in English? In point of fact, it is *entirely unknown* with that meaning: as Mr. Allen shows, it occurs twice in the Targum to denote *the act of lying down* (of cattle); and Prof. Marshall has quoted no additional examples of its occurrence which might support his previous very definite statement as to its meaning. He now proposes, as a preferable alternative, כַּרְבֵּעָה. Had this word been before Mr. Allen, he would naturally not have criticised it as he has criticised the imaginary אַרְבַּעָה. It is, however, very uncertain whether even כַּרְבֵּעָה is right. It is true, it is found (in the form כַּרְבֻּעָה) in the Palestinian Lectionary, in the expression כַּרְבֻּעָה דְּכַרְבֻּעָה; "top of the reclining-places" for the Greek πρωτοκλισῖαι (Matt. 23, 6; Mk. 12, 39; Lk. 14, 7. 8. 20, 46); but these passages are not sufficient to show that it could be used of the κλίνη, on which the paralytic was carried: it is at least significant that this word, wherever it occurs in the passages forming the Lectionary, is rendered by כַּרְבֵּעָה (Matt. 9, 2. 6; Mk. 7, 30; Lk. 5, 18. 8, 16; so for κλινίδιον, ib. 5, 19. 24), the word that would naturally be expected, and which is used likewise in the Curetonian Syriac, and the Peshitto. But, as usual, Prof. Marshall does not tell us which of the two alternative texts he conceives to have been the original: if he had expressed distinctly his preference for St. Mark's form, and at the same time stated the facts correctly, it is possible that Mr. Allen would not have objected to the hypothesis that אַרְבַּעָה "four," with its first letter imperfectly legible, might have suggested to a translator some derivative of רַבַּע, which he represented by the Greek κλίνη. But the variation between the prepositions ἐπὶ and ὑπὸ remains still to be satisfactorily accounted for by Prof. Marshall.

3. *αἰρόμενον*, "borne," in the same passage (Mk. 2, 3), Prof. Marshall thinks, and still maintains, would be properly represented by the passive participle of כַּטְלֵט, כַּטְלֵט.

But the passages from the Pal. Targums, which he quotes for the purpose of confuting Mr. Allen, have not, unfortunately, the cogency which he attributes to them. They prove indeed that **טלטל** means (by a weakening of the primary sense of the root) to *move from place to place*, to *move on*, to *remove*, but not that it means to *bear* or *carry*.¹ Let it not be said that the difference is a slight one, or that I am hypercritical in drawing such a distinction; it is just such shades of meaning which, in translating into a foreign language, have to be most carefully noted and taken account of. In our own language, for instance, there are doubtless many sentences in which *move* or *carry* could be used indiscriminately; but how absurd it would sound to say, "He went out, *moving* his child with him"! And even here, of the two synonyms, *carrying* and *taking*, which might be substituted, how readily might a foreigner make a mistake in the idea which he intended to convey! The Pesh. represents *αἰρούμενον* by **ܦܫܘܢܐ**, the Lectionary by **ܦܫܘܢܐ**: these really express the idea of "being carried," or "borne," which, in spite of Prof. Marshall, I cannot consider that **ܦܫܘܢܐ** does.

4. Prof. Marshall demurs to Mr. Allen's statement that **ܦܫܘܢܐ** does not mean "thrown down." But is he sure that he has rightly translated the passage of Ps.-Jon. (Exod. 23, 8), which he has quoted to prove the contrary? Does not **ܦܫܘܢܐ ܕܚܝܘܝܐ ܕܚܝܘܝܐ ܕܚܝܘܝܐ** mean "And *expels* the wise from their abodes"? *Abode* is the common meaning of **ܚܘܝܐ** in this Targum (see Gen. 36, 43; Exod. 10, 23; 12, 20; 35, 3; Lev. 3, 17; 7, 26, etc.); and in Walton's Polyglott the rendering is "errare facit." Compare, from another Pal. Targum, Ps. 68, 13 **ܦܠܬܪܝܕܘܢ ܢܘܢ ܐܝܬܠܬܠܘ ܢܘܢ** "are

¹ In Exod. 16, 29, Lev. 25, 14, "move" and "moveable" (Levy, *bewegliches*), not the narrower ideas of "carry" and "portable," are manifestly intended; and in Deut. xix. 14 the Sam. **ܦܫܘܢܐ** represents the Heb. **הסיר**, which is not to "carry" but to "remove."

expelled from their palaces." It surely will not be denied that the proper meaning of טלטל, both in Heb. and in Aram., is to *hurl away, drive forth, banish*. Shebna, no doubt, when "hurled" from his dignity, was also "thrown down" from it; but the word used by Isaiah (22, 17) denotes the former idea, not the latter.

It is still left uncertain whether Prof. Marshall considers αἰρόμενον or βεβλημένον to represent the original Aramaic. The unsuitability of כּטלטל, as expressing the former, has been pointed out. If כּטלטל, as expressing the latter, be preferred, even though it were conceded that it meant *thrown down*, it clearly must mean *thrown down with violence*. Is it, therefore, at all a likely term to have been chosen to denote the manner in which the unfortunate paralytic was deposited on his couch? βεβλημένον may seem to be rather a strong term (yet cf. Matt. 10, 34, and note its use in Mark 7, 30 of a girl *after* her cure), but it is not so strong as כּטלטל (with the assumed meaning) would be. The word to which it would naturally correspond is ܟܬܠܬܠ, which is actually used here, as well as in the similar passage, 9, 2, and in Mk. 7, 30, by both the Pesh. and the Lectionary. In the Pesh. the same verb is used in Gen. 21, 15 (for השליך) of Hagar's *casting* Ishmael *down* under the tree. I cannot think that Prof. Marshall has found the right word for either αἰρόμενον or βεβλημένον.

5. Prof. Marshall seeks (May, 1881, p. 384 f.) to explain the variants εἰς ὄρος ὑψηλὸν (Mt. 17, 1; Mk. 9, 2) and εἰς τὸ ὄρος προσεύξασθαι (Luke 9, 28) by a confusion between עלאה, *very high*, and צלאה, *to pray* (strictly, between לטור עלא and לטורא לצלאה, the resemblance between which is not quite so great). Mr. Allen denies that עלא is the equivalent of ὑψηλός; and again Prof. Marshall demurs. It is difficult not to think that Mr. Allen is right. ܥܠܐ, like the Heb. עֲלִיּוֹן, denotes what is *elevated* so as to be (expressly, or by implication) above other things; the word

which expresses the simple idea of *high*, *lofty*, is יִסְרָם. A *high mountain* (Heb. דֶּהַר גְּבוּהָ or דֶּהַר רָם) is regularly expressed in the Aramaic versions by יִסְרָם; יִסְרָם (e.g. Gen. 7, 19; Deut. 12, 2; Isa. 40, 9. 57, 7); a nation of tall men is יִסְרָם יִסְרָם (Deut. 1, 28 Pesh.); but Israel, when *exalted* above other nations, or a king *exalted* above other kings, is in Heb. עֲלִיּוֹן, in Aram. יִסְרָם, עֲלִיּוֹן (Deut. 26, 19. 28, 1; Ps. 89, 28). The *high gates* of Babylon are יִסְרָם יִסְרָם; יִסְרָם (Jer. 51, 58); but יִסְרָם יִסְרָם; יִסְרָם, תִּרְעַנָּה עֲלֵיָהּ, is the *elevated* (i.e. *upper*) gate, viz., of the Temple (2 Kings 15, 35 al.); and בְּרִיכַתָּא עֲלִיתָא, יִסְרָם יִסְרָם, is the *upper pool* (Isa. 7, 3). Applied to the Temple (1 Kings 9, 8), עֲלִיּוֹן, עֲלִיּוֹן, יִסְרָם, describes it, not properly as “high,” but as *standing on high*, above the rest of the city. The Aramaic words, as Mr. Allen rightly observes, are accordingly applied very frequently to God, as the One who, κατ’ ἑξοχὴν, has His abode on high (e.g. Luke 1, 32. 35, in the Pesh., for ὑψιστος), and to heavenly things or places. Hermon, as a lofty mountain, would thus be correctly described in Aramaic as a יִסְרָם; יִסְרָם: a building on the top of it, however diminutive in itself, would be עֲלִיּוֹן in Heb., יִסְרָם עֲלֵיהֶּן in Aramaic. So in the Lectionary ὄρος ὑψηλὸν is represented by יִסְרָם; יִסְרָם (Matt. 17, 1); even with λίαν, it is not יִסְרָם (Matt. 4, 8). The sense, not of *high* (in the sense of *tall*, as reaching from the ground), but of *elevated*, *upper* (in tacit contrast to other things not so elevated), is apparent in the four passages quoted by Prof. Marshall; and it is singular that he should not have perceived it. The אֲדָרוֹן עֲלֵיהֶּן of Job 37, 9 is surely not the “lofty chamber,” but the “upper chamber” of the skies, whence elsewhere also rain and storm are conceived as emerging, the עֲלִיּוֹת “upper chambers” (Targ. בֵּית גַּנְזֵי עֲלֵיהֶּן “upper treasuries”) of Ps. 104, 13. I cannot think that יִסְרָם would be at all the proper term to be used, merely for the sake of expressing the idea of a *high* or *lofty* mountain.

6. No doubt, in view of Isa. 42, 6, Mr. Allen is guilty technically of an inaccuracy in saying (p. 460) that רַבִּי, in the sense of *to call*, is "always" followed by שׁמָא or בְּשׁמָא; it is true, this is generally the case, but in Isa. 42, 6 it is found in that sense alone. But the objection is only thrown a stage further back: why is this somewhat peculiar and unusual expression resorted to by Prof. Marshall at all? Surely, where it occurs, it denotes not a mere calling (ἐφώνησε), but (in accordance with the proper sense of רַבִּי, *to magnify*) to call or name honourably.¹ Is this idea suitable to the context in Lk. 8, 54, where Jesus simply *calls out* to the damsel, for the purpose of bidding her arise? The ordinary word for ἐφώνησε would, of course, be קרא, קָרָא, which is found, both here and elsewhere, in the Lectionary. It must remain in the highest degree doubtful not only whether רַבִּי would have been used in Luke 8, 54 by the original writer, but even whether (to adopt the other alternative) the consonants רביתא, (for this, not רבי, will of course have been "*the (female) child*"), even with the last two letters obscured or illegible, would have suggested the meaning *call* to a translator.

7. The difference between Mr. Allen and Prof. Marshall is here not very important. It is not denied, on the one hand, that זרע, not ררי, is the proper Aramaic word for *to sow*, or, on the other, that *to sow* might be used metaphorically in the sense of *to strew* or *scatter* (as in LXX. of Exod. 32, 20). The question between them resolves itself really into this, whether a word denoting *that which was sown*, or *that which was strewn* (sc. unintentionally) is most suitable in the original autograph of Matt. 13, 19 = Mk. 4, 15 = Luke 8, 12. In view of the prominence given in the parable as a whole to the action of the sower, the former

¹ In Jer. 20, 3 the clause from יתכניסון does not seem to be Pashur's new name, but an independent sentence.

might seem to be the more probable ; but the latter view is doubtless a tenable one, and Prof. Marshall prefers it. If it be adopted, Prof. Marshall's argument would seem to require for consistency the same word *strewn* to be presupposed in Matt. 13, 20. 22 for ὁ σπαρείς, but not in v. 23 (where the act on the part of the sower is intentional) ; it may be doubted whether this change of verb is a recommendation of his hypothesis.

8. I am sorry to be quite unable to allow that ἡγαλλιάσατο τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ may mean "gave glory to the Holy Spirit." Not only is this sense entirely unrecognised in the Greek Lexicon, but in the LXX. ἀγαλλιάομαι is used habitually to express various Hebrew words meaning *to exult* or *rejoice*, just as the substantives ἀγαλλίασις and ἀγαλλίαμα are used for various words significant of *exultation* or *joy*. In the passages of the LXX. which Prof. Marshall quotes, it corresponds to רָנַן, הִרְנִין, הִתְהַלֵּל, words signifying *to glory* (not "to give glory") or *boast*, and to *ring out joyously*. The Aramaic הִרְנִין, which does mean *to deck with honour* or *glorify*, would surely have been represented in the Greek by some other verb than ἀγαλλιάομαι.

IV. 1. Prof. Marshall thinks Mr. Allen hypercritical in objecting to the use of נִזְנֵן in the sense of kindling a lamp (June, 1891, p. 459), when it is, he urges, used in the Targum in the sense of kindling a fire. The question, however, is, whether it is so used. It is not the ordinary Aramaic word for *kindling* either a lamp or a fire : it is a very rare word, occurring thrice in Daniel (3, 19. 22) : two passages are cited by Levy from the Targum, six other passages (in his *N.H.W.B.*) from the Jerusalem Talmud and the Midrashim. The question is, whether it means *to kindle*, or only *to heat*. In Dan. 3, 19 it seems plainly to have the latter sense, "And commanded that they should

heat the furnace seven times more than it was wont to be heated"—surely *kindle* would not suit in this passage: v. 22, "And the furnace was *heated* exceedingly." Isa. 44, 15 and Hos. 7, 4 are ambiguous; either meaning would suit, but *heat* is sufficient. In the six other passages quoted by Levy it is used in connexion with bath-houses.¹ The rendering *heat* suits all passages, the rendering *kindle* does not. I submit, therefore, that the word can only, on the evidence available, be shown to mean *to heat*, and that it is not applicable to the lighting of a lamp. I do not deny that the word may occur elsewhere in Aramaic, or even that it *may* there have the sense of *kindle*; but I submit that, before Prof. Marshall is entitled to employ it in this sense, he must produce the passage or passages where it is so used, and used unambiguously.² The common Aramaic words for *lighting* a lamp are אַדְלַק (Exod. 40, 4. 25; Lev. 24, 2 Onq. and Ps.-Jon.; Matt. 5, 15; Lk. 8, 16. 11, 33 in the Lectionary), or אַנְהַר (the same passages in the Peshitto). Why presuppose such a questionable word as אֹס in the *Ur-evangelium* here, when there were suitable and ordinary words close at hand?

2. Another unimportant difference, the issue not relating to Aramaic usage, but being a question of literary feeling: is it more likely that in such a sentence as "He eateth and drinketh with publicans and sinners," the ordinary word for *drinketh* would have been used, or one meaning *to drink to excess* (רוי, like the Greek μεθύσκεισθαι)? Ἐσθίει is the ordinary word for *eating*, and hence it might be argued that the parallel *drinketh* would be the ordinary word as well. The Greek πίνει (Matt., Luke) would seem also to point

¹ e.g. הוּהּ הָהִיא בִּי בְנֵי אֲזִייה שְׁבַעה יוֹמִין "There was a bath-house there, which he heated for seven days," etc.

² In Samaritan it occurs intransitively in the sense of *to burn* or *be hot*, Deut. 32, 22 (Heb. יקר).

in the same direction. Prof. Marshall argues for the suitability of רוי. The reader must be left to judge of the force of the opposing arguments for himself.

But the consideration of Prof. Marshall's remaining objections must be reserved for a future occasion.

S. R. DRIVER.

(To be concluded.)

*THE GALATIA OF THE ACTS: A CRITICISM
OF PROFESSOR RAMSAY'S THEORY.*

STUDENTS of Early Church History owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Ramsay which they are not likely to forget. His brilliant achievement in the recovery of the epitaph of Abercius is itself a sufficient title to honour; and that achievement is very far from standing alone. In his last book, *The Church in the Roman Empire*, he has taken a fresh step. In the latter part of that volume he has discussed the relation of the Church to the Empire from the time of Nero till 170 A.D. In the earlier part he has treated of the history of St. Paul in the light of the knowledge which he has gained as a traveller and explorer in the regions in which St. Paul laboured. It is with part of this earlier section of his work that I am now concerned.

There are scholars whom fortune allows to probe the secrets of the very soil trodden by the generations of antiquity. Such men are few in number; in their front rank Prof. Ramsay holds a conspicuous, perhaps in this country the first, place. Others "sit at home at ease"; their flights never take them far from their bookshelves. Yet both classes of students have their peculiar office in the commonwealth of letters. To the former belongs the glory of romantic or startling discovery; to the latter the patient investigation of the text of ancient writings, to which the labours of their more adventurous fellow-workers supply fresh illustration. To them pertains the humbler and less exciting task of testing theories and checking hasty conclusions. The grammar and the dictionary of the stay-

at-home student have a part to play not less necessary than that of the spade of the excavator and the diary of the traveller.

In discussing St. Paul's journeys Prof. Ramsay joins issue with the late Bishop Lightfoot on a point of considerable importance in the Apostle's life. It is this. Does the "Galatian district" which St. Luke mentions (Acts xvi. 6, xviii. 23) denote "the district popularly and generally known as Galatia" (p. 9¹) or the Roman province which bore that name? To the former view, which Bishop Lightfoot maintained in the Introduction to his Commentary on the Galatians,² Prof. Ramsay gives the convenient designation of "the North-Galatian theory"; to the latter view, which he himself upholds, the designation of "the South-Galatian theory" (p. 9). According to the former opinion, St. Luke gives no details as to St. Paul's visit to Galatia, but hastens on to the Apostle's entrance into Europe, when for a short time he himself became St. Paul's companion (Acts xvi. 10, 40). According to the latter view, St. Luke uses the term Galatia in a brief recapitulation of what he has already related (xvi. 1-4), viz.: St. Paul's second visit to Derbe and Lystra, and probably also (note τὰς πόλεις, v. 4) to Iconium and Antioch.

There are probably many who make it a kind of rule to allow no one but themselves to find fault with Bishop Lightfoot's work; many, that is, who do not admit that his conclusions are in error unless they have sifted the evidence for themselves. I confess that I am of that number. I have tried to review this question as to St. Paul's journeys independently. The conclusion which I have

¹ The references are to *The Church in the Roman Empire*. Second edition, Revised.

² Prof. Ramsay has, I think, overlooked an important note of Bp. Lightfoot's dealing with Renan's theory as to Galatia, written some years after the Commentary on the Galatians; see *Colossians*, pp. 25-28.

reached is that, though I am obliged to disagree with what the Bishop wrote in one important point, I believe that as to the main question the Bishop was right and that Prof. Ramsay is wrong.

The Professor adduces many interesting arguments to support his opinion. But there is a preliminary question to which I venture to think that he has not given sufficient attention. I believe that a careful examination of the narrative of St. Luke leaves no room whatever for doubt that he uses the term Galatia in the popular, not the political, sense; and that consequently the North-Galatian theory holds the field.

It will be convenient to summarize those parts of St. Luke's narrative which introduce the crucial passages and to transcribe the passages themselves.

(i.) xv. 40—xvi. 7. (xv. 40) St. Paul and Silas leave the Syrian Antioch. (41) They pass through Syria and Cilicia. (xvi. 1) The Apostle visits Derbe and Lystra. (2) At the latter city he chooses Timothy as his companion. (3) He circumcises him. (4) As they passed through the cities (*ὡς δὲ διεπορεύοντο τὰς πόλεις*), they delivered the apostolic letter. (5) *αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐκκλησίαι ἐστερεοῦντο τῇ πίστει καὶ ἐπερίσσεον τῷ ἀριθμῷ καθ' ἡμέραν.* (6) *διήλθον δὲ τὴν Φρυγίαν καὶ Γαλατικὴν χώραν, κωλυθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος λαλῆσαι τὸν λόγον ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ,* (7) *ἐλθόντες δὲ κατὰ τὴν Μυσίαν ἐπειράζον εἰς τὴν Βιθυνίαν πορευθῆναι καὶ οὐκ εἶπεν αὐτοὺς τὸ πνεῦμα Ἰησοῦ.* (8) *παρελθόντες δὲ τὴν Μυσίαν κατέβησαν εἰς Τρωάδα.*

(ii.) xviii. 22 f. (xviii. 22) St. Paul visits Jerusalem and the Syrian Antioch. (23) *καὶ ποιήσας χρόνον τινὰ ἐξήλθεν, διερχόμενος καθεξῆς τὴν Γαλατικὴν χώραν καὶ Φρυγίαν, στηρίζων πάντας τοὺς μαθητάς.*

The investigation falls under two heads—(1) the examination of the crucial phrases in xvi. 6, xviii. 23; (2) the

examination of the context of the former of these two verses (xvi. 4-10).

(1) "The passage xvi. 4-6," writes Prof. Ramsay (p. 75), "is one of extreme obscurity; but it must be examined, for the decision of the controversy as to the signification of the term Galatia depends on the meaning to be taken out of it." I cannot for a moment admit that the passage "is one of extreme obscurity." On the contrary, when interpreted according to common Greek usage and the ordinary rules of Greek grammar, it appears to me to be luminously clear. But I am quite at one with the Professor in the belief that the signification of "Galatia" in St. Luke turns on the interpretation of these verses.

Prof. Ramsay, drawing attention to the absence of the article in the true text before *Γαλατικὴν χώραν* says that the phrase *τὴν Φρυγίαν καὶ Γαλατικὴν χώραν* (xvi. 6) means "the country which is Phrygian and Galatic,' a single district to which both epithets apply. . . . 'the country which according to one way of speaking is Phrygian, but which is also called Galatic'" (p. 77 f.), "which may in English be most idiomatically rendered 'the Phrygo-Galatic' territory" (p. 79f.). "This," he says (p. 78), "is the only possible sense of the Greek words as they are now read." Here, as far as the grammatical analysis of the phrase is concerned, Prof. Ramsay treads in the steps of Bishop Lightfoot. "The form of the Greek expression," wrote the Bishop (Commentary on Galatians, p. 22), "implies that Phrygia and Galatia here are not to be regarded as separate districts. The country which was now evangelized might be called indifferently Phrygia or Galatia." This view is adopted, apparently not without some misgiving, by Mr. Page, whose notes on the Acts are without a rival as a scholarly exposition of the text.

From this view of "the *vinculum* of the common article"

I am obliged to dissent. In quoting passages from which to deduce what I believe to be the real force of this subtilty of Greek idiom, I shall confine myself to phrases which occur in St. Luke's writings. Just before the phrase under discussion we have the words τὰ δόγματα τὰ κεκριμένα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων τῶν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις (v. 4). Are we here to understand persons who "according to one way of speaking" are apostles, "but who are also" elders? Such an interpretation is excluded by the term of the decree itself οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι (xv. 23, comp. v. 22). When St. Luke writes in xvii. 18 τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρίων καὶ Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων, and in xxiii. 7 ἐγένετο στάσις τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ Σαδδουκαίων, does he mean us to understand in the one passage philosophers who could be "called indifferently" Epicureans or Stoics; in the other Jews who could be "called indifferently" Pharisees or Sadducees? Is this the 'only possible sense of the Greek words'? Does St. Luke in xix. 21 διελθὼν τὴν Μακεδονίαν καὶ Ἀχαίαν point to "a single district to which" both designations, Macedonia and Achaia, apply? Or in xxvii. 5: τὸ πέλαγος τὸ κατὰ τὴν Κιλικίαν καὶ Παμφυλίαν to a tract of country, which might be "called indifferently" Cilicia or Pamphylia?

These examples, which might be multiplied (comp. i. 8, viii. 1, ix. 31, xv. 3),¹ make it abundantly clear, that "the *vinculum* of the common article" does not imply that the designations which follow the article are alternative expressions (comp. Acts xiii. 9, Σαῦλος δὲ ὁ καὶ Παῦλος: see Bishop Lightfoot's note on Ignatius *Eph.* i.), but rather that from the point of view of the writer at the particular moment they are invested with a kind of unity, sufficiently defined by the context. For example, in xv. 23 the Apostles and the Elders are the common authors of the

¹ The reading in xv. 41 (διήρχετο δὲ τὴν Συρίαν καὶ [τὴν] Κιλικίαν) is considered by Westcott and Hort to be doubtful.

decree ; in xix. 21 St. Paul purposes to traverse Macedonia and Achaia in a single rapid journey which would end at Jerusalem ; in xxiii. 7 the Pharisees and the Sadducees, though they were all but coming to blows, are the common authors of the tumult.

I have reserved for separate consideration an exact and important parallel to the phrase under discussion. In his description of the political condition of Palestine at the time when our Lord began His ministry, St. Luke uses the expression *τετρααρχοῦντος τῆς Ἰτουραίας καὶ Τραχωνίτιδος χώρας* (iii. 1). This phrase (1) illustrates the view of "the *vinculum* of the common article" which I have maintained above ; Ituræa and the region of Trachonitis were separate districts, but were united in the one tetrarchy of Philip ; (2) indicates that though the phrase in Acts xvi. 6 may be based on a corresponding expression in a "Travel-document," such as Prof. Ramsay supposes St. Luke to have used (p. 6 ff.), yet the *form* of the phrase is St. Luke's ; a reference to Bruder shows that *χώρα* is a favourite word with St. Luke, occurring seventeen times in his writings, eleven times in the rest of the N.T. ;¹ (3) makes it almost certain that in xvi. 6, as in Acts ii. 10, *Φρυγία* is a substantive, not an adjective ; whatever doubt still remains is, I believe, dissipated by a comparison of xviii. 23, *τὴν Γαλατικὴν χώραν καὶ Φρυγίαν*.

We arrive therefore at the conclusion that in Acts xvi. 6, St. Luke speaks of St. Paul as traversing in a single journey, which he summarily describes, two districts, Phrygia and the Galatian region.² Now districts known as Phrygia

¹ It is worth while to notice that in Mc. i. 5, *ἡ Ἰουδαία χώρα* is simply a variation for *ἡ Ἰουδαία* which is used in the parallel passage (Matt. iii. 5). Such compound names as those under discussion (Lc. iii. 1, Acts xvi. 6, xviii. 22) are mere literary amplifications.

² Thus Wendt's rendering *Phrygien und das galatäische Land*, which Prof. Ramsay criticises as one "which cannot be got from the text which he approves of," is perfectly accurate.

There is a good instance of what may and of what may not be deduced from

and Galatia lie between the cities on the south which St. Paul leaves behind him, and Bithynia on the north towards which he ultimately directs his steps (xvi. 1 ff., 7).

The conclusion to which our examination of the phrase in xvi. 6 has led us, receives complete confirmation when we turn to xviii. 23. Prof. Ramsay indeed again complains of the ambiguity which he discovers in St. Luke's words "The terms," he says (p. 90), "in which the country traversed by him before reaching Asia is described are unfortunately very obscure, 'he went through the Galatic region and Phrygian' (or perhaps 'and Phrygia'), 'in order establishing all the disciples.'" Again I must refuse to join in the Professor's complaint against St. Luke. We would indeed gladly have learned further details about St. Paul's journey. But what information St. Luke does give, he gives with absolute clearness.

When we recall our analysis of the phrase used in xvi. 6, and when we compare the following passages, xv. 3 *διήρχοντο τὴν τε Φοινίκην καὶ Σαμαρίαν*, xv. 41 *διήρχετε δὲ τὴν Συρίαν καὶ [τὴν] Κιλικίαν*, xvii. 1 *διοδεύσαντες δὲ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ τὴν Ἀπολλωνίαν*, xix. 21 *διελθὼν τὴν Μακεδονίαν καὶ Ἀχαΐαν*; when, further, we take account of the fact that the *διύ* of the compound verb (*διερχόμενος*) in xviii. 23 is reinforced by *καθεξῆς*, it is impossible to doubt that St. Luke speaks of two adjacent districts which St. Paul successively traversed. Further, when we remark that St. Luke, in referring to the journeys of Christian teachers, is careful to give

the use of the *vinculum* of the common article in Eph. ii. 20 (*τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ προφητῶν*); comp. iii. 5 (*τοῖς ἀγίοις ἀποστ. αὐτοῦ καὶ προφ.*) On the one hand the expression used does not require us to understand persons who might be called indifferently Apostles or Prophets. This interpretation is excluded by iv. 11, *ἔδωκεν τοῖς μὲν ἀποστόλοις, τοῖς δὲ προφήταις*. On the other hand those indicated are so closely united that they can be represented as a single foundation (ii. 20), as the recipients of a single revelation (iii. 5). Thus the reference must be to the N. T., not the O. T., Prophets. Chrysostom, understanding ii. 20 to refer to O. T. prophets, instinctively inserts the article in his paraphrase—*θεμέλιος οἱ ἄποστολοι καὶ οἱ προφῆται*.

the names of places in the order in which they visited them¹ (viii. 1, ix. 31, xi. 19, xiv. 6, 19, 21, xv. 3, 41, xvi. 1, xvii. 1, xix. 21, xxvii. 5), we are convinced that St. Luke intends us to understand that in his third journey St. Paul reversed the order of his second journey, and traversed *first* the Galatian district, and *then* Phrygia.

(2) From the consideration of the crucial phrases in xvi. 6, xviii. 23, I turn to the context of the former of them.

In xvi. 1-4, St. Luke tells us definitely of St. Paul's visit to Derbe and Lystra, and by the use of the phrase, τὰς πόλεις, v. 4, seems to imply that St. Paul visited the other chief cities of the district. He next records the *sequel*, which he introduces by the particle οὖν. For this οὖν of historical sequence see i. 6, ii. 41, v. 41, viii. 4, 25, ix. 31, x. 23, xi. 19, xiii. 4, xiv. 3, xv. 3, 30, xvi. 11, xvii. 12, 17, xxii. 29, xxiii. 18, 22, 31, xxv. 1, 4, 17, 23, xxviii. 5. This *sequel* has two parts, which St. Luke clearly marks off by the use of μέν (v. 5) and δέ (v. 6). In the first place St. Luke traces the fortunes of the *Churches* which St. Paul and his companions had just visited (αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐκκλησίαι). This visit of their founder, probably also the settlement of the Judaic controversy through their reception of the apostolic decrees, issued in their continuous growth, a growth alike intensive and extensive—ἐστερεοῦντο τῇ πίστει καὶ ἐπερίσσειον τῷ ἀριθμῷ καθ' ἡμέραν. In the *second* place, St. Luke follows the movements of the *travellers*, (διήλθον δέ).² After they had

¹ The only exception which I have noticed is ix. 31, καθ' ὅλης τῆς Ἰουδαίας καὶ Γαλιλαίας καὶ Σαμαρίας. But the explanation of this variation from the geographical order is not far to seek. Judæa and Galilee (closely connected in our Lord's ministry, Luke v. 17, xxiii. 5; John iv. 47, 54) were Jewish districts; Samaria was the home of an alien population. In ix. 31 the single article before the names of three *distinct* districts will be noticed.

² The connexion of vv. 5, 6 is unfortunately obscured by the division into paragraphs, both in Westcott and Hort's text and in the R.V. The student will find passages bearing a very close resemblance to xvi. 4-6, as far as the connexion of the sentences is concerned, in ii. 41-43, v. 41-vi. 1, viii. 4f., 25f., ix. 31f. (ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐκκλησία . . . ἐγένετο δὲ Πέτρον διερχόμενον . . . κατελ-

left the cities of Lycaonia and Pisidia, they journeyed northwards, traversing successively Phrygia and the Galatian district. The reason why they went northwards and not westwards, as left to their own judgment they would have done, was that they had already "been forbidden of the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia (*διήλθον . . . κωλυθέντες*)."

Thus the sequence of the clauses (*μὲν οὖν . . . δέ*) and the relation of the participle *κωλυθέντες* to the indicative *διήλθον* are alike fatal to Prof. Ramsay's theory, that the expression *ἡ Γαλατικὴ χώρα καὶ Φρυγία* means the Roman province of Galatia, and that consequently in *v. 6* we have "a geographical recapitulation of the journey which is implied in verses 4, 5" (p. 77).

The question of the sequence of clauses is not examined by Prof. Ramsay. He has, however, dealt with the second point indicated just above. It will be best to quote his own words. "It is advisable," he writes (p. 89), "to notice an argument derived from the syntax of *xvi. 6*. It has been contended that the participle *κωλυθέντες* gives the reason for the finite verb *διήλθον*, and is therefore preliminary to it in the sequence of time. We reply that the participial construction cannot, in this author, be pressed in that way. He is often loose in the framing of his sentences, and in the long sentence in verses 6 and 7 he varies the succession of verbs by making some of them participles. The sequence of the verbs is also the sequence of time: (1) They went through the Phrygo-Galatic land; (2) they were forbidden to speak in Asia; (3) they came over against Mysia; (4) they assayed to go into Bithynia; (5) the Spirit suffered them not; (6) they passed through¹ Mysia; (7) they came to Troas."

θεῶν), xi. 19f., xii. 5f., xiii. 4-6, xiv. 3-5, xv. 3f., xvii. 12, 17-19, xxiii. 18f., xxv. 4-6, xxviii. 5f. Compare Mr. Page's note on ii. 41ff.

¹ This is a slip. The word *παρελθόντες* (*xvi. 8*) means that they skirted

This paragraph is a remarkable one. Hard pressed by a very simple and decisive grammatical argument, Prof. Ramsay has taken refuge in the desperate expedient of maintaining that a Greek writer can vary "the succession of verbs by making some of them participles." This seems to me, if Prof. Ramsay will pardon the illustration, as if a chess-player, somewhat suddenly checkmated by the combined action of a bishop and a knight standing in certain relative positions, were to plead that in this particular game the action of the chess-men "cannot be pressed in that way," that, in fact, a bishop and a knight are interchangeable, and may be transposed. A player holding these views would play on fearless of defeat.

It is, of course, certain that St. Luke is "often loose in the framing of his sentences." So is Thucydides. But it is no less certain that a Greek writer who, in the way supposed, varied "the succession of verbs by making some of them participles," would be incapable of writing half a page of intelligible narrative. He would set at defiance the elementary laws of the Greek language, and we should be without the means of ascertaining his meaning. If we could believe that St. Luke, in a short and simple clause where there could be no anacoluthon, wrote *διήλθον . . . κωλυθέντες* when what he really meant would have been easily and naturally expressed by the words *διελθόντες . . . ἐκωλύθησαν*,¹ it would not be worth while to waste our energies in studying his writings any more. They would remain beyond, because below, criticism.

Mysia without passing through it (comp. *Mc. vi. 48*). Prof. Ramsay elsewhere (p. 76) correctly paraphrases thus: "Keeping along the southern frontier of Mysia."

¹ In a Greek sentence, when an anarthrous aorist participle agrees with the subject of an aorist indicative, the participle expresses an act *either* coincident in time with (*e.g. Acts viii. 34, ἀποκριθείς . . . εἶπεν*), or prior to (*e.g. Acts ix. 2, προσελθὼν . . . ἠτήσατο*), that which is expressed by the indicative. See Dr. Moulton's *Winer*, p. 430. Whether the participle stands before or after the indicative is a matter determined simply by considerations of euphony

I am quite confident that Prof. Ramsay wrote the paragraph, which it has been necessary to criticise, hastily, and that he is too good a scholar to hold to the proposition as to the possible functions of the Greek participle, which he has incautiously laid down. Just in proportion as we rate very highly Prof. Ramsay's work as a traveller and an epigraphist, and as we gladly recognise that a volume of lectures from his pen was sure to meet with a warm welcome, and to be widely read, we feel it to be a matter for serious regret that he did not examine the document which he undertook to interpret and illustrate with the care and accuracy which are incumbent on a scholar, especially when he addresses himself to a popular audience. The impression that Prof. Ramsay has made out a very strong, some will think an unanswerable, case, for his view of St. Paul's journeys has probably spread very widely. Very few readers go through Prof. Ramsay's arguments with their Greek Testament in their hands. It is the unguarded statements and arguments of popular, often deservedly popular, books which sow and water popular errors.

The verdict, then, which, as I believe, any Greek scholar who goes into the evidence supplied by St. Luke's language must pronounce on the South-Galatian theory, is that it is shipwrecked on the rock of Greek grammar.

The questions of interpretation, which have been discussed thus far, have prepared the way for an attempt to bring out more clearly what I believe to be the chief points in connexion with St. Paul's visits to Galatia, *i.e.* North Galatia, so far as they seem to be suggested by St.

and emphasis. It will be noticed that in Acts xiii. 4 (*ἐκπεμφθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος κατῆλθον κ.τ.λ.*) we have an incident which is the converse of that related in xvi. 6.

Some authorities, *e.g.*, HLP lat. vg. (*transeuntes autem Frygiam et Galatiae regionem uetati sunt*) support *διελθόντες* in place of *διῆλθον*. The attestation, however, is decisively in favour of *διῆλθον*.

Luke's narrative. I need hardly say that I have no claim to speak with authority as to the route which St. Paul took. I have simply used the excellent map which accompanies Prof. Ramsay's volume, as a help to the understanding of the brief hints given by St. Luke.

The main interest which the record of the earlier part of St. Paul's second journey has for us, lies in the fact that it was a period of preparation for his entrance into Europe as a Christian missionary. In xv. 35-41 St. Luke records St. Paul's sojourn at the Syrian Antioch. But the only details of his stay there, of which we are informed, are his separation from Barnabas and his choice of Silas as a companion. Of the four verses (xvi. 1-4), which St. Luke devotes to the Apostle's visit to the churches of Lycaonia and Pisidia, three relate to St. Paul's call of Timothy. Again, in xvi. 6-10, our attention is concentrated not on the Apostle's journey itself, but on the divine interpositions, which closed first one door of activity, and then another, and which finally summoned him into Europe.

At each stage of the narrative we crave fuller information. St. Luke tells us little probably because he knew little. We can hardly doubt that the history reflects the mind of St. Paul. Whether St. Luke gained his information from oral communication, or, as seems more likely, from written memoranda, St. Paul himself is probably the ultimate authority. And to St. Paul the matter of absorbing interest would be the way in which there was brought home to him God's call to enter on a new stage of missionary activity, a stage which included within itself the foundation of the churches of Macedonia and of Achaia. He would reckon it a call second in importance only to the primary call on the road to Damascus.

But Prof. Ramsay cannot believe that, if St. Paul really penetrated into Northern Galatia, St. Luke would have given us so little information about his visit there. "On

the above interpretation," he writes (p. 83), "we have to interpose between the two verbs a tale of months of wandering over Galatia. No person who possessed any literary faculty could write like this." It will have already appeared that I cannot altogether agree with Prof. Ramsay as to what could or could not be written by a Greek author "with any literary faculty." But the point of real importance seems to me very obvious. The number of details which a conscientious historian records at any given part of his work depends not on his "literary faculty," but rather on the amount of information which he possesses. If he knows only the bare outline of the facts, he will record only the bare outline of the facts. Every student of the Acts must have been struck by St. Luke's silences. I will take a single example. In two verses (xviii. 22 f.) St. Luke summarizes a journey by sea from Ephesus to Cæsarea, from Cæsarea to Jerusalem, from Jerusalem to Antioch; a sojourn of some duration at Antioch; a journey through "the Galatian territory and Phrygia." "Nothing is more striking," wrote Bishop Lightfoot in his article on the Acts in the new edition of the *Dictionary of the Bible* (p. 33), "than the want of proportion in the Acts. In some parts the history of a few months occupies several chapters; in others the history of many years is disposed of in two or three verses. Sometimes we have a diary of a journey or a voyage; elsewhere a bald statement of the main facts is given." ¹

¹ Compare Prof. Ramsay's treatment of the relation of the Acts to St. Paul's Epistles. "On the usual theory," he writes (p. 103), "we find throughout St. Paul's writings no single word to show that he retained a kindly recollection of them [the South-Galatian group of Churches] or an interest in them. Once he does refer to them, but only to recall his sufferings and persecution among them (2 Tim. iii. 11); in no other way, at no other time, does he make any allusion to them. . . . It would be impossible to conceive a more direct contradiction in tone and emotional feeling than exists, on this theory, between Acts and Galatians as regards St. Paul's attitude to the South-Galatian churches." This argument would be a strong one if (1) we had any reason for thinking that all St. Paul's letters have been preserved; (2) his letters

The narrative is brief. But it is worth while to endeavour to expand the writer's hints, always remembering that in such an expansion much must be largely conjectural.

The missionaries then determined that, when they left the cities of Lycaonia and Pisidia, they would travel westwards along the road which led from the Pisidian Antioch to Ephesus. But the proposal was frustrated. They were "forbidden of the Holy Ghost to speak the word in Asia." It is very probable, as Prof. Ramsay suggests (p. 75), that this divine intimation came to them at Antioch. It came probably through the utterance of one or more of those who were known in the earliest age of the Church as Prophets. Such a prophetic intimation of the Divine will had started St. Paul on his first missionary journey (xiii. 2ff.), and was again to be vouchsafed to him as his third journey drew towards its close (xxi. 10f.). And yet further, as St. Paul had miraculous guidance as to the course of his journey, so, it would appear, at Lystra he had already received similar direction as to the choice of a companion. Writing to Timothy (1 Tim. i. 18) years afterwards, he reminds him of "the prophecies which led the way to thee (*τὰς προαγούσας ἐπὶ σὲ προφητείας*)"; he reminds him, that is, that the Holy Spirit, speaking probably through the prophets, had directed his "separation for the work" (Acts xiii. 2).¹

Forbidden to turn westwards, the travellers had but little choice as to the direction in which, after leaving

were systematically autobiographical. As to "tone and emotional feeling" the Acts and the Epistles are mutually complementary. Thus we should not gather from the brief notices in the Acts (xvi. 12-15, 32, 40, xx. 6) that St. Paul had at Philippi a large body of converts, towards whom he felt a special affection. This we learn from the Letter to the Philippians. Further, in all the other extant Epistles of St. Paul "once he does refer to" the Philippians, "but only to recall his sufferings and persecution among them" (1 Thess. ii. 2).

¹ This is the interpretation which Dr. Hort, as I remember, maintained in some lectures on the Pastoral Epistles.

Antioch, they should journey. They bent their steps northwards, passing along the road, it seems likely, which led through Phrygia to Nakoleia. At this point they turned aside and entered "the Galatian district" on the east. We may conjecture that they halted at Pessinus.

Here, however, Prof. Ramsay asks a question which deserves consideration. "The question," he says (p. 81), "has then to be met, How did St. Paul come to be in North Galatia? What theory can be suggested to explain his route and his plans consistently with the rest of the narrative?" The answer, as it seems to me, is a simple one. St. Paul just now had no definite and well-considered plan. He had had a clear policy—the evangelization of Asia; but he had been prevented from carrying it out in a way which he dared not gainsay, but which he could not as yet explain. He was bewildered. He allowed himself to drift. He moved from place to place waiting on Providence.¹ We may conjecture that he intended, so far as he had a plan at all, to pass through the cities in the west corner of Galatia, and so to journey further north to the cities in the east of Bithynia and of Pontus.

But the wanderer became once again an evangelist. He was quickly, almost aimlessly, passing through "the Galatian district." Suddenly an attack of illness, probably that mysterious malady which he elsewhere calls "a thorn in the flesh," brought him to a standstill. The attack, whatever its nature, may have been short; it was certainly sharp, and it left its painful traces upon him. Before however he recovered, the Apostle learned to feel an interest in the warm-hearted Galatians: he saw how ripe they were to receive the tidings of the gospel. His illness, like the words of the prophets at Antioch and at Lystra, like

¹ For a somewhat similar crisis see 2 Cor. ii. 12 ff., vii. 5 f. It is worth while to notice how brief is St. Luke's account of this latter period (Acts xx. 1 f.).

the vision at Troas, was a voice of God. He stayed in Galatia for a time, "doing the work of an evangelist"—journeying perhaps to Ancyra or even to the cities further east. "Ye know," he afterwards wrote to his converts, "that because of an infirmity of the flesh I preached the gospel unto you the former time" (Gal. iv. 13).

Such an account as this, though of course largely conjectural, seems precisely to suit the hints which we gather from the Acts and the Epistle to the Galatians. It is necessary, however, to turn aside and consider Prof. Ramsay's criticisms and suggestions in connexion with St. Paul's illness.

(i.) Prof. Ramsay finds in this connexion an argument against the "North-Galatian theory." "On the North-Galatian theory, I fail to comprehend the situation implied in Gal. iv. 13. It is remarkable that the long toilsome journey, involving great physical and mental effort, and yet voluntarily undertaken, should be described as the result of a severe illness; such a result from such a cause is explicable only in certain rare circumstances" (p. 64 f.). I have already indicated what I believe to be the answer to this criticism. The exact point of St. Paul's phrase has, I think, escaped Prof. Ramsay. The apostle says, not that he *visited* the Galatians, but that he *evangelized* them, "because of an infirmity of the flesh." His illness, in other words, was the cause, not of a journey, but of a delay which was over-ruled for the spread of the gospel.

(ii.) Prof. Ramsay's own account of St. Paul's illness must also be considered. He holds that in Pamphylia St. Paul had "a bad attack of malarial fever" (p. 63), that it therefore became advisable for him to go as soon as possible "to the high lands of the interior"; that St. Paul, accordingly, crossed the Taurus and entered the Roman province of Galatia, and that thus "the evangelization of the Galatian churches was due to 'an infirmity of the

flesh'” (p. 64). The meaning of the term Galatia has been already discussed. Does the theory that St. Paul's illness was an attack of malaria satisfy the conditions of the problem? It is true that malarial fever could be well described by the phrase which St. Paul uses in Galatians iv. 13, ἀσθένεια τῆς σαρκός. But is it conceivable that it is alluded to in the words which follow in the next verse, which Prof. Ramsay does not notice? Travellers recovering from malarial fever must have been common enough in those parts. “The attack,” writes Prof. Ramsay (p. 65), “described in the letter to the Galatians need not be understood as lasting long; that is not the character of such attacks.” Could St. Paul's illness, if it was such an attack as this, be described as a “temptation” to the Galatians, or as something which might reasonably have called forth their contempt and loathing (Gal. iv. 14 οὐκ ἐξουθενήσατε οὐδὲ ἐξεπτύσατε)? Further, it is very probable, though it cannot be said to be absolutely certain, that in the two Epistles to Corinth (written, according to the common view, about the same time as the Epistle to the Galatians) there are allusions to this same “infirmity of the flesh” (see 1 Cor. ii. 3; 2 Cor. i. 8 f., xii. 7 ff.). These allusions, if such they are allowed to be, confirm the verdict against the “malaria” theory which the evidence of Galatians iv. 14 has already rendered necessary.

To resume the thread of the narrative—after spending some time (how long it is impossible to say) in Galatia, the travellers turned their steps westward. Following, possibly, the course of the Tembrogius, they arrived, we may suppose, at Dorylaion. Here they might be described as being “over against Mysia (κατὰ τὴν Μυσίαν).” “And when,” St. Luke tells us (xvi. 7), “they were come over against Mysia, they assayed to go into Bithynia”; they determined, that is, at this point to take the road northwards leading from Dorylaion to Nicæa. But again they

were not allowed to have a policy of their own. "The Spirit of Jesus¹ suffered them not." Every door was thus closed to them save one. They could go westwards; accordingly, without entering Mysia, they skirted its southern boundary. At last they reached the sea at Troas. There the call, for which the preparation had been so long and so perplexing, came and summoned them to cross into Europe.

Briefer still is the account which St. Luke gives of St. Paul's visit to Galatia during his third missionary journey.

As the section (xvi. 1-10) which we have just considered is simply the introduction to the history of St. Paul's work in Europe, so this later section (xviii. 22, 23) is but a brief preface to the record of St. Paul's sojourn in Asia.

After a visit to Jerusalem (implied by the word *ἀναβάς*), St. Paul went to the Syrian Antioch and made there a stay of some duration. Leaving Antioch, he would pass through the Syrian and Cilician Gates. He then would travel along the north road to Sasima. At Sasima he would either take the road which goes almost due north to Tavium, or would follow the track, which afterwards became the Pilgrims' Road from Constantinople to Jerusalem, leading to Ancyra. Then, going eastwards, he would revisit "in order" the Galatian churches, which he had planted some two or three years previously. At length he would strike the road which traverses Phrygia and leads to the Pisidian Antioch. From Antioch, on the former occasion, he probably started on his journey "through Phrygia and the Galatian region." At Antioch he now probably ended his journey through the same districts, but in the reverse order—his journey "through the Galatian region and Phrygia." Passing along the road which led direct from Antioch to Ephesus—the road which before

¹ This remarkable phrase should be taken in connexion with the accounts of St. Paul's conversion (Acts ix. 5, xxii. 8, 17 f., xxvi. 15 ff.).

he had been forbidden to traverse—he at length set foot in the latter city, and there founded the Church which in the closing years of the century succeeded Jerusalem and the Syrian Antioch as the metropolis of Apostolic Christianity.

F. H. CHASE.

PROFESSOR MARSHALL'S ARAMAIC GOSPEL.

II.

3. DOES פַּחְרִין in Aramaic mean *tiles*? Prof. Marshall argues, without any misgivings, that it does. In the EXPOSITOR, March, 1891, p. 219, he says, “פַּחְרִין would be tiles.” When challenged by Mr. Allen for his proof, he now produces it: “פַּחְרָא = a potter, *κεραμεύς*, פַּחְרָא = earthenware, as in J, Exod. 12, 22, כֵּן דַּפְחָרָא = vessel of earthenware. The plural of nouns of material denotes pieces of that material. Hence פַּחְרִין must denote *κέραμοι*, tiles.” It is allowed, then, that פַּחְרִין is not known to occur with that meaning, but it is argued that it ought to have it. Obviously, however, the argument is fallacious. There is no doubt that פַּחְרָא means *earthenware*, but it does not follow from this that the plural פַּחְרִין has the definite sense of *tiles*: it may have been used to denote *fragments*, or *pieces*, of earthenware: can it be shown that Job (2, 8), when he took, in the Hebrew a דָּרַשׁ, in the Aramaic a פַּחַר, to scrape himself with, took definitely a “tile?” What the native Aramaic word for a *tile* was I am very ready to own I do not know. And the translators of the Lectionary and of the Harkleian Version appear to have been in the same predicament. For they know well enough what *κεράμων* in Luke 5, 19 means, but they express it, not by any genuine Aramaic word, but by *κεραμίδες*, or *κεραμίδιον* (ܩܪܡܝܕܝܘܢ, ܩܪܡܝܕܝܘܢ), the diminutive of *κέραμος* itself, and the recognised

Syriac word for a *tile* (see Payne Smith, col. 3749).¹ In view of the two facts (1) that no instance has been produced in which פִּדְרִין signifies *tiles*, (2) that *tile* is expressed in Syriac by a different word altogether, of foreign origin, I submit that Prof. Marshall has not succeeded in showing that פִּדְרִין has the meaning "tiles."

4. When I first read Prof. Marshall's paper of March, 1891, this appeared to me to be the most plausible instance of his hypothesis which it contained. I then understood *ἰκμάδα* of the sap of the plant. I changed my opinion afterwards, because a more careful study of the text of the parable led me to believe that Mr. Allen was right in contending that *ἰκμάδα* (treated as an original and integral part of the parable) meant the moisture of the earth, which would not be denoted by the Aramaic שֶׂרֶף. If, however, Prof. Marshall will put his hypothesis in the definite form that the original gospel had שֶׂרֶשׁ, *root*, but that in the copy which formed the basis of St. Luke's Gospel the last letter was so disfigured or imperfect that it suggested to the translator שֶׂרֶף, *sap*, I have no objection to it: *root* will then be the true text of the parable;² *ἰκμάδα* being now no longer an integral part of the parable, but originating in an error, it becomes a matter of indifference in what sense it is understood, and it may be taken in that which the Aramaic שֶׂרֶף will allow, viz. *sap*.

5. Surely the "real meaning" of שִׁירָא is not a *crowd*, but a *company of travellers*, i.e. a *caravan*. This is the meaning supported both by etymology and by usage. The root is preserved in the Arabic مَسَارٌ *proficisci*, whence مَسِيرَةٌ "agmen una commeantium" (to quote Roediger's definition in the *Thesaurus*, p. 1384a); and this is the sense which the word has both in Syriac, the Aramaic of the Targums,

¹ The Pesh. renders loosely עַל לְגַבְרֵי הַגַּבַּיִת "from the roof."

² Observe that in his interpretation of this part of the parable, St. Luke like the other Evangelists, has *πίσαν* (8, 13).

and also in the Aramaic of Palmyra (Roediger gives citations from each).¹ The word is thus used of a caravan, not, as Prof. Marshall says, "from the promiscuous nature of its crowd," but because it is derived from a root which signifies *to journey*. A more inappropriate word can hardly be imagined for describing the miscellaneous ἄπαν πλῆθος, gathered from the neighbourhood, of Lk. 8, 36. Levy, in his larger Lexicon, having cited six occurrences from the Talm. with the meaning *caravan*, cites a seventh, in which he renders it, not (as Prof. Marshall quotes him) "a crowd gathered in the street," but "a company of men going along the street." Even here, then, the true sense of the word is not lost; and the passage lends no support to the meaning contended for by Prof. Marshall. Kohut (who cites more examples than Levy) gives only the meaning *travelling company, caravan*.

6. Δῶμα, Lk. 5, 19 = στέγη, Mk. 2, 4. Δῶμα is used uniformly in the LXX., not of the *house* generally, but specially of the *house-top* (Heb. גג), which, in the East, as is well known, is flat, and used as a promenade and for many other purposes; and it has the same sense wherever it occurs in the Greek of the N.T. Even supposing, therefore, that כַּטְלָלָא (properly a *hut* or *booth*; used mostly for the Heb. סִפֵּה) could be applied to the οἶκος of Mk. 2, 1 (which, in spite of all that Prof. Marshall has urged, may still be doubted), what reason is there to suppose it would be the original of δῶμα? The Aramaic word, which would naturally correspond to this (in its Hellenistic sense), is ܕܡܐ, used here both in the Peshitto and in the Lecti-
tionary, and regularly for δῶμα in the N.T., and גג in the O.T.²

¹ In Palmyrene (see De Vogué, *Syrie Centrale*, pp. 12, 13), רב יִירְתָא "chef de caravane" corresponds to συνοδιάρχης, בני יִירְתָא are members of a caravan. רַי סַפְסָא שִׁירְתָא מִנְן מִן כִּיסָא = ἀνακομισά[μενον τῆν] συνοδίαν προῖκα ἐξ ιδίων. Συνοδία means a travelling company or caravan (Luke 2, 44).

² Were it legitimate to presuppose distinctively Syriac usage, ܕܡܐ or

7. I am still as unconvinced as ever that שָׁרָא could stand for καθῆσθαι. (That it may be employed suitably for καταλῦσαι, Lk. 19, 7, has not been denied either by Mr. Allen or by myself; this is a sufficiently common usage.) It is true, in Ps. 80, 2; Isa. 6, 1, 37, 16 “שרא and καθῆσθαι represent the same Hebrew word”; but the form of the sentence is in the Targum so changed that the value of the fact for Prof. Marshall’s argument is reduced to *nil*. In the passages quoted, the Heb. speaks of Jehovah as “sitting” on the cherubim (or, in Isa. 6, 1, on a throne); in the Targum, however, the sentence is paraphrased, and the subject of שָׁרָא is no longer Jehovah Himself, but His Presence (שְׁכִינְתָא), or glory (יְקָרָא). The case is similar in 1 Sam. 4, 2, and elsewhere. That שרא could be used of a spiritual Presence—as it is used also of a spirit itself, Jud. 11, 29, or of the cloud, Ex. 40, 35—*settling down* or *resting* upon a place, is not disputed by Mr. Allen;¹ but this usage is no proof that it would be used in ordinary parlance of a person *sitting*. Nor can I think it probable that a translator, conversant with Aramaic, finding the words (Apr., 1891, p. 285) וְהוּוּ שְׂרִין סְפְרִיא וְהִשְׁבִּין, properly and naturally² signifying, “And the scribes *began* to think,” would have been likely to misunderstand שְׂרִין in the improbable and unsupported sense of καθήμειν.³

8. Prof. Marshall considers Mr. Allen’s objections to אָרָא,

אָרָא might be suggested as the common original of both στέγη and ὄψμα the latter word being understood in its Hellenistic sense, and being a slightly free rendering of the Aramaic). For στέγη = אָרָא, see Mark 8, 8, Lk. 7, 6 in the Peshitto; = אָרָא Mark 2, 4.

¹ Examples are abundant. See, for instance, Gen. 49, 27; Ex. 24, 16; Num. 5, 3; Isa. 8, 18; P’s. 82, 1; 84, 8; Cant. 1, 5; 8, 14; and in the Aphel, Ex. 25, 8; Deut. 12, 5; Ps. 9, 12; Joel 4, 17, 21, etc.

² Except that the *Pael* conjugation (כִּי־שְׂרִין) might have been rather expected in the sense of *begin*.

³ Is it not a further objection to the supposition that ἤκουον in Lk. 5, 21 really corresponds to καθήμειν of Mk. 2, 6, that St. Luke has introduced the notice of the scribes and Pharisees “sitting” and listening while Jesus was teaching at an earlier point in his narrative (see *v.* 17)?

in the sense of *to go out*, very extravagant. גָּזַל in Dan. 2, 5. 8 is not even pointed as a verb;¹ and the view is a perfectly tenable one that the Talmudic גָּזַל *to go* or *to go away* is no genuine Aramaic verb, but a verb formed illegitimately upon the (false) assumption that גָּזַל in Dan. was a verb with that meaning. But even supposing that this view is incorrect, and that there was a real Aramaic verb גָּזַל , the use of the word is so restricted and peculiar²—for it is not the ordinary Aramaic word for *go out*—that it is extremely difficult to think that it would have been used of the lightning in Matt. 24, 27. Both the Peshitto and the Lectionary represent ἐξέρχεται here by the normal and ordinary גָּזַל .

9. Is it really the case that “ בְּעֵיִן is certainly the equivalent of *μόγυς* or *μόλις* = *cum molestia* (as the numerous usages of עֵיִן in Ecclesiastes fully prove)?” The author of Eccl. might, possibly, have framed an aphorism, “And a merchant gaineth riches בְּעֵיִן (*with labour, or difficulty*)” (though I think he would have written בְּעֵיִן רַב or רַע בְּעֵיִן),³ for the *occupation, business, toil*, which עֵיִן denotes would be the process by which a merchant would amass his wealth. But though the spirit left the afflicted youth *μόγυς, hardly or with difficulty*, he surely did not leave him through a process of hard and vexatious occupation or business (עֵיִן),⁴ but “with difficulty” in the sense of

¹ Baer quotes no MS. authority for his punctuation גָּזַל .

² It is used chiefly in the phrase, of which Kohut cites some eighty occurrences in the Talmud, $\text{וְאִזְדָּרוּ לְטַעֲמֵיהֶוּ}$, “and they (or he) went after (*i.e.* followed, adhered to) their (or his) own opinion.” The shade of meaning, expressed by the word, is not that of going or coming *forth* (cf. Keil on Dan. 2, 5), which is required in Matt. 24, 27, but that of going *away*.

³ In order that the reader may know exactly how עֵיִן is used in Ecclesiastes, I append a note of all the passages of that book in which it occurs: 1, 13. 2, 23. 26. 3, 10. 4, 8. 5, 2. 13. 8, 16. In none does it appear in an adverbial phrase.

⁴ This objection might indeed be met if it could be shown that בְּעֵיִן was a phrase in such common use, that its original sense was no longer consciously perceived, and it was felt simply to have the force of an adverb, “scarcely.” But is the evidence of this forthcoming?

reluctantly, i.e., ܘܠܥܘܠܘܢ “with hardness,” as the Lectionary has it, ܘܠܥܘܠܘܢ “scarcely,” as the Peshitto.

V. a. 1. Prof. Marshall holds that ἀποχωρεῖ in Lk. 9, 39 represents the Aram. ܦܥܪܩ, *to flee*. Mr. Allen asks, “Can ܦܥܪܩ express the simple idea of departure implied in ἀποχωρεῖ?” and adds that here “the *nuance* of ‘flight’ is excluded by the context” (pp. 302, 303). To this Prof. Marshall replies, “Mr. Allen suggests that the idea of ‘flight’ is unsuitable to the Greek verb and also to the departure of the demon,” and proceeds to reproach him with not knowing that ܦܥܪܩ is so used three times in Neubauer’s *Tobit*.

I do not understand Mr. Allen to have suggested that ܦܥܪܩ is unsuitable in the abstract to the departure of a demon. What he meant, I suppose, was (1) that, joined with *μόγισ*, and denoting only a *temporary* departure of the evil spirit, ܦܥܪܩ, *to flee*, was not exactly the word that would be expected (in the passages of *Tobit* referred to, 6, 4. 17. 8, 3, it is used of the final and total flight of the demon); and (2) that had St. Luke been translating the Aram. ܦܥܪܩ, *to flee*, he would probably have represented it by some more adequate equivalent than the rather colourless ἀποχωρεῖ. Are these two considerations so very unreasonable?

2. It is doubtless true that ܫܢܪ (in its sense of *kindling, setting on fire*) might possibly, in such a context as that of Matt. 10, 28, have been paraphrased in the Greek by ἀπολέσαι. But the necessity of postulating such a paraphrase diminishes considerably the strength of the reasoning by which Prof. Marshall seeks to show that ܫܢܪ was really the common Aramaic original of the two versions (ἀπολέσαι and ἐμβαλεῖν). And is it clear that the rare ܫܢܪ,¹ *to kindle, light*, is a word that would be suitably used of the *burning* of souls in Gehenna? ܐܘܩܝܪ (with its passive) is the

¹ More common in Syriac than in the Targums.

word commonly used, as of burning in a furnace generally,¹ so in particular of the burning in Gehenna (Eecl. 8, 10, 10, 11 Targum לאיתוקדא בניהנם; Cant. 8, 6 לאוקידא; 2 Sam. 23, 7). The cognate subst. יקידא occurs similarly, Isa. 33, 14; Gen. 27, 33 Ps.-Jon. ("And Isaac smelt a savour ניהנם ריהא דיקידת גיהנם like the savour of the *burning* of Gehenna"); and, expressly, of the burning of *souls* (יקידת) (נפשתא) Num. 11, 26 Ps.-Jon.; 2 Chr. 32, 21 (אוקיד). Eecl. 9, 14 Targum might also justify אדלק.

3. Here I must content myself with saying that Prof. Marshall does not seem to me to have made it at all probable that כותר should have even "suggested" βίος to a translator. βίος, in such passages as Lk. 8, 43. 15, 12. 30. 21, 4, means, of course, *that by which life is sustained*, i.e., *resources*, "living," "substance," or even affluence; but in the phrase ἡδοναὶ τοῦ βίου it surely denotes *life*, as a period of existence. Hence I do not understand what inducement a translator could have had to render כותר by βίος, "life": the etymology of כותר would rather, I should have thought, have suggested to him some word expressing more distinctly than βίος does the idea of *excess* or *abundance*.

c. Here there are two questions: (1) would דרך be naturally used of the birds which "came" (ἦλθε) to devour the seed in the parable (Matt. 13, 4; Mk. 4, 4)? (2) does דרין (the pass. part.) fairly express the idea of κατεπατήθη, "was trampled down" (Lk. 8, 5)? "In every case *but one*," says Prof. Marshall emphatically, "where דרך occurs in the Hebrew, it is transferred to the Targums." This is an extraordinary misstatement, involving a far graver inaccuracy than any of which Mr. Allen has been guilty. In point of fact, of the forty-nine times which דרך occurs in the Hebrew Bible, it is rendered by the Aramaic דרין only

¹ E.g., Gen. 11, 28 Ps.-Jon.; and the Palestinian Fragments cited by Lagarde, *Prophetæ Chaldaice*, p. xxiv., l. 26; p. xxvi., l. 14.

ten times ;¹ and the Hiphil הִרְרִיךְ, of which there are thirteen occurrences, is expressed by אָרַךְ only four times.² The inaccuracy is, however, immaterial to our present argument. אָרַךְ in Heb. means to *step* or *tread*—as on a threshold (1 Sam. 5, 5), a path, a way, a land ; sometimes with the idea of *treading on* with impunity (Ps. 91, 13), or in triumph (Jud. 5, 21), or the proud consciousness of ownership (Deut. 33, 29 ; Am. 4, 13) ; it will then be nearly equivalent to the English *march* ; it is also used in particular of *treading* the wine-press (Isa. 63, 2 al.), and *treading* (*i.e.* bending) a bow (Ps. 7, 13 al.). In Aramaic, as the passages quoted in the footnote show, its sense is not substantially different (except that there is no example of its use in connexion with the wine-press or the bow), *viz.*, to *step* or *tread* ; on the other hand, it is used (in the Aphel) more freely than in Heb. (in which it so occurs only once, Jer. 51, 33) of making the oxen *tread* the corn in threshing.³ A land which is “trodden on” is also, of course, “entered” ; but naturally this is no proof that אָרַךְ in itself means “to enter” ; in Deut. 11, 25 it plainly means *to step* ; in Mic. 5, 5. 6, Hab. 3, 15, to *tread*, in Prov. 6, 11 (Targum) to *advance steadily* or *march* (“as a warrior”). In Num. 24, 17 (Heb.), a highly poetical passage, where it is applied to a star (“hath *stepped forth*”), it is, of course, used figuratively (*cf.* the מַסְלֹת, or “highways” [A. V. courses], from which the stars fight, in Deborah’s song), denoting a proud and stately advance. Mr. Allen contends that such a word would not be naturally used of the birds approaching to devour the fallen seed. It may be confidently affirmed that it would not be used of birds “coming” by *flight*. If the birds were conceived as ad-

¹ Deut. 1, 36. 11, 24. 25. 33, 29. Jos. 1, 3. 14, 9. 1 Sam. 5, 5. Is. 59, 8. Mic. 5, 4. 5. (There is no Targum of Neh. 13, 15.)

² Isa. 42, 16. Jer. 51, 33. Ps. 25, 9. 119, 25.

³ So also in Syriac (Payne Smith, col. 950) : *cf.* the subst. אָרַכְתָּ, אָרַכְתָּ.

vancing on foot, in a stately and dignified procession, I am not prepared to deny that it might be used, though, I must confess, the employment of the word in such a connexion does not appear to me to be probable. The verb that would naturally be expected is, of course, אַתָּא |ל|.

(2) (A point not noticed by Mr. Allen.) It is far from clear that אַרְרִי is the Aramaic word which would here be rightly used to express *κατεπατήθη*. It is true *καταπατεῖν* and *πατεῖν* in the LXX. both sometimes correspond to the Heb. אַרְרִי (as Deut. 11, 24; Jud. 5, 21); but in Lk. 8, 5 the idea is plainly not *trodden on* simply (Heb. אַרְרִי), but *trodden on with insult or contempt, i.e., trampled down* (Heb. רָמַס, for which *πατεῖν* or *καταπατεῖν* is also used, Isa. 1, 12. 26, 6. 28, 3 al.). The proper Aramaic word to express this idea is, I venture to think, not אַרְרִי, but אַרְרִישׁ, אַרְרִישׁ, in the passive אַתָּא, אַרְרִישׁ. This is used for רָמַס in 2 Kings 14, 9; Isa. 1, 12. 26, 6. 28, 3, and elsewhere; it is used also for *καταπατεῖν* and *πατεῖν* in the Peshiṭto, not only here (Lk. 8, 5), but also wherever else they occur in the N.T., and similarly in the Lectionary (Matt. 7, 6; Lk. 8, 5. 10, 19). Will the reader think me hypercritical if I therefore express a doubt whether Prof. Marshall has found the right original either for ἦλθε in Matt. 13, 4, or for *κατεπατήθη* in Lk. 8, 5?

I must express my regret that Prof. Marshall has felt himself debarred by want of space from examining Mr. Allen's other criticisms; for I feel sure that, if called upon to do so, I could defend similarly their substantial justice.

On the whole, I venture to think that Mr. Allen's papers are not "disfigured" by such serious "blemishes" as Prof. Marshall supposes. Though in one or two instances he has committed an oversight, and has sometimes also not, perhaps, stated his objections as fully and effectively as he might have done, his criticisms in other respects have either been substantiated entirely, or have been shown to express

a perfectly tenable view, which derives its strength, not from an imperfect acquaintance with Aramaic literature, but from an appreciative sense of idiomatic propriety which prompts him to doubt, once and again, whether the word proposed by Prof. Marshall is really admissible in the context for which it is claimed. In composition in a foreign language, it is better, surely, to be cautious than to be bold, to be even (it may be) too scrupulous in the choice of expressions than to be not scrupulous enough; and I cannot understand how Prof. Marshall could have postulated for his original Aramaic Gospel, words of which there could be the slightest doubt that they were properly and correctly used, and that they really and unquestionably bore the meanings which he attributes to them. But again and again we find him making use of words to which some *doubt* attaches: they are not the ordinary and natural words that would be expected; sometimes they are words that do not exist at all; at other times they are either very rare words, the precise meaning of which is not readily determinable, or they are words which do not really express the idea required.¹ Prof. Marshall reproaches Mr. Allen with trusting too exclusively to the Lexicon, instead of basing his criticisms upon a first-hand acquaintance with Aramaic texts; but the Aramaic Lexica are comprehensive,

¹ The following are some additional examples of words used by Prof. Marshall, which are, I venture to think, either extremely doubtful, or altogether inadmissible:—**אתירא** (June, 1891, p. 457 f.) in the sense required Mk. 5, 29; Lk. 8, 44; **אתננת** (*ib.* p. 464); **אסתכי**, *to look*, often for the Heb. ה'יסקיה (is this the same as *εἶδον*, *saw*?), Sept., p. 219; **פצח**, *to open*, *ib.* p. 220; **מיסתיצי** = *κατηρητισμένος* (of a man), *ib.* p. 220; **שמום** or **שעמום**, Nov. p. 386 (the *reflexive*, **אשתעמום** or **אשתעמום**, which would be required, does not greatly resemble **שמוע**); **אתבטל** (Dec., p. 414); **גלילא**, for *ἡ περιχώρος* (as a *general* term), *ib.*, p. 445; **תקיפא**, *rock* (!; is it possible to doubt, in the light of the general practice of the Targums—see *e.g.* Ps. 18, 3. 32. 47. 19, 15. 28, 1— and especially of the very explicit corresponding version of the parallel passage Job 14, 18, that the second Targum of Job 18, 4 simply understands “rock” figuratively of the Strong One, God?), Aug., 1892, p. 90; **צרו** and **צרו** for *ἀφανίζουσι* (does **ציד** mean anything except “daub over with lime”?), *ib.* p. 92.

and give numerous quotations; and though neither they, nor Mr. Allen's reading, may be exhaustive, yet if the meaning, or application, of words used by Prof. Marshall lies outside the limits of what the Lexica recognise, the burden of proof rests upon him who maintains the use to be legitimate; and scholars are justified in withholding their assent from it until the proof is produced. Were all Prof. Marshall's examples as unexceptionable as יתקרב and יתקרבא (June, 1891, p. 455) they would carry conviction immediately; but how seldom can this be said to be the case! ¹

In conclusion, while hoping that Prof. Marshall may continue his studies in Aramaic literature (in which his notes on the usages of particular dialects, and the applications of particular words, can hardly fail, when completed, to form a welcome supplement to the materials at present available for students), I would venture to propose to him two modifications of his method, which, if he would consent to adopt them, would, I am sure, free his results from the philological blemishes which at present too often attach to them. The first is, that he should abstain entirely, in his reconstruction of the original Aramaic Gospel, from the use of words with theoretical meanings, and confine himself to those the meaning and applicability of which is established beyond the reach of reasonable doubt. Prof. Marshall, even where he has not adopted a meaning hypothetically, has frequently not exercised sufficient care in ascertaining the *precise* force of the word which he has employed; in the case of a rare or doubtful word, he is too ready to accept a meaning which will suit

¹ Prof. Marshall is severe on Mr. Allen when he deems him guilty of an inaccuracy; but he is guilty of them sometimes himself. ܘܢܝ (Sept., 1891, p. 216) does *not once* occur in the Syriac N.T.,—or indeed, unless Payne Smith is strangely defective, in Syriac at all: the form used is always ܘܢܝܐ; and even this is only one, not "the constant" representative of *σώζεις*.

the position that he desires it to occupy. And secondly, he would both lighten his own labour, and materially improve his case, if, instead of attempting (as he seems often to have done) to find *two* passable Aramaic phrases, representing respectively the *two* corresponding passages in the Gospels, he were to content himself with finding a good and unexceptionable Aramaic equivalent for *one* of the parallels, and with pointing out how the other could, by the assumption of textual error or other confusion, be reasonably deduced from this. If, for instance, instead of labouring fruitlessly to show that פחרין in Aramaic actually meant *tiles*, he had been content to argue that the original text had הפרין, *digging*, but that in the copy which formed the basis of Lk. 5, 19 the first two letters had become accidentally transposed, and that the translator, not knowing what פחרין meant, *conjectured*, from its resemblance to פחרא, a potter, and פחרא, earthenware, that it had the meaning of κέραμοι, *tiles*, no objection, upon grounds of philology, could be raised to his hypothesis, and numerous examples of mistakes, arising in a similar manner, could be quoted from the pages of the LXX.¹ I am not prepared now, any more than I was when writing my prefatory note (p. 387), to deny that *some* of Prof. Marshall's examples possess plausibility; others, as the one just noticed, and שרש and שרר (above, p. 420), admit of being re-stated in a form which (so far as I am able to judge) seems free from objection. Whether his solution of the variations between the Gospels is the true one, can hardly be determined until it has been applied, and found to suit, upon a more comprehensive and systematic scale than has hitherto been attempted. Especially, in order to judge of it properly, we ought to have not

¹ But in saying this, I must not be considered as endorsing in their entirety either of the two Aramaic sentences on p. 219 (March, 1891); for neither (apart from the questionable words employed) appears to me to be correct grammatically.

single, isolated phrases, but entire verses, or at least entire sentences, re-translated into Aramaic, and the origin of the variants in the parallel texts, examined and accounted for, one by one.¹ It would be not less premature, at present, to condemn Prof. Marshall's hypothesis *in toto* than to accept it *in toto*; and if what I have written may be the means of enabling him to free it from weak points, and to place it upon a securer basis, no one will rejoice more heartily than myself.

S. R. DRIVER.

¹ The two sentences (Mar., 1891, p. 211) are, for instance, both incomplete if they were properly filled out, (accepting, for the sake of argument, the words used) the resemblance between them would be considerably diminished.

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

XII. THE MORAL ENERGY OF FAITH.

EARNESTLY bent on reconciling his gospel with all the three interests covered by his apologetic, the apostle was specially anxious to show that his doctrine was not open to objection on the score of moral tendency. It was quite natural that he should be exceptionally sensitive on this subject, not only because he was himself a morally earnest man keenly alive to the supreme importance of right conduct as the ultimate test of the truth of all theories, and of the worth of all religions, but more especially because it was at this point that his system might plausibly be represented as weakest. How easy to caricature his anti-nomianism as a licentious thing which cancelled all moral demands, and set the believer in Jesus free to do as he liked, to sin if he pleased, without fear, because grace abounded! It is not improbable that such misconstruction was actually put by disaffected persons on the Pauline gospel; it is only too likely that some members of the various churches founded by the apostle's preaching, by the unholiness of their lives, supplied a plausible excuse for misrepresentation. In any case both these phenomena were *a priori* to be expected. On all grounds, therefore, it was most needful that the doctrine of justification by faith in God's free grace should be cleared of all suspicion in reference to its practical tendency.

As already pointed out, the Pauline apologetic offers two lines of defence for this purpose, the one based on the moral energy of faith, the other on the sanctifying influence of the indwelling Holy Spirit. The first line of defence falls now to be considered.

Faith, as St. Paul conceives it, is a mighty principle,

possessing a plurality of virtues, and capable of doing more things than one. For him, as for the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is the mother of heroic achievements, and can not only please God, but enable men to make their lives morally sublime. It is, in his view, as good for sanctification as for justification. Therefore, his programme, as formulated in *Galatians* v. 5, is: faith alone for all purposes, for the obtainment of righteousness in every sense; not merely righteousness objective, or God's pardoning grace, but righteousness subjective, or personal holiness. In this notable text *δικαιοσύνης* is an objective genitive—"the hope whose object is righteousness"—and the righteousness hoped for is *subjective*, an inward personal righteousness realizing the moral ideal. That the apostle does sometimes use the term *δικαιοσύνη* in a subjective sense is unquestionable. We have clear instances of such use in *Romans* viii. 10: "if Christ be in you, the body is indeed dead on account of sin, but the spirit is life on account of righteousness"; and *Romans* vi. 16-20, especially ver. 18: "being freed from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness." On enquiry it will be found that the subjective sense prevails chiefly, as we might expect in apologetic passages, where the apostle is concerned to vindicate for his doctrine a wholesome ethical tendency. On this principle *Galatians* v. 5 must be regarded as one of the texts in which *δικαιοσύνη* bears a subjective meaning. For in the context the writer is engaged in combating a religious theory of life on which the Galatian churches seem to have been, perhaps half unconsciously, acting, viz., that while faith might be good for the initial stage of the Christian life it was of little or no avail for the more advanced stages, whose needs must be met by a methodized system of legal observances. Against this patchwork theory what should we expect the champion of antilegalist Christianity to say? This: "faith is good for all stages, beginning, middle, and

end; for all purposes, to make us holy, as well as to obtain pardon; it is the only thing that is good for holiness. Circumcision is good for nothing, and of equally little avail is the whole elaborate system of ritual, which legal doctors inculcate upon you." This accordingly is just what the apostle does say in the text *Galatians* v. 5, 6, if we take righteousness in a subjective sense as equivalent to holiness: "we, right-minded, right-thinking Christians, in the spirit, from faith, expect the hope of holiness, for in Christ neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith working by love." It tends to confirm this interpretation that righteousness is here represented as an object of hope. Righteousness is set forth as the goal of Christian hope, which the apostle and all who agree with him expect to reach from faith, that is on the footing of faith, with faith as their guide all through. Obviously this goal of righteousness is synonymous with Christian holiness, conformity to the moral ideal. One other fact supporting the foregoing interpretation is the description of faith in the last clause of v. 6, as *energising through love* (δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη). How far the description is true is a question to be considered; the point now insisted on is that such an account of faith is relevant only if faith be viewed as a sanctifying influence, as conducive to *subjective* righteousness.¹

This then is the Pauline programme: from faith *justification*, *i.e.* righteousness in the objective sense; from faith also the hope of *holiness*, *i.e.* righteousness in the subjective sense. But by what right does the apostle repose such unbounded confidence in faith as the principle of a new life of Christian sanctity? He gives two answers to this

¹ Holsten (*Das Evangelium des Paulus*) endorses this view. He says "that here δικαιοσύνη refers not to objective righteousness but to subjective righteousness of life is shown by the connection and the grounding of δικαιοσύνη on the spirit." (p. 173.)

question at least formally distinct; one in the text just quoted, wherein faith is described as energetic through love; the other in that earlier text in *Galatians*, wherein faith is also described as making the believer one with Christ,¹ a line of thought which is resumed and expanded in *Romans* vi.

The former of these two views of faith exhibits it as a powerful, practical force, which works mightily, and in the best way, from the highest motive, love. The attribute denoted by *ἐνεργουμένη*, guarantees the requisite life force, the motive denoted by the expression *δι' ἀγάπης* insures the pure quality of the action produced thereby. The allegations are obviously most relevant to the argument. For if faith be really an energetic principle, and if it do indeed work from love as its motive, then we may expect from its presence in the soul right conduct of the highest order. Out of the energy of faith will spring all sorts of right works, and those works will not be vitiated by base motive, as in religions of fear, in connection with which superstitious dread of God proves itself not less mighty than faith, but mighty to malign effects, making men even give of the very fruit of their body for the sin of their soul. The only question therefore remaining is: are the apostle's statements concerning faith true? is faith an energetic force? does it work from love as its motive?

There should be no hesitation in admitting the truth of both statements. That faith is an energetic principle all human experience attests. Faith, no matter what its object, ever shows itself mighty as a propeller to action. If a man believe a certain enterprise to be possible and worthy, his faith will stir him up to persistent effort for its achievement. The eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews settles the question as to the might inherent in faith. In this might all faith shares, therefore, the faith of

¹ *Gal.* ii. 20.

Christians in God. But why should the faith of Christians work by *love*? Why not by some other motive, say fear, which has been such a potent factor in the religious history of mankind? Is there any intrinsic necessary connection between Christian faith and love? There is, and it is due to the Christian idea of God. *All turns on that.* The God of our faith is a God of *grace*. He is our Father in heaven, and we, however unworthy, are His children. Therefore our faith inevitably works by love. First and obviously by the love of gratitude for mercy received. For, whereas the question of a religion of fear is: wherewithal shall I come before the Lord that I may appease His wrath, faith speaketh in this wise: what shall I render unto the Lord for all His benefits? But not through the love of gratitude alone; also through the love of adoration for the highest conceivable ethical ideal realized in the Divine nature. God is love, benignant, self-communicating, self-sacrificing. To believe in such a God is to make love, similar in spirit, if limited in capacity, the law of life. Hence the necessity for taking care that our developed theologies and our theories of atonement do not make whole-hearted faith in such a God difficult or impossible. All theologies which have this result are suicidal, and secure a barren orthodoxy at the expense of Christlike heroic character and noble conduct.

The apostle's conception of the Christian faith as energetic through love [is thus in harmony at once with the general nature of faith as a principle in the human mind, and with the specific nature of the Christian religion. But the boldness with which he gave utterance to this conception really sprang out of his own experience. His own faith was of this description; hence his unbounded confidence in the power of faith to work out the problem of salvation from sin. And his life as a Christian is the justification of his confidence; for if we may judge of faith's sufficiency for the

task assigned to it in the Pauline system by the character and career of the Apostle of the Gentiles, then we may, without hesitation, give in our adherence to the watchword, FAITH ALONE. Testing the formula by the common phenomena of religious life, we might very excusably pause before adopting it. Two classes of phenomena are of frequent occurrence. One is the combination of the standing-ground of faith with various forms of legalism. The other is the more incongruous combination of evangelic faith with vulgar morality or, worse still, with immorality. The former combination, exhibited in one form or another in every generation, and in every branch of the Church, may seem to prove that the programme, faith alone for all purposes, is generally found by devout souls unworkable. From the latter combination it may plausibly be inferred that the proclamation from the housetop of the Pauline programme is dangerous to morals.

Now, as to the combination of faith and legalism, it must be sorrowfully admitted that it always has been, and still is, very prevalent. History attests that it has ever been found a hard thing to remain standing on the platform of free grace. Downcome from that high level to a lower, from grace to law, from faith to technical "good works," from liberty to bondage, seems to be a matter of course in religious experience, individual and collective. What happened in Galatia repeats itself from age to age, and in all churches. Legalism in some form recurs with the regularity of a law of nature. The fact raises a preliminary presumption against the Pauline programme which must be faced. How, then, are we to reconcile the fact with the all-sufficiency of faith? We shall best do this by taking into account the law of growth in the kingdom of God, enunciated by our Lord in the parable of the blade, the ear, and the ripe corn. Legalism is a characteristic of the stage of the green ear, in the spiritual life of the individual and of the community.

The blossom and the ripe fruit, the beginning and the end of a normal Christian experience, exhibit the beauty of pure evangelic faith. The green fruit is a lapse from the simplicity of the beginning, a lapse which is at the same time a step in advance, as it prepares the way for a higher stage, in which evangelic faith shall reappear victorious over the legal spirit of fear, distrust, and self-reliance. If this be true, and it is verified at once by Church history and by religious biography, then the apostle's programme is vindicated ; for we must test his principle by the end of Christian growth, and by the beginning, which is a foreshadowment of the end, not by the intermediate stage, in which morbid elements appear, the only value of which is that they supply a discipline which makes the heart glad to return again to the simplicity of trust. Judge Paulinism by its author, not by his degenerate successors ; by the Reformers, not by the scholastic theologians of the seventeenth century ; by the men in whom the spirit of the Reformation reappeared at the close of the dreary period of Protestant scholasticism, terminating in universal doubt ; by men like Bengel in Germany, and Chalmers in Scotland, whose faith was not a mere tradition from the fathers, and, as such, a feeble degenerate thing, but a fresh revelation from heaven to their own souls. True evangelic faith cannot be a tradition ; in the very act of becoming such, what passes for evangelic faith degenerates into a legalism which brings the way of faith into discredit.

Passing now to the other phenomenon, the combination of evangelic faith, so-called, with a low moral tone, what shall we say to it ? Does it not prove that there is a real risk of the Pauline doctrine not only failing to promote sanctification, but even becoming perverted into a corrupting, demoralizing influence ? It certainly does show that there is serious risk of abuse, through the unworthiness of men who turn the grace of God into licentiousness. But

Divine grace is not the only good thing that is liable to be abused. And in other matters men guard against abuse as best they can, still holding on to the legitimate use. Even so must we act in reference to the matter of salvation by faith in Divine grace. We must refuse to be put out of conceit with that way to spiritual life and health by a counterfeit, hypocritical, immoral evangelicism. We must reckon the principle of the Pauline gospel a thing so good as to be worth running risks for, and continue to adhere to it in spite of all drawbacks. We may not be ashamed of the motto on our banner because a rascally mob follows in the rear repeating our watchword, and shouting, "We will rejoice in Thy salvation." Think of the men who constitute the real body of the army, the people who give themselves willingly to the noble fight against evil, clothed in the beauties of holiness from the womb of the morning; men of the stamp of Luther, Knox, Wishart, who were as the dew of Christ's youth in the morning of the Reformation. May we not bear with equanimity the presence in the church of some worthless counterfeits, orthodox worldlings, selfish saints, hypocritical schemers, and the like, for the sake of such a noble race of men? May we not patiently see some using Christian liberty for an occasion to the flesh, when we recognise in such simply the abuse of a principle whose native tendency is to produce men like-minded with St. Paul; men taking their stand resolutely on grace, not because they desire to evade moral responsibilities, but because they hope to get the hunger of their spirit for righteousness filled, and to be enabled to rise to heights of moral attainment otherwise inaccessible; men passionately bent on being freed from every species of degrading, hampering bondage, specially jealous of all religious fetters, yet desiring freedom only for holy ends, ridding themselves of "dead works" that they may serve God in a new living, devoted way? Such, beyond doubt, is the kind of men thorough-

going faith in Divine grace tends to produce ; and if there are fewer such men in the church than one could wish, it is because the faith professed is not earnestly held, or held in its purity, but is mingled with some subtle element of legalism which prevents it from having its full effect.

After what has been said in a former paper,¹ it will not be necessary to expatiate on the other source of faith's sanctifying power, the fellowship which it establishes between the believer and Christ. However mystic and transcendental this fellowship may appear to some minds, it will not be denied that in proportion as it is realized in any Christian experience it must prove a powerful stimulus to Christlike living. No man can, like the apostle, think of himself as dying, rising, and ascending with Christ without being stirred up to strenuous effort after moral heroism. The "faith-mysticism" is the stuff out of which saints, confessors and martyrs are made. The only point on which there is room for doubt is whether, under this form of its activity, faith be a sanctifying power to any considerable extent for all, or only for persons of a particular religious temperament. Under the aspect already considered, faith is a universal moral force. No man, be his temperament what it may, can understand and believe in the lovingkindness of God as proclaimed in the gospel without being put under constraint of conscience by his faith. The man who earnestly believes himself to be a son of God must needs try to be Godlike. Even if in spiritual character he be of the unimaginative, unpoetic, matter-of-fact type, he will feel his obligation none the less ; it will appear to him a plain question of sincerity, common honesty, and practical consistency. In comparison with the mystic, he may have to plod on his way without aid of the eagle wings of a fervid religious imagination ; nevertheless observe him, and you shall see him walk on persistently without fainting. He knows little

¹ On *The Death of Christ*. Vide EXPOSITION for September.

of devotee raptures; St. Paul's way of thinking concerning co-dying and co-rising is too high for him. He does not presume to criticise it, or depreciate its characteristic utterances as the extravagant language of an inflated enthusiasm; he simply leaves it on one side, and, renouncing all thought of flying, is content with the pedestrian rate of movement. But the steadiness of his advance approves him also to be a true son of faith.

The wings of the mystic are essentially one with the feet of the plain Christian man. Fellowship with Christ is only a form which the moral energy of faith takes in certain types of spiritual experience. In a low degree it is known to all, but in signal measure it is exhibited only in the lives of saints like St. Bernard and Samuel Rutherford. Translated into ethical precepts directed against fornication, uncleanness, and covetousness, to rise with Christ is a universal Christian duty;¹ but to clothe duty in that imaginative garb, and to realize it emotionally under that aspect, is, at the best, a council of perfection.

From all that precedes, it will be apparent that I regard St. Paul as teaching that sanctifying power is inherent in faith. It is not an accident that it works that way, it cannot but so work. Given faith, Christian sanctity is insured as its fruit, or natural evolution. This view, if well founded, supplies a satisfactory connection between justification and sanctification, between religion and morality. Faith is the sure nexus between the two. But some writers on Paulinism demur to such prominence being given to the moral energy of faith. One can understand how Protestant orthodoxy, in its jealousy of Romish views, should be tempted to minimise faith's ethical virtue, with the result of failing to insure a close, genetic connection between justification and sanctification; but modern commentators might have been expected to rise above such

¹ *Colossians* iii. 1-5.

onesidedness. Yet so weighty a writer as Weiss, under what influences one can only conjecture, completely disappoints us on this score. He maintains that such a view of faith's function as I have endeavoured to present is un-Pauline. The true account of the apostle's doctrine, he thinks, is that justification and the communication of new life are two distinct divine acts, independent of each other, and connected together only in so far as faith is required in receiving both. Far from producing the new life by its moral energy, faith, according to this author's reading of Paulinism, is hardly even the main condition of our receiving that life from God. In this connection, Baptism is supposed to come to the front as a second great principle of salvation, not less indispensable for regeneration, or the reception of the Holy Spirit, than faith is for justification.

Is this really Paulinism? I should be slow and sorry to believe it. This minimising of faith's function is hardly in the great apostle's line. He was more likely to exaggerate than to under-estimate the extent and intensity of its influence. We should not, indeed, expect from him any doctrine of faith which ascribed to it, conceived as a purely natural faculty of the human soul, power to renew character apart altogether from the grace of God. But he nowhere conceives of faith after this manner. He regards it as due to the action of the Divine Spirit in us that we know, have the power to appreciate, the things that are freely given to us of God.¹ And no other view of the matter is reasonable. Faith, even in its justifying function, is a fruit of the Divine Spirit's influence. It is the act of a regenerate soul. How much is implied even in the faith that justifies! A sense of sin and of the need of salvation, self-distrust, trust in God, victory over the fear engendered by an evil conscience, and courage to believe in God's goodwill even towards the guilty; instinctive insight into the magnani-

¹ *Corinthians* ii. 12.

mity of God, in virtue of which He most readily gives His grace to the lowest, with resulting boldness to conceive and utter the prayer: pardon mine iniquity, for it is *great*. Surely the Divine Spirit is in this initial faith, if He be anywhere in our religious experience, and surely the faith which at its birth is capable of such achievements will, as it grows and gains strength, prove itself equal to all the demands of the spiritual life. And because both these things are true, the whole Christian life, from beginning to end, must be conceived of as an organic unity, with faith for its inspiring soul. The rupture of that unity, by the dissection of experience into two independent experiences, justification and renewal, is a fatal mistake on the part of any one who undertakes to expound the Pauline theology. The resulting presentation is not Paulinism as it lives and breathes in the glowing pages of the four great Epistles, but the dead carcase of Paulinism as anatomized by scholastic interpreters.

And what is to be said of the theory which gives to Baptism, in reference to the new life of the Christian man, a function parallel in importance to that of faith in reference to justification? Many reasons can be given why it cannot be accepted as resting on the authority of St. Paul. It would require very clear and strong texts to overcome the antecedent unlikelihood of any such theory receiving countenance from him. Think of the man who so peremptorily said: Circumcision is of no avail, assigning to Baptism not merely symbolical, but essential significance in reference to regeneration. Then how weak his position controversially, if this was his view! How easy for Judaistic opponents to retort, What better are you than we? You set aside circumcision, and you put in its place baptism. We fail to see the great advantage of the change. You insist grandly on the antithesis between letter and spirit, or between flesh and spirit. But here is no anti-

thesis. Baptism, not less than circumcision, is simply a rite affecting the body. You charge us with beginning in the spirit and with faith, and ending in the flesh. How do you defend yourself against the same charge? It is not likely that the apostle would teach a doctrine that made it possible for foes to put him in so narrow a corner. But consider further his position as an apologist for his gospel, as not unfavourable to ethical interests. It is in this apologetic connection that he refers to baptism in *Romans* vi. And on the hypothesis as to the significance of that rite now under consideration, what we must hold him to say is in effect this: No fear of my doctrine of justification by faith compromising ethical interests. Every believer is baptized, and baptism insures a new life of holiness. This defence is open to criticism in two directions. First, on the score of logic. Opponents might bring against it the charge of *ignoratio elenchi*, saying: We questioned the moral tendency of your doctrine, of justification by *faith*, and we expected to hear from you something going to show that the faith that makes a man pass for righteous can, moreover, make him really righteous. But lo! you bring in as *deus ex machinâ* this baptism which you never mentioned before. Is this not really an admission that your doctrine of justification is morally defective? On the other hand, the hostile critic might assail the supposed Pauline apologetic on the ground of fact, by enquiring, Is then baptism an infallible specific for producing holiness? Do you find that all baptized persons live saintly lives? It is incumbent on you, who have been so severe a critic of heathenism and Judaism, to be scrupulously candid and truthful in your answer. Who does not feel that the very conception of this ideal situation is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the sacramentarian theory? After pronouncing heathenism and Judaism failures, as tested by morality, the apostle Paul, in the face of the world, in a letter

addressed to the metropolis of universal empire, declares his faith in Christianity as a religion that will stand the severest moral tests, and the ground of his confidence is—the rite of baptism!

The theory is without exegetical foundation. It is not necessary, in order to do full justice to the apostle's argument in *Romans* vi., to assign to baptism more than symbolical significance. We can, if we choose, ascribe to the rite essential significance, and bringing that view to the passage, ingeniously interpret it in harmony therewith. But it cannot be shown that baptism is for the apostle more than a familiar Christian institution, which he uses *in transitu* to state his view of the Christian life in vivid, concrete terms, which appeal to the religious imagination. He employs it in his free, poetic way as an aid to thought, just as elsewhere he employs the veil of Moses, and the allegory of Sarah and Hagar. But alas! what with him was a spirited mystic conception, has become a very prosaic dogma. It is a fatality attending all religious symbolism. An apostle cannot say, "We were baptized into Christ's death," but he must be held to mean that the rite not only symbolizes, but causes death to sin and resurrection to righteousness. Christ Himself cannot say, "This is my body," but He must be held to mean, 'This bread is changed into my body. Yet, in the case of the apostle, the very manner in which he expresses himself as to the prevalence of the rite might put us on our guard against ascribing to him a theory of sacramental grace. "So many of us as were baptized" (*ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν*). He leaves it doubtful whether all bearing the Christian name were baptized. Bengel appends to the word *ὅσοι* the remark; "Nemo Christianorum jam tum non baptizatus erat." It may have been so as a matter of fact, but it cannot be inferred from the apostle's language that every Christian without exception was baptized. There may have been some who

remained unbaptized for anything he says to the contrary ; just as the statement of the evangelist, that "as many as touched were made perfectly whole,"¹ leaves it doubtful whether all who desired to touch the hem of Christ's garment succeeded in gratifying their wish. If St. Paul had been a sacramentarian, he would have taken care to exclude the possibility of doubt.²

A. B. BRUCE.

THE SOJOURN OF THE ISRAELITES IN EGYPT.

IN the present rapidly advancing knowledge of Egyptian history derived from Egyptian monuments of various kinds, papyri, inscriptions on tombs, on rocks, and so on, it is become a matter of supreme importance, as well as of lively interest, to ascertain correctly what is the true evidence of Holy Scripture as to the events, and as to the chronology of the events, which befell the Israelites in connection with Egypt.

We are perhaps unreasonable if we expect to find a record of transactions which were of vital consequence to the Israelites, and so occupy a large space in Israelite annals, in the annals of the great Egyptian empire, and more especially when those transactions were calamitous or in any way discreditable to the Egyptian power. But at the same time if the Bible history of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt is *history* and not fiction, the facts must harmonize with the condition of Egypt at the time when they are stated to have occurred. It is a matter, therefore, of considerable moment to the cause of Divine truth that we

¹ *Matthew* xiv. 36.

² A slight tinge of Bengel's dogmatism is discernible in the Revised Version, which substitutes at this point for the words of the A.V. quoted above, "All we who were baptized."

should be accurately informed as to what are really the Scriptural accounts of this epoch in the history of Israel which connects them so closely with Egyptian history.

The purpose of the following paper is to lay before the reader as distinctly as possible the evidence from the Books of Genesis and Exodus, and other parts of Scripture, as to the duration of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt, and some of its chronological consequences; and then to call attention to some considerations which seem to point in a different direction, in the hope that some one learned in Egyptian antiquities will be able to solve the difficulty.

Genesis xlv. relates the descent of Jacob into Egypt "and all his seed with him" (*vv.* 6 and 7); and Genesis xlvii. 1, 11, 29 records their settlement in the Land of Goshen, or, as it is otherwise called, the land of Rameses. Exodus xii. 37-51 records their departure from Rameses, and the removal of all Israel from the land of Egypt. The question is how long was the interval between these two events.

There are, as is well known, two different opinions on this matter.

One opinion is that the Israelites were 430 years in Egypt.

The other opinion is that they were 215 years, or possibly a few more.

The grounds for these two opinions respectively, as far as the statements of Holy Scripture are concerned, are the following:—

I. For 430 years we have the express statement of Exodus xii. 40, 41. (R.V.): "Now the sojourning of the children of Israel, which they sojourned in Egypt, was 430 years; and it came to pass at the end of 430 years . . . that all the hosts of the Lord went out from the Land of Egypt." Nothing can be more express than this statement, and under ordinary circumstances it would be conclusive. But

it stands alone, and, as we shall see, all the other statements in the Bible are against it. We are constrained therefore to look closely at it.

Now, first of all, the LXX.—with which the Samaritan version agrees:—reads *Ἡ δὲ κατοίκησις τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, ἦν κατώκησαν ἐν γῆ Αἰγύπτῳ, καὶ ἐν γῆ χαναὰν, ἔτη τετρακόσια τριάκοντα*. And what is still more important is that St. Paul (Gal. iv. 17) sanctions this reading, or at least the reckoning contained in it, for he reckons the 430 years as covering the whole time from the covenant with Abraham to the giving of the law. The naming 430 (not—as in Gen. xvi. 13—400) proves further that he had this passage of Exodus in his mind. But further, this accurate chronological statement of Exodus xii. 40, 41 is quite unlike anything else in the Book, and is very like the chronological statement of 1 Kings vi. 1, which has been found quite unmanageable by chronologers; suggesting that both passages are insertions by a later hand, well intended, but based on a false chronological system. Again, it is certainly singular that these three verses (Exod. xii. 40, 41, 42) seem quite out of place, as they separate *v.* 39 from *v.* 43, which is immediately connected with it. And again, *v.* 41, “Even in the self-same day it came to pass,” is a mere repetition of *v.* 51, where it comes in its proper place. It seems to me, therefore, that Exodus xii. 40, 41, is discredited.

II. Now let us see what is the Scripture evidence for the shorter period of two hundred years and upwards, or rather for including the sojourn of Abraham’s seed in Canaan, as well as in Egypt, in the 400 years of Genesis xv. 13.

(1) We must look carefully at that passage itself. If we only look at the English version, we shall of course feel quite sure that Genesis xv. 13 agrees with Exodus xii. 40 in making the sojourn in Egypt 400 years, because we there read, after a semi-colon, “And they shall afflict them 400 years.” But we could not make a greater mistake, as we

shall see immediately we turn to the Hebrew. There, instead of, as in the A.V. and the R.V., “. . . and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them 400 years”; according to the Hebrew stopping we read, “. . . and shall serve them, and they shall afflict them: 400 years.” The stop which separates “they shall afflict them” from “400 years” is that called *athnach*, corresponding to our colon, and the strongest distinctive stop but one in the Hebrew language. The Hebrew, therefore, can only be rendered thus: “Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them, and they shall afflict them: 400 years.” The 400 years applies to the whole verse, not to the last member of it. The LXX. gives the same sense, except that the clause “shall serve them” is rendered *δουλώσουσιν αὐτούς*, “they shall make them servants.”¹ indicating a slightly different reading of the Hebrew; and the Hebrew *יג* is rendered twice over, by *κακώσουσιν* and by *ταπεινώσουσιν*. The object of the prophetic promise was to let Abraham know how many years were to elapse before his seed took possession of the promised land. It may be added that the statement, “They shall afflict them 400 years,” is positively false. For at least 70 years of Joseph’s life (from the age of 39 to 110—Gen. xli. 46–l. 26),² and probably for some 20 or 30 years longer (Exod. i. 6, 7, 8), the Israelites in Egypt were most prosperous. So that the rendering of the A.V. and the R.V. cannot be right.

(2) We turn next to see if there is any other indication in Scripture of the time that elapsed between the promise to Abraham and the Exodus; and we naturally think of the genealogies. Are there any genealogies which span the

¹ So quoted, too, by Stephen (Acts vii. 6).

² Joseph was 30 when he stood before Pharaoh; and so about 39 (7 years of plenty + 2 years of famine) when Jacob came to Egypt. Joseph lived 110 years. Therefore 71 years elapsed between Jacob’s arrival and Joseph’s death.

period from Abraham to the Exodus, by which we can approximately calculate the length of it? There are certainly five such, as appears by the following table. The first is that of Moses and Aaron, which by its shortness justifies the saying in Genesis xv. 16, "In the fourth generation they shall come hither again"; *i.e.* dating from the immigration to Egypt to the Exodus. In Moses' line there are just four generations. The next is that of Nahshon, the prince of Judah. Here are six generations. In that of Bezaleel there are seven. In that of Zelophehad there are seven. In that of Joshua there are eight.

But we must say a few words about Joshua. The advocates of the 430 years as the time of the Egyptian bondage say curtly that the other genealogies are abbreviated, but that Joshua's genealogy containing *eleven* generations proves the longer time to be the true one. Now, first of all, those who thus reason must have forgotten that Joshua's grandfather, Elishama, was "captain of the sons of Ephraim" in the "second year after they were come out of the land of Egypt" (Num. i. 1, 10; ii. 18), and therefore that his, and not his grandson's, who was a mere youth, is the generation to be assigned to the Exodus. That knocks off two of the supposed eleven generations. But next, the most cursory glance at the genealogy of Joshua in 1 Chronicles vii. 10-27 shows how very corrupt the passage is. The names Telah and Shutelah, Tahath and Tahan, Eleadah and Elead and Laadan, are repeated in utter confusion. Moreover, on comparing the Ephraimite genealogy in Numbers xxvi. 35-37 we find out that there is no such person as the Laadan of 1 Chronicles vii. 26, but that לערן is a correct reading for לערן "of Eran" (Num. xxvi. 36), and that Tahan (1 Chron. vii. 25) was not the son but the brother of Shuthelah or Telah. We learn too that Shuthelah was the son of Ephraim. And so the genealogy comes out quite distinctly, as in the table below, and as in the

LXX. of 1 Chronicles vii. 26, where the sequence Shuthelah (Thalees), Eran (Laadan), Ammihud, Elishama, Nun, Joshua is tolerably clear.

TABLE OF GENERATIONS FROM THE PATRIARCHS TO THE EXODUS.

(1) Levi <small>(Exod. vi. 16-25).</small>	(1) Judah <small>(1 Chron. ii. 3-10).</small>	(1) Joseph <small>(1 Ch. vii. 14, 15).</small>	(1) Joseph <small>(1 Ch. vii. 14-26, Num. xxvi. 28-37).</small>
(2) Kohath.	(2) Pharez.	(2) Manasseh.	(2) Ephraim.
(3) Amram.	(3) Hezron.	(3) Ashriel.	(3) Shuthelah.
(4) Aaron. Moses.	(4) Ram, Caleb <small>(1 Ch. ii. 13-26).</small>	(4) Machir.	(4) Eran.
	(5) Amminadab. Hur.	(5) Gilead.	(5) Ammihud.
	(6) Nahshou. Uri.	(6) Hepher.	(6) Elishama.
	(7) Bezaleel.	(7) Zelophehad.	(7) Nun.
			(8) Joshua.

Now if we reckon forty years for a generation, and take seven as the average number of generations from the Patriarchs to the Exodus, we get $40 \times 7 = 280$ as the number of years from the Patriarchs (inclusive) to the Exodus. And if we take 127¹ years as the time from the birth of Isaac (Abraham's seed) to the birth of the Patriarchs, we get $280 + 127 = 407$ years as the total. Or if we date from the time of the promise to Abraham, as St. Paul seems to do (Gal. iii. 17), we get about 16 years more, *i.e.* a total of 423 years. Now though such calculations cannot pretend to accuracy, they are sufficient to show that the genealogies confirm the theory that the 400 years of Genesis xv. 13 include the sojourn in Canaan as well as that in Egypt, and so limit the sojourn in Egypt to about 215 years,² more or less.

One other way remains of testing the length of the so-

¹ From birth of Isaac to birth of Jacob, 60 years (Gen. xxv. 26). From birth of Jacob to his death, 147 years (Gen. xlvii. 28). $60 + 147 = 207$. Deduct from Jacob's age 80 years for the average birth of Patriarchs, and you get $207 - 80 = 127$.

² If you reckon the whole time, from the promise to Abraham to the Exodus as 423 years, and deduct $16 + 60 + 130 = 206$ (from the promise to the birth of Isaac, 16; from birth of Isaac to birth of Jacob, 60; and from birth of Jacob to his arrival in Egypt, 130) you get $423 - 206 = 217$ as the length of the sojourn.

jour in Egypt, viz. the rate of increase of the Israelites. We have two data upon which to found our calculation. The number of the sons of Jacob who came down to Jacob with their father as recorded in Genesis xlvii., viz. 70 souls (v. 27), and the number of grown-up men who came out of Egypt, viz. 600,000 (Exod. xii. 37).

Now 600,000 men, if they included youths of seventeen or eighteen years of age, represent a population of about $600,000 \times 4 = 2,400,000$. And if we take the number who came into Egypt with Jacob as 140 (*i.e.* 70×2 , to include the wives), and take Malthus's calculation that under favourable circumstances population will double itself every twenty-five years, we shall find that in 225 years 140 persons would increase to 71,680.

But it appears also that in the back settlements of North America the actual rate of increase for several successive periods was for the population to double itself every fifteen years. And at this rate 140 persons would increase to 2,293,760, in 210 years. "Sir William Petty thought it possible for population to double itself in 10 years."¹ If then we take into account the fact that the increase of the Israelites in Egypt is represented as something extraordinary (Exod. i. 7, 12), and consider also that the numbers may have been augmented by the adhesion of proselytes like Caleb the son of Jephunneh, and Heber the Kenite (Judg. i. 16; iv. 11) in the course of 200 years, and that many of the Patriarchs had concubines of foreign birth, like Manasseh (1 Chr. vii. 14), we shall see that there is nothing incredible in the rate of increase, and that it suits perfectly the estimate of about 217 years as the length of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt.²

But the interest of the inquiry does not terminate when

¹ Rees, *Cyclopædia*, article "Population."

² Reckoning the population to double itself every twenty years, 150 persons would increase to 157,286,400 in four hundred years.

we have established the length of the Israelite sojourn. If we take the Exodus to be now definitively fixed to the reign of Menephtah, and to about the year B.C. 1300, as the consensus of Egyptologists entitles us to do, it is obvious that it must greatly affect the harmonious adjustment of Israelitish history to that of Egypt, for times preceding the Exodus, whether we go back about 200, or about 400 years. Let us see what results are attained in the way of synchronisms by going backwards 220 years from the Exodus (considered as = 6th year of Menephtah), in Israelite, and, as far as known, in Egyptian history.

ISRAELITE HISTORY.		EGYPTIAN HISTORY.	
	Years.		Years.
From Joseph's "Standing before Pharaoh" (Gen. xli. 46) till his death (110-30) Gen. i. 26	80	Years of the reigns of the latter kings of the 18th dynasty.	138
From death of Joseph to commencement of oppression (Exod. i. 6, 7, 8, 9) say . .	30	Two first kings of 19th dynasty, at 10 years each. . .	20
From commencement of oppression to the birth of Moses (Exod. i. 11-14, 15-22; ii. 2) say	30	Years of reign of Rameses ii. . .	67
From the birth of Moses to his return from Midian (Acts vii. 23, 30; Deut. xxxiv. 7).	80	Years of Menephtah's reign before the Exodus.	5
	220		220

From the above calculations, as far as they are correct, it appears that Joseph came to Egypt in the 18th dynasty. Brugsch assigns 300 years to this dynasty. On this supposition the 18th dynasty would have been in existence 162 years when Joseph came to Egypt. But Bunsen assigns to it only 216 years (*Egypt's Place*, vol. ii. p. 577). Canon Rawlinson also gives it as his opinion that "it did not exceed 200 years," in which last case it would have been

established only about 72 years, and the memory of that hated Hyksos usurpation would still have been fresh in the minds of the native Egyptians. That it was so, the strong expression in (Gen. xlvi. 34), "that every shepherd is an abomination unto the Egyptians" seems to prove beyond all doubt, and that text is a very strong indication, as Sir Gardner Wilkinson long ago observed,¹ that the invasion of the shepherds happened before the time of Joseph. Indeed it seems quite impossible that such a phrase should have been used if a Hyksos king had been actually reigning at the time.

It is true that Brugsch expresses a strong opinion that the Pharaoh of Joseph was one of the Hyksos kings. But he arrives at this conclusion mainly by reckoning the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt as 430 years. If this premise is false, the conclusion falls to the ground.

The other grounds for believing the Hyksos domination to have been still existing in the time of Joseph, are the following.

(1) Georgius Syncellus (Brugsch, p. 121; Rawlinson, in note on Exod., p. 334) says that the synchronism of Joseph with Apepi, or Apophis, the last Hyksos king, "is universally admitted."

(2) A far more important ground is the statement by Joseph (Gen. xiv. 10), that by dwelling in the land of Goshen, Jacob and his family would be "near him," which certainly points to Avaris or Zoan as the residence of the court at that time,² and would not be true if Joseph was living at Thebes.³ Avaris was taken by Aahmes the first king of the 18th dynasty (Brugsch, pp. 116, 128).

¹ *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, vol. i. p. 20; vol. ii. p. 16.

² Avaris was the residence of Apepi, the last Hyksos king (Brugsch, p. 111).

³ Rameses II. made Zoan his royal residence, and fortified it, and built a temple there. It became the capital of the empire from his time (Brugsch, pp. 298, 299). Was it so anytime in the 18th dynasty?

(3) Brugsch quotes an inscription at El-Kab, the author of which, Baba, he says, "must have lived immediately previous to the 18th dynasty," which shows that Joseph's seven years' famine had happened at that time. In the inscription Baba says, "When a famine arose, LASTING MANY YEARS, I distributed corn to the city each year of the famine." Brugsch thinks this can only be the seven years, famine which occurred in the time of Joseph.

To reconcile these conflicting evidences is the difficult task which lies before Egyptologists, and perhaps awaits some further light from Egyptian monumental inscriptions. But it may not be amiss to add that the evidence which points to the reign of Menepthah, and about the year B.C. 1300, as the time of the Exodus, is exceedingly strong, both from Scriptural and Egyptian sources. The genealogies which span the time between the Exodus and the time of David: the weak reign of Menepthah, and the absolute silence of the monuments as to the closing years of his reign: the building of the "treasure cities of Pithom and Raamses" (Exod. i. 11): the length of the reign of Rameses II. exactly suiting Moses' long absence in Midian: the fear expressed in Exodus i. 10 of the Israelites joining the enemies of Egypt exactly tallying with the fear of Hittite invasion which prevailed in the reigns of Seti I. and Rameses II.—these are consecutive and striking coincidences which leave no doubt as to the Pharaoh of the Exodus, and the *terminus ad quem* of the 400 years of Genesis xv. 13.

ARTHUR C. BATH. & WELL.

SOME MINOR MIRACLES.

THERE is a question which few students of the Gospels can have failed to ask themselves. What end is served by those brief and passing narratives which give, in the merest outline, some work, the duplicate of which we find elsewhere recorded more fully, amid more picturesque surroundings, with more impressive and edifying details? Does not the greater imply the less? Why has the evangelist spent some priceless verses, among an aggregate of so few pages, to tell very briefly such an event as is related elsewhere at full length? Nor does this criticism apply to these outline drawings only. We have an elaborate picture of the feeding of four thousand persons, by a writer from whom we knew already that Jesus could and did feed five thousand in just the same way. And one cannot but notice that when a commentator has shown that these two miracles are distinct events, he has not much more to say about the second, finding in it little or no distinct and original spiritual suggestion. An unwary Christian might easily be entrapped into a barter of this whole paragraph, if such a thing were possible, for the story of some new action more unique, more remote from what he had already learned.

But the foolishness of inspiration is wiser than man. It is far more important that we should know Jesus well than that we should know much of what He did; and one is better known when we discover what is characteristic, what repeats itself almost instinctively, than by noting a larger variety of actions, some of which are exceptional and unwonted.

Of course, this is a rule which may not be pressed too far. We scarcely realize the character or the powers of a man at all, until we know how he will bear himself in varied

circumstances; and Moltke will never take rank beside Napoleon as a commander, if only because we have not seen him contending against adverse fortune.

But our Gospels entirely satisfy this requirement. We see Jesus in privacy, and amid acclaiming multitudes, and in the upper room, and at the bar of Pilate. His miracles "are a complete revealing of His power and nature, so far as everything known to man is concerned. We find them including examples of His power over nature, His power over external objects, His power over man's bodily frame, His power over man's mind, His power over death and him that hath the power of death."¹ We also find them to include all circumstances of private friendship, of hostile observation, of surprise, and of deliberate purpose.

Now when this much is secured, it is thenceforward much more important to deepen and strengthen our impressions by reiteration than to diversify and leave them faint. A real addition is made to our conception of His work and character by these narratives, which are criticised for contributing little or nothing of new incident, if by them we are helped to discern, not only that He did one such work, and did it in such a manner, but that such were the works He used to do, and such His manner in doing them.

Even their evidential value is greater than we suspect; and it may be measured by the eagerness of the same sceptics, who sometimes labour to show that one miraculous narrative is but a variant of another, at other times to discredit a miracle, simply because it resembles nothing that we find elsewhere. Such narratives, therefore, may be regarded as buoys which indicate the main channel, the central flow of the miraculous activities of Jesus.

They are also valuable as showing in their variety, amid all similarities, the freshness and vitality of a narrative not

¹ Nicoll: *The Incarnate Saviour*.

evolved by theology, but reproducing a life. For it may safely be affirmed that not even the briefest of them is deficient in such differences as our own experience knows full well, wherein one day is never so like another as to lack the spontaneity and freshness which are the very salt of our lives.

THE TWO BLIND IN THE HOUSE.

(Matt. ix. 27.)

Every traveller in the East observes the terrible prevalence of blindness, because the sun is glaring, the sand and dust are everywhere, many persons sleep in the open air under pernicious dews, and the helps of medicine and surgery are seldom available.

Nor is any malady better calculated to express that moral darkness which follows upon the toleration and indulgence of sin, the misery of those whose feet stumble on the dark mountains, who grope for the wall in the day, whose eyes are darkened that they should not see.

In the New Testament blindness has almost completely taken that place, which once seemed to be destined for leprosy, as a type of sin, and of the death-in-life of the sinner. The god of this world hath blinded the eyes of the disobedient. Christ is the true light which lighteth every man. We were sometimes darkness, but now are we light in Him. And, therefore, none of His miracles can be more appropriate than the opening of darkened eyes.

But on this very account, scepticism hopes to explain these works as spiritual imagery frozen into cold matter-of-fact assertions. Isaiah had promised that the eyes of the blind should be opened : it was, therefore, an article in the predicted programme ; and when Jesus was supposed to be the promised Messiah, prosaic folk believed that He had actually wrought the miracles, because they could not credit

a Messiah who had not done so, because they did not understand poetry. The marvel was not created through excess of imagination, but by the dearth of it.

And yet, as we saw when considering leprosy, the same passage could promise streams in the desert without forcing into belief any such miracle as the striking of the rock by Moses. These unimaginative people were quite able to accept the spiritual and mystic interpretation of this assertion; they divined that the rock was Christ Himself. But they were, at least, as conscious that Christ was the Light of the world as that He was the Well of living Water. If the latter could satisfy them, so could the former, and the alleged necessity for the creation of such miracles entirely disappears.

It was perhaps natural that blind men were not among the first to seek help from Jesus. For themselves there were difficulties, and their friends had learned to acquiesce in their condition, which was settled, and threatened no further aggressions to disturb them.

At all events, it was not until Jesus left the house of Jairus that He was accosted by two blind men, the first who are known to have brought this grief to Him. It was just then easy to find Him, for a great crowd had followed Him from the table of Levi, and enough of delay had since ensued to enable the most helpless to seek Him out. But to gain close access was not so easy, for the multitude would "throng and press Him" even more eagerly on His successful return than when He went. Accordingly they could only follow at some distance; and as they did so, they uttered an invocation hitherto unheard, "Have mercy on us, Thou Son of David." The same title was afterwards given Him in the appeal of the woman of Canaan, and of Bartimæus and his companion in Jericho; but cautious men will draw no inference from so narrow and precarious an

induction as the fact that in two out of three recorded instances the speakers were blind. The phrase was perhaps derived from the promise to "set one shepherd over them, even My servant David" (Ezek. xxxiv. 23), and its thoroughly Old Testament view of the Messiah was suitable to persons whom little of the new teaching had reached. Renan indeed asserts that the first group of men and women who adhered to Jesus said to Him, Thou art the Messiah, and because the Messiah should be son of David conceded to Him this title also, which was synonymous with the first. "Jesus with pleasure allowed it to be given to Him, although it caused Him some embarrassment, His birth being perfectly notorious" (*V. de J.*, p. 137). All this is gratuitous invention, and Christians may indulge themselves in the luxury of scepticism when asked to believe that folk who knew that the Messiah should be the Son of David, in whose circle also it was quite notorious (*toute populaire*) that Jesus was not so, should choose this title above all others by way of affirming His Messiahship. As to the pleasure with which Jesus received it, we know of but three cases where suppliants used it (it was addressed to Him a fourth time on His triumphant entry to Jerusalem), and two of these three are marked off from all His other miracles by the fact that the answer was only granted to a long continuance of importunity.

It is, therefore, with a singular recklessness, generalizing not only from insufficient data but in direct contradiction of the facts, that Renan asserts again that, "He performed with greater readiness those miracles which were asked of Him by this appellation"¹ (p. 248). Nor may we forget

¹ "Il faisait de la meilleure grâce les miracles qu'on lui demandait en l'interpellant de la sorte." It is odd to notice that one of Renan's proofs of this is Matthew xii. 23, where, only after the miracle was wrought, people, speaking among themselves, said, "Is this the Son of David?" A curious inducement to the working of it!

that Jesus formally and explicitly refuted the notion that Son of David was an adequate description of the rank of the Messiah.

For whatever reason, and possibly for more reasons than one, Jesus gave no answer to their prayer, and entered "the house," probably that of Peter, and without doubt His own home in Capernaum. For the crowds, more than enough of wonder had already marked this day, and it had been needful to suppress the details of the raising of the ruler's daughter. For the Pharisees there would be an especial provocation, and perhaps a tempting opportunity for mischief, in a miracle publicly yielded to an invocation so political in its import. For the blind men themselves something was yet required to elicit their half latent faith, to shape it in rendering it articulate, to convert desire and hope more thoroughly into reliance, consciously recognising His ability. This process, presently to be completed by a direct question and answer, was begun when they refused to be shaken off, following Him not only along the road but into the house, which doubtless they could only reach by waiting until the crowds had melted. The formal confession of their faith which He there demanded of them is highly instructive, for it is not that He is Son of David (or for that matter that He is Son of God) but that He is qualified to meet their own needs, the Saviour whom they require. Believe ye that I am able to do this? It is the first time when such a formal profession is exacted; and it is to be explained not chiefly by the growth of opposition (on the contrary, at this hour all was enthusiasm) nor altogether by the progress of events, (because much had now been done, and a higher standard of faith might fairly be expected) but above all by their own spiritual condition. They needed to have their faith drawn out: they proved their unsatisfactory condition afterwards, when even the

urgent command of Jesus could not restrain their wilful garrulity.

Yet, since their faith was real, Jesus helped it. And very remarkable is this, that since no blind man could have that spiritual stimulus and incitement which other sufferers drew from His loving and kingly face, so merciful and strong, therefore Jesus, when treating the blind, always added to His words some curative action, sometimes anointing their eyes, never omitting at the least to touch them. Such a coincidence is too slight to be designed, and it extends over all the Gospels; from one point of view, therefore, it is an evidence, while from another it is an edifying example of His matchless wisdom in treating little things. That profound mind, which fathomed all the depths of religion, of ethics, and of human nature, was alert and practical as well, and did not omit to supply by a gesture the encouragement which His bearing could not supply. And as He touched their eyes, He said, According to your faith be it done unto you. To their belief in His power, these words added an equal sense of His readiness, the circuit of spiritual electricity was completed, and now their eyes were opened. It was not human faith which wrought this, and yet the action of heaven was according to the trust of man. Such is the principle on which God is wont to deal with us, and S. Paul exhorted his Roman converts to prophecy "according to the proportion of 'their' faith." For, he said, their gifts differed according as God had dealt to each a measure of faith. (Rom. xii. 6, 3.)

And now Jesus strictly charged them, saying, "See that no man know it." The word is very emphatic (*ἐνεβριμίσατο*); we shall meet it again in more remarkable circumstances by the grave of Lazarus; and as it certainly conveys the notion of something hostile to be confronted, we may suppose that Jesus was rebuking within them the shallow impulse which would fain talk to others, noisily and

egotistically, instead of giving such lowly and earnest thanks to God as rise up in solitude and quietness, the praise which is silent before God. (Ps. lxxv. 1.)

They ungratefully and wilfully disobeyed Him, perhaps persuading themselves that in so doing they glorified Him better than by obedience, and thus resembling all who allow themselves to break any laws of God by way of furthering His cause. In no such case do we read of a blessing revoked, a gift cancelled, because of its abuse. Yet such retribution, totally unknown in the actions, is frequent in the teaching of Jesus. The servant who would not forgive another was delivered to the tormentors till he should pay what had been frankly forgiven. From him that hath not shall be taken away even that he hath.

If the miracles were a kind of fungus growth from the beliefs of the Church, why did they not conform to the general law which He laid down? How came they to be so finely and accurately consistent with the present position, rather than the abstract principles of Him who shall some day say, "Depart, ye cursed," but who had not yet come to judge? Nor even now has the rule taken full effect.

For the present, endowments of intellect, rank and affluence are not snatched away from one who abuses them, although he may gradually waste them, as one whom Jesus healed, might bring "a worse thing" upon himself than what for the moment he had escaped.

THE DUMB MAN WITH A DEVIL. THE BLIND AND DUMB DEMONIAK.

(Matt. ix. 32, xii. 22.)

These narratives are so closely similar, that if they occurred in different Gospels, it might seem ridiculous to deny their identity.

The first tells us that one was brought to Jesus to have a devil cast out, who was not only "possessed," but also

dumb. When He expelled the devil, it became apparent that He had not merely soothed and calmed a cruel agitation, but had mastered a tyrant by whom the bodily powers had been oppressed, for the dumb man spake. Is it wonderful, on the assumption that such an event once took place, that another sufferer of the same kind, but even more unhappy, since he was blind as well as dumb, should soon afterwards be led to Him? If this more deep affliction also were removed, is it not certain that the crowd would still be amazed, and would ask among themselves, "Is this the Son of David?" What they could not repeat a second time is precisely what they are recorded to have said at first, for now it had been once already "so seen in Israel."

There is, therefore, exactly at the proper place, one significant variation in the accounts. But it was just this feeling that their own attempts at exorcism had been surpassed, that nothing like this had been seen before, which stung the Pharisees to utter their worst of blasphemies, and to explain, by the help of the devil, His superiority over them—who had but the help of God to rely upon! And if the indignant and crushing rebuke of Jesus were spoken on the first occasion, the repetition of this blasphemy would be much more surprising than when we find Him answering only the second attack.

To sum up, it does not seem that the repetition of such an application for help creates the slightest addition to difficulty; while it is almost certain that if we have here two versions of the same story, collision and confusion would arise. But what we actually find is perfect harmony.

It is perfectly open, therefore, to a student who knows how events repeat themselves, without any hard and fast theory of inspiration, certainly without any desire except to look at the facts with candour, to believe that we have here the story of two similar but not identical events.

G. A. CHADWICK.

THE RELATION OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION
TO OUR JUSTIFICATION.

IT has recently been asserted by Prof. Everett, of Harvard, in his *Gospel of Paul* (pp. 199 ff.), as an objection against the doctrine of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, that it does not enable us to recognise an objective effect of Christ's resurrection towards our justification, such as Paul teaches. For, he argues, if it is by Christ bearing the penalty of our sin on the cross that we are forgiven, His rising again may have value as confirming our faith, but cannot be, as Paul declares, for our justification (Rom. iv. 25), or indispensable to our forgiveness (1 Cor. xv. 17). He therefore holds, as if opposed to the generally accepted doctrine, the view, which is also propounded as a new one by M. Ménégos, that the resurrection was of essential importance, because by it Christ was justified, having paid the penalty due to sin; and Dr. Bruce¹ states this view as a new and strange one, a novel and ingenious explanation of the apostle's doctrine, which, though deserving respect, is, he thinks, at fault in several respects.

But the strange thing in all this is, that this view of Christ being justified, and we in Him, by His resurrection, whether it be right or wrong, is, in the first place, not a new theory at all, but one that has been held and fully expounded, both in doctrinal and practical treatises, by some of the best known divines. For instance, Amesius says: "Sententia haec (justificationis) fuit i^o in mente Dei quasi concepta, per decretum justificandi (Gal. iii. 8); ii^o fuit in Christo capite nostro a mortuis jam resurgente pronunciata (2 Cor. v. 19); iii^o virtualiter pronunciatur ex prima illa relatione, quae ex fide ingenerata exurgit (Rom. viii. 1); iv^o expresse pronunciatur per Spiritum Dei testantem spiritibus

¹ See EXPOSITOR, August, 1893, pp. 92-5.

nostris reconciliationem nostram cum Deo (Rom. v. 5).” *Theologiæ Medulla*, Lib. I. cap. xxvii. § 9.¹ Still more distinctly writes Bishop Pearson: “By His death we know that He suffered for sin, by His resurrection we are assured that the sins for which He suffered were not His own; had no man been a sinner, He had not died; had He been a sinner, He had not risen again; but dying for those sins which we committed, He rose from the dead to show that He had made full satisfaction for them, that we believing on Him might obtain remission of our sins, and justification of our persons; ‘God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, for sin, condemned sin in the flesh,’ and raising up our Surety from the prison of the grave, did actually absolve, and apparently acquit, Him from the whole obligation to which He had bound Himself, and in discharging Him acknowledged full satisfaction made for us (Rom. viii. 33, 4).” *Exposition of the Creed*, Art. v. The same view is also taken by Thomas Goodwin in *Christ Set Forth*, (Works, vol. iv.), sermons on Rom. viii. 33, 4; by Bishop Horsley, in his sermon on Rom. iv. 25; and by Principal Candlish, in his *Life in a Risen Saviour*, on 1 Corinthians xv.

Surely a view held by so many theologians of different times and schools is no novelty, but might rather be regarded as a commonplace of divinity. But a second strange thing is, that it should be supposed, as it is by Prof. Everett, that it is at all at variance with the substitutionary view of Christ’s death to ascribe such an effect to His resurrection. For all the writers above cited held that doctrine; and both Bishop Horsley and Dr. Candlish expressly argue in support of it, from the efficacy which Paul ascribes to Christ’s resurrection. This is an instance of the way in which objections to the doctrine generally held

¹ This passage is the more memorable, as it is on it that the statement of the Westminster Confession (ch. xi. § 4) as to the time of justification is modelled.

in the Church proceed from a too narrow and inadequate conception of what it really is. The aspects of the truth as presented in Scripture are manifold, and the great theologians have really endeavoured to do justice to them all; but it is not possible to include every one in a single representation; and if critics fasten upon partial statements without trying to enter into the system of thought as a whole, they are liable to grave errors.

But the more important question remains, whether this view of the effect of Christ's resurrection is really Paul's, and not a notion gratuitously forced upon his words by the ingenuity of expositors. In favour of the former alternative must be reckoned the frequency with which he uses expressions that cannot naturally be otherwise understood. The statement in 1 Corinthians xv. 17, "If Christ hath not been raised, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins," is an express assertion, that His resurrection was indispensable to our forgiveness. For it should be observed, that the word translated "vain" here is not the same as in verse 14 at an earlier stage of the argument. There he used the word *κενή*, empty, *i.e.* hollow, untrue; but here he says *ματαιά*, useless, to no purpose. Though we believe in Christ, yet if He has not been raised from the dead, it will not profit us; we should be still in our sins. Why this is so, Paul does not deem it necessary to explain; but as this forms part of a chain of reasoning, he must have thought it obvious to his readers; and since he had said before that Christ died for our sins, the inference is natural, that His resurrection was needful to show that He had fully atoned for and made an end of them. Again, the words in Romans iv. 25, "who was delivered up for our trespasses, and raised for our justification," express such a close connection, and are so parallel to that of our trespasses with His death, that Meyer's explanation, that the resurrection is the ground of the faith by which we are justified, seems a

very far-fetched one, and that of Horsley preferable, "delivered on account of our trespasses, *i.e.* because we had trespassed, and raised up on account of our justification, *i.e.* because we in Him had been justified, by His atonement for our sins." Thus we can see why, in Romans viii. 34, the resurrection is mentioned, in addition to the death of Christ, as a distinct ground of our freedom from condemnation; and in Romans x. 9 the fact that God has raised Christ from the dead is the object of that faith which is unto righteousness. Further, in 2 Corinthians v. 15 the words, "who for their sakes died and rose again," import that the resurrection was as truly *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν*, on their behalf, as the death of Christ; He was a public person acting for us in both alike. This text has sometimes been alleged to prove that the statement, "He died for them," does not imply substitution: but it implies that representation, which is the ground of what we call substitution, though it is rather vicarious action of the Head for the members. Once more in 1 Timothy iii. 16, Jesus is said to have been "justified in the Spirit"; and if the antithesis is to be understood like that in Romans i. 3, 4, the reference will be to the resurrection. So in Romans viii. 34, the exclamation in the mouth of believers, "It is God that justifieth; who is he that shall condemn?" is taken from the words of the servant of Jehovah in Isaiah l. 8, 9; and in Romans vi. 7, "He that died hath been justified from sin," apply both to Christ and to us. Thus it seems clear, that Paul does really speak of Christ being justified, and our being justified in Him, as well as for His sake (Gal. ii. 17); and the act by which God acquitted Christ and declared Him righteous was His raising Him from the dead on the third day.

Indeed it seems to have been just the resurrection that convinced Paul that Jesus had died for our sins, and that we have forgiveness and acceptance for His sake. For, as

Prof. Everett well says, the cross had been his offence ; he had held Jesus to be accursed, only not merely because of his being hanged on a tree, but because put to death thus by the condemnation of those who were the guardians of God's law and justice. If Jesus was not the Christ, the Son of God, He was justly condemned, and His crucifixion was really the curse of God, and so Paul held it. But when he saw Him risen again, he perceived that God had reversed the judgment of the Sanhedrin against Him, and declared Him innocent. Since then God had delivered Him up to death ; it cannot have been for any sin of His, but, as had been said of the Servant of Jehovah who was to justify many, "He was wounded for our transgressions, bruised for our iniquities." These were the grounds of His death ; and His resurrection proved that these had been done away, and that when we believe in Him our faith is not vain, for we trust in one whom our sins killed, but exhausted their power in doing so, and could not prevent His rising and our salvation in Him.

But it is objected this gives a different sense to justification in the case of Christ and in ours. I cannot see that it does. Justification in every case is acquittal and absolution from guilt ; that is the simple and uniform meaning of the word ; and the difference in the two cases is simply that in the one the guilt is personal, in the other only imputed ; and in the one the acquittal is for the sake of another ; in the other for His own innocence. Even this difference disappears in view of Paul's conception of the believers' oneness with Christ ; He made our guilt His own and died for it, and by His being raised to life He and we in Him are absolved from that guilt for His righteousness' sake. The double meaning of death, too, is only apparent, and due to the difference between the holy Son of God and the sinful children of men. Paul describes the death that is the wages of sin as involving "tribulation and anguish" ; the

endurance of that by impenitent sinners can never cancel guilt, because they are going on in sin ; but the endurance of it by the Holy One of God does cancel the guilt of all who believe in Him ; He died for our sins, as truly bearing their penalty as the finally impenitent shall do ; but He did what no sinner can do, "He died to sin" (Rom. vi. 10), and therefore, having thus died, He was justified from our sin and on our behalf. According to M. Ménégos' view, indeed, that Paul held the death that is due to sin to be simply destruction, there does lurk in the apostle's teaching a double meaning of death ; but that view is far from being self-evident, and it is certainly not necessary to the belief, that he attributed to the resurrection of Christ an objective bearing on our justification. The general Biblical idea of the death that is the wages of sin would seem to be, separation from God ; and though it cannot perhaps be certainly shown that Paul held this view, it is quite consistent with his statements, and would remove any ambiguity in his use of it in this connection.

JAMES S. CANDLISH.

“*THEY CRIED THE MORE.*”

ST. MATT. XX. 31.

ARE our prayers ever obtrusive? Can our insistence be a fault before God? Blind and burdened men, groping in a dark world, cry for the light to Him who makes it, for mercy to the Father of Mercies. They are told that they interrupt the orderliness of the march of things—of religion, of providence. The Lord is on His way from Jericho, having done His work there. Other cities wait for Him. The crowd is in motion. It is a type of the church in its collective movement, as a great organization, militant, impressive. Christ is guiding the course of events, the development of humanity. Should two blind men with their cries be allowed to arrest His advance? Is not their blindness insignificant compared with the purpose the Saviour has in view and the majesty of His progress? The great Christ has great things to do; but it is little to open these blind eyes. Soon they will be closed again in death. Let the men hold their peace. If the Lord passes them by, let them have faith that He is doing the best for the world nevertheless.

But that would not satisfy. There is an insistent personality in man which will not be hushed. If it is an error to be one's self, to seek perfectness for one's self, even in respect of the senses, if the first virtue is to suppress one's self, then God has indeed made us strangely, and Christ should not have answered those men's prayer. One says, “The world is to be redeemed, you tell me. But I am sorely vexed with a devil. If God cares not for me, He is nothing to me.” “Israel is to have its glory through this Jesus of Nazareth, who is the Christ.” “But we are blind,” say the two men; “A Christ who minds us not is no Christ for us.”

They speak truly. Is salvation self-neglect? Is the

great duty of a man to care for the rest, for the whole, to be content to be nothing for the sake of humanity? A man begins really to believe when he asks and trusts God to make him a complete man according to His gracious purpose. If blindness is the defect he feels most, let him cry for sight; and if others rebuke him, let him cry the more. Yet, let him learn while he cries. The two men had not heard Christ proclaiming the salvation of the soul. We have heard. We know that the soul is first in us—not made for the body, but the body made for it. Would we ask the Lord insistently to mend an empty casket, when He offers the jewel?

Let prayer be insistent. Never rebuke prayer. But our prayers must be instructed; each must, like that which was taught verbally by Christ, be a "Lord's prayer." Listen to the sermon on the mount, to the parables of the kingdom, and then pray. Keep in view of the cross while you pray.

The importunity of the blind and the maimed and the leprous is no offence to God; nor should it be an offence to us. The church is not to press on as if it could save humanity without serving individual men. Its movement should be so ordered that the cry of one soul might arrest the advance. Men do not exist for the church, but the church for men. So the Lord taught. He stood still, and called the men, and said, "What will ye that I should do unto you?"

ROBERT A. WATSON.

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